Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sarbjit Kaur vs State Of Punjab And Others on 24 February, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
127
CWP-5749-2026
Date of Decision : 24.02.2026
Sarbjit Kaur .....Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and others ....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present : Mr. Manish Dadwal, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Swapan Shorey, D.A.G., Punjab.
****
NAMIT KUMAR, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this
Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking
issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 14.05.2013
(Annexure P-5), whereby the voluntary retirement from service granted
to the petitioner, vide order dated 17.04.2013 (Annexure P-1), has been
revoked; charge-sheet dated 03.10.2016 (Annexure P-11) served upon
the petitioner by respondent No.2; enquiry report dated 25.04.2018
(Annexure P-19) conducted by respondent No.4; punishment order
dated 29.03.2019 (Annexure P-21) passed by respondent No.2, whereby
the petitioner has been ordered to be removed from the services and
order dated 25.01.2021 (Annexure P-22) passed by respondent No.5,
whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner against the punishment order
dated 29.03.2019 has been dismissed. Further, seeking issuance of a
writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to act upon the order dated
17.04.2013 (Annexure P-1), whereby the request of the petitioner for
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voluntary retirement from services has been accepted and to grant the
petitioner all pensionary benefits along with statutory interest.
2. Brief facts, as have been pleaded in the petition, are that the
husband of the petitioner namely Kulwinder Singh was shot dead by the
terrorists in the month of December, 1990 and the respondent-
department appointed the petitioner as a Clerk on compassionate ground
in the month of April, 1993. In the year 2005, the petitioner got
remarried with one Sukhdeep Singh, who was working in Germany. In
the year 2013, the husband of the petitioner fell seriously ill and the
petitioner submitted an application dated 04.03.2013 seeking voluntary
retirement from service w.e.f. 03.06.2013 in order to take care of her
husband. The said request was accepted by respondent No.2, vide order
dated 17.04.2013 (Annexure P-1). However, the said order was
subsequently revoked by respondent No.2, vide order dated 14.05.2013
(Annexure P-5), on the ground that the petitioner did not fulfill the
criteria for premature retirement as per the Premature Retirement Rules,
1975 as she had neither completed 20 years of regular service nor
attained the age of 50 years. Consequently, the petitioner continued in
service. Thereafter, due to some domestic reason, the petitioner had
applied one month leave with pay w.e.f. 30.03.2015 to 30.04.2015,
which was approved by respondent No.3, vide order dated 20.03.2015
(Annexure P-6). Subsequently, the petitioner submitted a letter dated
27.04.2015 (Annexure P-7) seeking extension of leave for six months
w.e.f. 01.05.2015 to 31.10.2015, which was rejected by respondent
No.3, vide letter dated 14.05.2015 (Annexure P-8), on the ground that
the petitioner was having only 14 days earned leave in her account and
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she was directed to join the duty immediately, failing which she would
be deemed to be absent from duty and the appropriate departmental
action would be taken against her. Since due to critical condition of her
husband, the petitioner had to go abroad, the letter dated 14.05.2015
(Annexure P-8) remained undelivered with the remarks ‘left India’
‘returned to sender’. The department again sent a letter dated
04.08.2015 (Annexure P-9) to the petitioner, however, the same was
also returned with the same remarks. By relying upon the aforesaid
letters and taking into consideration that the petitioner was absent from
duty w.e.f. 01.05.2015, respondent No.3, vide letter dated 28.08.2015
(Annexure P-10) addressed to respondent No.2, recommended
departmental action against the petitioner. Pursuant to the said letter,
chargesheet dated 03.10.2016 (Annexure P-11) was issued to the
petitioner which was not served upon her and at her back, vide order
dated 06.10.2017 (Annexure P-12), passed by respondent No.2, inquiry
officer i.e. respondent No.4 was appointed. A public notice was also
published in the newspaper, whereby the petitioner was asked to appear
before respondent No.4 till 22.11.2017. Since, at that time, the petitioner
was in Germany and she was also having one minor daughter, therefore,
she sent a letter dated 15.11.2017 (Annexure P-14) requesting that she
may be provided one month time for appearance before respondent
No.4. After serving the charge-sheet upon the petitioner at Germany,
vide letter dated 29.08.2017 (Annexure P-15), the petitioner returned to
India on 24.12.2017 and appeared before respondent No.4 on
27.12.2017. The petitioner also went to her office at Jalandhar and gave
joining report dated 16.01.2018 (Annexure P-16), however, she was not
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allowed to join the duty. The enquiry was conducted and respondent
No.4, without considering the explanation submitted by the petitioner,
had proved the charges against her, vide enquiry report dated
25.04.2018 (Annexure P-19). Consequently, vide order dated
29.03.2019 (Annexure P-21), passed by respondent No.2, the petitioner
was ordered to be removed from the service. Aggrieved against the said
order, the petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed by respondent
No.5, vide order dated 25.01.2021 (Annexure P-22). Hence, the instant
petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
had submitted letter dated 27.04.2015 (Annexure P-7) for extension of her
leave w.e.f. 01.05.2015 to 31.10.2015, however, due to critical condition
of her husband, she had to go to Germany and she did not receive letters
dated 14.05.2015 and 04.08.2015 (Annexures P-8 & P-9), whereby she
was directed to join her duty immediately. Even the department issued
charge-sheet dated 03.10.2016 (Annexure P-11) in the absence of the
petitioner. He further submits that when the petitioner came back to India
on 24.12.2017, she appeared before respondent No.4-Enquiry Officer on
27.12.2017, who without considering her reply/explanation, proved
charges against her in his enquiry report dated 25.04.2018 (Annexure P-
19) and on the basis of the said enquiry report, the petitioner was
removed from service, vide order dated 29.03.2019 (Annexure P-21),
passed by respondent No.2. He further submits that against the order of
dismissal, the petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed by
respondent No.5, vide order dated 25.01.2021 (Annexure P-22). He
further submits that once the request of the petitioner seeking voluntary
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retirement from service was accepted by respondent No.2, vide order
dated 17.04.2013 (Annexure P-1), and even the petitioner had completed
the condition for three months notice period by depositing the salary for
the remaining notice period, the petitioner is deemed to have been
voluntary retired w.e.f. 08.05.2013 and she is entitled for grant of all
pensionary benefits and therefore, the order dated 14.05.2013 (Annexure
P-5), passed by respondent No.2, cancelling the order dated 17.04.2013 is
not sustainable in the eyes of law.
4. On receipt of advance copy of the petition, learned State
counsel appears and submits that the present petition is liable to be
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as the petitioner is
seeking quashing of order dated 14.05.2013 (Annexure P-5), whereas
he has approached this Court after a lapse of period of more than 12
years.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant documents.
6. The grievance of the petitioner is that respondent No.2, vide
order dated 14.05.2013 (Annexure P-5) had wrongly revoked his order
dated 17.04.2013 (Annexure P-1), whereby the request of the petitioner
seeking voluntary retirement was accepted. The petitioner is now
seeking quashing of said order dated 14.05.2013 and grant of all
pensionary benefits, after a lapse of period of more than 12 years. The
petitioner is also seeking quashing of order dated 29.03.2019 (Annexure
P-21), whereby he has inflicted the punishment of removal from service
and order dated 25.01.2021 (Annexure P-22), passed by respondent
No.5, whereby an appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of
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dismissal dated 29.03.2019 (Annexure P-21), has been rejected.
Even from the date of passing of the order dated 25.01.2021, a
period of more than 05 years have elapsed. Since there is an undue
and unexplained delay in approaching this Court, therefore, the
instant petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai) A
Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary and
others : 2009 (2) SCT 24, while referring to the issue of delay and
laches, had held as follows:-
“8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of
the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with
the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice
to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is
involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court
as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 769). Of
course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.
9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock
in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurde etc., (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was approved by
this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts, (AIR
1967 SC 1450) and Maharashtra State Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (AIR 1969
Supreme Court 329), Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where
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CWP-5749-2026 7waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a
bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances always important in
such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice
in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates
to the remedy.”
10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of
this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation
with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what
has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a
fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N Bose v. Union
of India (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 470) that no relief can
be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable
explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after
inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself
a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the
intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should
disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed
after inordinate delay.
11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987
Supreme Court 251) that the High Court in exercise of
its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such
delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it
may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party
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rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction.
12. In view of the aforesaid position we are not inclined to
interfere in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.”
8. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of
Uttaranchal and another Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and
others, 2013(12) SCC 179, while considering the issue regarding delay
and laches and referring to earlier judgments on the issue, opined that
repeated representations made will not keep the issues alive. A stale or a
dead issue/dispute cannot be revived even if such a representation has
been decided either by the authority or got decided by getting a
direction from the court as the issue regarding delay and laches is to be
decided with reference to original cause of action and not with reference
to any such order passed. Delay and laches on the part of a government
servant may disentitle him from receiving the benefit that had been
granted to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not be
attracted as it is well established principle that the law favours those
who are alert and vigilant. Even equality has to be claimed at the right
juncture and not on expiry of reasonable time. Even if there is no period
prescribed for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, yet it should be filed within a reasonable time.
Though it is not a strict rule, the courts can always interfere even
subsequent thereto, but relief to a person, who allows things to happen
and then approach the court and puts forward a stale claim and try to
unsettle settled matters, can certainly be refused on account of delay and
laches. Anyone who sleeps over his rights is bound to suffer the
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consequences. An employee who remains dormant like a ‘Rip Van
Winkle’ and awakens from his slumber at his own convenience,
cannot claim relief, as such conduct justifies denial on the ground of
delay and latches. Relevant paragraphs from the aforesaid judgment are
extracted below:
“13. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents could
have challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on the
junior employee at the relevant time. They chose not to do
so for six years and the junior employee held the
promotional post for six years till regular promotion took
place. The submission of the learned counsel for the
respondents is that they had given representations at the
relevant time but the same fell in deaf ears. It is interesting
to note that when the regular selection took place, they
accepted the position solely because the seniority was
maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at the doors of the
tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as noon day that the cause
of action had arisen for assailing the order when the junior
employee was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983. In
C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and another,
2008(4) SCT 604 : (2008) 10 SCC 115, a two-Judge Bench
was dealing with the concept of representations and the
directions issued by the court or tribunal to consider the
representations and the challenge to the said rejection
thereafter. In that context, the court has expressed thus:-
“Every representation to the Government for relief,
may not be replied on merits. Representations
relating to matters which have become stale or
barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground
alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In
regard to representations unrelated to the
Department, the reply may be only to inform that the
matter did not concern the Department or to inform
the appropriate Department. Representations with
incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking
relevant particulars. The replies to such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of
action or revive a stale or dead claim.”
14. xx xx xx xx
15. xx xx xx xx
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16. xx xx xx xx
17. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Ghanshyam
Dass (2) and others, 2011(2) SCT 712 : (2011) 4 SCC 374,
a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated the principle stated in Jagdish Lal Vs. State of
Haryana, 1998(1) SCT 26: (1997) 6 SCC 538 and
proceeded to observe that as the respondents therein
preferred to sleep over their rights and approached the
tribunal in 1997, they would not get the benefit of the order
dated 07.07.1992.
18. In State of T. N. v. Seshachalam, 2007(4) SCT 472 :
(2007) 10 SCC 137, this Court, testing the equality clause
on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of
service benefit, has ruled thus:-
“… filing of representations alone would not save
the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant
factor for a court of law to determine the question as
to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves
consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a
government servant may deprive him of the benefit
which had been given to others. Article 14 of the
Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that
nature, be attracted as it is well known that law
leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.
19. xx xx xx xx
20. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
others, 2007(2) SCT 601 : (2007) 9 SCC 278, the Court
has opined that though there is no period of limitation
provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a writ petition should
be filed within a reasonable time. In the said case the
respondents had filed the writ petition after seventeen
years and the court, as stated earlier, took note of the delay
and laches as relevant factors and set aside the order
passed by the High Court which had exercised the
discretionary jurisdiction.”
9. In a recent judgment by a Division Bench of this Court in
Ram Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others : 2022 (3) SCT 346,
while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for counting of his ad hoc
service, for the purpose of seniority/pension and regularization in
service on completion of 02 years as per policy, held that the petition
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filed by him suffered from gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in
approaching the High Court. In the said judgment, it has been held as
under:-
“10. What we wish to emphasize, in particular, is that
services of the appellant were regularized w.e.f.
01.04.1997. And, he was assigned a specific seniority
position in the cadre. Whereafter, he continued to serve the
department for nearly twenty five years, before attaining
the age of superannuation in January, 2022. Needless to
assert that during all these years, he availed all admissible
benefits, promotions, and retired as Inspector. Thus, it
rather appears that institution of the petition by the
appellant was speculative and an attempt to resurrect a
stale and dead claim. The Supreme Court, in New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors., 2007(9) SCC
278, observed:
“15. There is another aspect of the matter which
cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein filed a
Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate
their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed
herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at
the earliest possible opportunity. They did not
implead themselves as parties even in the reference
made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is
not their case that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited after the cut-
off date have been granted the said scale of pay.
After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions
could not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the Court after a long time. Delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K.
Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman,
U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr.
[2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing
Director and Another v. K. Thangappan and
Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322]”
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11. Similarly, in Jagdish Lal & Ors. Vs. State of
Haryana & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 538, it was held by the
Supreme Court:
“That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the
delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief
under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. It is not
necessary to reiterate all catena of precedents in this
behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellant kept
sleeping over their rights for long and elected to
wake up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal
Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratios…………………
Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to re-
do the seniority had by them in various
cadres/grades though in the same services according
to 1974 Rules or 1980 Rule, are not amenable to
judicial review at this belated stage….”
12. In the wake of the position as sketched out above, we
are dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order and
judgment rendered by the learned single Judge. The appeal
being bereft of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.”
10. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Prem Nath Vs.
State of Punjab : 2018(2) SCT 687, while rejecting the claim of
additional increments on acquisition of higher qualifications has held as
under:-
“3. It is the case set up on behalf of the petitioners that
they had all been appointed before 19.02.1979 and had
even improved/acquired higher qualifications before
19.02.1979 and as such there would be no difference
between the employees working with the Punjab
Government, holding corresponding post and the
employees like the petitioners who have worked for Punjab
Privately Managed Recognised Aided Schools. It is also
the assertion made by counsel representing the petitioners
that their claim would be covered in terms of decision
dated 02.07.2013 rendered by this Court in a bunch of writ
petitions including CWP No.8083 of 1989 titled as Radha
Krishan Narang and others vs. State of Punjab and
others.
4. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at length,
this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the12 of 18
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CWP-5749-2026 13petitioners would not require any consideration on merits
and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole
ground of delay and laches.
5. Placed on record and appended at Annexure P-1 are
the particulars of the petitioners. The tabulation at
Annexure P-1 would show that all the petitioners stand
retired on various dates between the years 1995 to 2012.
Out of 32 petitioners in all, 22 petitioners superannuated
more than 10 years back.
6. There is no justification coming forth as regards the
inordinate delay in having approached the Writ Court.
There is also no explanation put forth by the petitioners as
to why the claim raised in the instant petition was not
agitated by the petitioners while they were in service. The
entire thrust of the submissions advanced by counsel is that
similarly situated employees had approached this Court
and have been granted releif.
7. The issue regarding delay in invoking the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was considered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and another
v. Jaswant Singh and another, 2007(1) SCT 224 :
(2006)11 SCC 464. In such case, certain employees raised
the issue that they were not liable to be retired at the age of
58 years but should be permitted to continue in service till
they attain the age of 60 years. Such employees were still
in service when the writ petitions were filed. The writ
petitions were ultimately allowed. Placing reliance upon
such judgment, some of the employees, who had already
superannuated, filed writ petitions seeking the same
benefit. Even such petitions were allowed by the High
Court in terms of following the earlier judgment. The
judgment of the High Court was challenged before the
Apex Court and wherein while referring to earlier
judgments in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989)2
SCC 356; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, 1998(1) S.C.T.
26 : (1997)6 SCC 538 and Government of West Bengal v.
Tarun K. Roy, 2004(1) SCT 78 : (2004)1 SCC 347, it was
opined that persons who approached the Court at a
belated stage placing reliance upon the order passed in
some other case earlier, can be denied the discretionary
relief on the ground of delay and laches. The relevant
observations made by the Supreme Court are contained in
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Paras 5, 6 and 16 of the judgment and are extracted here
under:-
“5. So far as the principal issue is
concerned, that has been settled by this court.
Therefore, there is no quarrel over the legal
proposition. But the only question is grant of relief to
such other persons who were not vigilant and did not
wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted
the same but filed writ petitions after the judgment of
this court in Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer,
Karmik, 2006(1) SCT 541 : (2005) 13 SCC 300.
Whether they are entitled to same relief or not?
Therefore, a serious question that arises for
consideration is whether the employees who did not
wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted
the same, collected their post-retirement benefits,
can such persons be given the relief in the light of
the subsequent decision delivered by this court?
6. The question of delay and laches has
been examined by this court in a series of decisions
and laches and delay has been considered to be an
important factor in exercise of the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a
person who is not vigilant of his rights and
acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be
heard after a couple of years on the ground that
same relief should be granted to him as was granted
to person similarly situated who was vigilant about
his rights and challenged his retirement which was
said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A
chart has been supplied to us in which it has been
pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by
the employees of the Nigam before their retirement
wherein their retirement was somewhere between
30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were
filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed.
They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate
of writ petitions followed in which employees who
retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006
much after their retirement. Whether such persons
should be granted the same relief or not?
xx xx xx
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16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if
similar relief is to be given to the persons who have
not approached the court that will unnecessarily
overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will
completely collapse with the liability of payment to
these persons in terms of two years’ salary and
increased benefit of pension and other consequential
benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any
relief to the persons who have approached the court
after their retirement. Only those persons who have
filed the writ petitions when they were in service or
who have obtained interim order for their
retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand
to benefit and not others.
(Emphasis Supplied).”
8. The issue of delay was also dealt with by this Court
in Tarsem Pal vs. Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited and others, 2013 (3)SLR 314. In the case of
Tarsem Pal(supra), the petitioner was serving as a Clerk
with the respondent-Corporation and had retired on
31.03.2005. Claim in the writ petition was to grant to him
the benefit of proficiency set up in the pay scale on
completion of 23 years of service from the due date as per
policy of the Corporation. During the service career, he
had not agitated the claim for increments. For the first
time, such claim had been made on 28.02.2005 i.e. just one
month prior to superannuation. While non-suiting the
petitioner on account of delay and laches it was held as
follows:-
“11. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been
clearly laid down that discretionary relief in a writ
jurisdiction is available to a party who is alive of
his rights and enforces the same in court within
reasonable time. The judgment in another case does
not give a cause of action to file a writ petition at a
belated stage seeking the same relief. Such petitions
can be dismissed on account of delay and laches.
As has already been noticed above in the present
case as well, the petitioner joined service in the
year 1965 and retired in the year 2005, but raised
the issue regarding benefit of proficiency step up in
the pay scale on completion of 23 years of service
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CWP-5749-2026 16retirement referring to a judgment of this court and
filed the petition claiming the same relief.
12. The petitioner retired from service on
31.3.2005 and the claim pertaining to the benefit of
proficiency step up, which may be admissible to the
petitioner during his service career, was sought to be
raised more than five years after his retirement, the
claim made at such a late stage deserves to be
dismissed on account of delay and laches only. The
petitioner could raise a grievance about the pay
scales admissible to him or the last pay drawn by
him within a reasonable time after his retirement. He
cannot be permitted to raise the same at any time on
the plea that the same is recurring cause of action.
13. Considering the enunciation of law, as
referred to above, in my opinion, the petitioner
herein is not entitled to the relief prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed merely on account
of delay and laches.”
9. At this stage, counsel appearing for the petitioners
would make an attempt to overcome the obstacle of delay
by placing reliance upon a Full Bench Judgment of this
Court in Saroj Kumar vs. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT
664. Counsel would argue that as per dictum laid down in
Saroj Kumar‘s case(supra), matters of pay fixation involve
a recurring cause of action and as such, writ petitions for
such claim cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches and the Court at the most, may restrict the arrears
upto 38 months from the date of filing of the petition and
disallow the arrears for the period for which even a suit
had become time barred.
10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in
Saroj Kumar‘s case, is wholly misplaced. The observations
and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar‘s case, were in the light
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta vs.
Union of India and others, 1996(1) SCT 8 : 1995(4) RSJ
502. In M.R. Gupta‘s case(supra), it had been
categorically held that so long as an employee “is in
service” a fresh cause of action arises every month when
he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong
calculation made contrary to rules. It was further held that
the claim to be awarded the correct salary on the basis of a
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CWP-5749-2026 17
proper pay fixation “is a right which subsists during the
entire tenure of service”.
11. In the present case, however the petitioners choose
not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much
subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken
up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that
may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated
employees.
12. Considering the dictum of law as laid down in
Chariman, U.P. Jal Nigam‘s case (supra), the petitioners
herein are not entitled to any releif as prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of
delay and laches.
13. Ordered accordingly.”
11. A Division Bench of this Court in H.S. Gill vs Union of
India and others, 2016(2) SCT 477, has held that an employee cannot
claim the revised pay scale after retirement once he has been receiving
the pay scale granted by the employer for the last 09 years. The relevant
portion from the said judgment, reads as under:-
“14. The petitioner is also not entitled to any relief on
account of principle of delay and laches. He has been
receiving the pay in the pay scale of Rs.6500-10500 right
from his transfer to CSIO, Chandigarh i.e. 2.7.2002. For
the first time, he moved the representation on 29.8.2011,
so, he kept mum for about 9 years. Thus, the claim of the
petitioner is highly belated and stale.”
12. In the present case, the request of the petitioner seeking
voluntary retirement was accepted vide order dated 17.04.2013
(Annexure P-1), passed by respondent No.2, however, the said order
was subsequently revoked by respondent No.2, vide order dated
14.05.2013 (Annexure P-5) and thereafter, the petitioner continued her
services with the respondent-department till 30.04.2015 without
challenging or agitating against the order dated 14.05.2013. Now, when
the petitioner has been removed from service, vide order dated
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CWP-5749-2026 18
29.03.2019 (Annexure P-21), passed by respondent No.2 and her appeal
against the dismissal order has also been dismissed by the Appellate
Authority, vide order dated 25.01.2021 (Annexure P-22), the petitioner
has approached this Court challenging the order dated 14.05.2013 after
an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than 12 years. Even, from
the date of dismissal of her appeal, i.e. 25.01.2021, a period of more
than 05 years has elapsed. The law is well settled that equity aids the
vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. Moreover, the
petitioner is now permanently settled in Germany and such belated
invocation of the writ jurisdiction, without furnishing any satisfactory
explanation for the prolonged silence, defeats the very object of
equitable relief and disentitles her from any discretionary relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
13. In view of the abovesaid discussion and the settled legal
position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present petition
is liable to be dismissed on the ground of gross delay and laches.
14. Consequently, the instant petition is dismissed with costs of
Rs.25,000/- to be deposited with the Indian Red Cross Society, U.T.
Branch Chandigarh, SBI New Haryana Secretariat, Sector-17,
Chandigarh, having Account No.44938097476, IFSC-SBIN0010603
within a period of four weeks from today, failing which the same shall
be recovered as arrears of land revenue.
24.02.2026 (NAMIT KUMAR)
Kothiyal JUDGE
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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