Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Chhoti Devi Tomar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 February, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
ON THE 24th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 18632 of 2021
SMT. CHHOTI DEVI TOMAR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Anil Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Sohit Mishra -GA for the respondents/State.
ORDER
Petitioner has filed this writ petition praying for a direction to
respondents to pay her full pay and allowances for the period of suspension
from 1/9/1999 to 30/8/2016. She has also prayed for interest on the aforesaid
amount.
2. Facts necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner was
working as ANM and was posted at Sub-Health Centre, Badapura under
Community Health Centre, Porsa, District Morena. A criminal case was
registered against the petitioner at Police Station Mahua, District Morena for
offence punishable under Section 307, 294, 341 & 34 of IPC. In connection
with the said criminal case, she was arrested by the Police. Resultantly, she
was placed under suspension by the respondents on 1/9/1999.
3. After investigation, the challan was filed and the petitioner was tried
for the aforesaid offences. Trial concluded with judgment dated 18/11/2005,
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SOLANKI
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whereby, the petitioner was convicted under Section 307 & 34 of IPC and
was directed to undergo imprisonment for five years with fine. Petitioner
challenged the said judgment of conviction and sentence before this Court by
filing Cr.A. No.810/2005. Criminal Appeal was allowed vide judgment dated
23/3/2017 (Annexure P/2) and the petitioner stood acquitted.
4. While the criminal appeal was pending before this Court, the
petitioner attained the age of superannuation and stood retired from service
w.e.f. 31/8/2016. After acquittal in the criminal case, she approached
respondents for regularization of period of her suspension. Accordingly, vide
impugned order dated 25/1/2019 (Annexure P/1), the period of suspension
has been treated as on duty for all purposes except for pay and allowances
for the said period. The petitioner is thus aggrieved by the denial of monetary
benefit of full pay & allowances for the suspension period and is therefore,
filed the present writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the impugned order on
the ground that once the petitioner is acquitted in the criminal case, the very
foundation of placing her under suspension vanished. He accordingly
submitted that petitioner’s suspension was unjustified and she is entitled to
get full pay and allowances for the said period. Learned counsel also
submitted that even though no charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner,
however, an enquiry was conducted by the enquiry officer and he gave a
verdict vide his report (filed at page no.13 of the reply) that the petitioner is
not entitled for pay and allowances for the period of suspension. It is his
submission that by denying the monetary benefits, petitioner has been
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punished for the offence in which she has been acquitted by the Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of Apex
Court in the case of Brahma Chandra Gupta Vs. Union of India, reported in
AIR 1984 SC 380 and the order passed by this Court in the case of Brijesh
Singh Kushwaha Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. passed in W.P. No.22404/2021 to
submit that once the petitioner is acquitted in the criminal case, the reason
on account of which she was placed under suspension vanished. The learned
counsel therefore, submitted that the petitioner’s suspension was unjustified
and therefore, he should be paid full pay and allowances for the said period.
6. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents supported the
impugned action of the respondents and submitted that the petitioner got
involved in the criminal case because of her own acts and the respondents
were not instrumental in her prosecution. He further submitted that the
petitioner was arrested by the police, she was required to be placed under
suspension. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner’s suspension was
unjustified. He further submitted that the respondents have treated the
suspension period of the petitioner as on duty for all purposes except the
benefit of full pay & allowances. He referred to provisions of FR 54-B in
support of his submissions. It is his submission that the competent authority
since did not find the suspension of petitioner as wholly unjustified, she is
rightly denied full pay & allowances for the period of suspension. He relied
upon Division Bench judgment in the case of Ramesh Singh Vs. M.P. State
Electricity Board reported in 2011(1) MPLJ 466 as also in the case of Pratap
Singh vs. State of M.P. & ors. passed in W.A. No.2397/2025 . The learned
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counsel thus prayed for dismissal of writ petition.
7. Considered the arguments and perused the record.
8. In relation to his prosecution in the criminal case, the petitioner
remained under suspension from 1/9/1999 till 31/8/2016 i.e. the date of her
retirement. It is not in dispute that criminal prosecution of the petitioner was
not at the instance of the respondents. Further, since the petitioner was
arrested by police, it was incumbent on the part of respondents to place her
under suspension by virtue of Rule 9(2)(a) of M.P. Civil Services
(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966. Thus, it cannot be said that
the action of the respondents in placing the petitioner under suspension was
unjustified.
9. The regularization/treatment of period of suspension of a Govt.
servant is governed by the provisions of FR 54-B. Sub-rule (3) of FR 54-B is
relevant for consideration of the controversy involved in this case and is thus
extracted below:
“(3) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the
opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the
Government servant shall subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8)
be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been
entitled had he not been suspended:
Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the
termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government
servant had been delayed due to reason directly attributable to the
Government servant it may, after giving him an opportunity to
make his representation [within 60 days from the date on which
the communication in this regard is served in him] and afterSignature Not Verified
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considering the representation if any, submitted by him direct, for
reasons to be recorded in writing that the Government servant
shall be paid for the period of such delay only such [amount (not
being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine.”
Thus, from reading FR 54-B(3), it is evident that full pay &
allowances are payable to the employee only when the competent authority
forms an opinion that the suspension of the employee was wholly
unjustified. In other words, it is only when the authority comes to the
conclusion that suspension was wholly unjustified, the pay and allowances
for the period of suspension are liable to be paid to the employee. In this
Case, there is no such finding recorded by the competent authority nor the
petitioner could establish that his suspension was wholly unjustified.
10. The issue involved in this case was considered by the Division
Bench of this Court in the case of Ramesh Singh (supra), wherein, the
Division Bench held in para 7 as under:-
“7.Thus, from perusal of F.R. 54-B(3) of the Fundamental Rules it
is apparent that the authority who is competent to pass order of
reinstatement is required to form an opinion as to whether
suspension was wholly unjustified. If the authority comes to the
conclusion that suspension was wholly unjustified, then the
incumbent would be entitled to full pay and allowances under sub-
rule (8) of Rule 54-B. In the instant case, the competent authority
vide order dated 31.3.2010 which was assailed in the writ petition
by the appellant, has found that suspension of the appellant was
mandatory as challan against him was filed in the Court for a
criminal case. The appellant was acquitted by the court only by
giving benefit of doubt, therefore, it cannot be said to be wholly
unjustified. Accordingly, the period of suspension from 25.3.2000Signature Not Verified
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to 22.9.2002 was directed to be treated as on duty and his pay and
allowances for the said period were restricted to the subsistence
allowance already paid to him. Thus, cogent reasons have been
assigned by the competent authority while passing the order in
terms of Rule 54-B(3) of the Fundamental Rules. The discretion
conferred by the rule has rightly been exercised by the competent
authority.”
11. Similar view was taken by this Court in the case of Pratap Singh
vs. State of M.P. & ors. In W.P. No.165 of 2024 . The order passed in writ
petition has been affirmed by Division Bench in W.A. No.2397/2025 holding
as under:
“10. As in the present appeal, appellant was arrested on
22.07.2017 in pursuance to the criminal case and he was remained
in custody up to 26.07.2017 which is more than 48 hours,
therefore, he was placed under suspension w.e.f. 22.07.2017. The
said suspension on account of arrest in a criminal case which was
under Rule 9(2)(a) (deeming clause) of Rules 1966 on account of
custody for more than 48 hrs., the authority had no other option
but to place employee under suspension under the deeming clause
of Rule 9(2)(a) of Rules 1966. Therefore, the said suspension
cannot be treated as unjustified even in case of acquittal also,
because at the time of suspension it was justified under deeming
clause of Rule 9(2) of Rules 1966.
11. Once it is held that suspension of employee was not wholly
unjustified, he cannot be held entitled to pay allowances for the
period of suspension. As at the time of suspension, there was no
other option but to suspend the appellant on account of his custody
in a criminal case. Merely because he was acquitted, the said
suspension of petitioner which was under the statutory rulesSignature Not Verified
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cannot be treated as wholly unjustified.”
12.The issue regarding payment of back-wages to an employee who
was dismissed from service on account of conviction in criminal case and
was later reinstated on his acquittal, has been dealt with by Apex Court at
more than one occasion. In the case of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore vs.
Gujarat Electricity Board reported in (1996)11 SCC 603 , the Court was
dealing with an issue regarding payment of back wages to an employee who
was dismissed from service on account of his conviction in the criminal case.
The Court held thus:
“2. This case does not warrant interference for the reason that,
admittedly, the petitioner was charged for an offence under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for his involvement in a
crime committed on 1-10-1986. The Sessions Judge had convicted
the petitioner under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and
sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. On that basis, the
respondents had taken action to have him dismissed from service
since he was working as a Junior Clerk in the respondent-
Electricity Board. The petitioner challenged the validity of the
dismissal order by way of a special civil application filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Pending disposal, the Division
Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated 14-10-1992
acquitted him of the offence. Consequently, while disposing of the
writ petition, the learned Single Judge directed the respondent to
reinstate him into the service with continuity of the service, but
denied back wages. The petitioner then filed Letters Patent Appeal
No. 319 of 1993 which was dismissed by the impugned order
dated 26-8-1993. Thus, this special leave petition.
3.The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already
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been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he
is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself
in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in
service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is
entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was
terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso
to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of
back wages would be considered only if the respondents have
taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was
found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented
from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes
relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop.
In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime,
though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from
rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in
jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to
payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting
interference.”
13. The similar view was taken by Apex Court in the case of Union of
India vs. Jaipal Singh reported in (2004)1 SCC 121 , wherein the Court held
thus:
“4.On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on
record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice,
we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a
special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons
therefor does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or
constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon
by the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically
recorded therefor it operates as a binding precedent as well. On
going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with theSignature Not Verified
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view taken in Ranchhodji [(1996) 11 SCC 603 : 1997 SCC (L&S)
491] . If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the
person concerned was at the behest of or by the department itself,
perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as
a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a
criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial court, he
gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in
any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service,
since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so
kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the
reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are
not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as
well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing
reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be
reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was
on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the
appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the
respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants
cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could
not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our
view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also,
without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations.
Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar as it directed
payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside.”
14. The aforesaid legal proposition is reiterated by Apex Court in the
case of Crop. Mithilesh Kumar Vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in
(2020)12 SCC 423.
15.The aforesaid judgments by Apex Court held that a Govt. Servant is
not entitled to back wages if he got involved in a criminal case for his own
acts and the department is not responsible for his prosecution and resultant
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conviction. This is because, the department could not avail his services while
he was out of service because of his conviction. The matter is held to be
different if the prosecution was at the instance of department.
16. Similar is the case with an employee who is suspended because of
his involvement in criminal case, lodged not at the instance of department
but at the instance of a third person with which department is not concerned.
In such case also, under the service rules, the department is obliged to place
the employee under suspension and is thus not in a position to avail services
of the Govt. servant. As is held by Apex Court in aforementioned cases, the
employer cannot be burdened with payment of back wages in such cases.
Similarly, as has been held by Division Benches of this Court in the case of
Ramesh Singh and Pratap Singh (supra), the suspension in these
circumstances would not be wholly unjustified and the concerned Govt.
servant would not be entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of
suspension even when he is acquitted in the criminal case. This is because,
on his arrest, the suspension is inevitable.
17. The issue was also considered by Apex Court in the case of
Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan reported in (2012)13
SCC 94. It was a case where a Judicial Magistrate was prosecuted for charge
of murder. On account of his arrest, he was placed under suspension by
Rajasthan High Court on 22.12.1985. He remained under suspension till his
acquittal by Trial Court and thereafter the appeal against acquittal was
decided by High Court. His suspension still continued since the High Court
initiated disciplinary proceedings thereafter wherein also the employee was
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exonerated. At this stage his suspension was revoked by High Court on
26.03.2008. He thus remained under suspension for a long period of time
from 22.12.1985 to 26.03.2008. While deciding the issue as to whether the
petitioner is entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of suspension
or not, the Apex Court divided the entire period into different stages. The
extract of the Apex Court judgment is reproduced hereunder-
“29.The only issue that needs to be resolved at this stage is as to
whether the petitioner would be entitled only to the subsistence
allowance as already paid to him or full salary and allowances, in
view of his acquittal in the criminal case and the exoneration in
departmental proceedings. Related to the aforesaid issue would be
a consequential issue of notional promotion from the date an
officer junior to him was promoted in the Rajasthan Judicial
Service and the consequential entitlement to the emoluments on
the promotional post, which in turn would determine the amount
of suspension allowance and the other retiral benefits.
xxx xxx xxx
35.We have examined the entire issue keeping the aforesaid
principles in mind. In order to determine the issue relating to the
entitlement of the petitioner to the salary and other allowance(s)
upon reinstatement, the matter needs to be examined at the
different stages/point of time. The first stage commenced at the
time when the petitioner was initially suspended on 22-12-1985
w.e.f. 20-12-1985. The petitioner, in our opinion, cannot
legitimately protest against his suspension, at the initial stage,
when he had remained in police custody for more than forty-eight
hours, though unfortunately for circumstances for which he was
not responsible. This suspension was naturally continued when he
was facing the trial for murder.
xxx xxx xxx
39. As noticed above, Mr Calla has submitted that the suspension
of the petitioner should have been revoked at this stage. It will not
be possible to accept the proposition that as soon as the trial court
had acquitted the petitioner, the Rajasthan High Court was
required to forthwith revoke the order of suspension.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner could have been given a non-sensitive
posting, not involving judicial functions. But, it was not
imperative for the High Court to revoke the suspension, at that
stage. It is a matter of record, that the prosecuting agency decided
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to file an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the trial
court, acquitting the petitioner. The appeal filed by CBI was
admitted by the Delhi High Court and remained pending till it was
decided on 27-9-2005 [State v. Gurpal Singh, (2005) 124 DLT
282] . Therefore, the conclusions recorded by the trial court, were
not final. They were liable to be reversed in appeal by the High
Court. Thus, during the said period/stage, it cannot be said that the
continuance of the suspension of the petitioner was wholly
unjustified. Merely because the High Court could have revoked
the suspension, would not render the decision to continue the
suspension, wholly unjustified.
xxx xxx xxx
52. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition. We reject the
submissions of Mr Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was
rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by the trial court. We
also reject the submissions of Mr Calla that the suspension of the
petitioner was wholly unjustified during the pendency of the
appeal before the High Court. We, however, hold that the
continued suspension of the petitioner during the pendency of the
departmental proceedings was wholly unjustified. The petitioner
is, therefore, held entitled to full pay and allowances from 27-9-
2005 i.e. the date of the judgment [State v. Gurpal Singh, (2005)
124 DLT 282] rendered by the Delhi High Court onwards. We
further hold that the petitioner was entitled to be considered for
promotion notionally from the date when an officer junior to him
was promoted. We, therefore, direct the High Court to consider
the case of the petitioner for promotion (if he otherwise satisfies
the requirements as per the Rules) from the date when a person
junior to him was considered and promoted to the next higher post.
Let such a decision be taken by the High Court within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of this order.”
It is thus evident that, even though the petitioner therein was found to
be fully innocent, the period of suspension during the trial was held to be
justified inasmuch as it was inevitable to suspend the petitioner on account
of his arrest in criminal case. He was thus held not entitled to pay &
allowances for this period and was granted the same for the period thereafter.
The issue thus stood conclusively decided by Apex Court in the case of
Gurpal Singh (supra) .
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18. This Court has also considered the similar issue in the case of
Vijay Kumar Sharma Vs. MPMKVVCom. Ltd. & Ors. , passed in W.P.
No.6869/2023, which has been confirmed by the Division Bench in W.A.
No.184/2026.
19. In view of the aforesaid discussion made above, petitioner is not
entitled for the full pay and allowances for the period of suspension.
Impugned order is therefore found to be just and proper, same is accordingly
upheld. Petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(ASHISH SHROTI)
JUDGE
JPS/-
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JAI PRAKASH
SOLANKI
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