inkinccorporation@gmail.com Madhya Pradesh High Court
Hemant Batham vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 26 February, 2026
Author: Anand Pathak
Bench: Anand Pathak, Anil Verma
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND PATHAK
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL VERMA
WRIT APPEAL NO. 450 of 2026
MAHENDRA SINGH BATHAM
Vs.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
&
WRIT APPEAL NO. 456 of 2026
HEMANT BATHAM
Vs.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
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APPEARANCE:
Shri Yash Sharma - Advocate for the appellant in
W.A.No.450/2026 and Shri Anand Bhardwaj - Advocate for the
appellant in W.A.No.456/2026.
Shri Vivek Khedkar - Additional Advocate General for the
respondents/State.
JUDGMENT
(Delivered on 26th the day of February, 2026)
Per: Justice Anand Pathak
1. Regard being had to similitude of the dispute and since common
question is involved in both the writ appeals, therefore, they are
being heard analogously and decided by this common judgment. For
factual clarity, facts of Writ Appeal No.450/2026 are taken into
consideration.
2. The present writ appeal (Writ Appeal No.450/2026) under Section 2
(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyyaypeeth
Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 is preferred by the appellant being
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crestfallen by the order dated 28-01-2026 passed by learned Single
Judge in writ petition No.30183/2025 (although wrongly the order
passed in W.P.No.30444/2025 is filed) whereby the writ petition
preferred by the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner)
has been dismissed.
3. Matter pertains to validity/invalidity of caste certificate. The SDO,
Gwalior issued a caste certificate, certifying that petitioner belongs to
Manjhi caste (Scheduled Tribe). On the strength of that caste
certificate, petitioner was appointed as Pharmacist Grade -II in Public
Health and Family Welfare Department at Shivpuri vide order dated
16-03-2016 against a vacancy reserved for the Scheduled Tribe
category. In the appointment process, all educational testimonials as
well as the caste certificate of the petitioner were allegedly verified
by the competent authorities. However, on the basis of complaint
made by one Gaurishankar Rajput, matter was enquired into and FIR
at crime No.07/2025 for offence under Sections 420, 468, 471 and
120-B of IPC was registered against the petitioner and thereafter vide
notice dated 15-07-2025 petitioner was asked to produce all the
documents having material bearing in the matter. From time to time,
General Administration Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh
issued instructions governing the verification of social status of
candidates belonging to the Manjhi community. Registration of
aforesaid FIR was called in question by the petitioner before learned
Writ Court but the same was dismissed, therefore, the present appeal.
4. It is the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that matter
involves validity of the caste certificate of the petitioner. According
to counsel for the petitioner, it is well settled law, after the judgment
of Apex Court in the case of Madhuri Patil Vs. Addl.
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Commissioner, reported in AIR 1995 SC 94 that all the disputes in
relation to caste certificates, will be the domain of High Power Caste
Scrutiny Committee. Therefore, if respondents have any doubt in
relation to petitioner belonging to Manjhi caste, then they should
refer the matter to the Caste Scrutiny Committee. It is further
submitted that earlier petitioner preferred writ petition bearing
No.13536/2024 challenging the orders of respondents dated 26-02-
2024 and 28-02-2024 by which petitioner was stopped to discharge
his duties. Said writ petition was allowed, setting aside both the
orders and direction was given to the respondents to permit the
petitioner to discharge his duties. Another writ petition bearing
No.254/2025 was also preferred by the petitioner seeking the relief
that his matter be referred to the Caste Scrutiny Committee for its
decision, which was allowed but still petitioner is facing the wrath of
criminal prosecution.
5. When learned counsel for the petitioner further raised arguments then
at the outset, learned counsel for the respondents/State opposed the
prayer on the ground of maintainability of appeal. According to him,
although petition was preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution
but the relief was akin to the relief which is claimed under Section
482 of Cr.P.C., therefore, against the said order, writ appeal is not
maintainable.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. Petitioner preferred the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India and sought the following reliefs:
“(i) That, the impugned F.I.R. Registered at Crime
No.07/2025 for the offences registered under sections 420,
468, 471 and 120-B of IPC contained in Annexure –P/1 in
4relation to the petitioner may kindly be quashed so also quash
the notice Annexure — P/2 issued to the petitioner, in the
interest of justice.
(ii) That, this Hon’ble Court be further kind enough to direct
the respondents not to take any coercive action against the
petitioner until and unless the matter is referred to the High
Power Committee with regard to the validity of the caste
certificate issued to the petitioner, in the interest of justice.
(iii) That, any other just, suitable and proper relief which this
Hon’ble Court deems fit looking to the facts and
circumstances of the case in favour of the petitioner including
the costs throughout may also be granted.”
8. Once a petition in the nature of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is preferred
and decided by learned Single Judge, then even if it is a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution, the question of maintainability
gains ground. Such appeal at the instance of petitioner who availed
the remedy effectively under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (even in the garb
of writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution) is not
maintainable.
9. We can profitably rely upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case
of Ram Kishan Fauji Vs. State of Haryana and others, (2017) 5
SCC 533 wherein some what, similar question arose for
consideration before the Apex Court. The question was regarding
maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against the order
passed by learned Single Judge while exercising criminal jurisdiction.
Apex Court held in following manner:
“28. The Court in Ishwarlal Bhagwandas case referred to
Article 133 of the Constitution and took note of the submission
5that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court as regards
the grant of certificate pertains to judgment, decree or final
order of a High Court in a civil proceeding and that “civil
proceeding” only means a proceeding in the nature of or
triable as a civil suit and a petition for the issue of a high
prerogative writ by the High Court was not such a proceeding.
Additionally, it was urged that even if the proceeding for issue
of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution may, in certain
cases, be treated as a civil proceeding, it cannot be so treated
when the party aggrieved seeks relief against the levy of tax or
revenue claimed to be due to the State. The Court, delving into
the nature of civil proceedings, noted that :
“8. … The expression “civil proceeding” is not defined in
the Constitution, nor in the General Clauses Act. The
expression in our judgment covers all proceedings in which
a party asserts the existence of a civil right conferred by the
civil law or by statute, and claims relief for breach thereof.”
29. After so stating, the Court elucidated the nature of
criminal proceeding and, in that regard, ruled thus:
“8. … A criminal proceeding on the other hand is ordinarily
one in which if carried to its conclusion it may result in the
imposition of sentences such as death, imprisonment, fine or
forfeiture of property. It also includes proceedings in which
in the larger interest of the State, orders to prevent
apprehended breach of the peace, orders to bind down
persons who are a danger to the maintenance of peace and
order, or orders aimed at preventing vagrancy are
contemplated to be passed.”
30. Explicating the concept further, the Court opined that:
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(Ishwarlal Bhagwandas case)
“8. … The character of the proceeding, in our judgment,
depends not upon the nature of the tribunal which is
invested with authority to grant relief, but upon the nature
of the right violated and the appropriate relief which may
be claimed.”
It further held that a civil proceeding is, therefore, one
in which a person seeks to enforce by appropriate relief the
alleged infringement of his civil rights against another person
or the State, and which, if the claim is proved, would result in
the declaration, express or implied, of the right claimed and
relief such as payment of debt, damages, compensation,
delivery of specific property, enforcement of personal rights,
determination of status, etc.
31. The aforesaid authority makes a clear distinction between
a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. As far as
criminal proceeding is concerned, it clearly stipulates that a
criminal proceeding is ordinarily one which, if carried to its
conclusion, may result in imposition of (i) sentence, and (ii) it
can take within its ambit the larger interest of the State, orders
to prevent apprehended breach of peace and orders to bind
down persons who are a danger to the maintenance of peace
and order. The Court has ruled that the character of the
proceeding does not depend upon the nature of the tribunal
which is invested with the authority to grant relief but upon
the nature of the right violated and the appropriate relief
which may be claimed.
10. This judgment is further discussed by the Apex Court in the case of
Jasbir Singh alias Jassa and others Vs. State of Punjab and
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others, (2022) 13 SCC 462. Although in this case, Apex Court on the
basis of facts of the case, found the Writ Appeal/Letters Patent
Appeal maintainable as the writ petition arises out of delay in
decision on the mercy application. Relevant discussion is reproduced
as under:
“16. If a clear-cut distinction is accepted that while dealing
with a writ petition based on the ground of delay in disposal of
mercy petition or application for commutation, the Court does
not and will not enter into the merits of the matter, the
proceedings so initiated by way of writ petition are not
connected with the earlier determination of guilt in regular
proceedings. The nature of such proceedings by way of a writ
petition would be independent, original and founded on
circumstances which occurred after the guilt stood determined
by the criminal courts; and, therefore, such proceedings will
certainly be one where remedy by way of an intra-court appeal,
if the Rules concerned of letters patent so permit, would be
maintainable.”
11. The Apex Court also discussed earlier judgment passed in the case of
CIT Vs. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, AIR 1965 SC 1818 and held in
following manner:
“56. As we find from the decisions of the aforesaid three High
Courts, it is evident that there is no disagreement or conflict
on the principle that if an appeal is barred under Clause 10 or
Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, as the case may be, no appeal
will lie. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, however, has held
that when the power is exercised under Article 226 of the
Constitution for quashing of a criminal proceeding, there is
no exercise of criminal jurisdiction. It has distinguished the
8proceeding for quashing of the FIR under Section 482 CrPC
and, in that context, has opined that from such an order, no
appeal would lie. On the contrary, the High Courts of Gujarat
and Delhi, on the basis of the law laid down by this Court in
Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, have laid emphasis on the seed of
initiation of criminal proceeding, the consequence of a
criminal proceeding and also the nature of relief sought
before the Single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The conception of “criminal jurisdiction” as used in Clause
10 of the Letters Patent is not to be construed in the narrow
sense. It encompasses in its gamut the inception and the
consequence. It is the field in respect of which the jurisdiction
is exercised, is relevant. The contention that solely because a
writ petition is filed to quash an investigation, it would have
room for intra-court appeal and if a petition is filed under
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, there would be
no space for an intra-court appeal, would create an
anomalous, unacceptable and inconceivable situation. The
provision contained in the Letters Patent does not allow or
permit such an interpretation. When we are required to
consider a bar or non-permissibility, we have to appreciate
the same in true letter and spirit. It confers jurisdiction as
regards the subject of controversy or nature of proceeding and
that subject is exercise of jurisdiction in criminal matters. It
has nothing to do whether the order has been passed in
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution or inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
57. In this regard, an example can be cited. In the State of
Uttar Pradesh, Section 438 CrPC has been deleted by the
9State amendment and the said deletion has been treated to be
constitutionally valid by this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab. However, that has not curtailed the extraordinary
power of the High Court to entertain a plea of anticipatory
bail as has been held in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State
of U.P. And Hema Mishra v. State of U.P. But that does not
mean that an order passed by the Single Judge in exercise of
Article 226 of the Constitution relating to criminal
jurisdiction, can be made the subject-matter of intra-court
appeal. It is not provided for and it would be legally
inappropriate to think so.”
12. After the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Jamshed N. Guzdar
Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 591, Madhya Pradesh
Uchha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005
(hereinafter referred to as “the Adhiniyam, 2005”) came into
existence for intra court appeal. Section 2 of the Adhiniyam, 2005
provides a mechanism of intra court appeal in following manner:
2. Appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a
Judgment or order of one Judge of the High Court made in
exercise of original jurisdiction:- (1) An appeal shall lie from
a Judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court
in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising of two
judges of the same High Court:
Provided that no such appeal shall lie against an
interlocutory order or against an order passed in exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India.
(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within 45
10days from the date of order passed by a single Judge:
Provided that any appeal may be admitted after the
prescribed period of 45 days, if the petitioner satisfies the
Division Bench that he had sufficient cause for not preferring
the appeal within such period.
Explanation:- The fact that the petitioner was misled by any
order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining
or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause
within the meaning of this sub-section.
(3) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed, heard and
decided in accordance with the procedure as may be
prescribed by the High Court.
13. It provides an appeal only arising out of order passed under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. As per discussion held in Ram
Kishan Fauji (supra) proceedings under Article 226 of Constitution
would be original/civil proceedings and here powers exercised by
learned Single Judge is of original/criminal jurisdiction.
14. Therefore, this distinction is to be kept in mind while considering the
moot question. This aspect is discussed by the Full Bench in the case
of Shailendra Kumar Vs. Divisional Forest Officer and another,
2017(4) MPLJ 109. In para 18 the Full Bench held in following
manner:
“18. We may clarify that the orders passed by the Judicial
Courts, subordinate to a High Court even in criminal matters
when challenged in proceedings before the High Courts are
only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thus no
intra court appeal would be maintainable against an order
passed by the Learned Single Judge in proceedings arising
11out of an order passed by Judicial Courts, may be civil or
criminal proceedings.”
15. Relying upon the said judgment, the Division Bench in the case of
Pradeep Kori Vs. State of M.P. and another, 2020(4) MPLJ 332
also held that writ appeal is not maintainable out of the order passed
by learned Single Judge in criminal proceedings.
16. Once a litigant exercised extraordinary/inherent/supervisory criminal
jurisdiction before learned Single Judge under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,
then no appeal would lie before the Division Bench.
17. So far as relief No.2 is concerned that is also consequential to relief
No.1. Through this relief, petitioner in fact wants to stay the criminal
investigation against him and if this relief would have been granted,
then certainly Investigating Officer may resist to arrest him even and
in this manner he would have got anticipatory bail in the garb of
order not to take any coercive action. Therefore, both the writ
petitions are primarily against registration of FIR and criminal
proceedings initiated thereto.
18. In view of the aforesaid discussion as well as the facts situation of the
case, this Court is of the considered view that writ appeal preferred
by the appellant is not maintainable.
19. Resultantly, both the Writ Appeals (Writ Appeal No.450/2026 and
Writ Appeal No.456/2026) stand dismissed. Copy of this order be
kept in Writ Appeal No.456/2026.
(ANAND PATHAK) (ANIL VERMA) Anil* JUDGE JUDGE ANIL KUMAR CHAURASIYA 2026.02.26 18:44:35 +05'30'
