Delhi High Court – Orders
Harsh Rekha Jain vs Shri Neeraj Jain on 25 February, 2026
$~13
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CS(OS) 285/2024, I.A. 7960/2024, I.A. 6665/2025, I.A. 12886/2025,
I.A. 12887/2025 & O.A. 189/2025
HARSH REKHA JAIN .....Plaintiff
Through: Ms. Samvedna Verma, Adv.
Mob: 9873600464
Email: [email protected]
versus
SHRI NEERAJ JAIN .....Defendant
Through: Mr. Karan Bidhuri, Adv.
Mob: 9711537925
Email:
[email protected]
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
ORDER
% 25.02.2026
O.A. 189/2025
1. The present chamber appeal has been filed under Rule 5 Chapter II of
the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, read with Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC“), challenging the order dated 16th
September, 2025, passed by the learned Joint Registrar, wherein, the delay
in filing the written statement of the defendant was not condoned, and the
written statement was taken off the record.
2. As per the facts on record, the defendant was served by the Registry
of this Court through E-mail on 03rd May, 2024. The written statement was
filed by the defendant on 13th September, 2024, with a delay of One
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Hundred Thirty-Three (133) days from the date of service through E-mail.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant submits that
the period of filing the written statement ought to be calculated from 20th
May, 2025, as that is the day, when the defendant came across the E-mail
dated 03rd May, 2024, and the defendant gained knowledge about the suit
pending before this Court.
4. At this stage, it would be prudent to reproduce the impugned order,
i.e., order dated 16th September, 2025, passed by the learned Joint Registrar
(Judicial), wherein, it was held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
6. Perusal of record shows that summons of the suit was issued to the
defendant and the same was served upon the defendant through e-mail
on 03.05.2024. Further perusal of record shows that the defendant
has entered appearance in this case through his counsel on
21.05.2024. Written statement filed on behalf of the defendant vide
diary no.3790563/2024 dated 13.09.2024 was returned under
objection. Thereafter, the defendant again filed the written statement
vide diary no.5505679/24 dated 26.11.2024 but the same again
returned under objection. Written statement of the defendant is still
lying under objection.
7. The defendant was served through e-mail sent by the Registry on
03.05.2024 along with the attachment. The submission of defendant
that copy of the plaint was supplied to counsel for defendant on
21.05.2025 is not tenable as the Registry sent attachment of the paper
book with the e-mail. Perusal of record shows that the defendant has
failed to file the written statement even within the extended period of
120 days and even thereafter, the defendant failed to remove the
objections within the prescribed period. Accordingly, the captioned
IAs are dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx”
5. The present suit would be governed by the Delhi High Court (Original
Side) Rules, 2018, wherein, as per Chapter VII Rule 2, the time for filing of
the written statement is to be counted from the date of service of the
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summons. Rule 2 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side)
Rules, 2018, reads as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
2. Procedure when defendant appears- If the defendant appears
personally or through an Advocate before or on the day fixed for his
appearance in the writ of summons;-
(i) where the summons is for appearance and for filing written
statement, the written statement shall not be taken on record, unless
filed within 30 days of the date of such service or within the time
provided by these Rules, the Code or the Commercial Courts Act, as
applicable. An advance copy of the written statement, together with
legible copies of all documents in possession and power of defendant,
shall be served on plaintiff, and the written statement together with
said documents shall not be accepted by the Registry, unless it
contains an endorsement of service signed by such party or his
Advocate.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
6. Further, Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original
Side) Rules, 2018, clearly stipulates that the written statement has to be filed
within a period of thirty (30) days of receipt of summons and the Court on
being shown sufficient cause can extend the time for filing of the written
statement for a further period not exceeding ninety (90) days, but not
thereafter. Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side)
Rules, 2018, reads as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
4. Extension of time for filing written statement-If the Court is
satisfied that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause for
exceptional and unavoidable reasons in filing the written statement
within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the same by a
further period not exceeding 90 days, but not thereafter. For such
extension of time, the party in delay shall be burdened with costs as
deemed appropriate. The written statement shall not be taken on
record unless such costs have been paid/deposited. In case the
defendant fails to file the affidavit of admission/denial of documents
filed by the plaintiff, the documents filed by the plaintiff shall bePage 3 of 12
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deemed to be admitted. In case, no written statement is filed within
the extended time also, the Registrar may pass orders for closing the
right to file the written statement.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
7. Reading of the aforesaid Rule makes it apparent that the written
statement has to be filed within the outer limit of One Hundred Twenty
(120) days from the service of the summons. The Court can condone delays
beyond thirty (30) days only for a further period not exceeding ninety (90)
days, i.e., the Court has the authority and power to condone delay in filing of
written statement, which has been filed within the outer limit of 120 days,
with the caveat that sufficient cause has been shown by the defendant for not
filing within the period of 30 days.
8. The usage of the words, ‘but not thereafter’ in Rule 4 of Chapter VII
of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 clearly shows that this
Court does not have any power to condone the delay in filing the written
statement beyond the period of One Hundred Twenty (120) days. The
Supreme Court in the case of P. Radha Bai and Others Versus P. Ashok
Kumar and Another, (2019) 13 SCC 445, while interpreting the words, ‘but
not thereafter’, held as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
32.4. The limitation provision in Section 34(3) also provides for
condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay
can only be condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient cause. The
crucial phrase ‘but not thereafter’ reveals the legislative intent to fix
an outer boundary period for challenging an award.
xxx xxx xxx
33.2. The proviso to Section 34(3) enables a court to entertain an
application to challenge an award after the three months’ period is
expired, but only within an additional period of thirty dates, “but not
thereafter”. The use of the phrase “but not thereafter” shows that
the 120 days’ period is the outer boundary for challenging an award.
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If Section 17 were to be applied, the outer boundary for challenging
an award could go beyond 120 days. The phrase “but not thereafter”
would be rendered redundant and otiose. This Court has consistently
taken this view that the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso of
Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act are of a mandatory nature, and
couched in negative terms, which leaves no room for doubt. (State of
H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers [State of H.P. v. Himachal
Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 605]
, Assam Urban Water Supply & SewerageBoard v. Subash Projects &
Mktg. Ltd. [Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash
Projects & Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831]
and Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai
Patel [Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel,
(2018) 15 SCC 178 : (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 141] .)
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
9. In this regard, reference may also be made to the case of Manhar
Sabharwal Versus High Court of Delhi and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine Del
5945, wherein the Division Bench of this Court, settled the principles with
respect to filing of written statements and the period of limitation thereof,
whilst interpreting the words, ‘but not thereafter’, in the following manner:
“xxx xxx xxx
10. In Chapter VII, Rule 4 of the DHC Original Side Rules, the
phrase ‘but not thereafter’ is used, to stipulate that the period of
filing written statement may be extended beyond the period of thirty
days, for a further period not exceeding ninety days, but not
thereafter. The phrase ‘but not thereafter’, as used in various
Legislations, and interpretation of the said phrase, as given in various
judgments, have been dealt with by the Division Bench of this Court in
the case of Ram Sarup Lugani Versus Nirmal Lugani, wherein, it
has been held, as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
15. This is not the first time that the phrase, “but not thereafter”
have been used in the statute. The said preemptory words have been
used in other provisions that have come up for interpretation before
the Supreme Court. In Union of India v. Popular Construction
Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470, the words “but not thereafter” were used in
relation to the power of the court to condone the delay in challenging
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the award beyond the period prescribed under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Concilliation Act, 1996 and the Supreme Court
observed as below:–
“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the
proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would
amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the
application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go
further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set
aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso,
would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No
principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a
court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application
for setting aside such award “in accordance with” subsection (2) and
sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an
award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed
beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not
be an application “in accordance with” that sub-
section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the
court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period
prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is
emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that
“where the time for making an application to set aside the
arbitral award under Section 34 has expired … the award shall be
enforced under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 in the same
manner as if it were a decree of the court”.
This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration
Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award
expired, the court was required to “proceed to pronounce judgment
according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a
decree shall follow” (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time
expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes
immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there
were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in
Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in
favour of curtailment of the court’s powers by the exclusion of the
operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”
16. In Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise,
Jamshedpur, (2008) 3 SCC 70, on interpreting Section 35 of the
Central Excise Act, which contains similar provisions, the Supreme
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Court has observed as under:
“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise(appeals) as also the
Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to
condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the
statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be
accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the Limitation
Act“) can be available for condonation of delay. The first proviso
to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be
preferred within three months from the date of communication to
him of the decision of order. However, if the Commissioner is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from
presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he
can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In
other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed
within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days time can
be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The
proviso to sub-section(1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal
clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal
to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used
makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate
authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30
days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for
preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section
5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were
therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the
delay after the expiry of 30 days’ period.”
17. After referring to the above decision, in Commissioner of
Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited, (2009) 5
SCC 791, the Supreme Court went on to observe as under:
“30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to
Chapter VI-A of the Act which provides for appeals and revisions to
various authorities. Though Parliament has specifically provided an
additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the
Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is
sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.
Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by the
Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an
appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and reference
application to the High Court under Section 35-H, Parliament has
provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal
and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act.
XXXXPage 7 of 12
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32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B,
35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and
reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only
from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other
words, the language used in other provisions makes the position
clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to
entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after
expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for
preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the
delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there
is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High
Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to
condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.
XXXX
35. It was contended before us that the words “expressly excluded”
would mean that there must be an express reference made in the
special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act
of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to
see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the
Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is
such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself
which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on
an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the
benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement
the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a
case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to
what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the
subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the
Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the
Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act
relating to filing of reference application to the High Court.”
xxx xxx xxx
19. In P. Radhabai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445,
while construing the phrase, “but not thereafter” used in the proviso
to sub section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Concilliation
Act, the Supreme Court held thus:
“32.4. The limitation provision in Section 34(3) also provides
Page 8 of 12
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for condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the
delay can only be condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient
cause. The crucial phrase “but not thereafter” reveals the
legislative intent to fix an outer boundary period for challenging
an award.
XXXX
33.2. The proviso to Section 34(3) enables a court to entertain
an application to challenge an award after the three months’ period
is expired, but only within an additional period of thirty dates, “but
not thereafter”. The use of the phrase “but not thereafter” shows
that the 120 days’ period is the outer boundary for challenging an
award. If Section 17 were to be applied, the outer boundary for
challenging an award could go beyond 120 days. The phrase “but
not thereafter” would be rendered redundant and otiose. This
Court has consistently taken this view that the words “but not
thereafter” in the proviso of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act
are of a mandatory nature, and couched in negative terms, which
leaves no room for doubt. (State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno
Engineers [State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12
SCC 210 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 605], Assam Urban Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd. [Assam Urban
Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg.
Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831] and Anilkumar
Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel [Anilkumar Jinabhai
Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178 : (2019) 1
SCC (Civ) 141].)
34. In our view, the aforesaid inconsistencies with the language of
Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act tantamount to an “express
exclusion” of Section 17 of the Limitation Act.”
xxx xxx xxx
21. A conspectus of the decisions referred to above leaves no
manner of doubt that where ever the phrase “but not thereafter” has
been used in a provision for setting a deadline, the intention of the
legislature is to treat the same as a preemptory provision. Thus, if
Rule 15 of the DHC Rules mandates filing of a replication within a
period of 30 days reckoned from the date of receipt of the written
statement, with an additional period of 15 days provided and that too
only if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has been able to
demonstrate that it was prevented to do so by sufficient cause or for
exceptional and unavoidable reasons, can the time for filing the
replication be extended for a further period not exceeding 15 days in
any event, with costs imposed on the plaintiff. The critical phrase “but
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not thereafter” used in Rule 15 must be understood to mean that even
the court cannot extend the period for filing the replication beyond the
outer limit of 45 days provided in the DHC Rules. Upon expiry of the
said period, the plaintiff’s right to file the replication would stand
extinguished. Any other meaning sought to be bestowed on the above
provision, would make the words “but not thereafter”,
inconsequential.
xxx xxx xxx
31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that in case of
any inconsistency, the provisions of the Delhi High Court (Original
Side) Rules, 2018 will prevail over the Civil Procedure Code. The
inherent powers contemplated in Rule 16 are not to be exercised to
overcome the period of limitation expressly prescribed in Rule 5 for
filing the replication. Nor can Rule 5 be circumvented by invoking any
other provision or even the inherent powers of the court, contrary to
the scheme of the Rules. The phrase, “but not thereafter” used in
Rule 5 makes it crystal clear that the Rule is mandatory in nature
and the court cannot permit the replication to be taken on the record
after the plaintiff has exhausted the maximum prescribed period of
45 days. Any other interpretation will result in causing violence to
the DHC Rules.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. Thus, it is manifest that the phrase ‘but not thereafter’, provides
for an action, which is mandatory in nature.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
10. The said principle was again reiterated by the Division of Bench of
this Court in the case of Delhi Gymkhana Club Limited Versus Col. Ashish
Khanna Sm Retd and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7022, wherein, it was
held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
21. The purpose of fixing an outer time limit under Rule 4 of
Chapter VII of the DHC Original Side Rules for filing the written
statement is to ensure that the delay in filing of written statement
does not lead to further delay in adjudication of civil suits. The
validity of this Rule having been upheld by the Division Bench
in Manhar Sabharwal (supra), the said Rule becomes mandatorilyPage 10 of 12
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applicable to all suits including non-commercial suits before the
Delhi High Court (Original Side). Accordingly, the Court can only
extend the period of 30 days for filing of written statement by further
90 days, but not beyond the period of 120 days in total in the opinion
of this Court. The language of Rule 4, Chapter VII of the Delhi
High Court (Original Side) is clear when it uses the term ‘not
thereafter’, as is seen from the text extracted above.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. Further, this Court notes that the defendant is a Non-Resident Indian
(“NRI”), residing in Dubai, as per the averments made by the defendant. The
defendant is a working professional, residing in Dubai. Therefore, the plea
of the defendant that the defendant did not see the E-mail on 03rd May, 2024
and saw it only on 20th May, 2024, is not acceptable.
12. Even otherwise, the aforesaid Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules,
2018, are very categorical to the extent of counting the period of filing of the
written statement from the date of service of summons, which in this case
would be the same as the date of receipt of summons of the Email dated 03rd
May, 2024, therefore, the period of limitation for filing of the written
statement is not to be calculated from the date of any purported knowledge.
Furthermore, nothing has been brought on record by the appellant/defendant
to show that they did not have the knowledge of the E-mail, and only
averments are made in that regard. Therefore, the plea of the defendant in
that regard, is liable to be rejected.
13. This Court finds no error in the aforesaid order passed by learned
Joint Registrar (Judicial), in view of the detailed discussion hereinabove.
14. No merit is found in the present appeal.
15. The present appeal filed on behalf of the defendant is accordingly
dismissed.
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CS(OS) 285/2024
16. The written statement filed on behalf of the defendant has been
returned under objection and the same cannot be taken on record, having
been filed beyond the period of limitation.
17. Accordingly, admission/denial of documents has to be carried out, by
the defendant only of the plaintiff documents.
18. List before the Joint Registrar (Judicial) on 16th March, 2026.
19. List before the Court on 10th April, 2026.
MINI PUSHKARNA, J
FEBRUARY 25, 2026/SK
Page 12 of 12
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