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THE ILLUSION OF FREE CONSENT IN DIGITAL CONTRACTS

INTRODUCTION TO FREE CONSENTThe most important element of any contract is consent. The principle of ‘Consensus ad idem’, which means meeting of the...
HomeSupreme Court of IndiaReliance General Insurance Company ... vs Kanika on 24 February, 2026

Reliance General Insurance Company … vs Kanika on 24 February, 2026


Supreme Court of India

Reliance General Insurance Company … vs Kanika on 24 February, 2026

Author: Sanjay Karol

Bench: Sanjay Karol

2026 INSC 188




                                                                             REPORTABLE




                                      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2506-2507 OF 2026
                                  (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.26979-80 of 2025)




                            RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE
                            COMPANY LIMITED                                …APPELLANT(S)



                                                           VERSUS



                            KANIKA & ORS.                             …RESPONDENT(S)



                                                   JUDGMENT

SANJAY KAROL J.,

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2026.02.24
Leave Granted.

17:44:14 IST
Reason:

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 1 of 14

2. Reliance General Insurance Company Limited has filed
these appeals questioning the correctness of final judgments and
orders dated 15th October 20241 passed in CM NO.16984 of
2024 and 17th January 20232 passed in CM No.13449 of 2021,
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The
order dated 15th October 2024 was an order passed in Review of
the latter. The order dated 17th January 2023 was a consequence
of a clarification having been sought of order dated 18th
September 2019 passed by the High Court in FAO No.2017 of
20113.

3. The facts as necessary for disposal of the appeal are: On
2nd November 2009, a motorcycle being driven by Ravinder
Kumar, carrying two pillion riders, Smt. Hom Devi and Kanika
respondent no.1 herein collided with a jeep, on account of the
latter’s rash and negligent driving. Smt. Hom Devi passed away
and the other two people on the motorcycle received multiple
injuries. The deceased was employed as MPHW in PHC Chhara
at Village Daboda, drawing a salary of Rs. 21805 per month.

Respondent no.1 herein along with her two brothers, filed a
claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal,

1 Order in Review
2 Clarification Order
3 Main Order

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 2 of 14
Rohtak which was allowed in terms of order dated 9th October
2010. The amount awarded was Rs.8,80,000/- @7.5% interest
per annum, to be borne by respondents, jointly and severally.

4. The claimants-respondents approached the High Court
seeking enhancement thereof. The Court allowed the prayer for
enhancement but held that the amount received by the family as
per the Haryana Compassionate Assistance to Dependents of
Deceased Government Employees Rules, 20064, had to be
deducted from the total amount of compensation awarded to
them. As such, the total compensation awarded by the High
Court in terms of the Main Order was Rs. 29,09,240/- while
holding that the amount received by the claimant-respondents as
part of compensation under the 2006 Rules and any part of the
compensation as awarded by the Tribunal, would be deducted.
The claimant-respondents filed an application for clarification
in so far as the deduction of the amount received as per the
2006 Rules was ordered. By way of the Clarification Order, the
position of the Main Order appears to have been reversed. It
was held:

“ Considering the submissions made, as noted
above, the order dated 18.09.2019 is hereby
modified to the extent that the claimants would also

4 2006 Rules

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 3 of 14
be entitled to pension, therefore the entire amount of
compensation as received from the Government
under the Scheme of 2006 , will not be deductible
from the amount payable. In this way, the claimants
would be entitled to Rs. 25,83,949/-…”

The Order in Review records that the application was withdrawn
seeking liberty to challenge the same.

5. The matter now stands before us. The short question to be
decided is whether the amount in terms of the 2006 Rules has to
be deducted from the compensation awarded by the Tribunal or
not?

6. We find that the High Court, in its Main Order, relied on
the judgment of this Court in Reliance General Insurance v.

Shashi Sharma5 to hold the opposite to what it did in the
Clarification Order. The said judgment holds the field in so far
as the 2006 Rules and deductions of the amounts awarded
thereunder is concerned.

6.1 A three judge bench in the above judgment dealt
with a claim for compensation after a fatal motor acci-
dent. The deceased was a Government employee, and his

5 (2016) 9 SCC 627

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 4 of 14
family filed a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 19886
against the insurer. At the same time, the dependents were
entitled to receive financial assistance under the 2006
Rules, which provide ex-gratia payments to families of
Government employees who die during service. These
benefits include amounts that replace lost pay and al-
lowances, as well as other forms of assistance not directly
related to income.

The main question before the Court was whether
amounts received under the 2006 Rules should be de-
ducted from the compensation awarded under the MVA.

It was held that only benefits that directly replace
the same type of loss, like loss income, can be deducted.
Benefits under the 2006 Rules that correspond to pay and
allowances the deceased would have earned must there-
fore be offset against the compensation awarded under
MVA, to prevent double recovery. Other components of
the 2006 Rules, such as pensions, life insurance, or unre-
lated allowances, remain unaffected and cannot be de-
ducted. The relevant extract is as under:-

“26. Indeed, similar statutory exclusion of claim
receivable under the 2006 Rules is absent. That,
however, does not mean that the Claims Tribunal

6 MVA

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 5 of 14
should remain oblivious to the fact that the claim to-

wards loss of pay and wages of the deceased has
already been or will be compensated by the em-
ployer in the form of ex gratia financial assistance
on compassionate grounds under Rule 5(1). The
Claims Tribunal has to adjudicate the claim and de-
termine the amount of compensation which appears
to it to be just. The amount receivable by the de-
pendants/claimants towards the head of “pay and al-
lowances” in the form of ex gratia financial assist-
ance, therefore, cannot be paid for the second time to
the claimants. True it is, that the 2006 Rules would
come into play if the government employee dies in
harness even due to natural death. At the same time,
the 2006 Rules do not expressly enable the depend-
ants of the deceased government employee to claim
similar amount from the tortfeasor or insurance com-
pany because of the accidental death of the deceased
government employee. The harmonious approach for
determining a just compensation payable under the
1988 Act, therefore, is to exclude the amount re-
ceived or receivable by the dependants of the de-
ceased government employee under the 2006 Rules
towards the head financial assistance equivalent to
“pay and other allowances” that was last drawn by
the deceased government employee in the normal
course. This is not to say that the amount or payment
receivable by the dependants of the deceased gov-
ernment employee under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, is
the total entitlement under the head of “loss of in-
come”. So far as the claim towards loss of future es-
calation of income and other benefits is concerned, if
the deceased government employee had survived the
accident can still be pursued by them in their claim
under the 1988 Act. For, it is not covered by the
2006 Rules. Similarly, other benefits extended to the
dependants of the deceased government employee in
terms of sub-rule (2) to sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 in-
cluding family pension, life insurance, provident
fund, etc., that must remain unaffected and cannot be
allowed to be deducted, which, any way would be
paid to the dependants of the deceased government

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 6 of 14
employee, applying the principle expounded
in Helen C. Rebello [Helen C. Rebello v. Maha-
rashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (Cri)
197] and Patricia Jean Mahajan [United India In-
surance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, (2002) 6
SCC 281 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1294] cases.”

This ruling ensures even scales – families receive
full compensation for the loss caused by the accident, at
the same time, they are not paid twice for the same finan-
cial loss. The Court’s decision clarifies that when calcu-
lating compensation, only overlapping or equivalent ben-
efits are taken into account for deduction, leaving unre-
lated assistance intact.

6.2 The claimant-respondents contend in their counter
affidavit that the subsequent decision of the Court in Na-
tional Insurance Company Ltd. v. Birender & Ors. 7 sub
silentio and per incuriam to the earlier judgment in
Shashi Sharma (supra). Before getting into that submis-
sion let us examine what the holding therein was. The
Court once again dealt with how amounts receivable un-
der the 2006 Rules, which provide compassionate assis-
tance to the dependents of deceased Government employ-
ees, should be treated when calculating compensation un-
der the MVA. The High Court had ordered the deduction

7 (2020) 11 SCC 356

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 7 of 14
of a part of the financial assistance under the 2006 Rules
from the MVA compensation, on the assumption that the
legal representatives of the deceased were entitled to it.

The Court held that this deduction was not correct
because there was no clear evidence on record showing
that the legal representatives were actually eligible for the
assistance or that they had received it. A deduction from
the MVA compensation can only be made once eligibility
and receipt of the assistance are established, rather than
assumed without proof.

The Court explained that the Tribunal should first
determine the full amount of compensation under the
MVA. After that, the legal representatives can withdraw
the compensation, provided they file an affidavit or dec-
laration before the executing Court stating whether they
have received or will receive any financial assistance un-
der the 2006 Rules. If such assistance is eventually
granted or has already been received, the corresponding
amount, including interest, should then be deducted from
the compensation to avoid double recovery. The practical
effect is that no provisional deduction should be made at
the award stage based on assumptions. Compensation un-
der the MVA should be paid in full initially, with adjust-

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 8 of 14

ments made later if the legal representatives actually re-

ceive amounts under the 2006 Rules. This ensures that
the dependents receive their rightful compensation with-
out the risk of receiving double benefits.

6.3 On a close reading of the two judgments, Shashi
Sharma (supra) and Birender (supra) it can be con-
cluded that they are not inconsistent on any point of law.
Both decisions operate within the same conceptual frame-
work governing the deduction of financial assistance un-
der the 2006 Rules from compensation awarded under the
MVA.

The rule laid down in Shashi Sharma is essentially
substantive in character. It clarifies that deduction is per-
missible only to the extent that financial assistance over-
laps with the same pecuniary loss for which compensa-
tion is awarded under the MVA, most notably the loss of
income. Benefits that are not in the nature of income sub-
stitution, or that are otherwise unconnected to the acci-
dent-related loss, are not deductible. The decision is
therefore concerned with the nature and scope of de-
ductible benefits.

Birender does not revisit or alter this substantive
rule. Instead, it addresses the stage at which such deduc-

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 9 of 14

tions may be made and the evidentiary basis required for
doing so. The Court held that the High Court was not jus-
tified in deducting a portion of the financial assistance
merely on the assumption that the claimants were entitled
to it. It emphasized that eligibility or actual receipt must
be established on record before any deduction is effected.
The Court, therefore, required that compensation under
the MVA be determined in full, with a declaration mecha-
nism to adjust the award later if overlapping assistance is
in fact received.

Thus, the two decisions are consistent in principle.
Shashi Sharma defines what is deductible, while Biren-
der clarifies when and how such deductions should be
made. The latter does not depart from the former; rather,
it ensures that the substantive rule is applied with appro-
priate procedural safeguards and without speculative as-
sumptions. Together, they form a coherent legal position
governing both the nature and the timing of deductions
under the 2006 Rules.

7. The next aspect to be considered in assessing the correct-
ness of the impugned orders, is whether it was open for the
Court to, while entertaining an application for clarification, to

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 10 of 14
make a substantive change to the award i.e., alter the amount of
compensation to be paid by the appellant. When a High Court
decides an appeal under Section 173 of the MVA, it is exercis-
ing civil appellate jurisdiction. The MVA does not create any in-
dependent procedural mechanism called a “clarification” of a
concluded appellate judgment. Consequently, an application
styled as one for clarification must be located within the limited
corrective powers recognised by the Code of Civil Procedure,
19088, principally Sections 151 and 152. It cannot operate as a
parallel or substitute procedure.

7.1 Section 152 CPC permits correction only of cleri-
cal, arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from acciden-
tal slips or omissions. The Supreme Court has consis-
tently confined this provision to its narrow textual limits.
In Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho9, this
Court held that Section 152 is attracted only where the er-
ror is accidental and does not extend to re-determining is-
sues or altering the substance of the decree. [See also:

Neeraj Kumar Sainy v. State of U.P.10] The Court empha-
sised that the provision cannot be used to modify, add to,
or subtract from the terms of a judgment once pro-
nounced.
Similarly, in State of Punjab v. Darshan

8 ‘CPC or ‘the Code’
9 (2001) 4 SCC 181
10 (2017) 14 SCC 136

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 11 of 14
Singh11, this Court reiterated that Section 152 cannot be
invoked to change the operative part of a judgment on
merits; it is confined to correcting clerical or accidental
errors and cannot be pressed into service to vary substan-
tive rights.

7.2 The limits of inherent power under Section 151
CPC are also no longer res integra. In Padam Sen v.
State of Uttar Pradesh12
, the Court held that inherent
powers cannot be exercised in a manner inconsistent with
the express provisions of the Code, or in other words that
these inherent powers have to be exercised, with due re-
spect to the other provisions of the Code.
They exist to
supplement the procedure, not to override it. A three-
judge bench in My Palace Mutually Aided Coop. Society
v. B. Mahesh13
, followed this position.

7.3 Therefore, the position is clear. In such an appeal,
the High Court may correct clerical or accidental errors
under Section 152 CPC, or issue limited clarificatory di-
rections under Section 151 CPC to give effect to what
was originally decided. However, it cannot, for example,
alter findings on negligence, modify the quantum of com-

11 (2004) 1 SCC 328,
12 AIR 1961 SC 218
13 (2022) 19 SCC 806

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 12 of 14
pensation, redistribute liability, or otherwise affect sub-

stantive rights under the guise of clarification. Any such
exercise would, in law, amount to a review in substance
and must satisfy the strict requirements of review under
Order XLVII CPC.

8. In that view of the matter, appeals are allowed. The Order
in Review is set aside, and the Main Order is restored. The
amount received by the claimant-respondents in terms of the
2006 Rules will be deducted from the award as modified by the
Main Order. The rate of interest as awarded by the Tribunal will
remain unchanged, payable from the date of institution of the
claim petition. Let an affidavit be filed before the Tribunal, by
the claimant-respondents, indicating the sum so received, if any,
enabling the Tribunal to make suitable orders for disbursal of
the money by appellant herein. Once such an order is made, the
sum shall be released in favour of the claimant-respondent
within six weeks therefrom. We clarify that if no amount is re-
ceived or receivable under the 2006 Rules, the claimant-respon-
dents shall be entitled to claim the entire amount in terms of the
main order passed by the High Court. The details of the bank
account of the claimant-respondent be supplied to the appellant
by the respective counsel before the Tribunal, when they appear
before the Tribunal on 27th February 2026.

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 13 of 14

Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the
Registrar General of the Punjab and Haryana High Court for en-
suring onward compliance.

Pending application(s) if any, shall stand closed and, in
the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.

………………………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)

…………………………………….…J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

New Delhi;

February 24, 2026

C.A.Nos..of 2026 @SLP(C)Nos.26979-80 of 2025 Page 14 of 14



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