Afr Pritiranjan Gharai …. Election vs Pradeep Bal Samant on 27 February, 2026
inkinccorporation@gmail.com Orissa High Court
Afr Pritiranjan Gharai …. Election vs Pradeep Bal Samant on 27 February, 2026
Author: Sashikanta Mishra
Bench: Sashikanta Mishra
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
I.A. No. 51 of 2025
(ARISING OUT OF ELPET No.-6 of 2024)
(An application under Order-VII Rule-11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure)
AFR Pritiranjan Gharai .... Election Petitioner
-Versus-
Pradeep Bal Samant .... Respondent
Advocate(s) appeared in this case :-
__________________________________________________________
For Election Petitioner: Mr. U K Samal, Sr. Advocate
with M/s. M.R. Mohapatra,
S.P. Patra & N. Samal, Advocates
For Respondent : Mr. P.K. Rath, Senior Advocate
with Mr. P.K. Satapathy, Advocate
__________________________________________________________
CORAM:
JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA
JUDGMENT
27.02.2026
SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.
This application has been filed by the sole
Respondent of the above Election Petition under Order VII
Rule 11 of CPC read with Section 83 of the Representation
Page 1 of 28
of People Act, 1951 to reject/dismiss the Election Petition
in its entirety at the very threshold. It is stated that the
pleadings in the election petition disclose no cause of
action and are vague, baseless without any source of
information or foundational pleadings so as to constitute
material facts. Further, the Election Petition being bereft of
material facts and particulars and not constituting any
triable issues needs to be dismissed at the threshold.
2. The Election Petition has been filed by the
Election Petitioner questioning the election of the sole
Respondent from 54-Sukinda Assembly Constituency to
the Odisha State Legislative Assembly in the General
Elections, 2024, seeking the prayers as enumerated under
Paragraphs-(a) to (f) of the prayer portion of the petition.
Pursuant to the notification issued by the Election
Commission of India, polling was conducted and upon
counting of votes the Respondent was declared elected after
securing the highest number of votes, the margin of victory
being 9,577 votes over the Election Petitioner. Pursuant to
summons issued by this Court upon admission of the
Election Petition, the sole Respondent entered appearance
Page 2 of 28
and filed his written statement. In addition, he has filed
the present I.A. to which a written objection has been filed
by the Election Petitioner.
3. For convenience, the parties are referred to as
per their original status in the Election Petition.
4. The grounds set forth by the Respondent in the
present application are that the pleadings in the election
petition are insufficient to constitute a cause of action. It is
stated that allegations relating to non-disclosure of
criminal cases amount in substance to allegations of
corrupt practice, yet the petition does not contain the
mandatory particulars required in law. It is further
contended that the two proceedings relied upon by the
Election Petitioner either arise from quasi-civil statutory
proceedings or relate to offences carrying punishment
below the statutory period for mandatory disclosure and,
therefore, even if undisclosed, do not furnish a ground to
void the election. With regard to educational qualification,
the Respondent states that the allegation is vague,
unsupported by source or documentary foundation, and
Page 3 of 28
incapable of trial. On these premises, rejection of the
election petition at the threshold is sought.
5. The Election Petitioner in his objection to the
present application has stated that this application itself is
belated and intended to delay the statutory trial of the
election petition. Further, the election petitioner has
specifically pleaded the existence of two pending criminal
cases, the relevant court orders, the omission of disclosure
in Form-26, the incorrect statement of educational
qualification, and the manner in which such suppression
materially affected the voters’ informed choice and the
election outcome. According to the Election Petitioner,
these pleadings clearly disclose triable issues which can
only be adjudicated in trial.
6. Heard Mr. P.K. Rath, learned Senior counsel
with Mr. P.K Satpathy, learned counsel appearing for the
sole Respondent-Petitioner in the I.A. and Mr. U.K. Samal
learned Senior Counsel with Mr. M.R. Mohapatra, learned
counsel for the Election Petitioner-Opp. Party in the I.A.
7. At the outset, Mr. U.K. Samal raised an objection
regarding the maintainability of the present application. He
Page 4 of 28
submits that the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
has been filed at a belated stage of the proceeding and
cannot be entertained when the trial is about to commence.
According to him, the Respondent has invoked the said
provision only with a view to delay the progress of the trial.
8. Per Contra, Mr. P.K. Rath submits that an
application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC can be
entertained at any stage of the proceeding prior to
commencement of trial if, upon a meaningful reading of the
election petition, it is found that the petition does not
disclose any cause of action. He submits that the power
under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is intended to prevent
unnecessary trial and wastage of valuable judicial time
where the pleadings themselves are insufficient. According
to him, the present election petition, being devoid of
material facts and not disclosing any triable issue, is liable
to be rejected at the threshold.
9. Having considered the rival submissions on the
question of maintainability, this Court deems it proper to
refer to the settled position of law at first. The Supreme
Page 5 of 28
Court in R.K. Roja v. U.S. Rayudu1 following earlier
decisions in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity
Commissioner2 and Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra3 held that the power of rejection of plaint is
an independent jurisdiction which can be exercised at any
stage and, once such an application is filed, the Court is
duty-bound to decide the same before proceeding with the
trial. The following observations are noteworthy –
“4. We are afraid that the stand taken by the High Court
in the impugned order cannot be appreciated. An
application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be filed at
any stage, as held by this Court in Sopan Sukhdeo
Sable v. Charity Commr. [Sopan Sukhdeo
Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137] : (SCC p.
146, para 10)
“10. … The trial court can exercise the power at any
stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after
issuing summons to the defendant at any time before
the conclusion of the trial.”
The only restriction is that the consideration of the
application for rejection should not be on the basis of the
allegations made by the defendant in his written
statement or on the basis of the allegations in the
application for rejection of the plaint. The court has to
consider only the plaint as a whole, and in case, the
entire plaint comes under the situations covered by
Order 7 Rules 11(a) to (f) CPC, the same has to be
rejected.
5. Once an application is filed under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC, the court has to dispose of the same before
proceeding with the trial. There is no point or sense in
proceeding with the trial of the case, in case the plaint
(election petition in the present case) is only to be
rejected at the threshold. Therefore, the defendant is
1
(2016) 14 SCC 275
2
(2004) 3 SCC 137
3
(2003) 1 SCC 557
Page 6 of 28
entitled to file the application for rejection before filing
his written statement. In case the application is rejected,
the defendant is entitled to file his written statement
thereafter (see Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra,
(2003) 1 SCC 557] ). But once an application for rejection
is filed, the court has to dispose of the same before
proceeding with the trial court. To quote the relevant
portion from para 20 of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable
case [Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3
SCC 137] : (SCC pp. 148-49)
“20. … Rule 11 of Order 7 lays down an independent
remedy made available to the defendant to challenge
the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his
right to contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly
does not contemplate at any stage when the objections
can be raised, and also does not say in express terms
about the filing of a written statement. Instead, the word
“shall” is used, clearly implying thereby that it casts a
duty on the court to perform its obligations in rejecting
the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities
provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without
intervention of the defendant.”
6. In Saleem Bhai case [Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557] , this Court has also
held that: (SCC p. 560, para 9)
“9. … a direction to file the written statement without
deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 cannot
but be a procedural irregularity touching the exercise of
jurisdiction by the trial court.”
However, we may hasten to add that the liberty to file
an application for rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC
cannot be made as a ruse for retrieving the lost
opportunity to file the written statement.”
10. In the instant case, admittedly the application
under order 7 Rule 11 was filed after completion of
pleadings. However, in view of the aforesaid settled position
of law, the objection of Mr. Samal that the present
application is liable to be rejected solely on the ground of
Page 7 of 28
delay or belated filing cannot be accepted. The preliminary
issue relating to maintainability is accordingly answered.
11. This Court shall now examine whether the
election petition, on a meaningful reading of its pleadings,
discloses material facts constituting a cause of action and
raises triable issues or not.
12. Mr. Rath submits that the allegations relating to
non-disclosure of criminal cases, as pleaded in the election
petition, do not satisfy the statutory requirement of
disclosure contemplated under the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 and the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.
According to him, if the Election Petitioner has alleged non-
disclosure of criminal antecedents by the Respondent,
then, as per law, this falls within the allegation of corrupt
practice under Section 100(1)(b) of the RP Act. Therefore,
the Election Petitioner ought to have filed Form-25 affidavit
as per the proviso to Section 83(1)(c). Non-filing of the same
and in the absence of material facts and particulars, entails
dismissal of the election petition in limine. He also submits
that the proceedings relied upon by the Election Petitioner
are either quasi-civil in nature or relate to offences not
Page 8 of 28
carrying the statutory period of punishment so as to
mandate disclosure in Form-26. He further submits that,
even assuming such non-disclosure, the same would not
constitute a ground to declare the election void in the
absence of pleadings demonstrating its material effect on
the election result.
Mr. Rath also argues that the challenge relating
to the declaration of educational qualification is vague and
unsupported by any foundational material. The election
petition, according to him, does not disclose the source of
information, the nature of alleged falsity, or any
contemporaneous document to substantiate the plea. Such
bald and unverified allegations, according to him, cannot
be treated as material facts within the meaning of Section
83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and are
therefore, liable to be struck down at the threshold. Mr.
Rath, in support of his argument, has cited the following
judgments:
i. Saleem Bhai (Supra) ii. K. Madanmohan Rao v. B.B. Patil4 iii. Hukum Singh Karada v. Arun Bhimavad5 iv. Rajan Baburao Vichare v. Naresh Ganpat Mhaske6 4 ELPET NO.-34 of 2019 of Telengana HC 5 AIR 2025 MP 67 Page 9 of 28
v. Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors7
vi. Senthilbalaji v. A.P Geetha & Ors8
vii. Anil Vasudev Salgonkar v. Naresh Kushali
Shigaonkar9
viii. Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang & Anr.10
ix. Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar &
ors.11
x. Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. A. Santhana Kumar &
Ors.12
xi. Mohammad Aslam Raeeni v. Ram Feran Pandey13
xii. Jitu Patnaik v. Sanatan Mohakud & Ors14
xiii. Virendra Kumar Sakleecha v. Jagjiwan & Ors15
xiv. F.A. Sapa v. Singora & Ors16
xv. V. Narayanswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu17
xvi. Mangani Lal Mandal v. Bishnu Deo Bhandari18
xvii. R.P Moidutty v. P.T. Kunju Mohammad & Anr19
xviii. Hari Shankar Jain v. Sonia Gandhi 20
13. In reply, Mr. Samal submits that the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Mr. Rath amount to
a premature evaluation of the merits of the pleadings,
which is impermissible while considering an application
under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. He contends that, at this
stage, the Court is required to confine itself strictly to the
averments contained in the election petition and to assume
the same to be true for the limited purpose of examining
6
2025 SCC OnLine Bom 3137
7
2025 0 INSC 992
8 2023 SCC Online SC 679
9 2009 SCC (9) 310
10 AIR 2024 (SC) 212
11 2024 4 SCR 523
12 AIR 2023(SC) 2366
13 2024 Supreme (All) 1
14 AIR 2012 SC 913
15 AIR 1974 (SC) 1957
16 AIR 1991 (SC) 1557
17 AIR 2000 (SC) 694
18 AIR 2012 (SC) 1094
19 AIR 200(SC) 388
20 2001 (8) SCC 233
Page 10 of 28
whether a cause of action is disclosed. According to him,
the election petition contains specific pleadings regarding:
(i) pendency of two criminal cases in which cognizance has
been taken by a competent criminal court; (ii) omission of
disclosure of such cases in Form-26 affidavit; (iii) incorrect
declaration of educational qualification; and (iv) the
manner in which such suppression and misstatement
materially affected the voters’ right to make an informed
choice. These, according to him, clearly constitute material
facts giving rise to triable issues. He further submits that
non-filing of an affidavit in Form 25 along with the election
petition cannot, by itself, entail dismissal of the petition at
the threshold, since such defect is curable and substantial
compliance with the requirement of Form-25 is sufficient,
as held in the decisions of the Supreme Court in G.M.
Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar21, Thangjam
Arunkumar v. Yumkham Erabot Singh22 and A. Manju
v. Prajwal Revanna23. He submits that the affidavit
appended to the election petition substantially complies
21
(2013) 4 SCC 776
22 (2023) 17 SCC 500
23 (2022) 3 SCC 269Page 11 of 28
with the requirement of Form-25. Mr. Samal, in support ofhis arguments, has cited the following judgments:
i. Resurgence India v. Election Commission of India 24
ii. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India 25
iii. Krishnamoorthy v. SivaKumar & Ors26
iv. Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India & Anr27
v. D.R Venkatachalam v. Transport Commissioner28
vi. Sate v. Sanjeev Nada29
vii. Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor30
viii. Resurgence India v. ECI31
ix. Shaligram Srivastava v. Narish Singh Patel32
x. Babu Verghese & Ors. V. Bar Council of Kerala & Ors33
xi. Rao Shiv Bahadur v. Sate of U.P34
xii. Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan35
xiii. State of U.P v. Singhara Singh36
xiv. D. Rama Chandran v. R.V Janakiraman & Ors37
xv. Bhim Rao Baswanath Rao Patil v. Madan Mohan Rao &
Ors38
xvi. Virendranath Gautam v, Satpal Singh39
xvii. A. Manju (Supra)
xviii. Thangjam Arunkumar (Supra)
xix. Dilip Kumar Ray v. Sarada Prasad Nayak40
xx. H.D Revanna v. G. Puttaswamy Gowda & Ors.41
xxi. V.S Achuthanandan v. P.J Francis & Ors42
xxii. G.M Siddeshwar (Supra)24
(2018) 4 SCC 699
25
(2003) 4 SCC 399
26
(2015) 3 SCC 467
27
(2019) 3 SCC 224
28
(1977) 2 SCC 273
29
(2012) 8 SCC 450
30
1936 SCC Online PC 41
31
(2014) 14 SCC 189
32
(2003) 2 SCC 176
33
(1999) 3 SCC 422
34
AIR 1954 SC 322
35
AIR 1961 SC 1527
36
AIR 1964 Sc 358
37
(1999) 3 SCC 267
38
(2023) 18 SCC 231
39
(2007) 3 SCC 617
40
ELPET No.-2/2024
41
(1999) 2 SCC 217
42
(1999) 3 SCC 737Page 12 of 28
14. Before adverting to the rival submissions, this
Court finds that it is not in dispute that the object and
purpose of requiring candidates to file a complete and
truthful affidavit in Form-26 is to secure the fundamental
‘right to know’ of the electorate, which has been judicially
recognized as part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court in Resurgence India (supra)
emphatically held that any suppression or omission in
such affidavit frustrates the voter’s right to information and
amounts to a direct infringement of constitutional
guarantees. The Court clarified that the filing of an affidavit
with blanks or incomplete particulars is impermissible, and
that the Returning Officer is duty-bound to ensure that all
disclosures relating to assets, liabilities, educational
qualifications, and criminal antecedents are properly
furnished. The relevant observation reads as follows:
“21. With this background, Section 33-A of the RP Act
was enacted by Act 72 of 2002 with effect from 24-8-
2002. Thus, the purpose of Act 72 of 2002 was to
effectuate the right contemplated in Assn. for
Democratic Reforms [Union of India v. Assn. for
Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294]. However, the
legislators did not incorporate all the suggestions as
directed by this Court in the above case but for
mandating all the candidates to disclose the criminal
antecedents under Section 33-A by filing an affidavit
as prescribed along with the nomination paper filed
Page 13 of 28
under Section 33(1) of the RP Act so that the citizens
must be aware of the criminal antecedents of the
candidate before they can exercise their freedom of
choice by casting of votes as guaranteed under the
Constitution of India. As a result, at present, every
candidate is obligated to file an affidavit with relevant
information with regard to their criminal antecedents,
assets and liabilities and educational qualifications.”
[Emphasis Added]
15. In the present case, so far as the first allegation
is concerned, it is observed that the Election Petitioner has
specifically pleaded that the Respondent failed to disclose
two pending cases, namely 2(c) CC No. 69 of 2010 and 2(c)
CC No. 71 of 2010, before the learned JMFC, Jajpur Road.
Such pleading is supported by reference to the orders
dated 16.09.2010, 21.02.2011 and 13.03.2024 passed in
the said proceedings. From a prima facie reading of the
pleadings and the documents relied upon, it appears that
cognizance had been taken and the proceedings were
pending on the date of filing of nomination. Both the cases
arise out of contravention of the provisions of Payment of
Wages Act, 1936.
16. The question, however, as raised by Mr. Rath, is
whether proceedings arising out of Payment of Wages Act
would amount to criminal proceedings requiring mandatory
disclosure in Form-26
Page 14 of 28
17. At this stage, it would be profitable to refer to
Section 33-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
which contains the statutory aspect of the voter’s right to
information and obligates a candidate to disclose specified
criminal antecedents by way of affidavit along with the
nomination paper. Section 33-A reads as follows:
“33A. Right to information.–(1) A candidate shall,
apart from any information which he is required to
furnish, under this Act or the rules made thereunder,
in his nomination paper delivered under sub-section
(1) of section 33, also furnish the information as to
whether–
(i) he is accused of any offence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more in a
pending case in which a charge has been
framed by the court of competent jurisdiction;
(ii) he has been convicted of an offence [other than
any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2), or covered in sub-section (3), of section 8]
and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more.
(2) The candidate or his proposer, as the case may be,
shall, at the time of delivering to the returning officer
the nomination paper under sub-section (1) of section
33, also deliver to him an affidavit sworn by the
candidate in a prescribed form verifying the
information specified in sub-section (1).
(3) The returning officer shall, as soon as may be after
the furnishing of information to him under sub-section
(1), display the aforesaid information by affixing a
copy of the affidavit, delivered under sub-section (2),
at a conspicuous place at his office for the information
of the electors relating to a constituency for which the
nomination paper is delivered.”
[Emphasis added]
18. From the above provision, it can be inferred that
a candidate is mandatorily required to disclose a pending
case in which he is accused of an offence punishable with
Page 15 of 28
imprisonment for two years or more and in which a charge
has been framed by a court of competent jurisdiction. As
argued by Mr. Rath, the charges in the above pending
cases attract a maximum term of imprisonment under the
Payment of Wages Act that is below the threshold
prescribed in Section 33-A for mandatory disclosure. This
Court, therefore, finds it appropriate to refer to Section 20
of the Payment of Wages Act, which is as follows:
“20. Penalty for offences under the Act.–(1) Whoever
being responsible for the payment of wages to an
employed person contravenes any of the provisions of
any of the following section, namely, 6 [section 5
except sub-section (4) thereof, section 7, section 8
except sub-section (8) thereof, section 9, section 10
except sub-section (2) thereof, and sections11 to 13],
both inclusive, shall be punishable [with fine which
shall not be less than one thousand five hundred
rupees but which may extend to seven thousand five
hundred rupees].
(2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 4, 8
[sub-section (4) of section 5, section 6, sub-section (8)
of section 8, sub-section (2) of section 10] or section 25
shall be punishable [with fine which may extend to
three thousand seven hundred fifty rupees].
[(2A) Whoever being required to nominate or designate
a person under section 3 fails to do so, such person
shall be punishable with fine which may extend to
three thousand rupees.]
(3) Whoever being required under this Act to maintain
any records or registers or to furnish any information
or return– (a) fails to maintain such register or
record; or (b) wilfully refuses or without lawful excuse
neglects to furnish such information or return; or (c)
wilfully furnishes or causes to be furnished any
information or return which he knows to be false; or
(d) refuses to answer or wilfully gives a false answer
to any question necessary for obtaining any
information required to be furnished under this Act,
Page 16 of 28
shall for each such offence, be punishable [with fine
which shall not be less than one thousand five
hundred rupees but which may extend to seven
thousand five hundred rupees].
(4) Whoever– (a) wilfully obstructs an Inspector in the
discharge of his duties under this Act; or (b) refuses or
wilfully neglects to afford an Inspector any
reasonable facility for making any entry, inspection,
examination, supervision, or inquiry authorised by or
under this Act in relation to any railway, factory of 4
[industrial or other establishment]; or (c) wilfully
refuses to produce on the demand of an Inspector any
register or other document kept in pursuance of this
Act; or (d) prevents or attempts to prevent or does
anything which he has any reason to believe is likely
to prevent any person from appearing before or being
examined by an Inspector acting in pursuance of his
duties under this Act, shall be punishable 5 [with fine
which shall not be less than one thousand five
hundred rupees but which may extend to seven
thousand five hundred rupees].
(5) If any person who has been convicted of any
offence punishable under this Act is again guilty of an
offence involving contravention of the same provision,
he shall be punishable on a subsequent conviction
with imprisonment for a term [which shall not be less
than one month but which may extend to six months
and with fine which shall not be less than three
thousand seven hundred fifty rupees but which may
extend to twenty-two thousand five hundred]:
Provided that for the purpose of sub-section, no
cognizance shall be taken of any conviction made
more than two years before the date on which the
commission of the offence which is being punished
came to the knowledge of the Inspector.
(6) If any person fails or wilfully neglects to pay the
wages of any employed person by the date fixed by
the authority, in this behalf, he shall, without
prejudice to any other action that may be taken
against him, be punishable with an additional fine
which may extend to 7 [seven hundred fifty rupees]
for each day for which such failure or neglect
continues.”
19. On perusal of Section 20 of the Payment of
Wages Act, this Court finds that the maximum punishment
Page 17 of 28
under the said Act is less than that prescribed under
Section 33-A of RP Act 1951.
20. Thus, from a conjoint reading of Section 33-A of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and Section 20
of the Payment of Wages Act, it is evident that the statutory
obligation of disclosure arises only in respect of a pending
criminal case in which the offence alleged is punishable
with imprisonment for a term of two years or more and in
which charge has been framed by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
The offences under Section 20 of the Payment of
Wages Act, as extracted hereinabove, are primarily
punishable with fine, and even in cases of subsequent
conviction, the provision does not prescribe punishment
meeting the statutory threshold of imprisonment for two
years or more as required under Section 33-A(1)(i) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951.This Court would
also like to rely upon the ratio decided in Krishnamoorthy
(supra) wherein it was held it
“94. In view of the above, we would like to sum up
our conclusions:
94.1. Disclosure of criminal antecedents of a
candidate, especially, pertaining to heinous or seriousPage 18 of 28
offence or offences relating to corruption or moral
turpitude at the time of filing of nomination paper as
mandated by law is a categorical imperative.
94.2. When there is non-disclosure of the offences
pertaining to the areas mentioned in the preceding
clause, it creates an impediment in the free exercise of
electoral right.
94.3. Concealment or suppression of this nature
deprives the voters to make an informed and advised
choice as a consequence of which it would come
within the compartment of direct or indirect
interference or attempt to interfere with the free
exercise of the right to vote by the electorate, on the
part of the candidate.
94.4. As the candidate has the special knowledge of
the pending cases where cognizance has been taken
or charges have been framed and there is a non-
disclosure on his part, it would amount to undue
influence and, therefore, the election is to be declared
null and void by the Election Tribunal under Section
100(1)(b) of the 1951 Act.”
[Emphasis added]
21. Therefore, even if the two cases referred to by the
Election Petitioner were pending at the relevant time, same
would not fall within the category of criminal antecedents
mandatorily required to be disclosed in Form-26.
Consequently, non-disclosure of such proceedings, by
itself, cannot constitute a ground to challenge the election
under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act,
1951. A similar view has been taken by the Telangana High
Court in the case of K. Madan Mohan Rao (supra).
22. Even otherwise, the Election Petitioner has failed
to place any foundational pleadings demonstrating as to
Page 19 of 28
how the alleged non-disclosure of the aforesaid two cases
materially affected the result of the election within the
meaning of Section 100 of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951. The pleadings in the election petition does not
disclose any specific facts showing a nexus between the
alleged omission and the ultimate electoral outcome, apart
from a general assertion regarding deprivation of informed
choice to the voters. Mere reproduction of statutory
provision or vague averments regarding impact on the
electorate, without supporting primary facts, cannot
substitute the mandatory requirement of a concise
statement of material facts under Section 83(1)(a) of the
Act. In the absence of such foundational pleadings, this
Court is of the view that no triable issue arises.
23. As regards the second ground relating to
incorrect declaration of educational qualification, this
Court has given its anxious consideration to the
contentions advanced by learned counsel for both sides
and has carefully examined the pleadings contained in the
Election Petition in the light of the settled legal principles.
Page 20 of 28
For better appreciation, paragraphs 10 (F) and
10(G) are quoted below:
F. That, in the purported Form 26 affidavit Part -A
serial No.8 the Respondent has mentioned as
follows:
“(8) My educational qualification is as under:
HSC pass under B.S.E., Odisha from Jagannath
High School, Sukinda, Odisha in the year 1973.
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Honoris Causa)
from the Open International University, Colombo Sri
Lanka for complimentary Medicines and Medicina
Altemativa in the year 2008″
The election petitioner through his election agent
had made a query regarding the educational
qualification of the Respondent and it is
ascertained that the Respondent has not passed
the High School Certificate Examination under
Board of Secondary Education, Odisha. But the
Respondent as against the educational
qualification has stated as H.S.C. pass under
B.S.E. Odisha from Jagannath High School,
Sukinda. The information provided by the
Respondent in the affidavit purportedly filed in
Form 26 would amount to misleading/false
declaration. The false declaration relating to the
educational qualification of Respondent is clear
violation of applicable law and same is a defect of
substantial character which cannot be brushed
aside lightly and same is designed to confuse and
mislead the voters. When the Respondent has not
passed the HSC under Board of Secondary
Education, Odisha, the Respondent has stated as
pass. Since the information provided is a false and
misleading information, the acceptance of
nomination of the Respondent is improper and the
votes polled is invalid votes and therefore the
result of the election, in so far as it concerns, the
Returned candidate (the Respondent) has been
materially affected and the said election from 54 –
Sukinda Assembly Constituency is liable to be set
aside.
G. That the wrong / false information relating to
the educational qualification by the Respondent in
the purported affidavit under Form 26 creates
impediment in free exercise of the electoral right byPage 21 of 28
the voters. Therefore, the election of the
Respondent in so far as the Returned candidate is
concerned has been materially affected and hence
the election of the Respondent from 54- Sukinda
Assembly Constituency is to be declared as null
and void as the misinformed voters could not make
an informed choice according to their free will and
conscience and the same is violative of the right of
the voters to know about the educational
qualification of the candidate. In the instant case
Respondent in total disregard of the applicable law
had not correctly furnished about his qualification.
The nomination of the Respondent has been
improperly accepted and the result of the election
in so far as it concern the returned candidate
(Respondent) has been materially affected. Hence
the election of the Respondent from 54- Sukinda
Assembly Constituency be declared void.”
On a close and careful scrutiny of the above
paragraphs of the Election Petition, this Court finds that
the allegations are vague and non-specific without
disclosing the material facts as there are no foundational
pleadings disclosing the source, basis, or material on which
the Election Petitioner formed the assertion that the
Respondent had not passed the Higher Secondary or High
School Certificate Examination. The Election Petitioner
merely states that such information was gathered through
the election agent of the Election Petitioner upon making a
query regarding the Respondent’s educational qualification,
and that it was thereafter ascertained that the Respondent
had not passed the High School Certificate Examination
Page 22 of 28
under the Board of Secondary Education, Odisha. Apart
from this, the Election Petitioner neither refers to any
official record, certificate, communication from the
concerned educational authority, nor to any
contemporaneous document demonstrating that the
declaration made in Form 26 is false.
24. It is apt to mention here that in election law,
pleadings must contain precise and material facts and
cannot rest upon hearsay, suspicion, or information of an
undisclosed origin. Absence of such foundational facts
renders the allegation speculative. It goes without saying
that in the absence of specific pleadings as regards the
identity of the election agent, the authority to whom the
query was made, the authority who gave the information
that the respondent had not passed HSC Examination
under the BSE, Odisha, it will not be permissible to lead
any evidence in this regard. In other words, the allegation
as is stated, appears to be based on hearsay. Furthermore,
the Election Petition is completely silent as to how the
alleged incorrect declaration of educational qualification
Page 23 of 28
had any nexus with, or materially affected, the result of the
election.
25. It is the settled principle of election law that an
Election Petition must comply strictly with the requirement
of stating material facts as mandated under Section
83(1)(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The
Supreme Court in Hari Shanker Jain (supra) has
categorically held that:
“Section 83(1)(a) of RPA, 1951 mandates that an
election petition shall contain a concise statement of
the material facts on which the petitioner relies. By a
series of decisions of this Court, it is well settled that
the material facts required to be stated are those facts
which can be considered as materials supporting the
allegations made. In other words, they must be such
facts as would afford a basis for the allegations made
in the petition and would constitute the cause of
action as understood in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. The expression “cause of action” has been
compendiously defined to mean every fact which it
would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to the
judgment of court. Omission of a single material fact
leads to an incomplete cause of action and the
statement of claim becomes bad. The function of the
party is to present as full a picture of the cause of
action with such further information in detail as to
make the opposite party understand the case he will
have to meet. (See Samant N. Balkrishna ν. George
Fernandez 18, Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Krishna
Behari¹9.) Merely quoting the words of the section like
chanting of a mantra does not amount to stating
material facts. Material facts would include positive
statement of facts as also positive averment of a
negative fact, if necessary. In V.S. Achuthanandan v.
P.J. Francis this Court has held, on a conspectus of a
series of decisions of this Court, that material factsPage 24 of 28
are such preliminary facts which must be proved at
the trial by a party to establish existence of a cause of
action. Failure to plead “material facts” is fatal to the
election petition and no amendment of the pleadings
is permissible to introduce such material facts after
the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition.
It is the duty of the Court to examine the petition
irrespective of any written statement or denial and
reject the petition if it does not disclose the cause of
action. To enable a court to reject a plaint on the
ground that it does not disclose a cause of action, it
should look at the plaint and nothing else. Courts
have always frowned upon vague pleadings which
leave a wide scope to adduce any evidence. No
amount of evidence can cure basic defect in the
pleadings.”
[Emphasis added]
26. As already stated, reading of the relevant
paragraphs 10(F) and10(G) in the present case reveals that
the averments fall short of setting out the material facts on
which the Election Petitioner seeks to establish that the
alleged act materially affected the result of the election. The
allegations are sweeping and general in nature, lacking any
clear indication as to how false declaration of educational
qualification, if at all, influenced the election result.
27. It is trite that an election dispute is a serious
matter; it cannot be treated lightly or used as a tool for
vexatious purposes. In Ram Sukh v. Dinesh Aggarwal 43
the Supreme Court, while interpreting Section 100(1)(d)(iv)
of the Act, observed as follows-
43
(2009) 10 SCC 541
Page 25 of 28
“21. We may now advert to the facts at hand to
examine whether the election petition suffered from
the vice of non-disclosure of material facts as
stipulated in Section 83(1)(a) of the Act. As already
stated the case of the election petitioner is confined to
the alleged violation of Section 100(1)(d)(iv). For the
sake of ready reference, the said provision is
extracted below:
“100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.–(1)
Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High
Court is of opinion–
***
(d) that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns
a returned candidate, has been materially affected–
***
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the
Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders
made under this Act,
the High Court shall declare the election of the
returned candidate to be void.”
It is plain that in order to get an election declared as
void under the said provision, the election petitioner
must aver that on account of non-compliance with the
provisions of the Constitution or of this Act or of any
rules or orders made under the Act, the result of the
election, insofar as it concerned the returned
candidate, was materially affected.”
28. As the Election petitioner has failed to disclose
the factual foundation necessary to bring the case of false
declaration of educational qualification of Respondent, this
Court finds the contention raised by the Election Petitioner
on this ground untenable.
29. Based on the above observations the arguments
of both counsel with regards to Form-25 becomes
redundant for consideration.
Page 26 of 28
30. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is
of the considered opinion that the pleadings contained in
the Election Petition do not disclose the material facts
necessary to constitute a cause of action within the
meaning of Section 83(1)(a) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951. The allegations relating to non-disclosure
of criminal cases pertain to proceedings which do not
attract the statutory threshold requiring disclosure under
Section 33-A of the Act and, in any event, are unsupported
by pleadings demonstrating any material effect on the
result of the election. Similarly, the allegation regarding
incorrect declaration of educational qualification is founded
on vague and unsubstantiated assertions, bereft of primary
material and wholly insufficient to establish a triable issue
or to show that the election result was materially affected.
31. In the result, the IA is allowed. The Election
Petition stands dismissed for want of any cause of action.
There shall be no order as to costs.
32. Office is directed to communicate the substance
of this order to the Election Commission and the Speaker
of the State Legislative Assembly at the earliest, so also an
Page 27 of 28
authenticated copy of this order to the Election
Commission, in terms of Section 103 of the R.P. Act, read
with Rule 16 under Chapter-XXXIII of the High Court of
Orissa Rules, 1948.
………………………….
Sashikanta Mishra,
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 27th February, 2026/A.K. Rana/P.A.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: AJAYA KUMAR RANA
Designation: P.A.
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Page 28 of 28
Date: 27-Feb-2026 13:21:38
