Orissa High Court
Odisha Public Service vs Dr. Sanjay Kumar Panda & on 25 February, 2026
Author: Chittaranjan Dash
Bench: Chittaranjan Dash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.A No.1328 of 2024
In the matter of an appeal under Clasue-10 of the Letter
Patent of Patna High Court read with Article-4 the
Orissa High Court Rules, 1948 from a common order
dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Single Judge in W.P.(C)
No.24199 of 2022.
----
Odisha Public Service ....
Commission, Cuttack & another Appellants
-versus-
Dr. Sanjay Kumar Panda & ....
another Respondents
W.A No.1330 of 2024
Odisha Public Service ....
Commission, Cuttack & another Appellants
-versus-
Dr. Anil Kumar Sahu & another ....
Respondents
Advocates Appeared in this case
For Appellant - Mr. A. Behera, Advocate
For Respondents - Mr. U.K. Samal, (For
Respondent No.1)
Mr. Saroj Kumar Jee, AGA
(For Respondent No.2)
Page 1 of 26
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CORAM :
MR. JUSTICE DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD
MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
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Date of Hearing: 09.02.2026
Date of Judgment: 25.02.2026
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Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. These two Writ Appeals are taken up together as they
arise out of a common judgment dated 23.02.2024 passed by
the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 24199 of 2022 and
W.P.(C) No. 24195 of 2022, which were heard analogously
and disposed of by a common order. The Odisha Public
Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as “OPSC”),
through its officials being the Appellants herein, lay a
challenge to the said judgment whereby the learned Single
Judge, while allowing the writ petitions, directed the
Appellants to recommend the names of the writ petitioners
for appointment to the post of Dental Surgeon (Group-A),
Junior, Odisha Medical Service (Dental) Cadre pursuant to
Advertisement dated 17.03.2018, within a period of two
months from the date of communication of the judgment.
2. The factual matrix of the case giving rise to the present
Writ Appeals is that on the basis of a requisition issued by
the Health and Family Welfare Department, the OPSC
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issued Advertisement No. 15 of 2017-18 dated 17.03.2018
inviting online applications for recruitment to 198 posts of
Dental Surgeon (Group-A), Junior in the Odisha Medical
Service (Dental) Cadre under the Health and Family Welfare
Department. The category-wise vacancy position was
notified as follows:
UR – 126 (38-W),
SC – 29 (08-W), and
ST – 43 (13-W);
Totalling 198 posts.
The advertisement prescribed the method of selection
as 30% weightage for career marking and 70% weightage for
the written examination to be conducted by OPSC. The
written examination carried 200 marks comprising 200
multiple choice questions (MCQs), with no negative
marking for incorrect answers. The qualifying marks were
fixed at 50% for UR and SEBC candidates, 45% for PwD
candidates and 40% for SC/ST candidates. Pursuant to the
said advertisement, the Respondents along with other
eligible candidates submitted their online applications
within the stipulated period and paid the prescribed
examination fee of Rs.300/-. Admit cards were issued and
the written examination was conducted on 06.05.2018.
Page 3 of 26
Thereafter, OPSC published a notice shortlisting 193
candidates, including the Respondents, for verification of
documents. The Respondents appeared for such verification,
and their documents were found to be in order. It was,
however, specifically stipulated that candidature was purely
provisional and subject to fulfilment of all conditions of the
advertisement. Subsequently, vide Notice dated 09.08.2018,
OPSC recommended 171 candidates in order of merit for
appointment to the post in question. The names of the
Respondents did not find place in the final list. Pursuant to
directions of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 13249 of 2018, OPSC
published on 18.08.2018 the marks secured by each
candidate in the written examination along with the
category-wise cut-off marks. The cut-off for UR (Male) was
189.558; SC – 131.673; ST – 120.740; UR (Female) – 188.366;
SC (Female) – 129.904; ST (Female) – 125.027; and PH –
146.835. On 20.08.2018, OPSC also published the Answer
Key to the written examination.
Upon publication of the Answer Key, certain
candidates, including the Respondents, alleged that several
answers were incorrect. According to them, 15 answers in
the published key were erroneous. Representations were
submitted along with standard textbooks and reference
materials seeking correction of the answer key and re-
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evaluation of answer scripts. A batch of writ petitions,
including W.P.(C) (OAC) No. 2542 of 2018 and connected
matters, was filed before this Court. Pursuant to directions
issued therein, OPSC constituted an Expert Committee,
which submitted its report on 05.10.2018. The Expert
Committee identified 14 answers in the original key as
incorrect and provided corrected answers with standard
references.
In the meantime, two candidates under the UR
(Female) and UR (Male) categories, namely Dr. Sriprada
Dash and Dr. Debashish Sahoo, who had secured 188.108
and 187.934 marks respectively under the earlier merit list,
were recommended and appointed vide appointment letter
dated 09.03.2019. In compliance with subsequent orders
passed by this Court, OPSC revisited the merit list on the
basis of the corrected answer key as per the Expert
Committee (Report dated 05.10.2018). Upon such revision,
the cut-off marks for UR (Male) stood revised to 192.558. On
revision, only Dr. Suman Tripathy was found eligible for
recommendation. The present Respondents were found to
have secured 192.002 marks and 191.210 marks respectively,
both being below the revised cut-off of 192.558.
Consequently, their names were not recommended to the
Government. Aggrieved by non-recommendation despite
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correction of the answer key, the Respondents approached
this Court by filing W.P.(C) Nos. 24195 of 2022 and 24199 of
2022, inter alia, praying for the following substantive relief:-
“c) Issue Rule Nisi in calling upon the opposite
parties as to why the letter dtd. 17.2.2022 under
Annexure-4 and letter dtd. 30.7.2022 under
annexure-8 shall not be quashed and the Key
answers prepared by the Odisha Public Service
Commission (Opp.party no.2 and 3) for the written
test examination conducted on 06.05.2018 for the
recruitment for the post of Dental Surgeon in
Group-A (Junior) of Odisha Medical Services
(Dental Cadre under Health and Family Welfare
Department) shall not be corrected as per the report
of the Expert Committee, the answer scripts of the
petitioner shall not be re-evaluated and the
petitioner’s name shall not be recommended to the
Government for appointment as Dental Surgeon in
Group-A (Junior) as per the advertisement no. 15 of
2017-18 published by Odisha Public Service
Commission and the State Govt. Shall not be
directed for appointment of the petitioner as Dental
Surgeon in Group-A (Junior) as per the
advertisement no.l5 of 2017-18.”
3. The Appellants having appeared before the learned
Single Judge challenged the contentions raised by the
Respondents and justified their action to be in accordance
with the Rules of the OPSC and the terms and conditions of
the advertisement. The learned Single Judge having assessed
the contentions of the Parties raised before it, favoured the
Respondents and disposed of the Writ Application with the
following directions: –
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49. In view of the aforesaid analysis of facts as well
as legal position, this Court is of the considered
view that the impugned rejection order holding
that the petitioners are found not eligible while
considering the case of Dr. Suman Tripathy for
appointment to the post of Dental Surgeon in
Group-A (Junior) OMS (Dental Cadre) vide the
order dated 30.07.2022, under Annexure-8 to the
writ application, is hereby quashed. Further, the
Opposite Party-OPSC is directed to recommend the
two petitioners as they have secured more than
cutoff mark. On such recommendation, the
Opposite Party No.1 shall do well to appoint the
Petitioner in the post of Dental Surgeon in Group-A
(Junior) OMS (Dental Cadre) pursuant to the
advertisement under Annexure-1 within a period
of two months from the date of communication of a
copy of this judgment. The appointment of the Dr.
Suman Tripathy, shall stand as she has secured
more mark than the cutoff mark. While appointing
the Petitioners, the Opposite Parties shall give
seniority at par with their batch mates, however,
the Petitioners shall not claim any back wages/
salary or other service benefits as they have not
worked for such period.
4. The Appellants, represented through the Secretary and
Chairman of the OPSC are assailing the impugned judgment
of learned Single Judge on the following grounds: –
i. That the direction issued by the learned Single
Judge to recommend the names of the Respondents to
the Government for appointment to the post of
Dental Surgeon (Group-A), pursuant to
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Advertisement No. 15 of 2017-18, is contrary to lawand unsustainable in the facts of the case.
ii. That the learned Single Judge erred in holding
that the OPSC lacked competence to revise the cut-off
marks after publication of the initial merit list,
particularly when such revision was necessitated by
correction of erroneous answer keys based on the
report of the Expert Committee.
iii. That the learned Single Judge failed to
appreciate that the Respondents had secured 192.002
and 191.210 marks respectively, which are below the
revised cut-off mark of 192.558 for the UR (Male)
category, and therefore were not entitled to
recommendation. It is further contended that
pursuant to the revised merit list, there were four
other candidates who stood higher in merit but had
neither sought re-evaluation nor approached this
Court, and that the impugned direction granting
appointment to the Respondents overlooks this
material aspect, thereby rendering the order legally
untenable.
5. The Respondents, on the other hand, represented
through their respective counsel, vehemently oppose the
grounds urged by the Appellants and contended that the
Page 8 of 26
learned Single Judge is justified in allowing the writ
petitions directing the Appellants to recommend their
names for appointment to the post of Dental Surgeon
(Group-A), Junior, Odisha Medical Service (Dental) Cadre
pursuant to Advertisement No. 15 of 2017-18. It is contended
that once the Expert Committee found material errors in the
original answer key and the merit list stood revisited
pursuant to judicial directions, the Respondents could not be
denied consideration in accordance with the corrected
evaluation. According to them, the action of the OPSC in
revising the cut-off score after publication of the earlier
merit list, while simultaneously permitting appointments of
candidates who had secured lesser marks, is arbitrary and
violative of the principles of equality under Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution. It is further submitted that the
learned Single Judge has merely restored fairness to the
selection process and no interference is warranted in appeal.
6. The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the
materials placed on record, proceeded on the premise that
once the initial merit list was published and
recommendations were made on the basis of the cut-off
marks declared therein, the OPSC could not subsequently
revise the cut-off to the detriment of the writ petitioners. The
learned Single Judge held that such upward revision, after
Page 9 of 26
conclusion of the selection process and recommendation of
candidates, amounted to altering the selection criteria
midway thereby “changing the rule of game”, which is
impermissible in law. Taking note of the fact that certain
candidates who had secured marks lower than the writ
petitioners were appointed, the learned Single Judge found
the action of the OPSC to be arbitrary and discriminatory. On
such reasoning, the writ petitions were allowed with a
direction to the OPSC to recommend the names of the
petitioners for appointment to the post of Dental Surgeon
(Group-A), Junior, Odisha Medical Service (Dental) Cadre
pursuant to Advertisement No. 15 of 2017-18.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the respective
parties and upon perusal of the memorandum of appeal
along with the materials annexed thereto, the questions that
arise for consideration before us in the present appeals may
be delineated as follows: –
i. Whether revision of the cut-off marks
consequent upon correction of erroneous answer keys
amounts to a change in the “rules of the game” so as
to vitiate the selection process?
ii. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified
in directing recommendation of the Respondents
Page 10 of 26
despite their failure to secure the revised cut-off
marks?
iii. Whether, in the facts of the present case,
particularly in view of the appointment of certain
candidates securing lesser marks, the Respondents
are entitled to any equitable or moulded relief?
8. Keeping in view of the factual backdrop, the rival
submissions and the reasons assigned by the learned Single
Judge, it becomes necessary to advert first to the governing
legal principles and thereafter examine their application to
the present case.
9. The doctrine that the “rules of the game” cannot be
altered after commencement of the recruitment process is a
settled principle of service jurisprudence. The Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak and Ors.
vs. Rajasthan High Court and Ors., 2024 Live Law (SC) 864
has authoritatively delineated the contours of this principle.
Relevant paragraph is as follows:
“42. We, therefore, answer the reference in the
following terms:
(1) Recruitment process commences from the issuance
of the advertisement calling for applications and ends
with filling up of vacancies;
(2) Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select
List, notified at the commencement of the recruitment
process, cannot be changed midway through the
recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit,
Page 11 of 26
or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the
extant Rules, so permit. Even if such change is
permissible under the extant Rules or the
advertisement, the change would have to meet the
requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and
satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness;
(3) The decision in K. Manjusree (supra) lays down
good law and is not in conflict with the decision in
Subash Chander Marwaha (supra). Subash Chander
Marwaha (supra) deals with the right to be appointed
from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree (supra)
deals with the right to be placed in the Select List. The
two cases therefore deal with altogether different
issues;
(4) Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may
devise appropriate procedure for bringing the
recruitment process to its logical end provided the
procedure so adopted is transparent, non-
discriminatory/ nonarbitrary and has a rational nexus
to the object sought to be achieved.
(5) Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on
the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and
eligibility. However, where the Rules are non-
existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill
in the gaps;
(6) Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible
right to appointment. The State or its instrumentality
for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the
vacancies. However, if vacancies exist, the State or its
instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment
to a person within the zone of consideration in the
select list.”
10. Similarly, in the book Services Under the State,
authored by M. Rama Jois, while dealing with recruitment
jurisprudence, it is observed as follows:
Page 12 of 26
“Subsequent change of qualification – no ground for
invalidating an earlier appointment: A person is entitled
to be appointed if he possesses the qualification
prescribed in the rules of recruitment at the time
when the recruitment takes place. When a person
who is eligible for recruitment under the rules in force
is recruited to the service under the state, his
appointment cannot be invalidated on the basis of
change in the new recruitment rules.1 His eligibility
would be tested on the basis of the qualification as
they stood prior to the change.2
Subsequent derecognition – no effect: The qualification of
a person for being recruited is with reference to the
date on which he is selected and appointed.
Therefore, when the qualification prescribed for
recruitment was a diploma in the concerned subject
and the qualification possessed by an appointee had
been recognised as equivalent to the diploma by the
competent authority, termination of service on the
ground that the said qualification was subsequently
derecognised is illegal.3
Relaxation of qualification: The recruitment in deviation
of the published qualifications amounts to arbitrary
exercise of power hit by articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution.4 Usually, rules regulating recruitment
empower the designated authority to relax the
qualification prescribed for recruitment to the post.
Such relaxation can be made only in public interest
and having due regard to the special qualifications,
experience or competence of a particular individual.
A general relaxation of the qualification invoking
such power is wholly without authority of law.5 Also
no relaxation can be made where persons possessing
qualification as advertised are available and have1 J J. Murlidhar v. State ofAP, SLR 1971 (1) AP 523.
2 Gopal Krushna Rath v. M. A. A. Baig, (dead) by LRS, AIR 1999 SC 209.
3 Miss Rashmi v. State of Punjab, SLR 1983 (1) P & 3.
4 See Shri Kuldip Chand v. Union of India. 1970 SLR 406 (Del).
5 I.S. Goel v. State ofHaryana, SLR 1983 (1) P& H 763.
Page 13 of 26
submitted their applications6 or where no relaxation
clause is mentioned in the advertisement.7 Relaxation,
however, does not mean doing away with the criteria
altogether.8″
…
At pp. 461: “No right for appointment: (a) The mere
inclusion in the list of selected candidates does not
create a right in a person included in the list to get
himself appointed irrespective of the existence of
vacancies.9 Further in spite of the availability of
vacancies, it is open to the appointing authority to
appoint out of the list of selected candidates such
number of persons according to its requirement. 10 A
person included in the list has no right to compel the
appointing authority to appoint all the persons
included in the list. However, it has been held that the
candidates enlisted do enjoy some right in terms of
principles of legitimate expectation.11”
At pp. 466: “Appointing authority has no power to
reassess the suitability of selected candidate: When the
law governing the selection and appointment to any
post under the State provides for the constitution of a
selection committee or board of appointment and the
appointing authority is required to make
appointments in accordance with the
recommendations made by such committee or board,
the appointing authority cannot make a reassessment
of the suitability of the candidates for appointment
and deny appointment to a selected candidate on the
ground that in its view he is not suitable for6 Swaran Lata v. Union of India. (1979) 3 SCC 165.
7 Virendra Nath Gupta v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1990 SC 1148; Shianda Hasan v.
State of UP. AIR 1990 SC 1381.
8 K. Shekar v. Indiramma, AIR 2002 SC 1230.
9 Also see. Union of India v. Kali Dass Batish, Decided on Jan. 5, 2006; Shankarasan
Dash, ibid.
10 Also see, State of UP v. Om Prakash. (2006) 6 SCC 474; Batiarani Gramlya Bank v.
Pallab Kumar, (2004) 9 SCC 100; N. Mohanan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 189.
11 R. S. Mittal v. Union of India, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 230.
Page 14 of 26
appointment. The decision regarding suitability in
such a case is exclusively within the power of the
selecting authority. The appointing authority,
however, has the power to decline to make
appointment if it finds that the selected candidate
does not possess the prescribed qualification or
suffers from disqualification or that any mandatory
procedure required to be followed in advertising the
post or making the selection had not been
followed.12″
11. In light of the settled legal position and the reasoning
adopted by the learned Single Judge, we now proceed to
examine the issues arising for determination in the present
appeals.
Issue (i): Whether the revision of cut-off marks pursuant to
correction of answer keys amounts to a change in the “Rules
of the Game”?
12. The foundational question is whether the act of
revising the cut-off marks after re-evaluation of fifteen
incorrect answer keys constitutes an impermissible alteration
of recruitment norms midstream.
13. The governing constitutional position has been
authoritatively settled by the Constitution Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra). The
Court held that the doctrine that the “rules of the game”
12Dr. A. V. Venkata Ratnam v. Chancellor, University of Mysore, ILR 1981(l)Kar630:
SLR 1981 (2) 486; S. Virupakshaiah v. Chancellor, Bangalore University, ILR 1981 (1)
Kar 1068.
Page 15 of 26
cannot be changed after commencement of the selection
process is rooted in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Recruitment begins with the issuance of advertisement and
ordinarily the eligibility criteria, method of selection, and
standards prescribed therein cannot be altered thereafter.
However, the Court clarified that the doctrine is not absolute.
A modification may be permissible if founded upon a
compelling public interest and if it satisfies the tests of
transparency, non-arbitrariness, and rational nexus with the
object sought to be achieved. The distinction, therefore, is
between the Alteration of recruitment norms (such as
eligibility, qualifications, or method of selection); and
Rectification of errors in implementation of those norms.
14. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the
advertisement prescribed the eligibility conditions and the
method of selection. The written examination was conducted
in terms thereof. Upon objections raised by the candidates,
an expert committee examined the answer keys. Fifteen
answer keys were found demonstrably erroneous. Re-
evaluation was conducted uniformly for all candidates. The
revised cut-off for Male (UR) category shifted from 189.558 to
192.558 as a mathematical consequence.
15. Admittedly, there was no alteration in eligibility, no
introduction of a new stage of selection, and no change in the
Page 16 of 26
evaluation scheme. What changed was the accuracy of
assessment. The shift in cut-off marks was derivative and
consequential, not normative. A candidate cannot claim a
vested right in an erroneous answer key or in a merit
position founded upon incorrect evaluation. Correction of
demonstrable mistakes is an incident of maintaining
institutional integrity. A re-evaluation uniformly applied to
all candidates preserves, rather than subverts, Article 14.
Accordingly, the revision of cut-off marks in the present case
cannot be characterised as a change in the “rules of the
game.”
Issue (ii): Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in
directing recommendation of the Respondents despite their
failure to secure the revised cut-off marks?
16. Once it is established that the revised cut-off marks
were lawfully determined, the legal consequence is
inevitable. Admittedly, upon re-evaluation, the Respondents
did not secure marks equal to or above the revised cut-off.
Their claim rests upon the earlier cut-off fixed prior to
correction of answer keys.
17. It is settled law that inclusion in a select list or securing
marks above a cut-off does not confer an indefeasible right to
appointment. The Constitution Bench in Tej Prakash Pathak
Page 17 of 26
(supra) reiterated that even where vacancies exist, a
candidate has no enforceable right to be appointed unless the
governing rules so mandate. The State must respect merit
order, but the mere fact of shortlisting or provisional
qualification does not create a vested entitlement. The
revised merit list alone represents the legally sustainable
evaluation outcome. Once the correction of answer keys is
upheld as valid, the earlier merit position loses juridical
significance. The Respondents cannot predicate a right upon
a superseded and erroneous evaluation framework.
18. Judicial review in matters of recruitment is
circumscribed. Courts do not substitute their assessment for
that of expert bodies, particularly in academic or evaluative
domains, unless the process is vitiated by illegality, mala
fides, or arbitrariness. In the present case, the correction was
based on expert opinion and applied uniformly.
Issue (iii): Whether the admitted recommendation of less
meritorious candidates during pendency of proceedings
vitiates the process and attracts the doctrine of legitimate
expectation?
19. On record, the Appellants have admitted that during
pendency of proceedings, certain candidates who had
secured marks below even the pre-revised cut-off were
Page 18 of 26
recommended and appointed. Two such names, namely Dr.
Sriprada Dash and Dr. Debashish Sahoo, were specifically
referred to, having secured 188.108 and 187.934 respectively.
This development introduces a constitutional dimension
distinct from the issue of revised cut-off.
20. The doctrine of legitimate expectation, as observed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sivanandan C T and Others
vs. High Court of Kerala and Others, AIRONLINE 2017 SC
609 is grounded in the principles of good administration, as
follows:
“43. The underlying basis for the application of the
doctrine of legitimate expectation has expanded and
evolved to include the principles of good
administration. Since citizens repose their trust in the
state, the actions and policies of the state give rise to
legitimate expectations that the state will adhere to its
assurance or past practice by acting in a consistent,
transparent, and predictable manner. The principles
of good administration require that the decisions of
public authorities must withstand the test of
consistency transparency, and predictability to avoid
being regarded as arbitrary and therefore violative of
Article 14.
44. From the above discussion, it is evident that the
doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is
entrenched in Indian administrative law subject to the
limitations on its applicability in given factual
situations. The development of Indian jurisprudence
is keeping in line with the developments in the
common law. The doctrine of substantive legitimate
expectation can be successfully invoked by
individuals to claim substantive benefits or
Page 19 of 26
entitlements based on an existing promise or practice
of a public authority. However, it is important to
clarify that the doctrine of legitimate expectation
cannot serve as an independent basis for judicial
review of decisions taken by public authorities. Such
a limitation is now well recognized in Indian
jurisprudence considering the fact that a legitimate
expectation is not a legal right. It is merely an
expectation to avail a benefit or relief based on an
existing promise or practice. Although the decision by
a public authority to deny legitimate expectation may
be termed as arbitrary, unfair, or abuse of power, the
validity of the decision itself can only be questioned
on established principles of equality and non-
arbitrariness under Article 14. In a nutshell, an
individual who claims a benefit or entitlement based
on the doctrine of legitimate expectation has to
establish: (i) the legitimacy of the expectation; and (ii)
that the denial of the legitimate expectation led to the
violation of Article 14.”
21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that state action must
exhibit consistency, transparency, and predictability. While
legitimate expectation is not a legal right in itself, denial
thereof must withstand scrutiny under Article 14. An
individual invoking the doctrine must establish the
legitimacy of the expectation; and that denial thereof resulted
in violation of Article 14.
22. In the present case, the Respondents participated in a
recruitment process where a uniform advertisement was
issued; Cut-off marks were notified; and the process was
subjected to judicial scrutiny. During such scrutiny,
Page 20 of 26
candidates below the benchmark were recommended. While
it is correct that Article 14 does not mandate negative
equality, illegality cannot be perpetuated merely because it
has been committed in another case, the situation here stands
on a different footing. The alleged irregularity occurred
within the same recruitment cycle and during the pendency
of adjudication. The action was neither explained as an
exceptional policy decision nor justified on any rational
criteria.
23. Such selective recommendation undermines
transparency and predictability in public recruitment. The
State, as a model employer, is constitutionally obligated to
adhere to uniform standards. Any deviation must be justified
on objective grounds. No such justification is forthcoming. At
the same time, the Court cannot unsettle appointments
already made, particularly when third-party rights have
crystallised. The balance between institutional integrity and
individual equity must therefore be carefully calibrated.
24. In these peculiar circumstances, the Respondents
cannot claim appointment as of right on the basis of the
revised merit list. Yet, the admitted selective
recommendation of less meritorious candidates during
pendency of proceedings introduces arbitrariness in
implementation. The exclusion of the Respondents, when
Page 21 of 26
others similarly or less placed were accommodated, offends
the constitutional mandate of non-arbitrariness.
25. The appropriate course is not to invalidate the entire
selection nor to disturb existing appointments, but to mould
relief in a manner that restores parity without unsettling
settled rights.
26. Further, in the aforesaid context, it is apposite to
observe that revision of answer keys is a remedial measure
undertaken to rectify demonstrable errors and does not
amount to an arbitrary alteration of the recruitment Rules.
Where the initial key answer is found to be incorrect, the
authority is under an obligation to correct the same, even if
such correction logically results in a change in the cut-off
marks.
27. In a catena of decisions, the Courts have held that
where the object of the selection process is to identify the
most meritorious candidates, correction of erroneous answer
keys to ensure preparation of an accurate merit list does not
offend the doctrine that the “rules of the game” cannot be
altered midstream. The determinative consideration is that
any revision in marks or cut-off must be uniformly applied to
all candidates without discrimination. It is no longer res
integra that a candidate cannot claim a vested right in an
erroneous answer key or in a cut-off mark derived from a
Page 22 of 26
flawed evaluation. Where objections are raised and the
authority, upon expert scrutiny, corrects the answer key, a
consequential adjustment of cut-off marks to reflect the
corrected evaluation is legally permissible, provided such
action is undertaken to ensure fairness and not to arbitrarily
favour or disfavor any individual candidate.
28. In essence, the Courts have consistently drawn a
distinction between altering recruitment criteria and
correcting mistakes in evaluation. If an answer key is
demonstrably wrong, re-evaluation on the basis of the correct
key becomes necessary to preserve the integrity of the
selection process. Consequently, a resultant shift in the cut-
off marks is merely a mathematical consequence of such
correction and cannot be construed as an impermissible
change in the recruitment criteria or as a modification of the
“rules of the game.”
Conclusion
29. In view of the discussions and observations made
hereinabove, we respectfully disagree with the learned Single
Judge in holding that the revised cut-off marks resorted to by
the Appellants pursuant to the re-evaluation of the answer
keys amounted to a change in the “rules of the game” and in
Page 23 of 26
declaring the action of the Appellants to be arbitrary on that
count.
30. Interestingly, however, it is borne out from the record,
as admitted by the Appellants, that while the matter was
under judicial scrutiny, the Appellants hastily recommended
the names of certain candidates who had secured marks
below the cut-off fixed prior to re-evaluation. Two such
names appearing on record are Dr. Sriprada Dash and Dr.
Debashish Sahoo, who secured 188.108 and 187.934 marks
respectively. This demonstrates that candidates less
meritorious than the Respondents were also recommended
for appointment against the advertised posts. This is indeed
disturbing. We do not hesitate to observe that such action on
the part of the Appellants reflects a closed-door exercise
which has the effect of frustrating a fair recruitment process
by resorting to a backdoor method of selection. Such a course
is impermissible in service jurisprudence and cannot be
countenanced under any circumstances.
31. This is a fit case where the matter requires to be
reopened for the purpose of fixing responsibility upon the
erring officials and for recovery of exemplary costs, which
we quantify at Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only), in an
appropriate enquiry to be conducted under the supervision
of the Chief Secretary of the State.
Page 24 of 26
32. Admittedly, the Respondents did not secure the
revised cut-off marks so as to be eligible for recommendation
after re-evaluation. It has been stated at the Bar that almost
all candidates pursuant to Advertisement No. 15 of 2017/18
have been accommodated, barring the present Respondents.
It is also evident that such accommodation includes
candidates who had secured marks lower than the notified
cut-off, both prior to and even after its revision. The
Respondents are educationally qualified and otherwise fulfil
the eligibility criteria for appointment to the advertised post.
33. While strict adherence to the Rules is the governing
norm, Courts, in rare and peculiar circumstances, have
intervened to prevent manifest injustice where candidates,
owing to compelling circumstances, could not be
accommodated despite successfully participating in a duly
notified recruitment process. In the present case, the
Respondents had legitimately aspired for appointment,
having secured the cut-off marks initially fixed by the
Appellants. It was only on account of the subsequent re-
evaluation of answer keys and consequential revision of cut-
off marks that they stood excluded from selection.
34. In these circumstances, and without disturbing the
appointments already made, since such appointees have
accrued rights to the posts, we are inclined to direct the
Page 25 of 26
Appellants to accommodate the two Respondents against
existing vacancies in the post of Dental Surgeon (Group-A),
Junior, Odisha Medical Service (Dental) Cadre. Such
accommodation shall, however, operate prospectively.
With the above observations, these Writ Appeals
stand disposed of, cost being made easy.
A copy of this judgment shall be forthwith
communicated to the Chief Secretary of the State for ensuring
compliance with the directions contained hereinabove, at
Paragraph 31, at the earliest.
(Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
I, Agree.
(Dixit Krishna Shripad)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 25th Day of February, 2026/ Bijay
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SARBANI DASH
Designation: Junior Stenographer
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 26-Feb-2026 10:20:56
Page 26 of 26
