Kerala High Court
Satkunam @ Sabesan (M/A €“ 49) vs Union Of India on 24 February, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. V. BALAKRISHNAN
TUESDAY, THE 24th DAY OF FEBRUARY 2026 / 5TH PHALGUNA, 1947
CRL.A NO. 1731 OF 2024
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED IN CRL MP 70/2024 IN SC
NO.4 OF 2021 OF SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA
CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/PETITIONER/9TH ACCUSED:
SATKUNAM @ SABESAN (M/A - 49)
AGED 33 YEARS
S/O SACHITHANANDAM 33, MURALI KRISHNA NAGAR MAIN
ROAD, VALSARAVAKKAM CHENNAI, TAMIL NADU PRESENTLY
CONFINED AT CENTRAL PRIUSON (RP. 582) VIYYUR JAIL,
THRISSUR, KERALA ... APPELLANT/PETITIONER/9TH
ACCUSED, PIN - 600087
BY ADVS.
SHRI.CIMIL CHERIAN KOTTALIL
SRI.B.VINOD
RESPONDENTS/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REP. BY NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, KOCHI (RC.
01/2021/NIA/KOC) ...
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT, PIN - 682001
BY ADVS.
SHRI.T.C.KRISHNA, SENIOR PANEL COUNSEL
O.M.SHALINA, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
19.02.2026, THE COURT ON 24.02.2026 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
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SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI,
&
P.V.BALAKRISHNAN,JJ.
-------------------------------------
Crl.Appeal. No. 1731 of 2024
---------------------------------
Dated this the 24th day of February 2026
JUDGMENT
P.V.BALAKRISHNAN,J
This appeal, under Section 21 of the National Investigation
Agency Act,2008 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the NIA Act‘, for short)
is filed by the petitioner in Crl.M.P.No.70/2024 in SC
No.4/2021/NIA, challenging the order dated 22.04.2024, passed by
the Special Court for trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam, dismissing his
application seeking bail.
2. The appellant is the 9 th accused in SC 4/2021/NIA on the
files of the Special Court for trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam. The
appellant is facing charges under Section 120B read with Section
125 IPC, Section 120B IPC, read with Sections 18, 20, 38, 39 and
40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, (hereinafter referred
to as ‘the UA(P) Act’ for short), Section 120B IPC read with
Sections 7 and 25(1AA) of the Arms Act 1959, Section 8(c) read
with Sections 21(c), 23(c), 24, 27A, 28 and 29 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as
‘the NDPS Act‘, for short), Section 125 of IPC and Sections
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18,20,38,39 and 40 of UA(P) Act.
3. The prosecution allegation against the appellant in brief is
as follows:
The appellant is a Sri Lankan citizen, residing in Chennai as a
refugee. He is an armed cadre of LTTE in Sri Lanka and was a
member of the outer security wing of the LTTE leader Prabhakaran.
Being a core cadre of LTTE, he got associated with accused Nos.
7,8,10 and others, who are active supporters and members of LTTE
and formed a terrorist gang. As a member of the terrorist gang, he
conducted and attended various conspiracy meetings with accused
Nos.7,8,10,12 and others at various places in Tamil Nadu, with an
intention to revive LTTE and furthering its activities in India and Sri
Lanka, for waging war against Sri Lanka. In furtherance of the
conspiracy, the terrorist gang including the appellant, decided to
conduct illegal trafficking of narcotic drugs, arms and ammunitions
in huge quantities to achieve their goal. In furtherance of a larger
conspiracy, accused Nos. 15 and 7 with the assistance of the 8 th
accused, conspired with accused Nos. 11,13 and others, and
arranged 300.323 kilograms of heroin, prohibited arms – 5 numbers
of Type 56 rifles and ammunitions -1000 rounds of 9 mm, for the
revival of LTTE; furthering its activities in India and Sri Lanka; for
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raising funds for LTTE and to commit terrorist acts. The appellant
also accrued huge funds and assets by sale of narcotic drugs, arms
and ammunition both, in Sri Lanka and India and part of the funds
were utilised for furthering the activities of LTTE in India and Sri
Lanka. The funds raised by illegal dealings were received by the
appellant in India through gold/hawala and other means with the
assistance of the 14th accused. Huge funds were also converted into
movable and immovable property, with an intention to liquidate the
same for providing funds for furthering the activities of LTTE in
India and Sri Lanka. Hence, the prosecution alleges that the
appellant has committed the afore offences.
4. During the pendency of SC No.4/21, the appellant filed
Crl.MP No.70/24 before the trial court seeking regular bail. The said
petition was dismissed by the trial court on 22.04.2024 vide the
impugned order.
5. Heard Adv.Cimil, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and Adv.Shalina, the learned DSGI appearing for the
respondent. A report was also called for from the trial court
regarding the status of SC 4/2021.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there
are absolutely no materials available to show that the accusation
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against the appellant is prima facie true. He submitted that the
materials/evidence projected by the prosecution, even if it is
accepted in toto, will not attract the offences as alleged. He argued
that there is no substantive evidence to inculpate the appellant and
the prosecution is relying upon the sole statement of an approver,
which has no value. He contended that the appellant is in custody
from 05.10.2021 onwards and considering the number of witnesses
to be examined, documents to be marked and other formalities,
there is no likelihood of the trial being completed in near future. He
also submitted that the appellant is suffering from various ailments,
including tuberculosis and has a family to support and that he is
ready to abide by any conditions imposed by this Court.
7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent
vehemently opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel
for the appellant and submitted that the offences alleged against
the appellant are very grave. She, after taking us through the
charge sheet and Annexures R1(b) to R1(k) contended that the
appellant, after entering into India through illegal means, has
conspired with other accused for the revival of LTTE and
procurement of arms, for the purpose of waging war against Sri
Lanka. She argued that the funds were raised through drugs and
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arms dealings, and substantial amounts were invested in properties
in Tamil Nadu. She also submitted that if the appellant, who is
having criminal antecedents and who was convicted earlier in a
drug trafficking case, is released on bail, there are chances of him
absconding, using forged documents. She argued that apart from
the bar under Section 43-D(5), the bar under Section 43-D(7) of
the UA(P) Act is also applicable in the instant case, since the
appellant is not an Indian citizen and he has entered the country
unauthorisedly/illegally. Hence, she prayed that this appeal may be
dismissed.
8. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the appellant
is in custody from 05.10.2021 onwards. The report obtained by
this Court from the trial court shows that SC 4/2021 is not ripe for
trial and there is no possibility of commencing the trial in near
future. It is stated in the report that the trial can probably
commence in January 2027 and if so commenced, can be
completed only by December 2027. The materials on record also
show that there are 209 witnesses cited for examination and about
446 documents to be marked. If so, the question to be considered
is whether the appellant, who has undergone such a long period of
incarceration and where there is no possibility of the trial being
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completed in near future, is entitled to be released on bail. While
considering the afore question, the law laid down by the Apex Court
on this issue assumes relevance. A three Judge Bench of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India v. K.A.Najeeb (2021 KHC
OnLine 6045), while considering the bail application of an accused
involved in a case charged inter alia, under Sections 16, 18, 19 and
20 of UA(P) Act and who had undergone a long period of
incarceration, after considering the rigor of Section 43-D (5) of the
UA(P) Act held as follows:
“18. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions
like S.43-D(5) of UAPA per-se does not oust the ability of
Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part
III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a
Statute as well as the powers exercisable under Constitutional
Jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of
proceedings, Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative
policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will
melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed
within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already
undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed
sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility
of provisions like S.43 – D (5) of UAPA being used as the sole
metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional
right to speedy trial.”
While holding so, the Apex Court also observed that Section 43-
D(5) of the UA(P) Act is comparatively less stringent than Section
37 of the NDPS Act.
9. Subsequently, in the decision in Shoma Kanti Sen v.
State of Maharashtra (2024 KHC OnLine 6182), the Hon’ble
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Apex Court, by relying on the decision in Najeeb‘s case (cited
supra) and rejecting the contentions of the prosecution, that unless
the conditions specified in Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P) Act are
fulfilled the accused is not liable to be enlarged on bail, went on to
hold thus :
“38. Relying on this judgement, Mr. Nataraj, submits that
bail is not a fundamental right. Secondly, to be entitled to
be enlarged on bail, an accused charged with offences
enumerated in Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, must
fulfil the conditions specified in S.43D(5) thereof. We do
not accept the first part of this submission. This Court has
already accepted right of an accused under the said
offences of the 1967 Act to be enlarged on bail founding
such right on Art.21 of the Constitution of India. This was
in the case of Najeeb (supra), and in that judgment, long
period of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to
enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail – restricting
provision of S.43D(5) of the 1967 Act. Pre – conviction
detention is necessary to collect evidence (at the
investigation stage), to maintain purity in the course of
trial and also to prevent an accused from being fugitive
from justice. Such detention is also necessary to prevent
further commission of offence by the same accused.
Depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence
alleged to have been committed by an accused, detention
before conclusion of trial at the investigation and post –
chargesheet stage has the sanction of law broadly on
these reasonings. But any form of deprival of liberty
results in breach of Art.21 of the Constitution of India and
must be justified on the ground of being reasonable,
following a just and fair procedure and such deprival must
be proportionate in the facts of a given case. These would
be the overarching principles which the law Courts would
have to apply while testing prosecution’s plea of pre – trial
detention, both at investigation and post – chargesheet
stage.”
10. While dealing with the provisions of UA(P) Act, the Hon’ble
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Apex Court in Athar Parwez v. Union of India (2024 KHC
6719) again followed the principles laid down in Najeeb‘s case
(cited supra) and observed as follows:
“20. At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to be
appreciated and followed by the Courts. Keeping the
statutory provisions in mind but with the passage of time
the effect of that statutory provision would in fact have to
be diluted giving way to the mandate of Part III of the
Constitution where the accused as of now is not a convict
and is facing the charges. Constitutional right of speedy
trial in such circumstances will have precedence over the
bar / strict provisions of the statute and cannot be made
the sole reason for denial of bail. Therefore, the period of
incarceration of an accused could also be a relevant factor
to be considered by the constitutional courts not to be
merely governed by the statutory provisions.”
11. At this juncture, we will also take note that in the decision
in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [2024
(9) SCC 813], the Apex Court while granting bail to the accused
prosecuted under the UA(P) Act, by taking into consideration his
incarceration for a period of four years, observed that, if the State
or any prosecuting agency, including the court concerned, has no
wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an
accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution, then the State or any other prosecuting agency
should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime
committed is serious. It was also held that Article 21 of the
Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.
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(emphasis supplied). It is also to be seen that in the recent
decision in Kapil Wadhawan v. Central Bureau of
Investigation (2025 KHC OnLine 8024), the Apex Court has
again reiterated the afore principles and reminded the
Constitutional courts of its obligation to intervene, where long
custody becomes disproportionate, arbitrary, or excessive. Further,
the Apex Court in the decision in Mohd. Muslim Alias Hussain v.
State(NCT of Delhi) [(2023) 18 SCC 166] has categorically
held that even the rigour under Section 37 of the NDPS Act will not
come in the way when the Court deals with the liberty of a person,
because more the rigour, the quicker the adjudication ought to be.
In the light of the dictums laid down by the Apex Court, considering
the fact that the appellant herein is undergoing incarceration for a
period of more than four years and four months and also the report
received from the trial court, which shows that the trial is not likely
to commence and end in near future, we are of the considered view
that this is a fit case where the appellant can be granted the relief
as sought for by him.
12. The contention of the respondent that Section 43-D(7) of
the UA(P) Act places a complete embargo on this Court in granting
bail to the appellant, does not have any legs to stand since, the
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right to speedy trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution is
applicable to all persons and is not restricted to citizens of this
country. The meaning of the word ‘life’ in Article 21 cannot be
narrowed down and it is available not only to every citizen of the
country, but also to a person, who may not be a citizen of the
country (See Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. v. Chandrima
Das & Others [(2000) 2 SCC 465]. In other words, the
constitutional right of speedy trial will have precedence over the
strict provisions such as Sections 43-D(5) and also 43-D(7) of the
UA(P) Act, and as held in Najeeb ‘s case (cited supra), by passage
of time, the effect of these statutory provisions will have to be
diluted to give way to protect the Constitutional rights.
In the result, Criminal Appeal No.1731/2024 is allowed as
follows :
i) The appellant/9th accused shall be released on bail on
executing a bond for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One lakh
only) with two solvent sureties for the like sum each to the
satisfaction of the Special Court for the trial of NIA cases,
Ernakulam. It shall be open to the Special Court to impose such
additional conditions as it may deem fit and necessary in the
interest of justice. However, the conditions shall mandatorily
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include the following:
a) If the appellant/9th accused intend to leave State of
Kerala, he shall obtain prior permission from the Special
Court.
b) If the appellant/9th accused is in possession of any
passport, he shall surrender the same before the Special
Court, forthwith.
c) The appellant/9th accused shall furnish to the
Investigating Officer of the NIA his complete and current
residential address, including any changes thereto, and
shall ensure that the same remains updated at all times.
d) The appellant/9th accused shall use only one mobile
number during the period of bail and shall communicate
the said number to the Investigating Officer of the NIA.
He shall remain accessible on the said number
throughout the duration of bail and shall not, under any
circumstances, switch off or discard the device
associated with it without prior intimation.
e) The appellant/9th accused shall report before the
Station House Officer of the Police Station having
jurisdiction over his place of residence on every first
and third Saturdays, without fail.
f) The appellant/9th accused shall not tamper with
evidence or attempt to influence or threaten any
witnesses in any manner.
g) The appellant/9th accused shall not engage in or
associate with any activity that is similar to the offence
alleged against him or commit any offence while on bail.
ii) In the event of any breach of the aforesaid conditions or
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of any other condition that may be imposed by the Special Court in
addition to the above, it shall be open to the prosecution to move
for cancellation of the bail granted to the appellant/9 th accused
before the Special Court, notwithstanding the fact that the bail was
granted by this Court. Upon such application being made, the
Special Court shall consider the same on its own merits and pass
appropriate orders in accordance with law.
Sd/-
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
JudgeSd/-
P.V.BALAKRISHNAN
Judgedpk
