Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Rajaram Sharma S/O Late Shri Shriniwas … vs State Of Rajasthan on 25 February, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:8379]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
(1) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19397/2025
Rajaram Sharma S/o Late Shri Shriniwas Sharma, Aged about
55 years, Resident of 23/98 Swarn Path, Mansarovar, Jaipur-
302020
----Petitioner
Versus
1 State of Rajasthan, through Chief Secretary, Secretariat,
Jaipur, Rajasthan.
2 Department of Personnel, through Secretary, Secretariat,
Jaipur, Rajasthan.
3 Deputy Secretary, Department of Personnel, State of
Rajasthan.
4 Additional Commissioner (First), Departmental Inquiry,
Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
5 Department of Medical, Health & Family Welfare, through
Additional Chief Secretary, Secretariat, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
Connected With
(2) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19398/2025
Rajaram Sharma S/o Late Shri Shriniwas Sharma, Aged about
55 years, Resident of 23/98 Swarn Path, Mansarovar, Jaipur-
302020
—-Petitioner
Versus
1 State of Rajasthan, through Chief Secretary, Secretariat,
Jaipur, Rajasthan.
2 Department of Personnel, through Secretary, Secretariat,
Jaipur, Rajasthan.
3 Deputy Secretary, Department of Personnel, State of
Rajasthan.
4 Additional Commissioner (First), Departmental Inquiry,
Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
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5 Department of Medical, Health & Family Welfare, through
Additional Chief Secretary, Secretariat, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
—-Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. R.N. Mathur Senior Advocate
assisted by Mr. Siddharth Bapna
Advocate, Mr. Abhishek Mewara
Advocate, Mr. Rahul Kumar Advocate
and Ms. Chinki Choudhary Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. Archit Bohra Additional
Government Counsel with Mr. Prakhar
Jain Advocate.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
Date of conclusion of arguments :: 16.02.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved :: 16.02.2026
Whether the full judgment or only
the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement :: 25.02.2026
1. Both the above writ petitions have been filed by the
petitioner feeling aggrieved by two different charge sheets
followed by orders for appointment of enquiry officer to conduct
enquiry against the petitioner. With the consent of the parties,
both the writ petitions were heard together and are being decided
by this common judgment.
S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 19397/2025
2. By way of filing the above writ petition, the petitioner
has assailed the charge sheet dated 19.09.2022 issued under Rule
16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, “the Rules of 1958”), whereby
disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him and the
subsequent order dated 29.10.2025 appointing an Inquiry Officer
is also under challenge.
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3. Facts in brief are that the petitioner was initially
appointed as Drug Inspector on 19.09.1994 and, after rendering
more than two decades of service, was promoted to the post of
Drug Controller on 03.02.2017. He was thereafter given additional
charge of Drugs Controller (First) and Drugs Controller (Second)
on 22.07.2020. The controversy arises out of a letter dated
26.06.2020 whereby the petitioner constituted a seven-members
committee to deliberate upon guidelines issued by the Central
Government concerning prosecution in matters where drugs were
declared not of standard quality. The committee submitted its
report on 29.06.2020, which was forwarded by the petitioner on
01.07.2020 to the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization
through the office of the Drug Controller General of India.
4. Subsequently, the State Government sought an
explanation regarding the constitution of the committee and its
recommendations. After internal examination, the Department of
Personnel issued a memorandum dated 19.09.2022 initiating
disciplinary proceedings under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 on the
allegation that the petitioner had exceeded his authority by
constituting the committee and forwarding its report without
approval of the competent authority.
5. First limb of the Charge was that during his posting
Drug Controller, Rajasthan, Jaipur, the petitioner, without the
permission of the State Government, on 26.06.2020,
unauthorizedly constituted a seven-members committee of
Assistant Drug Controllers to suggest amendments in the
guidelines issued by the Central Government under the said
Section 33P of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (for short, ‘the
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Act of 1940′) in cases of declared substandard category drug
samples. The committee, on 29.06.2020, recommended relaxation
in cases of drug samples declared as substandard category falling
under B-Category in the Central Government’s guidelines, which
the Petitioner hastily approved and, without the State
Government’s permission, on 01.07.2020, wrote a letter to the
Drug Controller General (Government of India) informing him to
apply it in matters of prosecution sanction, and also bound the
three-member screening committee of Assistant Drug Controllers
working under the petitioner, who give opinions on prosecution, to
provide opinions on prosecution in accordance therewith as per
the amendments made in the guidelines issued by the Central
Government under Section 33P of the Act of 1940.
6. Another limb of charge levelled against the petitioner in
the charge sheet was that by exceeding his official powers without
the State Government’s permission and misusing his position to
grant relaxation in cases of substandard drugs and by not granting
prosecution sanction for running cases in respect of drug samples
declared as grossly substandard category, he had directly
attempted to benefit the guilty manufacturers/ institutions/
persons. His aforesaid act is indicative of indiscipline and
negligence against his official duties, for which he was responsible.
7. After exchange of correspondence and consideration of
the petitioner’s reply, an Inquiry Officer was appointed on
29.10.2025. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this
Court.
8. Mr. R. N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner assisted by Mr. Siddharth Bapna, learned counsel
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submitted that the charge-sheet and appointment of Inquiry
Officer are arbitrary, illegal and vitiated by delay. It is argued that
the petitioner merely constituted a committee for better
implementation of existing guidelines and did not alter any
statutory provision. It is submitted that no prior sanction was
required and that the petitioner acted bona fide in discharge of
official duties. It is further contended that there is an inordinate
delay of more than two years in issuing the charge-sheet and
nearly three years in appointing the Inquiry Officer, which has
caused prejudice to the petitioner.
9. Learned Senior Counsel emphatically argued the
impugned charge-sheet is liable to be quashed on account of
gross, inordinate and unexplained delay at every stage of the
proceedings. The alleged misconduct pertains to the constitution
of a committee by the petitioner on 26.06.2020 and the
communication sent to the Director General of Drug Control,
Government of India on 01.07.2020. These facts were fully within
the knowledge of the respondents from the very beginning.
Despite this, the charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the Rules, 1958
came to be issued only on 19.09.2022, after an unexplained delay
of more than two years. No justification or reason for such delay
has been furnished by the respondents. It is a settled principle of
law that unexplained and inordinate delay in initiating disciplinary
proceedings vitiates the same, particularly where the material
facts are borne out from official records and no fresh inquiry was
required to unearth the alleged lapse. The delay, therefore,
renders the action arbitrary and is a significant ground to quash
the charge-sheet.
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10. It was further submitted that even after the petitioner
submitted a detailed reply to the charge-sheet dated 19.09.2022
denying all the charges, however, the Disciplinary Authority failed
to proceed further and took more than three years in appointing
the Enquiry Officer. Such prolonged inaction on the part of the
respondents clearly demonstrates lack of seriousness in the
matter and absence of any urgency or gravity in the alleged
misconduct. The departmental proceedings have, thus, been kept
pending indefinitely, causing serious prejudice to the petitioner.
The cumulative delay, both in issuance of the charge-sheet and in
further steps of the enquiry, vitiates the entire proceedings.
11. It was submitted that the Government of Rajasthan
decisions issued for effectively carrying out the proceedings under
Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958, read with the Handbook of
Disciplinary Proceedings published in 1963, prescribe that
departmental enquiries should ordinarily be concluded within a
maximum period of seven months. In the present case, not only
was there a delay of over two years in issuing the charge-sheet,
but even thereafter the matter has lingered for several years
without meaningful progress. The prescribed time-frame has been
completely disregarded. In view of such extraordinary and
unexplained delay, the impugned charge-sheet is hopelessly
belated and deserves to be quashed on this ground alone.
12. It was further submitted by learned Senior Counsel that
the Disciplinary Authority has proceeded under an erroneous
assumption that the Guidelines issued under Section 33P of the
Act of 1940 are mandatory in nature. The said Guidelines are
merely directory and procedural, intended to facilitate effective
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implementation. Even assuming, without admitting that there was
any deviation, such deviation would not ipso facto amount to
misconduct unless it is shown to be willful, mala fide or resulting
in any apparent loss to the Government. The very foundation of
the charge-sheet is, thus, based on a misconceived assumption,
and is therefore unsustainable.
13. The Guidelines dated 26.11.2020 itself confer powers
upon State Regulatory Authorities to frame Standard Operating
Procedures and to constitute Screening Committees for effective
implementation. The petitioner, at the relevant time, was holding
the post of Drug Controller, which is the highest post in the Drug
Control Organization under the Rajasthan Medical and Health
Service Rules, 1963 (for short ‘the Rules of 1963’). In exercise of
his administrative competence and in discharge of official duties,
the petitioner constituted a seven-member committee and
forwarded suggestions to the DCGI on the basis of the
committee’s report. The actions were taken bona fide, within
jurisdiction, and in the interest of proper administration. There is
neither any allegation of personal gain nor any material to indicate
mala fide intention. Even if the entire charge-sheet is read as it
stands, no misconduct whatsoever is made out against the
petitioner.
14. It is also submitted that the contents of the charge-
sheet are vague, indefinite and devoid of specific particulars. Rule
16(2) of the Rules of 1958 mandates that the charge-sheet must
contain definite and precise charges indicating the specific acts of
omission or commission alleged against the delinquent officer. The
impugned charge-sheet fails to specify which statutory provision
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or rule has been violated and does not disclose how the alleged
acts constitute misconduct. The vague and generalized allegations
deprive the petitioner of a reasonable opportunity to effectively
defend himself and are in clear violation of the principles of
natural justice. A charge-sheet lacking specific and definite
charges is liable to be quashed at the threshold.
15. In view of the foregoing submissions, learned Senior
Counsel reiterated that the impugned charge-sheet suffers from
inordinate and unexplained delay, is founded upon a legally
erroneous premise, does not disclose any misconduct, and is
vitiated by vagueness. The same, therefore, deserves to be
quashed and set aside by this Hon’ble Court. Learned Senior
Counsel placed reliance on judgments delivered by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the cases of A.L. Kalra vs. Project and
Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. (1984) 3 SCC 316,
Union of India & Others vs. J. Ahmed (1979) 2 SCC 286,
Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel vs. Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation & Another, (1985) 2 SCC 35, R.C. Sood vs. High
Court of Judicature at Rajasthan & Others (1998) 5 SCC
493, Union of India & Another vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana,
(2006) 12 SCC 28, M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India & Others,
(2006) 5 SCC 88, Vijay Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Others, (2012) 5 SCC 242 and A. A. Calton vs. Director of
Education & Another, 1983 (3) SCC 33.
16. Per contra, Shri Archit Bohra, learned Additional
Government Counsel vehemently opposed and submitted that the
writ petition was not maintainable at the stage of charge-sheet. It
was contended that the guidelines dated 26.11.2010 were issued
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by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of
India, under Section 33P of the Act of 1940 and were binding in
nature. The petitioner, being simply a drug controller was
expected to follow the guidelines and had no jurisdiction to
constitute a committee to reconsider or dilute such binding
guidelines. It was argued that the petitioner not only constituted
the committee without approval but also forwarded its report to
the Drug Controller General of India with an intention to
implement it alongside the binding guidelines, thereby exceeding
his statutory authority.
17. Learned Additional Government Counsel submitted that
the petitioner has not approached this Court with complete and
correct facts and has sought to create an impression of inordinate
delay in issuance of charge sheet and follow up orders, which is
factually incorrect. Allegation of any delay in issuance of the
charge-sheet was emphatically denied and learned Counsel
clarified that immediately after acquiring knowledge of the
unauthorized report dated 29.06.2020 and the communication
sent by the petitioner to the DCGI on 01.07.2020, a show cause
notice dated 11.01.2021 was issued to the petitioner calling upon
him to explain his conduct. The petitioner submitted his reply on
13.01.2021. Thereafter, the said reply along with the entire record
was examined at the appropriate administrative level. Only after
due consideration and upon being satisfied that disciplinary
proceedings were warranted, a conscious decision was taken to
issue a charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. The
charge-sheet was thereafter issued without any undue delay.
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Thus, the petitioner’s contention that the respondents remained
inactive for two years is misleading and contrary to record.
18. Further, learned Government Counsel submitted that
the petitioner himself contributed substantially to the alleged
delay after issuance of the charge-sheet. Instead of submitting a
comprehensive and final reply, the petitioner chose to file replies
in piecemeal. He repeatedly moved applications seeking inspection
of documents and furnishing of additional records and expressed
unwarranted dissatisfaction regarding the opportunities already
granted to him for inspection. The respondents, in order to ensure
fairness and adherence to principles of natural justice, permitted
inspection and also afforded him a personal hearing prior to
appointment of the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner submitted
additional short reply on 07.05.2025. The said reply as well as
other record was duly examined and, ultimately, vide order dated
29.10.2025, the Enquiry Officer was appointed. Therefore, any
delay, if at all, in appointment of the Enquiry Officer cannot be
attributed to the respondents, but was a direct consequence of the
petitioner’s own conduct and repeated procedural objections.
19. The contention of the petitioner that the Guidelines
issued by the Central Government under Section 33P of the Act of
1940 are merely directory is wholly misconceived. It is submitted
that though issuance of such guidelines by the Central
Government may be discretionary, yet once issued, they are
binding and are required to be mandatorily followed by the State
authorities. The petitioner, being a senior officer in the regulatory
framework, was duty-bound to ensure strict compliance of the said
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guidelines and could not act in deviation thereof on his own
understanding.
20. It is further submitted that merely because the
petitioner was holding the post of Drug Controller, he could not
assume the role or authority of the “State Government”. The term
“State Government” in the relevant statutory and regulatory
framework refers to the competent authority at the level of
Principal Secretary or Secretary to the Government, and not to an
individual departmental head. The petitioner had no authority to
unilaterally constitute a committee in a manner that had the effect
of diluting or modifying the implementation of mandatory Central
Guidelines, nor was he authorized to directly correspond with the
DCGI in a manner suggesting an official policy decision of the
State. The record would reveal that the petitioner, without seeking
prior approval of or even informing the State Government,
constituted a committee and obtained a report which effectively
sought to dilute the mandatory guidelines issued by the Central
Government. More seriously, he proceeded to forward the
recommendations of such an unauthorized committee directly to
the DCGI, advising that offences be dealt with in terms of the
committee’s report. He also directed the officers supposed to grant
sanction for prosecution to act as per the report and not
otherwise. Such conduct is not merely procedural irregularity but
amounts to serious misconduct, reflecting overreach of authority
and disregard for established administrative hierarchy.
21. Learned Additional Government Counsel further
submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner are
specific and clearly indicate the acts of omission and commission
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attributed to him. The charge-sheet sets out the factual
background, the nature of deviation from prescribed guidelines,
and the manner in which the petitioner exceeded his authority.
The petitioner has been fully aware of the allegations and has in
fact submitted detailed replies from time to time, which itself
demonstrates that he clearly understood the charges. The plea of
vagueness is thus an afterthought and untenable.
22. Learned Additional Government Counsel appearing for
the respondents submitted that the scope of judicial interference
at the stage of charge-sheet or during pendency of departmental
enquiry is extremely limited. No interference in the writ
jurisdiction is ordinarily called for unless it is established that the
charge sheet has been issued without jurisdiction or are wholly
illegal on the face of record. Disputed questions of fact and
sufficiency of material are matters to be examined in the course of
enquiry and not in writ jurisdiction.
23. Lastly, it was submitted by learned Additional
Government Counsel appearing for the respondents that mere
delay, even if assumed for the sake of argument, is not by itself a
ground to quash disciplinary proceedings unless the delinquent
employee establishes manifest prejudice. In the present case, the
petitioner has failed to demonstrate any real or specific prejudice
caused to him on account of the alleged delay. On the contrary,
the record shows that adequate opportunity has been provided to
him at every stage. In view of the above, it was submitted that
the charge-sheet has been issued after due application of mind,
the proceedings are being conducted in accordance with law,
hence, no case for interference is made out. Learned Additional
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Government Counsel, in support of his contentions relied upon the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh & Another vs. Akhilesh Jha & Another, 2021
Supreme (SC) 1060, Secretary to Government, Prohibition
and Excise Department vs. L. Srinivasan, 1996 Supreme
(SC) 385, judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in The
District Collector (BCW), West Godavari District & Others
vs. Smt. K.V. Ramana, 2017 Supreme (AP) 453, judgment of
Gurarat High Court in T.K. Vaghela vs. State of Gujarat & 1
Others, 2020 Supreme (Guj) 219, Judgment rendered by Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in Dr. Praveen Kumar Soni vs.
State of Rajasthan & Others (S.B Civil Writ Petition No.
17100/2025 decided on 06.01.2026), Suresh Sharma vs.
State of Rajasthan & Others (S.B Civil Writ Petition No.
18566/2025 decided on 08.01.2026), Laxman Singh Gujar
vs. Rajasthan State Board Transport Corporation (S.B Civil
Writ Petition No. 6611/2011 decided on 19.10.2023) and
Jagdish Prasad Vs. The State of Rajasthan & Others (S.B
Civil Writ Petition No. 13682/2024 decided on 05.03.2025).
24. The Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the
rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material available on record.
25. The principal contention of the petitioner is that the
impugned charge-sheet deserves to be quashed on the ground of
inordinate delay. However, from the record it transpires that upon
the respondents acquiring knowledge of the report dated
29.06.2020 and the communication addressed by the petitioner to
the DCGI on 01.07.2020, a show cause notice was issued to the
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petitioner on 11.01.2021, to which he submitted a reply on
13.01.2021. The material placed before this Court indicates that
the matter was thereafter examined at the appropriate
administrative level and only upon due consideration a decision
was taken to initiate proceedings under Rule 16 of the Rules of
1958. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the
respondents remained inactive or that the charge-sheet was
issued mechanically after unexplained delay. The period consumed
in examining the reply to the show cause notice and in taking an
administrative decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings cannot,
by itself, be termed as arbitrary or fatal.
26. So far as the alleged delay in appointment of the
Enquiry Officer is concerned, the record reflects that the petitioner
did not submit a comprehensive reply to the charge-sheet but filed
responses in piecemeal and moved repeated applications seeking
inspection of documents and raising objections regarding
adequacy of opportunity. The respondents, in order to ensure
adherence to principles of natural justice, permitted inspection and
also granted personal hearing before proceeding further. The
petitioner submitted another reply on 07.05.2025, which was
examined before the Enquiry Officer came to be appointed on
29.10.2025. In these facts, the delay, if any, cannot be attributed
solely to the respondents. It is well settled that where the
delinquent officer contributes to the prolongation of proceedings,
he cannot subsequently turn around and assail the enquiry on the
ground of delay.
27. The Court is also mindful of the settled principle that
delay by itself does not vitiate disciplinary proceedings unless it is
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shown to have caused serious and irreparable prejudice. No such
demonstrable prejudice has been made out by the petitioner. On
the contrary, the material suggests that adequate opportunity has
been afforded to him and that part of the delay is attributable to
his own procedural objections.
28. In the case of P.V. Mahadevan vs. MD, T.N. Housing
Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as
under:
“7. The very same ground has been specifically raised in
this appeal before this Court wherein it is stated that the
delay of more than 10 years in initiating the disciplinary
proceedings by issuance of charge memo would render the
departmental proceedings vitiated and that in the absence
of any explanation for the inordinate delay in initiating such
proceedings of issuance of charge memo would justify the
prayer for quashing the proceedings as made in the writ
petition.”
29. In the case of Secretary, Forest Department &
Others vs. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury, (2009) 7 SCC 305, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the issue and observed that
delay in concluding the domestic enquiry is not always fatal. It
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The
unexplained protracted delay on the part of the employer may be
one of the circumstances in not permitting the employer to
continue with the disciplinary proceedings. At the same time, if
the delay is explained satisfactorily then the proceedings should
not be permitted to continue.
30. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anant R.
Kulkarni vs. Y.P. Education Society & Others, (2013) 6 SCC
515 has observed thus:
“14. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the
departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the
ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as
such a power is dehors the limits of judicial review. In the
event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it
exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold.
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quashed by the court. The same principle is applicable in
relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary
proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in
question must be carefully examined taking into
consideration the gravity/magnitude of the charges
involved therein. The court has to consider the seriousness
and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the court
must weigh all the facts, both for and against the
delinquent officers and come to the conclusion which is just
and proper considering the circumstances involved. The
essence of the matter is that the court must take into
consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the
same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of
clean and honest administration that the said proceedings
are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in
their conclusion. …..”
31. Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
M.V. Bijlani (supra), as relied upon by the petitioner had
altogether different facts, where there were no justification
whatsoever for instituting charge sheet after 5 years of the
incidents, followed by delay of 7 years caused by the enquiry
officer in concluding the enquiry and further 7 years taken by the
Appellate Authority in deciding the appeal against penalty order,
which was decided by a cryptic and unreasoned order. Hence, the
above judgment is not at all applicable in the present case.
32. In the present case, it cannot be held that there was an
unexplained delay of in initiating the departmental proceedings. As
observed hereinabove, proper explanation has been given by the
Respondents for delay of two years in issuing the charge sheet, in
as much as that the authorities have in fact waited for
ascertaining the correct facts of irregularities committed by the
petitioner, and after ascertaining all the irregularities as well as
after calling explanation from the petitioner, he was issued the
chargesheet. Hence, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be set
aside on the ground of delay.
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33. The further submission of the petitioner that
departmental proceedings are liable to be quashed solely on the
ground that the Government instructions contemplate completion
of enquiry within seven months also does not merit acceptance.
Administrative instructions prescribing timelines are directory in
nature and intended to ensure expeditious disposal. Unless it is
demonstrated that such delay has caused manifest prejudice or
that the proceedings are actuated by mala fides, mere deviation
from the prescribed timeline does not render the charge-sheet
void. In the present case, no specific prejudice has been
established by the petitioner.
34. Section 33P of the Act of 1940 reads as under:
“33P. Power to give directions.-The Central Government
may give such directions to any State Government as may
appear to the Central Government to be necessary for
carrying into execution in the State any of the provisions of
this Act or of any rule or order made thereunder.”
35. The aforesaid provision empowers the Central
Government to issue directions to State Governments for carrying
into execution the provisions of the Act of 1940 and such
directions are binding in character. The legislative intent
underlying Section 33P of the Act of 1940 is to ensure uniformity
and consistency in the enforcement of drug regulatory standards
across the country, particularly in matters having public health
implications. Once guidelines are issued by the Central
Government in exercise of statutory powers under the said
provision, the State authorities and their instrumentalities are
under a legal obligation to implement the same in letter and spirit.
The State functionaries act as implementing agencies under the
scheme of the Act and cannot dilute, modify or deviate from such
directions on their own accord. Any action contrary to or
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inconsistent with the directions issued under Section 33P of the
Act of 1940 would amount to acting beyond jurisdiction and in
breach of the statutory mandate.
36. The contention of the petitioner that the Guidelines
issued under Section 33P of the Act of 1940 are merely directory
and that non-compliance cannot amount to misconduct also
cannot be accepted at this stage. While the power of the Central
Government to issue guidelines may be discretionary, once such
guidelines are issued in exercise of statutory authority, they are
required to be adhered to by the State authorities entrusted with
implementation. Whether the petitioner’s actions amounted to
permissible administrative initiative or constituted deviation from
binding norms is a matter requiring examination of facts and
evidence, which properly falls within the domain of the
departmental enquiry. This Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction,
does not sit as an appellate authority over the correctness of
charges at the threshold.
37. Contention of the petitioner that since he was holding
the post of Drug Controller, who is head of Drug Controller
Organization under the Rules of 1963, therefore, for the purpose
of guidelines issued by the Central Government, being responsible
officer, was competent to act as State Government, is totally
misconceived and unfounded in view of prevailing provisions of
law. This Court also examined the Rules of 1963 and found that
the post of Drug Controller has been placed in Schedule-II
appended to the Rules of 1963 and as per Rule 4(1) (c) & (d) of
the Rules of 1963, hence, the claim put forward by the petitioner
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with regard to status and powers of Drug Controller is totally
misplaced and baseless.
38. This court also finds that under the scheme of the Act
of 1940, the powers specifically vested in the “State Government”
cannot be usurped or exercised by an individual statutory
authority such as the Drug Controller unless there is an express
delegation in accordance with law. The expression “State
Government,” as used in the Act, if read in consonance with the
Rajasthan Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the
Constitution of India, denotes the Government acting through its
competent administrative head, ordinarily the Secretary to the
Government of the concerned Department, and not an individual
officer functioning under it. In absence of any statutory
delegation, the Drug Controller, though an important regulatory
authority, remains an implementing functionary and cannot
assume to himself powers which the statute reserves for the State
Government. Any such assumption of authority would be dehors
the Act and contrary to the established principles of administrative
law governing distribution and exercise of statutory powers. In
view of above, equally untenable is the submission that the
petitioner, by virtue of holding the post of Drug Controller, was
competent to constitute the committee and forward
recommendations to the DCGI in the manner done. The
respondents have specifically alleged that the petitioner acted
without prior approval of the State Government and thereby
exceeded his authority. With a view to save the enquiry
proceedings from being influenced by any of the observation in
this petition, this court finds that the question whether such action
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jurisdiction is again a matter to be adjudicated in the enquiry
proceedings. At this preliminary stage, this Court cannot
conclusively record findings on disputed questions relating to
authority, intent, or effect of the petitioner’s conduct.
39. Needless to mention here that every Government
Servant, while in service of Government of Rajasthan, is bound to
follow the Rajasthan Civil Services (conduct) Rules, 1971 (for
short ‘the Rules of 1971’), which have been framed to regulate the
conduct of Government Servants. Rules 3 and 13 of the Rules of
1971 lay down as under:-
“3. General: (1) Every Government servant shall at all
times-
(i) maintain absolute integrity; and
(ii) maintain devotion to duty and dignity of office.
(2) (i) Every Government servant holding a supervisory
post shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and
devotion to duty of all Government servants for the time
being under his control and authority;
(ii) No Government servant shall, in the performance of his
official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on
him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when
he is acting under the direction of his official superior and
shall, where he is acting under such direction, obtain the
direction in writing, wherever practicable, and where it is
not practicable to obtain the direction in writing, he shall
obtain written confirmation of the direction as soon
thereafter as possible.
Explanation: Nothing in clause (ii) of sub-rule (2) shall be
constituted as empowering a Government servant to evade
his responsibilities by seeking instructions from, or approval
of, a superior officer or authority when such instructions
are not necessary under the scheme of distribution of
powers and responsibilities.
13. Unauthorised communication of information: No
Government servant shall, except in accordance with any
general or special order of the Government or in the
performance in good faith of the duties assigned to him,
communicate directly or indirectly any official document or
part thereof or information to any Government servant or
any other person to whom he is not authorised to
communicate such document or information.
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Explanation: Quotation by a Government servant in his
representation to the Head of Office or Head of Department
or Governor, of, or from, any letter circular or office
memorandum or from the notes on any file to which he is
not authorised to have access, or which he is not
authorised to keep in his personal custody or for personal
purposes, shall amount to unauthorised communication of
information within the meaning of this rule.”
(emphasis supplied)
40. The plea that the charge-sheet is vague and contents
thereof does not constitute any misconduct by bare reading, has
also been considered by this court in the light of aforesaid Rules 3
and 13 of the Rules of 1971. In the case of Union of India &
Others vs. J. Ahmed (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that Code of Conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules
clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of service. It
would follow that conduct which is blameworthy for the
Government Servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be
misconduct. If a Government servant conduct himself in a way
inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service,
it is misconduct.
41. While delivering judgment in the case of Rasiklal
Vaghajibhai Patel (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed as under:
“4. …………………… It is thus well-settled that unless either in
the Certified Standing Order or in the service regulations an
act or omission is prescribed as mis-conduct, it is not open
to the employer to fish out some conduct as misconduct
and punish the workman even though the alleged
misconduct would not be comprehended in any of the
enumerated misconducts.”
42. In the light of above Rules of 1971 and the guidelines
given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court examined the
issue of vagueness of the chargesheet raised by the Petitioner.
This court finds that, in the present case, a perusal of the charge
memorandum indicates that the factual allegations, including
constitution of a committee, preparation of report, and
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[2026:RJ-JP:8379] (22 of 28) [CW-19397/2025]
communication to the DCGI without approval of the State
Government, exceeding his official powers without the State
Government’s permission and misusing his position to grant
relaxation in cases of substandard drugs, and by not granting
prosecution sanction for running cases in respect of drug samples
declared as grossly substandard category, he had directly
attempted to benefit the guilty manufacturers/ institutions/
persons, have been specifically set out. The petitioner has been
able to submit detailed replies addressing these allegations. This
itself demonstrates that he was aware of the nature of accusations
and was not handicapped in preparing his defence. The charge-
sheet, therefore, cannot be said to be so vague or indefinite as to
warrant interference at the threshold. In the present case, the
allegations, if proved, may constitute misconduct under Rules 3
and 13 of the Rules of 1971 being related to excess of authority
and non-compliance with binding guidelines and acting against the
interest of the Government. Whether they are ultimately
established is a matter for the disciplinary authority to determine
on the basis of evidence. The petitioner will have adequate
opportunity to raise all permissible defences before the Inquiry
Officer, including the question whether prior approval was
necessary or whether his actions were within administrative
competence.
43. This Court also finds no material to substantiate the
allegation of mala fides. Allegations of mala fides must be specific
and supported by cogent material, which is absent in the present
case.
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44. It is trite law that the scope of judicial review in
matters relating to issuance of charge-sheet and pendency of
departmental enquiry is extremely limited. It is not the function of
this Court, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, to examine the correctness of charges or
sufficiency of material at the stage of inquiry. Interference is
warranted only where the charge-sheet is issued without
jurisdiction, is patently illegal, or where the allegations, even if
taken at face value, do not disclose any misconduct.
45. In the case of Union of India & Another vs.
Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has clear held :
“16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the
High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice
if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some
other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the
High Court should not interfere in such a matter.”
46. In the case of The Secretary, Ministry of Defence &
Others vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:
“12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that the charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject-
matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the
rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the
same has been issued by an authority not competent to
initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary
proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial
stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the
issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the
grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated
stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period
unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent
employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant
factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the
proceedings.”
47. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the writ petition is premature and devoid
of merit. No ground is made out for interference with the
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memorandum dated 19.09.2022 or order dated 29.10.2025
appointing the Inquiry Officer.
S.B.Civil Writ Petition no. 19398/2025
48. Above writ petition has been filed by the petitioner
contending therein that while the petitioner was holding the post
of Drug Controller, information was received regarding alleged
disappearance/misappropriation and circulation of suspected
spurious medicines by M/s Ajota Enterprises. Pursuant thereto,
the Assistant Drug Controller, Jodhpur was directed to conduct an
inquiry. The firm was inspected on 27.03.2017 and 23.06.2017 by
the concerned Drug Control Officers. Upon investigation,
discrepancies were found in the purchase and sale records.
Medicines were shown as sold to non-existent firms, to firms
which denied such purchases, or in quantities inconsistent with
actual transactions. Contradictions were detected between sales
bills and corresponding purchase bills at 52 shops and certain
records were found to be tampered with and forged. On finding
prima facie violations of the Act of 1940, a show cause notice
dated 05.09.2017 was issued to the firm. However, vide letter
dated 14.09.2017, the State Government directed that
proceedings be kept pending. Thereafter, statements of the
petitioner and other officers were recorded on 15.12.2017 and
subsequently, in February 2018, the earlier order keeping
proceedings in abeyance was withdrawn with directions to proceed
in accordance with law.
49. It was stated that further correspondence took place
between the petitioner and the Department of Medical & Health in
February-March 2018. On 30.04.2018, a show cause notice was
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[2026:RJ-JP:8379] (25 of 28) [CW-19397/2025]
issued to the petitioner regarding the action taken against the
firm, to which the petitioner submitted a detailed reply on
16.05.2018 explaining the procedure adopted. After a lapse of
approximately five years, the petitioner was served with a
Memorandum dated 18.09.2023 under Rule 16 of the Rules of
1958, initiating disciplinary proceedings.
50. Allegations in the charge sheet were that during his
posting as Drug Controller, Drugs Control Organization, Jaipur, the
petitioner did not issue any instructions to the Assistant Drug
Controller, Jodhpur, or any Drug Control Officer to verify the bills
of any of the 31 firms in Jodhpur that were purchasing medicines
from the firm M/s New Medicine Point, Sri Ganganagar, engaged in
selling spurious drugs, even though stock of medicines purchased
from New Medicine Point was also found with these firms, and
samples taken from these firms were also declared
spurious/substandard. On the other hand, no stock of medicines
purchased from New Medicine Point, Sri Ganganagar, was found
with Ajoota Enterprises firm, yet the Petitioner issued instructions
for investigation of 181 buyer firms purchasing medicines from
Ajoota firm. His such act was against his official duties, and by not
ordering any legal/judicial action against firms engaged in the
trade of spurious drugs, the petitioner failed to perform your
duties. In this manner, he was responsible for gross negligence
and serious misconduct in the discharge of official duties.
51. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply denying the
allegations and stating that the matter had earlier been examined
and closed by the Anti-Corruption Bureau. Notwithstanding the
same, by order dated 29.10.2025, an Inquiry Officer was
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appointed to proceed with the departmental inquiry, and the
petitioner was directed, vide letter dated 01.12.2025, to appear
before the authority in connection with the charges. Aggrieved
thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court challenging the
Memorandum dated 18.09.2023, the order dated 29.10.2025
appointing the Inquiry Officer and the consequential proceedings.
The Charge sheet and appointment of enquiry officer has mainly
been challenged by the petitioner on two grounds that the charge
sheet has been issued after a considerable delay of 5 years and
appointment of enquiry officer has further taken two more years.
Second ground raised by the Petitioner is that no misconduct is
made out from bare perusal of the contents of charge sheet.
52. This court has examined the principles governing the
challenge to charge sheet and further proceedings while deciding
the aforesaid S.B. Civil Writ Petition 19397/2025, where both the
aforesaid grounds have been tested on the basis of prevailing
rules, guidelines, rival arguments and precedential law. Findings
given here-in-above are equally applicable in the instant case also.
53. The contention of the petitioner that the charge sheet is
liable to be quashed on the ground of delay of about five years in
its issuance and a further delay of nearly two years in
appointment of the Inquiry Officer, does not merit acceptance. As
observed here-in-above that delay, by itself, does not vitiate
disciplinary proceedings unless it is shown to have caused specific
and demonstrable prejudice to the delinquent officer. In the
present case, the allegations relate to irregularities in discharge of
official duties concerning investigation of serious violations under
the Act of 1940, involving scrutiny of records of multiple firms and
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inter-departmental correspondence. The matter required
examination at different administrative levels before initiation of
proceedings. The petitioner has neither pleaded, nor established
any real prejudice caused to his defence on account of the alleged
delay. In absence of such prejudice and considering the nature
and seriousness of the allegations, the proceedings cannot be
interdicted merely on the ground of lapse of time.
54. The further submission that the disciplinary authority
took nearly two years to appoint an Inquiry Officer also does not
invalidate the proceedings. The appointment of an Inquiry Officer
is an administrative step in continuation of the disciplinary
process. Unless the delay is shown to be deliberate, mala fide or
resulting in denial of reasonable opportunity, it does not render
the charge sheet or inquiry void. No material has been placed on
record to demonstrate that the delay was actuated by malice or
that it has impaired the petitioner’s right to defend himself
effectively.
55. The argument that a bare perusal of the charge sheet
does not disclose any misconduct under the Rules of 1971 is
equally untenable. At the stage of challenge to a charge sheet,
this Court cannot conduct a mini-trial or examine the correctness
or sufficiency of the allegations. The test is whether the
imputations, if taken at face value, disclose acts or omissions
which may amount to negligence, dereliction of duty or failure to
maintain devotion to duty and integrity expected of a government
servant. The charge sheet in the present case alleges failure to
properly verify transactions, omission to initiate appropriate legal
action and acts contrary to official duties in a matter involving
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spurious drugs. Such allegations, if proved, would prima facie
constitute misconduct within the meaning of the Rules of 1971.
56. Scope of writ petition in such matters has already been
discussed here-in-above. For the foregoing reasons, the grounds
urged by the petitioner do not warrant exercise of writ jurisdiction,
and the petition deserves to be rejected.
57. Accordingly, both the above writ petitions are hereby
dismissed. It is, however, observed that the disciplinary
proceedings shall be concluded expeditiously in accordance with
law and the petitioner shall be afforded full opportunity of hearing
and defence as contemplated under the Rules of 1958.
58. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
59. Office is directed to place a copy of this judgment on
record of connected writ petition.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI /
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