M/S. Sanjay Kumar Bijay Kumar vs Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax-I on 24 February, 2026

Orissa High Court

M/S. Sanjay Kumar Bijay Kumar vs Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax-I on 24 February, 2026

              ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK

                  W.P.(C) No.28067 of 2025

  In the matter of an Application under Articles 226 and 
               of the Constitution of India, 1950

                            ***

M/s. Sanjay Kumar Bijay Kumar
Adaspur, Cuttack – 754011
Represented through its partner
Sri Sudarshan Sahoo,
Aged about 72 years,
Son of Late Udayanath Sahoo. … Petitioner

-VERSUS-

1. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I
Aayakar Bhawan, Rajaswa Vihar
Bhubaneswar, Pin: 751 007.

2. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax
Circle-1(1), Cuttack
Aayakar Bhawan, Shelter Square
District: Cuttack
Odisha, Pin: 753 008.

3. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax
Range-1, Aayakar Bhawan, Shelter Square
District: Cuttack
Odisha, Pin: 753 008.

4. Income Tax Officer
Ward-1(1), Cuttack
Aayakar Bhawan, Shelter Square

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 1 of 31
District: Cuttack
Odisha, Pin: 753 008.

5. National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC),
Represented by Additional/joint/
Deputy/Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax/
Income Tax Officer,
National Faceless Assessment Centre
New Delhi. … Opposite parties

Counsel appeared for the parties:

For the Petitioner : M/s. Pranaya Kishore Harichandan,
and Pragyant Harichandan,
Advocates

For the Opposite parties : Mr. Subash Chandra Mohanty,
Senior Standing Counsel
(Income Tax Department)

P R E S E N T:

HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE
MR. HARISH TANDON
AND

HONOURABLE JUSTICE
MR. MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

Date of Hearing : 05.02.2026 :: Date of Judgment : 24.02.2026

J UDGMENT

MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.–

The petitioner felt constrained to knock the doors of the
writ court alleging lackadaisical attitude of the Deputy
Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 1(1), Cuttack (for
short, “DCIT”), who wantonly seeks to proceed with
WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 2 of 31
adjudication process under Section 147 by issue of
Notice dated 30.06.2025 under Section 148 (Annexure-

13) rejecting the explanation offered by it in connection
with Order dated 24.06.2025 passed under Section
148A(3) (Annexure-2) in connection with Notice dated
18.03.2025 under Section 148A(1) of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 (Annexure-1) on specious plea of information
received in connection with income pertaining to
Assessment Year 2019-20 (Previous Year 2018-19).

Facts culled out from writ petition:

2. The petitioner, a partnership firm carries on its business
dealing in cattle feed and building material on wholesale
and retail basis since 1985-86 in the name and style
“M/S. SANJAY KUMAR BIJAY KUMAR”, being allotted with
Permanent Account Numbers– “ABAFS4271L” (for
convenience be referred to as “PAN-1”) and
“AATFS3658P” (for convenience be referred to as “PAN-

2″). It has been furnishing returns under the provisions
of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short “IT Act“)
disclosing PAN-2, since Assessment Year 2003-04, but it
never utilized PAN-1 in connection with its business
activities. However, due to inadvertence it disclosed PAN-
1 in certain banking transactions with the Canara Bank,
nonetheless, it requested the Bank to take out
corrections in its records mentioning PAN-2.

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 3 of 31

2.1. On collecting information relating to the deposits made
with the said Bank, a Notice under Section 148A(1) of
the IT Act dated 18.03.2025 qua PAN-1 for the
Assessment Year 2019-20 (Financial Year 2018-19) was
issued by the DCIT, to which a response was submitted
that on the advice of Commissioner a new PAN-2 being
allotted, the returns have been filed, but the Bankers
having not updated their system reflected PAN-1 in the
alleged transactions. It is explained that the transactions
in question were shown in the returns reflecting PAN-2.
Notwithstanding such fact being placed before the DCIT,
he passed Order dated 24.06.2025 under Section
148A(3) vide Annexure-2 contemplating assessment of
escaped income under Section 147 by issue of Notice
under Section 148 of the IT Act.

2.2. Accordingly, a Notice dated 30.06.2025 under Section
148 of the IT Act vide Annexure-13 is issued by the DCIT
for assessment of escaped income under Section 147 as
against PAN-1. Further intimation was also issued on
25.07.2025 in this regard.

Arguments of counsel for respective parties:

3. With the above factual narration, Sri Pranaya Kishore
Harichandan, learned Advocate drew attention of this
Court to Notice dated 23.02.2023 issued under Section
148A(b) of the IT Act with respect to banking

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 4 of 31
transactions with the Canara Bank to the tune of
Rs.4,42,47,290/- pertaining to Financial Year 2018-19
(Assessment Year 2019-20), to which a response being
furnished by the petitioner, an Order dated 22.03.2023
under Section 148A(d) came to be passed by the ITO,
Ward 1(1), Cuttack for assessment under Section 147 by
issue of Notice under Section 148 against PAN-1. It is
forcefully submitted that after considering the reply and
undertaking verification of the records, the ITO assessed
the income to NIL.

3.1. The learned counsel highlighted that notwithstanding
the ITO, Ward 1(1), Cuttack having verified the records,
came to hold that the transactions with the Canara
Bank was disclosed in the return furnished against PAN-
2 and therefore, total income of the petitioner would not
be taxed again against PAN-1. Hence, he urged that
double taxation is anathema to the principles of taxation
being beyond the purport envisioned in Article 265 of the
Constitution of India. The petitioner-assessee cannot be
subjected to double jeopardy.

3.2. Sri Subash Chandra Mohanty, learned Senior Standing
Counsel appearing for the Income Tax Department
submitted that the writ petition challenging the Notice
dated 30.06.2025 under Section 148 (Annexure-13) read
with intimation dated 25.07.2025 under Section 144B
(Annexure-14) issued pursuant to Order dated
WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 5 of 31
24.06.2025 (Annexure-2) passed under Section 148A(3)
upon consideration of reply to Notice dated 18.03.2025
(Annexure-1) under Section 148A(1) of the IT Act is not
maintainable and the writ petition is liable to be
dismissed in limine.

3.3. Advancing argument further he would submit that the
petitioner is not denied to avail ample opportunities
before the Assessing Officer and other statutory
authorities, if circumstances would so arise, in order to
justify its claim of double taxation by adducing cogent
evidence and demonstrating on facts that the
transactions of deposit in the Canara Bank had already
been considered against PAN-2 instead of PAN-1. Having
not filed returns qua PAN-1, the DCIT is the competent
authority to institute proceeding under Section 147
treating the transactions with the Canara Bank
indicating PAN-1 as escaped assessment of income.

3.4. There is no plausible reason available for the petitioner
to circumvent the procedure established in the IT Act,
which is self-contained Code. Hence, it would not be
appropriate for this Court to entertain the writ petition.

4. Heard Sri Pranaya Kishore Harichandan, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Subash Chandra
Mohanty, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for
the Income Tax Department.

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 6 of 31

Discussions:

5. On perusal of record and documents forming part of the
writ petition, this Court is persuaded that relegating the
petitioner to rigmarole of adjudicatory process of the IT
Act would not only cause embarrassment and/or
prejudice, but also give scope for the Assessing Officer to
review the view already expressed leading to unfair
burden to the assessee as well as the Revenue. Since the
question posed by the petitioner touches upon the
jurisdiction to re-do the exercise by the DCIT, which the
ITO had already done upon participation of the assessee,
this Court repels the contention of the learned Senior
Standing Counsel with respect to his argument that the
petition is not entertainable particularly when facts are
not disputed and remained uncontroverted.

5.1. Taking note of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in the cases of Commissioner of Income Tax Vrs.

Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 and Godrej
Sara Lee Ltd. Vrs. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-
Assessing Authority, (2023) 3 SCR 871, there is no cavil
that existence of alternative remedy is not an absolute
bar for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The
Assessment Order dated 29.03.2023 of ITO, Ward 1(1),
Cuttack reveals that considering the explanation of the
petitioner that it had disclosed the alleged transactions
WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 7 of 31
with the Canara Bank in the return mentioning PAN-2
and it abandoned PAN-1 and upon verification of
records, he came to hold that the return of income was
furnished in the return in PAN-2. Cursory glance at
Notice dated 18.03.2025 issued under Section 148A(1)
by the DCIT clearly shows that the self-same transaction
with the Canara Bank was the subject-matter in the
assessment proceeding under Section 147 before the
ITO, Ward 1(1) pursuant to Notice dated 23.02.2023
issued under Section 148A(b) of the IT Act. Therefore, it
can be safely inferred that same transaction ought not to
be have been subjected to re-verification by a different
authority by undertaking assessment proceeding under
Section 147. Not entertaining the present writ petition
would ensue prejudice as for the same cause of action
the petitioner has to engage itself again for the purpose
of assessment.

5.2. In Muljibhai Patel Vrs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, AIR 1974
SC 2105, the Supreme Court held that the High Court is
not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution merely in
considering the petitioner’s right to relief, question of
facts at fault to be determined. The High Court has
jurisdiction to try issues both on facts and law. In case
complex question of fact is raised, which may for its
determination require oral evidence to be taken, the

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 8 of 31
High Court may decline to entertain the writ petition.
However, it is the discretion of the High Court to exercise
on sound and in conformity with judicial principle.

5.3. In State of Tripura Vrs. Manoranjan Chakraborty, (2001)
10 SCC 740, it is held that if gross injustice is done and
it can be shown that for good reason the Court should
interfere, then notwithstanding the alternative remedy
which may be available by way of appeal or revision, the
writ Court can in an appropriate case exercise its
jurisdiction to do substantial justice.

5.4. A Division Bench of this Court having referred to very
many decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
VFPL ASIPL JV Company Vrs. Union of India, 2020 (III)
ILR-CUT 388 observed thus:

“32. The word “efficacious” is adjective according to
Grammar and its noun is “efficacy”. The word
“efficacy” is derived from Latin word “efficacie”

which means capacity to produce results. The word
„efficacious‟ accordingly means able to produce the
intended effect or result.

33. In Abdul Sammad Vrs. Executive Committee of the
Marigaon Mahkuma Parishad, AIR 1981 Gau 15, the
Gauhati High Court held that it is well-known that
the meaning of the term “efficacious” is “able to
produce the intended result”. It is, therefore, held
that the preliminary objection raised by the opposite
parties with regard to maintainability of the writ
petition is hereby negatived and as such, this Court

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 9 of 31
held that the writ petitions are maintainable and
issue No.(i) is accordingly answered in affirmative.”

5.5. In the above perspective if the present case is analysed,
the objection of the learned Senior Standing Counsel
against entertainment of writ petition on the ground that
efficacious remedy is available for the petitioner to
participate in the proceeding to determine escaped
assessment under Section 147 by issue of Notice dated
30.06.2025 under Section 148 (Annexure-13) and
subsequent intimation dated 25.07.2025 for completion
of assessment adhering to the procedure laid in Section
144B (Annexure-14) by the DCIT, Circle 1(1), Cuttack, is
to be overruled.

6. This takes this Court to examine that both the
proceedings of the DCIT and the ITO are based on self-
same transactions with the Canara Bank.

6.1. The Notice dated 30.06.2025 issued by the DCIT under
Section 148 (Annexure-13) emanates from Order dated
24.06.2025 passed under Section 148A(3) of the IT Act
by the DCIT, Circle 1(1) of Cuttack, relevant portion of
which reads as follows:

     PAN:            A.Y.:       DIN & Notice No.:
     ABAFS4271L      2019-20     ITBA/AST/F/148A/2025-26/1077734077(1)
     *               *           *

During the Financial Year 2018-19, M/s. Sanjay Kumar
Bijay Kumar [PAN: ABAFS4271L] has deposited cash in
the following banks mentioned below:

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 10 of 31

Sl. Name of transaction Name of the bank Amount (in Rs.)
No.

1. Cash deposits or Canara Bank 90,78,290
cash withdrawals

2. -do- -do- 3,51,69,000
Total 4,42,47,290

On verification by this office it is observed that the
assessee M/s. Sanjay Kumar Bijay Kumar is filing its
returns using PAN: AATFS3658P from Assessment Year
2007-08 onwards. However, the assessee has used PAN:

ABAFS4271L in bank accounts maintained by it in
Canara Bank during the Financial Year 2018-19. It is
pertinent to mention here that for similar ground an Order
under Section 147 read with Section 144 passed by the
ITO, Ward-1(1), Cuttack on 29.03.2023 computing total
income of the assessee as NIL. Hence, this office treats
that total amounts to the tune of Rs.4,42,47,290/-
remains unexplained and thereby escaped
assessment of income of Rs.4,42,47,290 within the
meaning of Section 147 of the IT Act, 1961.

Considering above facts and circumstances into account
and on the basis of material available on record as well
as to protect the interest of revenue, it is considered that
the assessee‟s case is a fit case to issue notice u/s 148 of
the Act, for the impugned Assess Year 2019-20.

This order is being issued after obtaining prior approval of
the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range-1, Cuttack
as per Section 151 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.”

6.2. Such a perception of the DCIT discarding merit of the
explanation proffered by the petitioner smacks
arbitrariness and tainted with whimsical exercise of
power stemming on the same provision(s) which had
already been invoked by the ITO while investigating into

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 11 of 31
the fact of deposit of cash to the tune of
Rs.4,42,47,290/- in the Canara Bank by disclosing PAN-
1 instead of PAN-2. This fact is discernible from the
following factual details as obtained in Annexure-7, i.e.,
Order dated 22.03.2023 passed under Section 148A(d)
by the ITO:

“In response, the assessee submitted written compliance
as under:

„The assessee like to inform that the PAN: ABSFS4271L is
one old one which the assessee is not using since
Assessment Year 2003-04. The assesse is regularly filing
ITR under PAN: AATFS3658P disclosing its income. Photo
copy of the ITR along with balance sheet for the
Assessment Year 2003-04 is enclosed herewith and
accordingly for the Assessment Year 2019-20 the
assessee after auditing their books of accounts under
Section 44AB of the Act by a CA filed the return by
disclosing total income of Rs.51,12,820/- on 30.10.2019
under the PAN: AATFS3658P. In the meantime the
assessee has filed an application dated 06.03.2023
explaining in details before jurisdictional authority for
surrender of same as said PAN is de-duplicate one.‟

The submission of the assesse is perused.

No shred of evidence could be produced against said
assertion. No Profits & Loss account and Balance Sheets
were produced by the assessee for the impugned
Assessment Year 2019-20 to explain that the deposits
made in the current account and the assessee shall have
opportunity to furnish details during contemplated
assessment proceeding.

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 12 of 31

Thus, with regard to sources of cash deposits, the
assessee’s explanation without any supporting
verifiable evidence is found unacceptable at this
stage of the proceeding for which cash deposited in
current account of the assessee for Rs.4,42,47,290/-
remained unexplained. Similarly, in absence of any
supporting evidence interest income of Rs.11,306/- also
remained unexplained.

In the case of ACIT Vrs. Rajesh Javeri Stock Brokers Pvt.
Limited, Civil Appeal No.2830 of 2007 (SC) in para 16 it is
held that „in other words, at the initiation stage, what is
required is reason to believe, but not the established fact
of escapement of income. At the stage of issue of notice,
the only question is whether there was a relevant
material on which a reasonable person could have formed
a requisite belief. Whether the material would conclusively
proved the escapement is not the concern at that stage.
This is so because the formation of belief by the AO is
within the realm of subjective satisfaction.‟

Under the above facts and circumstances, the
aggregate amount of Rs.4,42,58,596/- i.e.
[Rs.4,42,47,290 + Rs.11,306] is prima facie
considered to be assets available in its hand and
income corresponding to said deposits has escaped
assessment for the assessment year 2019-20 within
the meaning of provisions of Section 147 of the IT
Act. Accordingly, it is considered to be a fit case for
issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act.”

6.3. After examining the genuineness of said cash deposits to
the tune of Rs.4,42,47,290/-, the ITO passed
Assessment Order dated 30.03.2023 under Section 147
of the IT Act with respect to Assessment Year 2019-20

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 13 of 31
enclosing therewith Computation Sheet with the
following observation:

“In response to notice under Section 148, the assessee
was required to file its return of income within 30 days.
But the assessee did not file its return of income in
response to the notice under Section 148 of the Act. In
response, the assessee has explained through e-
proceeding. The relevant portion is recast as under:

„That the assessee likes to state that, since A.Y. 2003-04,
they are not using PAN: ABAFS4271L. They are using the
PAN: AATFS3658P and regularly filing the IT return under
said PAN.(2). Similarly the assessee has also filed IT has
also filed IT return under PAN: AATFS3658P for the A.Y.
2018-19, disclosing the total income of Rs.37,04,680/- on
06.10.2018. Before filing the IT return CA has
audited the Books of accounts under Section 44AB,
by considering the deposits, out of trading income,
in Canara Bank current account
No.0353214000010 & 0328201001453 amounting
to Rs.3,31,79,990/- & Rs.4,99,76,500/- respectively.

The said current A/c. Nos. are mentioned in the balance
sheet as well as IT return which are filed along with
written submission in response to notice dated
06.01.2023. Copy of both the Canara Bank accounts are
enclosed for reference. (3) Further the assessee has
maintained day to day cash book relating to F.Y. 2017-
18, wherein the deposit made under the Bank Accounts in
question has been reflected and same has also been
audited under Section 44AB of the Act under PAN:

AATFS3658P. Copy of the cash book is enclosed for
reference. (4) It is pertinent to mention here that while the
bank started obtaining KYC from their customers, the
assessee inadvertently mentioned the PAN: ABAFS4271L,
WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 14 of 31
but subsequently informed the banks to correct the PAN to
AATFS3658P and while depositing the cheques, DD or
cash, the assessee is also quoting the same in deposit
sleep which can be evident from copy of the deposit slip is
enclosed for reference. (5) that the Branch Manager,
Canara Bank has also given confirmation in writing that,
the assessee firm is operating two banks A/c. bearing
0328201001453 and 0353214000010 against the PAN-
AATFS3658P. A copy of the confirmation letter is enclosed
for reference. (6) In view of the above submission, it is
stated that, there is no escapement of assessment under
Section 147 of the Act, as the amount deposited in Canara
Bank Accounts has been considered, while filing the
return under PAN: AATFS3658P for the Assessment Year
2018-19. As such the assessee submits that, the self-
same amount and self-same period should not be taxed
twice, which will amount to double taxation and prohibits
under the law. This also incorporates the principles of
„autrefois convict‟ or double jeopardy, hence proceeding
initiated under Section 148 of the Act may be dropped.‟

***

The submission of the assessee is perused. On
verification of the audited P&L, Balance Sheet, ITR and
bank ledger, it is found the contention of the assessee is
substantiated with corroborated documentary evidences.
The current account bearing No.0353214000010 and CA
No.0328201001453 of the firm maintained at Canara
Bank and all transactions of deposits & withdrawals
thereof were accounted for in the books of accounts for the
Financial Year 2017-18 relevant to the Assessment Year
2018-19 of M/s. Sanjay Kumar Bijay Kumar, PAN-
AATFS3658P which is certified by the Chartered
Accountant and return of income has filed by the

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 15 of 31
assessee for the said Assessment Year in PAN-
AATFS2358P.

Under the facts & circumstances of the case and in
view of above discussion, no adverse inference is
drawn after verifying of submission made by the
assessee, bank authority and the auditors
supported by documentary evidences. Total income of
the assessee is assessed at Rs.NIL for the relevant
Assessment Year 2018-19 in PAN-ABAFS4271L.”

6.4. A careful reading of contents of the Notice(s) and the
Order(s) of the DCIT and the ITO would manifestly
demonstrate that the ITO on earlier occasion for the self-

same transaction relating to cash deposits with the
Canara Bank having verified the books of accounts,
returns and bank accounts taking note of explanation of
the petitioner came to hold that the transaction was
reflected in the return against PAN-2 and there was no
escapement of income. On the contrary, the Notice/
Order of the DCIT indicates that for the same
transactions respecting Assessment Year 2019-20 are
premised on the basis that the petitioner used PAN-1 for
banking transactions sought to initiate proceeding under
Section 147 by issuing notice under Section 148 in the
year 2025 which had already been adjudicated on facts
by the ITO in the year 2023 under the same provisions.

6.5. The said fact remained uncontroverted by Sri Subash
Chandra Mohanty, learned Senior Standing Counsel. He

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 16 of 31
conceded that deposit of Rs.4,42,47,290/- was subject-
matter before the ITO and now the DCIT issued notice to
examine the same transaction.

6.6. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that for
the same transaction relating to deposit of
Rs.4,42,47,290/- in the Canara Bank cannot be subject-
matter of assessment under Section 147 twice; one by
the ITO and the other by the DCIT.

6.7. The legal maxim, Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem
causa, meaning thereby, no man should be vexed twice
over for the same cause would fit to the present context.
In Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair Vrs. Narayanan Nair,
(2004) 3 SCC 277 taking note of meaning of “cause of
action”, it has been laid down as follows:

“13. Section 11 (of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908)
contains the rule of conclusiveness of the judgment
which is based partly on the maxim of Roman
jurisprudence “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”

(it concerns the State that there be an end to law
suits) and partly on the maxim “nemo debet bis
vexari pro una et eadem causa” (no man should be
vexed twice over for the same cause). The section
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court but
operates as a bar to the trial of the suit or issue, if
the matter in the suit was directly and substantially
in issue (and finally decided) in the previous suit
between the same parties litigating under the same
title in a Court, competent to try the subsequent suit
in which such issue has been raised.”

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 17 of 31

6.8. In Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur Vrs. Shree
Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., (2009) 5 SCR 879 it
has been enunciated as follows:

“45. Before we part with the case, we may address to the
plea of res judicata raised by the learned Senior
Counsel for the Department. Mr. K. Radhakrishnan
pressed into service few legal maxims in this regard.
It is true that maxim Nemo debet bis vexari pro
una et eadem causa is founded on principle of
private justice as it states that no man ought
to be twice put to trouble if it appear to the
court that it is for one and the same cause. The
maxim Interest republicae sit finis litium
concerns the State that law suits be not
protracted. This maxim is based on public
policy. In our opinion, these maxims cannot be
applied as a rule of thumb in the taxation
matters. In the matters of classification of goods,
the principles that have been followed, by the
courts– which we endorse– are that there may not
be justification for changing the classification
without a change in the nature or a change in the
use of the product; something more is required for
changing the classification especially when the
product remains the same. Earlier decision on an
issue inter parties is a cogent factor in the
determination of the same issue. The
applicability of maxim Res judicata pro
veritate occipitur in the matters of
classification of goods has to be seen in that
perspective. The interpretation given by this Court
in Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. Vrs.
Collector of Central Excise, Nagpur, (1996) 9 SCC

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 18 of 31
402 with regard to this product has been considered
and applied by us after amendment because
Chapter Sub-heading 3003.31 does not contain
definition of Ayurvedic Medicine and the product
DML in nature, character and uses remains the
same as it was prior to amendment.”

6.9. In the instant case, nothing is suggested by Sri Subash
Chandra Mohanty, learned Senior Standing Counsel
that the subject and context for adjudication before the
ITO vide Assessment Order dated 30.03.2023 of the ITO,
Ward 1(1), Cuttack passed under Section 147 read with
Section 144 of the IT Act pertaining to Assessment Year
2019-20 qua PAN: ABAFS4271L (Annexure-10) was
different and distinct from the present investigation to be
continued pursuant to Notice dated 30.06.2025 issued
under Section 148 by the DCIT (Annexure-13) in
connection with his Order dated 24.06.2025 passed
under Section 148A(3) of the said Act. Applying the
principles as exposited by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India referred to supra this Court is inclined to show
indulgence in the matter by holding that the petitioner-
assessee should not face trial for the same cause
(subject-matter) twice.

6.10. It is manifested ex facie on the record that the ITO,
Ward-1(1), Cuttack passed Order dated 22.03.2023
under Section 148A(d) of the IT Act relating to
Assessment Year 2019-20 against PAN-1 stating clearly

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 19 of 31
therein that proceeding was initiated with respect to
cash deposit of Rs.4,42,47,290/- with the Canara Bank
and said proceeding upon verification of records
culminated in passing of Assessment Order dated
30.03.2023 and Computation Sheet appended thereto
clearly reflects the position in this regard. The petitioner
enclosed evidences of deposits made in the said bank
and copies of return(s) to demonstrate that the said
amount(s) was disclosed in the return filed against PAN-

2. Scrutiny of Order dated 24.06.2025 passed under
Section 148(3) of the IT Act, it leads to depict
unequivocally that the DCIT, Circle 1(1), Cuttack sought
to initiate proceeding for assessment invoking Section
147 by issue of Notice dated 30.06.2025 under Section
148 and treating the same amount of deposit being
made with the Canara Bank, i.e., Rs.4,42,47,290/- as
escaped income. Whereas the assessment under Section
147 came to be concluded by the ITO by passing
Assessment Order and Computation Sheet attached
thereto, the DCIT should not have rejected the
explanation offered by the petitioner in response to
Notice under Section 148A(1) for with respect to the
same period and the same transaction treating it to be
escaped income two assessments under same provision
cannot be held tenable in the eye of law. It can thus
seemly be held that the DCIT has initiated proceeding for
assessment under Section 147 by issue of Notice under
WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 20 of 31
Section 148 by rejecting mechanically the explanation
proffered by the petitioner in connection with the Notice
dated 18.03.2025 without ascribing plausible reason.

6.11. Nothing is placed on record by the learned Senior
Standing Counsel to indicate that the Assessment Order
dated 30.03.2023 of the ITO has ever been challenged
and/or varied or reversed by any higher forum. Hence,
the said order of ITO having attained finality, there was
no scope or occasion for the DCIT to initiate another
proceeding under the same provision.

6.12. Finality is attached to the finding of fact based on
analysis of evidence on record by passing order of
assessment and order passed by the quasi judicial
authority is not a matter to be trifled with. It cannot also
be stated that all finding of fact of the authorities
concerned would be correct on all counts. Nonetheless,
for functionality to exist and order to prevail, the
doctrine of finality of adjudication often eclipses or over
powers concerns or considerations that otherwise exist
in favour of accuracy or correctness of the fact-finding
adjudicatory process. Once a proceeding is shown to
have been concluded on participation of the assessee
before the Assessing Officer, the finality of such
adjudication must be maintained. In the same breath, so
far as the State/Department is concerned, there can be
no exception.

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 21 of 31

6.13. In view of the discussions made in the foregoing
paragraphs on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Order dated 24.06.2025 under Section 148A(3)
(Annexure-2) made with reference to Notice dated
18.03.2025 issued under Section 148A(1) (Annexure-1)
along with Notice issued under Section 148 dated
30.06.2025 to proceed with assessment under Section
147 (Annexure-13) coupled with intimation dated
25.07.2025 for completion of assessment in accordance
to the procedure laid down under Section 144B of the IT
Act (Annexure-14) are bad in law and hence, the
subsequent proceedings undertaken in the year 2025 by
the DCIT as the Assessment Order of the ITO attained
finality, being not shown to have been challenged and
the view expressed by the ITO being not stated to have
been overturned by any higher fora, the proceeding
instituted by the DCIT is held as invalid.

6.14. To fortify the view so expressed, a reference to following
observations contained in CIT Vrs. Sanjay Kumar Garg,
2015 SCC OnLine Del 11714 may throw light on the
issue at hand:

“10. The legal position appears to be fairly well settled. In
S.B. Jain, Income Tax Officer, Nagpur Vrs. Mahendra
(1972) 83 ITR 104 (SC) a notice was issued to the
Assessee on 5th January 1962 under Section
34(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 seeking to
reopen the assessment for Assessment Year 1946-

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 22 of 31

47. While the said proceedings were pending, the
Income Tax Act, 1961 came into force with effect
from 1st April 1962. The challenge by the Assessee
to the validity of the notice issued under the 1922
Act succeeded with the Bombay High Court
quashing the said notice by the Order dated 6th
March 1963. Thereafter the Income Tax Officer
issued a fresh notice on 26th March 1963 under
Section 148 of the Act in respect of the very
assessment which had sought to be reopened by the
earlier notice under Section 34(1)(a) of the 1922 Act.
The Supreme Court held that the proceedings
initiated under Section 34(1)(a) of the 1922 Act were
pending at the time when the 1961 Act came into
force and, therefore, the Income Tax Officer was not
competent to issue a fresh notice under Section 148
of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

11. In Nilofer Hameed Vrs. Income Tax Officer, (1999)
235 ITR 161 (Ker) after referring to a number of
judgments of the High Courts, it was held by the
Kerala High Court that

„if an assessment is pending either by way of
original assessment or by way of reassessment
proceedings, the Assessing Officer cannot issue a
notice under Section 148 but if no proceedings are
pending either by way of original assessment or by
way of reassessment, he can issue a notice under
Section 148 within the time mentioned.‟ ***”

6.15. Referring to such decision, in the case of Sanjay Kumar
Garg (supra) in Kamdhenu Enterprises Ltd. Vrs. Income
Tax Officer, Ward 14-2, Delhi, W.P.(C) No.8589 of 2022,

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 23 of 31
vide Judgment dated 27.10.2022 the Hon’ble Delhi High
Court said as follows:

“3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further states that
the assessment order dated 30th March, 2022, has
been passed without disposing of the objections
raised by the petitioner vide Letter dated 22nd July,
2021. He submits that non-disposal of objections
before passing the assessment order is in disregard
of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the
case of M/s. GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. Vrs.
Income Tax Officers & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 72.

***

7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, this
Court is of the view that it is settled law that during
the subsistence of a reassessment proceedings,
another reassessment notice cannot be issued for
the same assessment year. The Division Bench of
this Court in CIT Vrs. Sanjay Kumar Garg, (2015) 9
TMI 390 (Delhi High Court) = 2015 SCC OnLine Del
11714 has held as under:

„9. The contention of the Assessee which has been
accepted by the ITAT is that when the re-
assessment proceedings pursuant to the
notices issued on 21st September 2005 were
still pending and had not been completed by
31st December 2006 as was required by law, it
was legally impermissible that fresh notices
under Section 148 of the Act could be issued to
the Assessee. The ITAT has after examining a
large number of decisions of the High Court
and the Supreme Court come to the conclusion
that the issuing of fresh notices under Section
WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 24 of 31
148 of the Act for Assessment Years 2001-02
to 2004-05 was impermissible in law. The
assessments for the said Assessment Years
were annulled as being barred by
limitation.***‟

11. This Court is further in agreement with the
submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner
that non-disposal of petitioner‟s objections dated
22nd July, 2021, was contrary to the law laid down
by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. GKN
Driveshafts (India) Ltd. (supra).

12. This Court, is also in agreement with the contention
of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there
has been a violation of principles of natural justice
inasmuch as the Petitioner was not given a
reasonable opportunity to respond to the statement
of Sh. Kewal Krishna Arora shared by the AO with
the petitioner on 25th March, 2022.”

6.16. Being abreast of such ruling on the fact-situation
obtained in Sanjay Kumar Garg (supra) and Kamdhenu
Enterprises Ltd. (supra), in the instant case, however, the
Notice under Section 148 reached its destination on the
Assessment Order being passed by the ITO, Ward 1(1),
Cuttack under Section 147 on 30.03.2023 which had
already attained finality and, hence, on the same
grounds involving same transaction qua the same
assessee vis-a-vis the same Canara Bank, the DCIT is
not competent to initiate proceeding for assessment
under said provision again by issuing Notice dated
30.06.2025 subsequently.

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 25 of 31

Conclusion:

7. Before concluding it deserves to be stated that it is well
established that the material on which the Assessing
Officer forms his opinion must not be the same material
which had been considered at the time of the initial
assessment, as in that case, the proceedings under
Section 147 of the IT Act would amount to reviewing the
Assessment Order merely on a change of opinion, which
is not permissible.

7.1. It is also well settled principle in the context of
assessment undertaken under Section 147 that whilst it
is not necessary for the Assessing Officer to arrive at a
firm conclusion that the assessee’s income for the
relevant Assessment Year has escaped assessment,
which is to be drawn during the assessment
proceedings, the Assessing Officer must have “reasons to
believe” based on tangible material that has nexus with
the belief that income indeed did escape assessment.

Concluded and closed assessments cannot be reopened
merely on suspicion or ipse dixit of the Assessing Officer.

7.2. It is well settled that a notice under Section 148 of the
Act could not be issued on mere suspicion. In order to
form opinion, the Assessing Officer has to have reasons
to believe, and it is necessary for the authority
concerned to examine the information and satisfy

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 26 of 31
himself regarding the same. It is, thus, stated in Neelima
Srivastava Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 8 SCR 167
as follows:

“Thus, it is very well settled that it is not permissible for
the parties to re-open the concluded judgments of the
Court as the same may not only tantamount to an abuse
of the process of the Court but would have far reaching
adverse effect on the administration of justice.”

8. Factual position remained uncontroverted as noticed
hereinabove transpires that the ITO, Ward 1(1), Cuttack
proceeded with the assessment under Section 147 read
with Section 144 passed Assessment Order dated
30.03.2023 attaching Computation Sheet thereto
(Annexure-10) in connection with Notice issued under
Section 148 along with Order under Section 148A(b)
with respect to Assessment Year 2019-20 in the context
of deposits made in the Canara Bank depicting PAN-1;
whereas the DCIT, Circle 1(1), Cuttack sought to proceed
with assessment against the petitioner stating the self-
same reason in relation to deposits made in Canara
Bank as against PAN-1 for the said Assessment Year
vide Notice dated 30.06.2025 issued under Section 148
(Annexure-13) read with Order dated 24.06.2025 passed
under Section 148(3) of the IT Act (Annexure-2). It is also
not denied by the learned Senior Standing Counsel that
the ITO had taken into consideration the explanation of
the petitioner that it has been filing returns using PAN-

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 27 of 31

2, but not PAN-1, and accepting such fact on verification
of evidence and material on record, the ITO had reduced
the assessment to NIL for the relevant Assessment Year.

8.1. With the aforesaid backdrop of factual conspectus, at
this juncture it does need to be emphasised the following
enunciation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
rendered in Experion Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Himanshu
Dewan and Sonali Dewan, (2023) 12 SCR 1118:

“31. No doubt, in Pawan Gupta Vrs. Experion Developers
Private Limited 2020 SCC OnLine NCDRC 788, this
Court had not exercised the power or jurisdiction
conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution of India,
but had exercised its appellate power, which would,
in terms of the ratio in Kunhayammed and Others
Vrs. State of Kerala and Another, (2000) 6 SCC 359
= (2000) 1 Suppl. SCR 538, becomes the final order
which is executable. Thus, the dismissal of the
appeal by this Court in the case of Pawan
Gupta (supra), had put a finality and an end to
the litigation in the said case. To this extent,
therefore, the application of the general
principle of res judicata would bar the party
from raising the plea once again. The order
passed by this Court, on the application of the
principle of judicial discipline, bars and
prevents any tribunal or parties from
canvassing or taking a view which would have
the effect of re-examination of the issues and
points determined in the case of Pawan Gupta
(supra) inter se the parties to the decision.

However, dismissal of the appeal would not operate

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 28 of 31
as res judicata in the case of the respondents
against the appellant as they were not parties to the
said case, and the proceedings initiated by Pawan
Gupta were fact specific and not in a representative
capacity”

9. With the above note, this Court is of the strong view that
the DCIT, Circle 1(1), Cuttack while passing Order dated
24.06.2025 under Section 148A(3) of the IT Act, though
recorded the fact to the effect that “On verification by this
office it is observed that the assessee M/s. Sanjay Kumar
Bijay Kumar is filing its returns using PAN: AATFS3658P
from Assessment Year 2007-08 onwards. However, the
assessee has used PAN: ABAFS4271L in bank accounts
maintained by it in Canara Bank during the Financial
Year 2018-19. It is pertinent to mention here that for
similar ground an Order under Section 147 read with
Section 144 passed by the ITO, Ward-1(1), Cuttack on
29.03.2023 computing total income of the assessee as
NIL.”, tempted to proceed with the assessment again by

issuing Notice under Section 148 on the pretext “to
protect the interest of revenue”. The reason so assigned
by the DCIT for initiation of proceeding for assessment
is, thus, found to be self-conflicting. This Court may
observe that a quasi judicial authority at a subsequent
stage should not sit over the view expressed on facts in
earlier assessment proceeding on the same subject
matter adjudicated upon by another quasi judicial

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 29 of 31
authority. Factual narration of the ITO, Ward 1(1),
Cuttack clearly spelt out that the petitioner has been
filing returns using PAN: AATFS3658P, but not PAN:

ABAFS4271L.

10. In view of the analysis of undisputed facts and taking
note of submissions of the counsel appearing for
respective parties, this Court finds force in the
submission of Sri Pranaya Kishore Harichandan, learned
Advocate that the petitioner cannot be subjected to
assessment under Section 147 of the IT Act again. Ergo,
the Order dated 24.06.2025 passed under Section 148(3)
of the IT Act by the DCIT, Circle 1(1), Cuttack
(Annexure-2) is quashed and set aside. As a
consequence thereto, not only Notice dated 30.06.2025
issued by the said DCIT invoking power under Section
148 to proceed with assessment under Section 147
(Annexure-13) is set aside, but also the intimation dated
25.07.2025 to complete the assessment in terms of
procedure laid down in Section 144B of the IT Act
(Annexure-14).

11. It is made clear that as this Court has considered the
arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the
parties with respect to subsequent proceeding for
assessment initiated by the DCIT and shown indulgence
in such proceeding, it is not felt expedient to decide

WP(C) No.28067 of 2025 Page 30 of 31
other grounds available in the writ petition. However,
question of law, if any, arises on the facts is left open.

12. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and pending
Interlocutory Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of, but in the circumstances, there shall be no order as
to costs.

I agree.

                                   (HARISH TANDON)                     (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
                                    CHIEF JUSTICE                            JUDGE




Signature
Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI
KUMAR SETHY
Designation: Personal
Assistant (Secretary-in-
charge)
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH      High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
COURT, CUTTACK             The 24th February, 2026//Aswini/Laxmikant
Date: 24-Feb-2026
11:43:56

                           WP(C) No.28067 of 2025                                  Page 31 of 31