Introduction
The statutory framework governing arbitration in India has undergone significant evolution to establish the country as a hub for efficient dispute resolution. Central to this objective is Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which was introduced to address the chronic delays that historically hindered arbitral proceedings. While the 2015 and 2019 amendments aimed to streamline timelines, they simultaneously created a jurisdictional conflict regarding which court possesses the authority to extend an arbitrator’s mandate or substitute the tribunal.
This conflict primarily arises from the tension between the definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e) and the appointment powers of superior courts under Section 11. Recent rulings from the Supreme Court in 2025 and 2026, particularly in the cases of Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 INSC 92 and C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 INSC 112 have provided much-needed finality to these debates, clarifying both the competent forum for Section 29A applications and the court’s power to grant post-facto extensions even after an award is rendered.
Historical Context and the 2015 Amendment Mandate
Before the 2015 amendment, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, did not prescribe a fixed timeline for the completion of arbitral proceedings. This lack of a statutory clock often led to arbitrations stretching over several years, defeating the core purpose of alternative dispute resolution.
The Law Commission of India recognized that the absence of time limits was a significant bottleneck in making India a preferred seat for arbitration. Consequently, the 2015 amendment introduced Section 29A, which mandated that an award in domestic arbitration be made within twelve months from the date the arbitral tribunal entered upon the reference.
Section 29A(1) initially provided that the tribunal entered upon the reference when the arbitrators received notice of their appointment. The amendment also introduced Section 29A(3), allowing parties to extend this twelve-month period by a further six months through mutual consent. Crucially, Section 29A(4) stipulated that if the award was not made within the specified or extended period, the mandate of the arbitrator would terminate unless a court intervened to grant a further extension.
This created a statutory trigger for judicial oversight, ensuring that the arbitral process remained dynamic and time bound. The second proviso to Section 29A(4) and Section 29A(6) were designed as safeguards, empowering the court to extend the mandate for sufficient cause and to substitute arbitrators if the delay was attributable to the tribunal. This framework established a dual-layered control mechanism: a strict statutory timeline followed by a discretionary judicial review.
The 2019 Amendment and the Pleadings Bottleneck under Section 23(4)
Experience with the 2015 amendment revealed that a significant portion of the twelve-month period was often consumed by the filing of statements of claim and defense. To address this, the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, shifted the commencement of the twelve-month period. Under the modified Section 29A(1), the clock now begins only upon the completion of pleadings as per Section 23(4). Section 23(4) itself was introduced to mandate that pleadings be completed within six months from the date the arbitrator receives notice of appointment.
This shift was intended to ensure that the arbitrator has a full twelve months dedicated to the substantive hearing and the drafting of the award. However, the 2019 amendment also introduced a distinction between domestic arbitration and international commercial arbitration (ICA). While domestic arbitrations remain bound by the mandatory timelines of Section 29A, international commercial arbitrations are now excluded from the strict twelve-month limit. Instead, the proviso to Section 29A(1) suggests that in ICAs, the award may be made as expeditiously as possible, with an endeavor to conclude within twelve months.
The Supreme Court in Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Siva Industries and Holdings Ltd., Miscellaneous Application No 2680 of 2019 eventually clarified that the 2019 amendment, being procedural and remedial in nature, applies to all pending arbitral proceedings as of August 30, 2019. Despite these improvements, the precise definition of the “Court” authorized to exercise powers under Section 29A remained a primary source of litigation.
Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule: The Rejection of Status-Based Jurisdiction
The core of the jurisdictional conflict lay in the interpretation of the term “Court” as used in Section 29A(4) and (6). Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines “Court” for domestic arbitration as the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district or a High Court exercising its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. However, in many cases, the arbitrator is appointed by the High Court or the Supreme Court under Section 11, which deals with the appointment of arbitrators when parties cannot agree on a procedure. This led to a split in judicial opinion between a strict textual approach and a contextual approach that favored judicial hierarchy.
In January 2026, the Supreme Court addressed this specific issue in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule (2026 INSC 92). The Court held that the term “Court” in Section 29A must be interpreted as defined in Section 2(1)(e). It clarified that Section 11 is a narrow statutory function aimed solely at the composition of the tribunal.
Once the High Court or Supreme Court performs this task, it becomes functus officio. The Court explicitly rejected the “jurisdictional anomaly” reasoning used by several High Courts, which argued that it would be legally incongruous to permit a subordinate civil court to terminate or substitute the mandate of an arbitrator appointed by a High Court.
The reasoning was anchored in the rule of law. The Court stated that jurisdiction must be vested by law and cannot be inferred based on a perception of judicial hierarchy or status. Referring to A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1988 AIR 1531 the Supreme Court emphasized that institutional rank does not confer jurisdiction where the statute has clearly assigned it to a specific forum.
The Court also clarified that Section 42 (the “first-application rule”) does not route Section 29A applications to the High Court even if a Section 11 application was previously filed there. This is because a Section 11 application is made to the Chief Justice or their designate and is not an application to a “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e).
C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera: The Power to Grant Post-Award Extensions
Beyond the jurisdictional forum, a secondary debate focused on the timing of the application. The question was whether an application for extension could be filed after the arbitrator’s mandate had already expired. The Supreme Court in Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited V. Berger Paints India Limited, 2024 INSC 686 clarified that the power to extend the mandate is available “either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified”.
The Court observed that the termination of the mandate is not absolute but is conditional on the court not granting an extension. This principle established the groundwork for the 2026 decision in C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera (2026 INSC 112), which dealt with post-award extensions.
In C. Velusamy, the arbitrator had passed the award nearly three months after the termination of the mandate. The Supreme Court held that the court’s power and jurisdiction are not impaired by the arbitrator’s “indiscretion” in rendering a late award. The Court clarified that while an award made after the mandate has expired is ineffective and unenforceable under Section 36, it is not a non-entity that prevents a court from exercising its corrective powers under Section 29A.
The Supreme Court described Section 29A as a “toolkit” that allows judges to balance the integrity of the process with the need for a final resolution. This toolkit includes the power to extend time retroactively, reduce arbitrator fees for delays, or substitute arbitrators.
This ruling ensures that the effective delivery of judicial remedies is a constitutional mission, and the arbitral process should be preserved from technical failures. By granting an extension post-award, the court effectively validates the mandate for the period in which the award was rendered, making it enforceable once again.
Substitution and the Limits of Discretionary Power
Section 29A(6) provides that while extending the mandate, the court may substitute one or all of the arbitrators. This power is intended to address situations where the delay is squarely attributable to the tribunal’s conduct. In Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. Bharat Textiles, 2025 INSC 1409 the Supreme Court held that once a mandate has terminated by operation of law, the continuation of the same arbitrator is not automatic. The court is obligated to consider if substitution is warranted to ensure the timely conclusion of the dispute.
However, the 2026 decision in Viva Highways Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 2026 added a layer of caution. The Court clarified that Section 29A does not mandate automatic substitution. Substitution is a discretionary measure that should be exercised if the situation so warrants, but it is not an inevitable consequence of the mandate’s expiry.
If the proceedings have already reached a final stage, such as the reservation of the award, substituting the arbitrator would likely be counterproductive. The power to substitute is consequential to the power to extend time under Section 29A(4). Therefore, following the rule in Jagdeep Chowgule, the authority to substitute also rests with the Principal Civil Court or the High Court with original jurisdiction.
The Section 23(4) Mandatory vs. Directory Debate
The interplay between Section 23(4) and Section 29A(1) is critical for the practical functioning of the arbitration timeline. Since the twelve-month period for the award begins only after the completion of pleadings, any delay at the pleading stage effectively extends the overall timeline for the award. Section 23(4) states that pleadings “shall” be completed within six months, but the Act does not explicitly prescribe consequences for failing to meet this deadline.
This has led to a judicial debate on whether the six-month period for pleadings is mandatory or directory. Some High Courts, like the Calcutta High Court, have ruled that it is directory, reasoning that the absence of a penalty within the section implies that the timeline is a procedural guideline. Others argue that if the six-month period is not treated as mandatory, the entire 18-month framework of Section 29A becomes hollow, as parties could delay pleadings indefinitely.
In 2024, an expert committee recommended reforms to Section 23(4) to provide that pleadings should be completed “expeditiously and, in any event, not later than a period of six months”. This proposed amendment aims to clarify that six months is the outer limit, preventing the pleading stage from becoming a procedural bottleneck.
International Commercial Arbitration and Mandatory Timelines
The 2019 amendment’s exclusion of International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) from the mandatory timelines of Section 29A was a deliberate move to align Indian law with international standards. The proviso to Section 29A(1) now provides that in an ICA, the award “may be made as expeditiously as possible”. The Supreme Court in Tata Sons v. Siva Industries confirmed that for ICAs seated in India, there is no strict statutory limit of twelve months.
This means that the mandate of an arbitrator in an ICA does not automatically terminate after eighteen months, and there is no mandatory requirement for parties to approach a court for extension under Section 29A(4). However, the court’s power to extend time or substitute arbitrators under Section 29A still exists if the parties choose to invoke it. The forum for such applications in ICAs is always the High Court. While domestic arbitrations are handled by the Principal Civil Court, the legislature has reserved oversight of international cases for the higher judiciary to ensure consistency.
Conclusion
The evolution of Section 29A reflects the ongoing maturation of India’s arbitration framework. The legislative intent to curb delays through mandatory timelines was a necessary intervention, but it initially created significant jurisdictional and procedural uncertainty. The Supreme Court’s 2026 rulings in Jagdeep Chowgule and C. Velusamy have provided the final pieces of the statutory puzzle. By anchoring the jurisdictional forum in the definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e) and expanding the court’s power to grant post-facto extensions, the judiciary has created a system that is both disciplined and facilitative.
The rejection of status-based jurisdiction in favor of statutory definitions reinforces the rule of law and simplifies the process for litigants. Furthermore, the recognition that an arbitrator’s failure to meet a deadline should not automatically result in the wastage of the entire arbitral effort is a pragmatic and pro-arbitration stance. It ensures that the focus remains on the substantive resolution of disputes rather than on the rigid application of procedural technicalities.
A nuanced understanding of tribunal timelines also informs procedural fairness in Counterclaims in Indian Arbitration: Limits & Fairness, particularly where delayed adjudication may affect the admissibility and equitable treatment of counterclaims.
