Himachal Pradesh High Court
Naveen Kumar vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 2 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2984 of 2025
Reserved on: 24.02.2026
Date of Decision: 02.03.2026
Naveen Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr R.S. Chandel, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking
regular bail in F.I.R. No.10 of 2025 dated 29.03.2025, registered for
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 18 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS Act‘)
at Police Station Khairi, District Chamba, H.P.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2
2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police had set up a nakka on 29.03.2025. They saw the petitioner
carrying a backpack at about 11.25 PM. The petitioner got
frightened after seeing the police and started walking with fast
speed. The police apprehended the petitioner and, on search,
recovered 86 grams of opium from the backpack. The police arrested
the petitioner and seized the opium. As per the result of the analysis,
the sample was found to contain morphine, codeine, thebaine,
papaverine, narcotine and meconic acid. The percentage of
morphine in the exhibit was found to be 2.04% w/w. The police have
filed the charge sheet before the Court. The petitioner had earlier
filed Cr.MP(M) No. 1388 of 2025 and Cr.MP(M) No. 219 of 2025, which
were dismissed vide orders dated 26.11.2025 and 21.07.2025. The
prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, and this constitutes
a change in circumstances. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting
that the police had set up a nakka on 29.03.2025. They saw the
petitioner carrying a backpack at 11:25 p.m. The petitioner got
3
frightened after seeing the police and started walking briskly. The
police became suspicious and called him; however, the petitioner
continued to walk. The police apprehended him and searched the
backpack in the presence of Nikku Ram, an independent witness. The
police recovered 86 grams of opium from the backpack. The
petitioner identified himself as Naveen Kumar. The police arrested
the petitioner and seized the opium. The opium was sent to SFSL
Junga, and as per the result of analysis, Morphine, Codeine, Thebaine,
Papaverine, Narcotine and Meconic acid were found in it, which are
active constituents of opium (coagulated juice of opium poppy). The
percentage of morphine in the exhibit was found to be 2.04% w/w.
The police prepared the final report and submitted it before the
Court. The police have cited 21 witnesses. Three witnesses have been
examined, and the matter was listed for examination of PWs 9 and 11
on 26.02.2026. FIR Nos. 54 of 2023, 21 of 2024, 38 of 2024 and 149 of
2024 are pending against the petitioner. The petitioner has
committed a heinous crime, and there is every possibility of his
conviction. He would indulge in the commission of similar offences in
case of his release on bail. The consumption of narcotics is adversely
4
affecting the young generation of society, and no leniency should be
shown to the petitioner. The petitioner would abscond in case of his
release on bail. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
4. I have heard Mr R.S. Chandel, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State.
5. Mr R.S. Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely
implicated. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence
despite the lapse of about one year. The matter is listed for
recording the statements of only two witnesses, which shows that the
trial is not likely to be completed expeditiously, and this violates the
petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the State, submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed
two bail petitions, which were dismissed by this Court. The
subsequent bail petition only lies on the change in circumstances.
5
The petitioner has failed to make out any case of change in
circumstances, and the petitioner is not entitled to bail; hence, he
prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed two
bail petitions before this Court, which were registered as Cr.MP(M)
No. 219 of 2025 and Cr.MP(M) No. 1388 of 2025 and were dismissed
on 21.07.2025 and 26.11.2025. It was held in the State of
Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605,
that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail
application can only be considered if there is a change of
circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of
granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier
decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And
when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has
a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic
changes, which are of little or no consequence. ‘Between the two
orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody’s case
that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place,
necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial
discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned
order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders,
6including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days
before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact
situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and
circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by
a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the
litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected
another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.
9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh
Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail
application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection
of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent
bail application should be allowed. It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider
the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the
grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected
and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that
bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give
specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the
subsequent bail application should be granted.”
10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied
bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was
unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without
there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh
application should not have been dealt with within a short
span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a
tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata
7are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing
of bail applications without there being any change of
circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”
11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v.
State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed:
“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused
has a right to make successive applications for the grant of
bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications
has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the
earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court
also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it
to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier
applications.”
12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail
application can be filed if there is a material change in circumstances,
which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail
applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a
material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing
subsequent bail applications is a material change in
circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by
law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the
earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding
has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has
no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that
successive bail application needs to be decided by the same
Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There
needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider
8the application and a person’s right based on a material
change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance
creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a
fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a
subsequent application operates in a completely different
sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is
based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle
that if successive bail applications on the same subject are
permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would
be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every
Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the
credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side
being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court’s time
and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be
placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The
satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be
adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the
application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate
whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the
applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail
application.”
13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be
considered on the basis of the change in circumstances, and it is not
permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
14. The status report shows that the petitioner was found in
possession of 86 grams of opium, which is an intermediate quantity;
hence, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the
present case. The notification of the Central Government specifies
the commercial quantity of opium as 2.5 kilograms, and if the
9
principle of proportionality is applied, the petitioner has undergone a
substantial part of the imprisonment that can be awarded to him in
case of his conviction.
15. The status report mentions that the prosecution has cited
21 witnesses, out of whom only three witnesses have been examined.
The matter was listed for examination of PW-9 and PW-12 on
26.02.2026. This shows that the learned Trial Court has not
summoned all the witnesses for recording of their statements, but it
is recording the statements of prosecution witnesses in piecemeal,
which is contrary to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman
Ali, SLP (Criminal) No. 969 of 2025, decided on 22.09.2025. This
corroborates the petitioner’s apprehension that the learned Trial
Court is not likely to conclude the evidence at the earliest.
16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813: 2024
SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting agency
including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to provide the
right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should not be opposed on
10
the ground that crime committed is serious. It was observed at page
820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the court
concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State
or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea
for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious.
Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature
of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent
until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, however
stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded, the
right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to
have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.
17. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127 that
the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused. It was
observed at page 298:
“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948, assures that:
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
11attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights
in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time….”
And in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the
use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution
in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract these
paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp. 638-39,
paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as
an essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the
actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent
incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the
stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result
from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the
time of the commission of the offence till it
12
consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this
context, it may be noted that the constitutional
guarantee of a speedy trial is properly reflected in
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing with
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed thus:
(SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably
quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just”
and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore,
be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we
mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
enshrined in Article 21. The question which would,
however, arise is as to what would be the consequence
if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial
and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by
imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in
violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.
Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally,
freed from the charge levelled against him on the
ground that trying him after an unduly long period of
time and convicting him after such a trial would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right under
Article 21?”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being
present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in
departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court on
numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]
underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article
21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all
13
stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and
retrial; that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and
explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing
test to determine whether this right had been denied in the
particular case before it.”
18. It was held in Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of
India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be
kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant
some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their
personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any
prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future.
Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation
needs to be safeguarded, looking to the nature of the offences
these undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate
justification for such deprivation of liberty pending trial can
only be their being found guilty of the offences for which they
have been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived
at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes necessary.”
19. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri)
560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be subjected to
unending detention pending trial. It was observed at page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been
urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation of
bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an indefinite
14foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not necessary to dwell
upon the wealth of case law which, regardless of the stringent
provisions in a penal law or the gravity of the offence, has time
and again recognised the legitimacy of seeking liberty from
incarceration. To put it differently, no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial, especially when
the law presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even
where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such
as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967,
this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably long
period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason, such
stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be measured
over and above the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution (see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
20. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy
trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is
curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: –
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to
secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion (like
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this Court has
upheld them for conflating two competing values i.e. the right
of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the presumption of
innocence, and societal interest — as observed in Vaman
Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman Narain
Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri)
745: (2008) 17 SCR 369] (“the concept of bail emerges from the
conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who
is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of
15innocence in favour of the alleged criminal….”). They are, at the
same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is concluded
expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State
of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569:
1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375] made observations to this
effect. In the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of
India [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court
expressed the same sentiment, namely, that when stringent
provisions are enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and
restricting judicial discretion, it is on the basis that
investigation and trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court
said that parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen
Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996)
2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624,
para 17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal liberty
of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting the
community and the nation against terrorist and disruptive
activities or other activities harmful to society, it is all the
more necessary that investigation of such crimes is done
efficiently and an adequate number of Designated Courts
are set up to bring to book persons accused of such serious
crimes. This is the only way in which society can be
protected against harmful activities. This would also ensure
that persons ultimately found innocent are not
unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”
21. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial detention
and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178:
“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws
which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail may be
necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded
16in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is
immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living
conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to
the Union Home Ministry’s response to Parliament, the
National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-12-
2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against a
total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [ National
Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI-2021/Executive_ncrb
_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these, 1,22,852 were convicts; the
rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are at
risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the Kerala High
Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict
Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242] as
“a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC OnLine
Ker para 13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses
personal possessions. He has no personal relationships.
Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status,
possessions, dignity and autonomy of personal life. The
inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The
prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-
perception changes.”
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime,
“as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the
crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [ Working Papers –
Group on Prisons & Borstals – 1966 U.K.] (also see Donald
Clemmer’s “The Prison Community” published in 1940 [ Donald
Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald
Clemmer’s Concept of Prisonisation”, available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Sobec
ki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ). Incarceration has
further deleterious effects, where the accused belongs to the
17
weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in
several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family
bonds and alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have
to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an
acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure
that trials–especially in cases where special laws enact
stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded speedily.”
22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of the
offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article 21 of
the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in the conclusion of
the trial entitles the accused to the grant of bail. It was observed at
page 817: –
“10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC
81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right to
speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in
the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by
this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21
is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and
just”, it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or
just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for
determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure
which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul
of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
18fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.
The question which would, however, arise is as to what
would be the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be
deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a
long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State
of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671:
1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225:
1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the
right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused, facing
a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman Antulay
case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225:
1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84)“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus,
the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case
may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable
promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large
majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections
of society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not
often get competent legal advice, the application of the said
rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an
accused demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given
one, it may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot
disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of
his right to a speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask
for or insist upon a speedy trial.”
23. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed:
19
7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried trial
is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to prepare
for the defence, an inordinate delay in the conclusion of the
trial would infringe the right of an accused guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The
Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines
while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
24. It was held in Athar Parwez v. Union of India, (2024) 20
SCC 57: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762 that long incarceration and the
delay in the conclusion of the trial will entitle the accused to bail. It
was observed at page 63:
19. Long incarceration and the unlikely likelihood of the trial
being completed in the near future have also been taken as a
ground for exercising its constitutional role by the constitu-
tional courts to grant bail on violation of Article 21 of the Con-
stitution of India, which guarantees trial to be concluded
within a reasonable time. Gross delay in conclusion of the trial
would justify such invocation, leading to a conclusion of viola-
tion of Part III of the Constitution of India, which may be taken
as a ground to release an undertrial on bail.
*****
20
21. At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to be appre-
ciated and followed by the courts. Keeping the statutory provi-
sions in mind, but with the passage of time, the effect of that
statutory provision would, in fact, have to be diluted, giving
way to the mandate of Part III of the Constitution, where the
accused, as of now, is not a convict and is facing the charges.
Constitutional right of speedy trial in such circumstances will
have precedence over the bar/strict provisions of the statute
and cannot be made the sole reason for denial of bail. There-
fore, the period of incarceration of an accused could also be a
relevant factor to be considered by the constitutional courts,
not to be merely governed by the statutory provisions.
25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tapas
Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 that the
accused has a right to an expeditious trial. It was observed:
10. However, many times we have made ourselves very clear
that, howsoever serious a crime may be, the accused has a
fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of
the Constitution.
26. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the
violation of his right to a speedy trial.
27. It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he is not entitled to bail on this consideration. This
submission will not help the State. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3763: 2024:INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents may not be a
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reason to deny bail to the accused in case of long incarceration. It was
observed:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for
bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a
strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation
and period of incarceration, the presence of antecedents may
not be a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where a
Court can grant bail only on the grounds of long
incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not be
relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant
default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are
irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar
facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the existence
of the antecedents.”
28. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and
the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of
₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of
the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the
following terms and conditions: –
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will
he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever;
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments;
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing the
address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the
Police Station concerned and the Trial Court;
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(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the
Court; and(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social
media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide
by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court
through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case
of any change in the mobile number or social media
accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court
within five days from the date of the change.
29. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any
of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a
petition for cancellation of the bail.
30. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this
order be sent to the District Open Jail, Rajpura Chamba, District
Chamba, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
31. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the
case’s merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
02 March, 2026.
(jai)
Digitally signed
by JAI
JAI PRAKASH
PRAKASH Date:
2026.03.03
10:56:28 +0530