Delhi High Court
Gopal Krishan Srivastava vs M/S Lakras Infracon Pvt. Ltd. & Ors on 23 February, 2026
Author: Subramonium Prasad
Bench: Subramonium Prasad
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 23rd FEBRUARY, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
I.A. 43315/2024
IN
+ CS(OS) 685/2022, CC 14/2024, I.A. 4756/2025
GOPAL KRISHAN SRIVASTAVA .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Pankaj Vivek , Mr. Tarun Kumar,
Mr. SuryanshJamwal and Mr.
Hardeep Godara, Advocates
versus
M/S LAKRAS INFRACON PVT. LTD. & ORS. .....Defendants
Through: Mr. D.K Rustagi, Ms. Anjali Pandey
& Mr. SumitGhartan, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
I.A. 43315/2024
1. This Application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC has been filed by
the Defendants, seeking a decree for dismissing the Suit filed by the
Plaintiff.
2. The present Suit has been filed with the following prayers:
“a. Pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff and against
the defendants jointly and severally directing the
defendants to deliver up the documents like Agreement
to Sell dated 12.07.2010, General Power of AttorneySignature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 1 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
dated12.07.2010, Special Power of Attorney
dated12.07.2010, Will dated 12.07.2010, and any
otherin the nature of agreement, attorney, possession
letter or receipt etc.; and consequently declare the said
documents sham, voidundisclosed deed/document andin-
operative in the eyes of lawand/or cancel the said
documents and strike the registered documents from the
records of Sub-Registrar-IX atKapashera, New Delhi,
details of which are as under:
Agreement to Sell Registration No. 9061 in AB
No. 1, Vol. No. 5447 on
pages no. 110-119 on
12.07.2010
General Power of Registration No. 2711 in AB
Attorney No. IV, Vol. No. 1457 on
pages no. 60-64 on
12.07.2010
Special Power of Registration No. 4449 in AB
Attorney No. III, Vol. No. 524 on
pages no. 96-97 on
12.07.2010
Any other
deed/documentand
b. Pass a decree of possession in favour of the plaintiff
and against the defendants jointly and severally thereby
put the plaintiff in actual physical possession of the suit
plot bearing Plot No. 121 measuring 209 sq. metres,
Pocket No. 07, Block-B, Sector 23, Dwarka Residential
Scheme Phase-II, New Delhi, shown in red coloured
boundary in the site plan filed with the plaint; andc. Pass a decree of perpetual injunction thereby
restraining the defendants jointly and severally, and
their agents, servants, employees, officials, heirs, legalSignature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 2 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
representatives. liquidators, assigns etc. from
creatingany kind of third-party rights in the suit plot
bearing Plot No. 121 measuring 2Og sq. metres, Pocket
No. 07,Block-B, Sector 23, Dwarka Residential Scheme
Phase I-II, New Delhi, shown in red coloured boundary
in the site plan filed with the plaint; and
Any other/further and suitable relief may be granted in
favour of the Plaintiff in accordance with law.”
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts, as stated in the Plaint, are as
under:
a. The Plaintiff was allotted a residential plot bearing Plot No. 121
measuring 209 sq. metres, Pocket No. 07, Block-B, Sector 23,
Dwarka Residential Scheme Phase-II, New Delhi [“Suit
Property”], in a draw held on 05.02.2010 by the Delhi
Development Authority [“DDA”]. To this effect, a Demand-
cum-Allotment Letter dated 15.06.2010/07.07.2010 was also
issued by the DDA. It is stated that this allotment was done in
furtherance of a Recommendation Letter dated 02.07.2004
issued by the Land and Development Department, GNCTD.
b. Prior to 2010, the Plaintiff was allotted an alternative plot in
Sector 7, Dwarka, Delhi, pursuant to the abovementioned
Recommendation Letter, however, the Plaintiff could not avail
the same on account of paucity of funds.
c. In order to make payment to the DDA pursuant to the Demand-
cum-Allotment Letter dated 07.07.2010, the Plaintiff arranged
funds to the tune of Rs. 40,00,000/- by availing a loan from the
Defendant No. 2.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 3 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
d. The Defendant No. 2 acknowledged the Plaintiff‟s intention of
not selling or alienating the Suit Property and thereafter, agreed
to arrange the payment of cost of the Suit Property through his
company, M/s LakrasInfracon Pvt. Ltd., being the Defendant
No. 1 herein. Pursuant to this, the Plaintiff deposited all the
original documents such as the Recommendation Letter,
Demand-cum-Allotment Letter, etc. with the Defendant No. 2.
Additionally, the Plaintiff also executed certain registered
documents like Agreement to Sell, General Power of Attorney,
Will, Special Power of Attorney, as well as certain unregistered
documents in favor of the Defendant No. 1 Company, and its
director, being the Defendant No. 3 on 12.07.2010. Details of
the registered documents are as under:
Agreement to Sell Registration No. 9061 in AB No.
1, Vol. No. 5447 on pages no.
110-119 on 12.07.2010
General Power of Registration No. 2711 in AB No.
Attorney [GPA] IV, Vol. No. 1457 on pages no.
60-64 on 12.07.2010
Special Power of Registration No. 4449 in AB No.
Attorney [SPA] III, Vol. No. 524 on pages no.
96-97 on 12.07.2010
Any other
deed/document
e. It is stated that the parties were ad idem to the effect that
notwithstanding the execution of the aforesaid documents, there
was no intention to the transfer any rights of the Suit Property
in favor of any of the Defendants.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 4 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
f. In order to secure interest on the financed amount, the
Defendants No. 1 and 2, inserted an amount of Rs. 12,73,500/-
as having been paid in cash, however, no such cash was paid to
the Plaintiff. It is further stated that the Defendants with
malafide intention also inserted in the agreement to sell, that
symbolic possession of the Suit Property was handed over to
the Defendant No. 1.
g. Thereafter, on 24.11.2010 the Defendant No. 1 Company made
a total payment of Rs. 39,32,000/- to the DDA on behalf of the
Plaintiff in 3 tranches.
h. Possession of the Suit Property was handed over by the DDA in
favor of the Plaintiff on 15.06.2011. Simultaneously, the
Defendant No. 2, came and collected the original possession
letter and slip from the Plaintiff, claiming lien on the said
documents against the money advanced to the Plaintiff.
i. Subsequently, beginning from 29.06.2011, a series of Show
Cause Notices were issued by the DDA, calling upon the
Plaintiff to explain as to why allotment of the Suit Property
should not be cancelled on the ground that the same was
transferred to the Defendant No. 1, instead of the Plaintiff. In
response, the Plaintiff clarified to the DDA by way of a letter
dated 02.09.2011, that the arrangement with the Defendant
No.1 Company was merely a financing agreement and not
meant for sale/transfer of the Suit Property.
j. Sometime in 2012, the Plaintiff came to know that his case of
allotment of the Suit Property was under re-consideration, as itSignature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 5 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
was alleged in a letter dated 09.01.2012 addressed to the DDA,
that there were some irregularities in respect of the
recommendation by the Land and Development Department.
Though the Plaintiff made enquiries regarding this, no response
whatsoever was received from the DDA.
k. Since the DDA was not executing the perpetual lease deed, the
Plaintiff approached this Court by filing a writ petition being
W.P. (C) 5014/2016 titled as „Gopal Krishan Srivastava v.
Land & Building Department &Ors.,‟ which was pending
adjudication at the time when the Suit was filed. Pertinently,
however, the writ petitionwas disposed of a Coordinate Bench
of this Court during the pendency of the instant Suit vide Order
dated 01.02.2023.
l. Subsequently, the Plaintiff again made enquiries from the
DDA, and got to know that his case for execution of the
perpetual lease deed could be considered, only if the Plaintiff
had not executed any sale or transfer of the Suit Property.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff and Defendants conducted a meeting
on 12.03.2022 in the presence of a middle-man, wherein the
parties agreed to the cancel the documents executed on
12.07.2010, as the same were only in furtherance of a financing
arrangement, which purpose stood fulfilled.
m. Vide a letter dated 14.03.2022, the Defendant No. 1 Company
conveyed its no-objection to the DDA for the execution of a
perpetual lease deed with respect to the Suit Property in favor
of the Plaintiff. At the same time, it was orally agreed between
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 6 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
the parties that the Plaintiff shall refund the amount paid by the
Defendant No. 1 Company to the DDA within 6 months of the
No-Objection Letter dated 14.03.2022, return the original
documents of the Plaintiff and also execute cancellation deeds
for the financing agreement/GPA/SPA, etc., after the receipt of
the amount from the Plaintiff.
n. The Plaintiff then again approached the DDA for execution of
the perpetual lease deed by way of an application dated
16.03.2022 bearing Diary No. 585, reiterating that there was no
sale/purchase transaction in respect of the Suit Property
between the Plaintiff and Defendants.
o. On 07.04.2022, the Defendant No. 2 informed the middle-man
that an Execution Call Letter issued by the DDA was addressed
to the Plaintiff, and a stamp paper for execution of the lease
deed was already deposited with the DDA. This was
communicated to the Plaintiff only on 23.04.2022, who was
surprised to become aware of this fact, as he never purchased
any stamp paper.
p. Since the possession of the all the documents like the
Recommendation Letter, Demand-cum-Allotment Letter,
Possession slip, payment challans, etc. were in the custody of
the Defendants, the Plaintiff was unable to get the perpetual
lease deed executed despite the No-Objection Letter given by
the Defendants. Upon the Plaintiff‟s request to return the said
original documents, the Defendant No. 2 began blackmailing
the Plaintiff, threatening him that unless the Plaintiff enters into
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 7 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
a fresh deed of agreement for sale of the Suit Property in the
Defendant No. 2‟s favor against a consideration of Rs.
1,50,00,000/-, he would not return the original documents. The
Defendant No. 2 also disclosed that an electricity connection
was installed in the Suit Property in the name of the Defendant
No. 1 Company and as such, possession of the Suit Property
shall not be reverted to the Plaintiff.
q. Resultantly, the Plaintiff approached this Court by way of the
instant Suit.
4. Summons in the Suit was issued on 10.11.2022. Written Statements
have been filed by the Defendants. Issues have yet not been framed. It is
pertinent to mention that the Defendants have also filed a counter-claim,
seeking a decree of specific performance of the Agreement to Sell dated
12.07.2010. However, at this juncture,this Court is not dealing with the
counter-claim as the present Application is only for a decree dismissing the
Suit.
5. In the Written Statement,the Defendants state that pursuant to the
Agreement to Sell, an amount of Rs.52,25,000/- was paid and physical
possession of the Suit Property was handed-over to the Defendants. It is
further stated that the Plaintiff has executed various sale documents,
including aregistered General Power of Attorney dated 12.07.2010;
registered Special Power of Attorney dated 12.07.2010;
registeredAgreement to Sell dated 12.07.2010 and registered Will dated
12.07.2010, thereby virtually transferring the Suit Property to the Plaintiff.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 8 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
6. The Defendants further aver that the Suit is barred by limitation and
as also by Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as well as
Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
7. It is pertinent to mention that the four documents, cancellation of
which is the subject matter of the present Suit, were filed by the Plaintiff
itself along with the Plaint. Though the case setup by the Plaintiff is that the
documents, which were executed on 12.07.2010, are sham and were never
given up as they were only a security for the loan transaction, no material
has been placed on record to substantiate this position. Moreover, in their
Written Statement, the Defendants have categorically denied the existence
of any loan transaction or that these documents were executed only as a
security towards the loan document.
8. The present Application has been filed by the Defendants seeking
dismissal of the Suit on the ground that the Defendants have already paid a
sum of Rs.52,25,000/- towards the sale consideration of the Suit Property.
Attention of this Court has been drawn to Paragraph No.19 of the Plaint
which reads as under:
“19. That Since, the defendant No. 1 never ever had
any understanding with plaintiff or sale/purchase of
the suit plot and the documents dated 12.07.2010 were
basically sham documents executed only for limited
purpose of creating security in favour of defendant no.
1 company in order to secure the amounts paid by it to
the DDA towards cost of the allotted suit plot.
therefore, the defendant no. 1 company issued No-
objection Letter dated 14.03.2022 addressed to the
DDA thereby conveying that it had no objection toSignature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 9 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
execution of the perpetual lease deed in favour of the
plaintiff.”
9. It is the case of the Defendants that the sole basis of the present Suit is
the issuance of NOC dated 14.03.2022 addressed to the DDA for execution
of the perpetual Lease Deed in favour of the Plaintiff. It is, therefore, stated
that in substance, what the Plaintiff is seeking is a declaration that the four
documents which are sought to be cancelled were only security
documents,rather than representing transfer of title. It is the case of the
Defendants that this stand is completely contrary to Section s92 and 95 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
10. The Defendants further state that a bare reading of the Plaint would
show that the cause of action to file the present Suit arose when the first
show cause notice was issued by the DDA in 2011 and, therefore, the Suit
for getting these documents cancelled ought to have been filed within three
years from the date of the said notice as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act,
1963, and since the Suit was not filed within the time stipulated thereunder,
the present Suit is hit by Section 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
11. At the outset, this Court is of the opinion that Article 59 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. A
conjoint reading of the Plaint and the documents only indicates that the
occasion for invoking Section 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has not even
arisen, for the reason that the Defendants did not takeany step which would
have given the Plaintiff any cause of action to get the contract rescinded.Be
that as it may,in 2011, the cause of action only arose against the DDA and
not against the Defendants and, therefore, the objection of the Defendants as
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 10 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
to the Suit being barred by limitation, is untenable. In the present Suit, the
Plaintiff is exercising the right in personam against the Defendants and not a
right in rem against the DDA.
12. However, in the opinion of this Court, the entire case of the Plaintiff
hinges on an oral financing arrangement, for which, not a single document
has been filed by the Plaintiff,to indicate that all these documents were
executed only as a security for the purported loan advanced by the
Defendants.
13. In view of the above, the stand of the Plaintiff is clearly his by Section
92 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872, reads
as under:
“Section 92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.
When the terms of any such contract, grant or other
disposition of property, or any matter required by law
to be reduced to the form of a document, have been
proved according to the last section, no evidence of
any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as
between the parties to any such instrument or their
representatives in interest, for the purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting
from, its terms:
Proviso (1). — Any fact may be proved which would
invalidate any document, or which would entitle any
person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as
fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution,
want of capacity in any contracting party, 1[want or
failure] of consideration, or mistake in fact or law.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 11 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
Proviso (2). — The existence of any separate oral
agreement as to any matter on which a document is
silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may
be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso
applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of
formality of the document.
Proviso (3). — The existence of any separate oral
agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the
attaching of any obligation under any such contract,
grant or disposition of property, may be proved.
Proviso (4). — The existence of any distinct subsequent
oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract,
grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except
in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of
property is by law required to be in writing, or has
been registered according to the law in force for the
time being as to the registration of documents.
Proviso (5). Any usage or custom by which incidents
not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually
annexed to contracts of that description, may be
proved:
Provided that the annexing of such incident would not
be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms
of the contract.
Proviso (6). — Any fact may be proved which shows in
what manner the language of a document is related to
existing facts.
Illustrations
(a) A policy of insurance is effected on goods in ships
from Calcutta to London. The goods are shipped in a
particular ship which is lost. The fact that particular
ship was orally excepted from the policy cannot be
proved.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 12 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
(b) A agrees absolutely in writing to pay B Rs. 1,000
on the first March 1873. The fact that, at the same time
an oral agreement was made that the money should not
be paid till the thirty-first March cannot be proved.
(c) An estate called the Rampore tea estate is sold by a
deed which contains a map of the property sold. The
fact that land not included in the map had always been
regarded as part of the estate and was meant to pass
by the deed cannot be proved.
(d) A enters into a written contract with B to work
certain mines, the property of B, upon certain terms. A
was induced to do so by a misrepresentation of Bs as to
their value. This fact may be proved.
(e) A institutes a suit against B for the specific
performance of a contract, and also prays that the
contract may be reformed as to one of its provisions, as
that provision was inserted in it by mistake. A may
prove that such a mistake was made as would by law
entitle him to have the contract reformed.
(f) A orders goods of B by a letter in which nothing is
said as to the time of payment, and accepts the goods
on delivery. B sues A for the price. A may show that the
goods were supplied on credit for a term still
unexpired.
(g) A sells B a horse and verbally warrants him sound.
A gives B a paper in these words: “Bought of A a horse
of Rs. 500. B may prove the verbal warranty.
(h) A hires lodgings of B, and gives B a card on which
is written — “Rooms, Rs. 200 a month”. A may prove a
verbal agreement that these terms were to include
partial board.
A hires lodgings of B for a year, and a regularly
stamped agreement, drawn up by an attorney, is made
between them. It is silent on the subject of board. A
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 13 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
may not prove that board was included in the term
verbally.
(i) A applies to B for a debt due to A by sending a
receipt for the money. B keeps the receipt and does not
send the money. In a suit for the amount, A may prove
this.
(j) A and B make a contract in writing to take effect
upon the happening of a certain contingency. The
writing is left with B, who sues A upon it. A may show
the circumstances under which it was delivered.”
14. The registered documents, cancellation of which has been sought,
have been filed by the Plaintiff itself and, therefore, the Plaintiff admits the
documents, which means that the documents need not be proved. When the
documents need not be proved, in view of Section 92 read with Section 95
of the Evidence Act, 1872, the Plaintiff is precluded to lead evidence for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting the terms of the
contract which has been reduced in the form of an document. This Court can
only look into the documents as admitted by the Plaintiff. There is nothing
in any of the four registered documents indicating that these documents have
been executed only as a security of an oral loan transaction. No other
document has been produced by the Plaintiff to substantiate the case that the
registered documents were treated only as a security for a Loan Agreement.
In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Plaintiff is precluded from
leading any evidence to show that there was any other oral agreement which
contradicts the document which have been reduced into writing in terms of
Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 14 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
15. In the opinion of this Court, none of the provisos of Section 92 of the
Evidence Act, 1872, apply to the facts of the present case. Proviso 1 is
attracted only if there are facts which would indicate that the document is
executed due to fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want
of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or
mistake in fact or law. Proviso 2 can be applied only if the oral agreement is
not inconsistent with its terms of the written document. Proviso 3 applies
only when there is existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a
condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such
contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved. Proviso 4 deals
with subsequent oral agreement. Proviso 5 deals with usage or custom which
is not expressly mentioned in any contract.
16. Undoubtedly, the Defendants have executed an NOC for the
documents (being the perpetual lease deed) to be executed in the favour of
the Plaintiff but that does not help the Plaintiff. Unless the DDA conveys the
title of the Suit Property to the Plaintiff, the Defendants cannot get the
specific performance of the Agreement to Sell which has been entered into
between the parties. The NOC, therefore, cannot be used for the purpose of
varying or contradicting the Agreement to Sell and other documents which
have been executed by the Plaintiff in favour of the Defendants or give
credence to the stand taken in the Plaint that the documents have been
executed only as a security to the loan agreement.
17. While dealing with a case relating to proviso 6 to Section 92 of the
Evidence Act, the Apex Court in Mangala Waman Karandikar v. Prakash
Damodar Ranade, (2021) 6 SCC 139, has held as under:
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 15 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
“15. It is manifest from these two sections that it is only
in cases where the terms of the document leave the
question in doubt, then resort could be had to the
proviso. But when a document is a straightforward one
and presents no difficulty in construing it, the proviso
does not apply. In this regard, we may state that
Section 95 only builds on Proviso (6) of Section 92.
16. If the contrary view is adopted as correct it would
render Section 92 of the Evidence Act, otiose and also
enlarge the ambit of Proviso (6) beyond the main
section itself. Such interpretation, provided by the High
Court violates basic tenets of legal interpretation.
[Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma, (2013) 11
SCC 451 at p. 459 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 368] Section
92 specifically prohibits evidence of any oral
agreement or statement which would contradict, vary,
add to or subtract from its terms. If, as stated by the
learned Judge, oral evidence could be received to
show that the terms of the document were really
different from those expressed therein, it would
amount to according permission to give evidence to
contradict or vary those terms and as such it comes
within the inhibitions of Section 92. It could not be
postulated that the legislature intended to nullify the
object of Section 92 by enacting exceptions to that
section.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. Similarly, the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju
Reddiar, (1996) 4 SCC 551, has observed as under:
“7. At the outset it must be borne in mind that the
agreement between the parties was a written
agreement and therefore the parties are bound by the
terms and conditions of the agreement. Once aSignature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 16 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
contract is reduced to writing, by operation of Section
91 of the Evidence Act, 1872 it is not open to any of
the parties to seek to prove the terms of the contract
with reference to some oral or other documentary
evidence to find out the intention of the parties.
Under Section 92 of the Evidence Act where the
written instrument appears to contain the whole terms
of the contract then parties to the contract are not
entitled to lead any oral evidence to ascertain the
terms of the contract. It is only when the written
contract does not contain the whole of the agreement
between the parties and there is any ambiguity then
oral evidence is permissible to prove the other
conditions which also must not be inconsistent with
the written contract. The case in hand has to be
adjudged bearing in mind the aforesaid principles and
the plaintiffs being conscious of this position along
with the tender appended a letter and in that letter
inserted certain terms by writing in ink to establish the
case that the acceptance of the plaintiffs’ tender would
tantamount to the acceptance to the terms contained in
the letter in which there was insertion in writing to the
effect that it was on multi-slab basis. It is in this
context the question whether such handwritten portion
was originally there or was subsequently inserted
assumes great significance. We are unable to accept
the stand taken by the learned counsel for the
respondents that there was no such issue on this
question inasmuch as this question was considered by
the learned trial Judge while discussing Issue 1 on the
basis of evidence laid and the trial Judge had given a
finding in favour of the plaintiffs. The said finding,
however, on the face of it appears to us to be wholly
unsustainable. As has been stated earlier there was no
signature either by the persons submitting the tender
or by the persons receiving the same on the
handwritten portion of the letter. The learned trial
Judge had noticed that the certified copy which wasSignature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 17 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
issued by the Board on 11-7-1978 of the aforesaid
letter clearly contains the handwritten portion and
therefore he came to the conclusion that the
handwritten portion was there at the time of
submission of the tender. The tender itself was
submitted on 12-7-1978 and we fail to understand how
the Board could grant a certified copy of the letter on
11-7-1978 when the plaintiffs’ case itself is that along
with the tender he had appended the letter in question.
On this ground alone it can be safely held that
handwritten portion in Exhibit P-1 was not there at the
time of submission of the tender but was subsequently
inserted obviously with the connivance of the officers
of the Board. The Board in its rejoinder-affidavit filed
in this Court has stated that the attested copy was
actually received on 28-12-1978, much later than the
finalisation of the tenders and agreement and in order
to build up a case the aforesaid interpolation has been
made. In the facts and circumstances of the present
case the aforesaid stand of the Board appears to us to
be wholly justified and at any rate we have no
hesitation to come to the conclusion that the
handwritten portion in Exhibit P-1 was not there
initially and has been inserted subsequently. The main
basis of the plaintiffs’ case on which a multi-slab rate
was claimed therefore fails. The written agreement
between the parties nowhere indicates that the rate to
be paid to the plaintiffs was on multi-slab basis and the
terms and conditions of the written contract is not
susceptible of such a construction.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. In addition, Sections 74 and 77 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is
also attracted to the facts of the present case, as the documents were
registered in the Sub-Registrar‟s office and as such, are public documents, of
which certified copies were filed before this Court.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 18 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
20. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that a
decree dismissing the Suit is liable to be passed, inter alia on the basis of the
admitted documents filed along with the Plaint.
21. As far as the prayers in the Plaint are concerned, they also cannot be
granted and a decree dismissing the Plaint is liable to be passed. This Court
is not making any comment as to whether the counter-claim of the
Defendants seeking specific performance is within the time or not, or
whether the Defendants are entitled to decree for specific performance, as
these issues will be seen at the time of examining the counter claim.
22. The present Application is disposed of accordingly.
CS(OS) 685/2022
23. List for framing of issues in the Counter-Claim on 21.04.2026.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
FEBRUARY 23, 2026
Rahul/AP
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARIOM CS(OS) 685/2022 Page 19 of 19
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
Signing Date:24.02.2026
10:45:54
