Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ram Lakhan Gupta vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr on 20 February, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
WRIT PETITION No. 3417 of 2017
RAM LAKHAN GUPTA
Versus
STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri S.K. Sharma- Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Ravindra Dixit- Government Advocate for the respondent/State.
Reserved on : 30.01.2026
Pronounced on : 20.02.2026
___________________________________________________________________
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed
by the petitioner seeking the following reliefs:-
(i) That, the impugned order dated 24.01.2017 be
declared illegal and be quashed.
(ii) That, respondents may kindly be directed to prepared
the list of selection for group -4 vacancies only from theSignature Not Verified
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candidate who were eligible on the last date of application
21.11.2016 as per the existing rules.
(iii) That, respondents be also directed to prepare the merit
list as per the criteria set by the Apex Court wherein the
reserve candidate cannot be shifted to the vacancy of general
category on basis of acquiring the higher marks.
(iv) That, any other relief which this Hon’ble High Court
may deem fit, with cost of the petition.”
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, by the impugned order
dated 24.01.2017, respondent No.2 has illegally regularized the candidature of
certain candidates who were not eligible as on the last date for submission of
applications under the prevailing rules. It is contended that, despite being
ineligible, some candidates misrepresented their eligibility and submitted
applications for selection to the Group-4 vacancies. In order to accommodate
such candidates, the impugned order was issued during the pendency of the
selection process by altering the eligibility criteria, thereby causing serious
prejudice to a large number of candidates who did not apply in view of the
original prescribed criteria. An action which could not have been undertaken
directly has thus been carried out indirectly and is, therefore, without jurisdiction.
It is further submitted that, by way of the impugned order, the minimum typing
speed requirement was reduced from 30 words per minute to 20 words per
minute after the expiry of the last date for submission of applications. As a result,
several candidates who would have been eligible under the revised criteria did
not apply pursuant to the original notification. Hence, the impugned order is
arbitrary, illegal, and discriminatory in nature.
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3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/State submits that, in
exercise of powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, His Excellency
the Governor of Madhya Pradesh has framed the Madhya Pradesh Junior Service
(Joint Qualifying) Examination Rules, 2013. As per Rule 10(1)(C) of the said
Rules, possession of a valid CPCT Score Card has been made mandatory. It is
contended that these statutory rules were not considered by the Indore Bench
while deciding W.P. Nos. 7880/2016, 7883/2016, and 6110/2017, and therefore,
the present petition is not maintainable. He also reliance upon the judgment dated
15.09.2017 passed by the Indore Bench in W.P. No. 6100/2017, wherein a similar
prayer for consideration without a CPCT certificate was rejected. It is further
submitted that the General Administration Department, vide notification dated
24.01.2017, made possession of a CPCT Score Card mandatory, as reflected in
para 3(vi) of the circular. It is contended that the complete advertisement issued
by the Professional Examination Board clearly incorporated the said requirement,
and therefore, no illegality can be attributed to the impugned action.
Consequently, the respondents were justified in not recommending the
petitioner’s name for want of the requisite CPCT qualification. It is further
submitted that in W.P. No. 6627/2017 (Alok Singh vs. State of M.P.), involving
similar facts, this Court has dismissed the petition.
4. It is further submitted on behalf of respondent that the Full Bench of this
Court in Manoj Kumar Purohit and Others vs. State of M.P. & Ors., reported in
2016(1) M.P.L.J. 449, had occasion to consider a similar issue. In para 11(b) of
the said judgment, it was observed that a new service condition may be
introduced through executive instructions and would remain operative so long as
it is not expressly or impliedly repealed by a subsequent executive order, a rule
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framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, or by statute. It was
further held that, in the absence of any specific prohibition in the Rules, a
stipulation such as passing a Hindi typing test could validly be prescribed. He
also reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sitaram Jivyabhai
Gavali vs. Ramjibhai Potiyabhai Mahala and Others (AIR 1987 SC 1293) and
State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Rajendra K. Verma (2004) 13 SCC 706, wherein it
has been recognized that additional conditions of service may be introduced by
executive instructions, provided they do not run contrary to statutory rules. In
view of the aforesaid judgments, it cannot be contended that, after amendment of
the Madhya Pradesh Junior Service (Joint Qualifying) Examination Rules, 2013
vide notification dated 16.02.2015, the Rules could not be supplemented by
executive instructions contained in the GAD circular dated 24.01.2017. There is
no embargo in the 2013 Rules prohibiting prescription of such additional
qualifications. On the contrary, the Rules prescribe educational qualifications and
proficiency requirements for Group-IV posts, including typing and shorthand
speed as recognized by the General Administration Department from time to
time. Rule 10(b) does not restrict incorporation of qualifications as recommended
by the General Administration Department from time to time. Therefore,
prescription of the CPCT Score Card vide circular dated 24.01.2017 does not
supersede the Recruitment Rules of 2013 but merely supplements and fortifies
them in terms of the enabling provisions contained therein. Consequently, no
arbitrariness can be attributed to the prescription of CPCT qualification as a
mandatory condition and the present petition deserves to be dismissed.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
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6. The order dated 22.03.2024 of the Co-ordinate Bench of Indore Bench
of M.P. High Court in the case of Dr. Jagram Verma Vs. State of M.P. and
Ors. passed in W.P. No.25631/2021, relevant paras 16 to 18 of which are quoted
below for ready reference and convenience:
“16] On the other hand, since the petitioner has already
participated in the selection process, he is precluded from
challenging the advertisement, as has been held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Mohd. Mustafa Vs. Union of India and others
reported as (2022) 1 SCC 294, paras 35 to 41 of which read as
under:-
“35. It is in this context, we have to examine whether the
appellants are estopped from challenging the recommendations
made by the Empanelment Committee, given the fact that they
had taken a calculated chance, and not protested till the
selection panel was made public. In our opinion, the ratio in
Madan Lal v. State of J&K [Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1995)
3 SCC 486 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 712] , would apply in the present
case as when a person takes a chance and participates,
thereafter he cannot, because the result is unpalatable, turn
around to contend that the process was unfair or the selection
committee was not properly constituted. This decision, no
doubt, pertains to a case where the petitioner had appeared at
an open interview, however, the ratio would apply to the present
case as the appellant too had taken a calculated chance in spite
of the stakes, that too without protest, and then has belatedly
raised the plea of bias and prejudice only when he was not
recommended. The judgment in Madan Lal [Madan Lal v. State
of J&K, (1995) 3 SCC 486 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 712] refers to an
earlier decision of this Court in Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh
Kumar Shukla [Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla,
1986 Supp SCC 285 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 644], wherein the
petitioner who had appeared at an examination without protest
was not granted any relief, as he had filed the petition when he
could not succeed afterwards in the examination. This principle
has been reiterated in Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar
[Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar, (2010) 12 SCC 576 :
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(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 256] , and Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil
Joshi [Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi, (2013) 11 SCC
309 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 129] .
36. More appropriate for our case would be an earlier decision
in G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow [G. Sarana v. University
of Lucknow, (1976) 3 SCC 585 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 474] ,
wherein a similar question had come up for consideration
before a three Judge Bench of this Court as the petitioner, after
having appeared before the selection committee and on his
failure to get appointed, had challenged the selection result
pleading bias against him by three out of five members of the
selection committee. He also challenged constitution of the
committee. Rejecting the challenge, this Court had held : (SCC
p. 591, para 15)
“15. We do not, however, consider it necessary in the
present case to go into the question of the reasonableness
of bias or real likelihood of bias as despite the fact that
the appellant knew all the relevant facts, he did not before
appearing for the interview or at the time of the interview
raise even his little finger against the constitution of the
Selection Committee. He seems to have voluntarily
appeared before the committee and taken a chance of
having a favourable recommendation from it. Having
done so, it is not now open to him to turn round and
question the constitution of the committee. This view
gains strength from a decision of this Court in Manak Lal
case [Manak Lal v. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC
425] where in more or less similar circumstances, it was
held that the failure of the appellant to take the identical
plea at the earlier stage of the proceedings created an
effective bar of waiver against him. The following
observations made therein are worth quoting : (AIR p.
432, para 9)
”9. … It seems clear that the appellant wanted to
take a chance to secure a favourable report from
the tribunal which was constituted and when he
found that he was confronted with an unfavourable
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report, he adopted the device of raising the present
technical point.”
37. The aforesaid judgment in G. Sarana [G. Sarana v.
University of Lucknow, (1976) 3 SCC 585 : 1976 SCC (L&S)
474] was referred in Madras Institute of Development Studies v.
K. Sivasubramaniyan [Madras Institute of Development Studies
v. K. Sivasubramaniyan, (2016) 1 SCC 454 : (2016) 1 SCC
(L&S) 164] ,in which selection to the post of Assistant Professor
was challenged on the ground that shortlisting of candidates
was contrary to the Faculty Recruitment Rules. The challenge
was declined on the ground of estoppel as the respondent,
without raising any objection to the alleged variations in the
contents of the advertisement and the Rules, had submitted his
application and participated in the selection process by
appearing before the committee of experts.
38. Equally appropriate would be a reference to the decision of
this Court in P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee
[P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee, (2011) 8 SCC
380], in which the allegation was that one of the members of the
committee constituted by the Chairman of the Council of States
(Rajya Sabha) under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act,
1968 was biased. This judgment extensively recites and
assimilates from both domestic and foreign judgments on the
question of bias and prejudice and quotes the following
observations in G. Sarana [G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow,
(1976) 3 SCC 585 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 474] case : (G. Sarana
case [G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow, (1976) 3 SCC 585 :
1976 SCC (L&S) 474] , SCC p. 590, para 11)
“11. … the real question is not whether a member of an
administrative board while exercising quasi-judicial
powers or discharging quasi-judicial functions was
biased, for it is difficult to probe the mind of a person.
What has to be seen is whether there is a reasonable
ground for believing that he was likely to have been
biased. In deciding the question of bias, human
probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct
have to be taken into consideration.”
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41. In P.D. Dinakaran (1) [P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry
Committee, (2011) 8 SCC 380] , this Court held that the
member in question had during a seminar spoken against the
proposed elevation of the petitioner as a Judge of the Supreme
Court and, therefore, the apprehension of likelihood of bias is
reasonable and not fanciful, though in fact, the member may not
be biased. Nevertheless, the writ petition was dismissed on the
ground that the petitioner was not a lay person and being well-
versed in law should have objected to the constitution of
committee when notified in the Official Gazette, which factum
was highly publicised in almost all newspapers.
Notwithstanding the awareness and knowledge, the petitioner
did not object, which indicates that he was satisfied that the
member had nothing against him. Therefore, belated plea taken
by the petitioner did not merit acceptance and mitigates against
bona fides of the objection to the appointment of the person as a
member of the committee. ………………………………..
(Emphasis Supplied)
17] A perusal of the aforesaid decision clearly reveals that it is not
the ratio of this case that when a person has participated in a
proceeding/selection process etc., he is precluded from challenging
the same, but the rider is that his or her objections must be voiced
before participating in the said process. In other words, if a person
is taking exception to any selection process or the like, he cannot do
so after he has participated and failed in the same, however, if he
has challenged such process at the earliest opportunity, before
participating in the same, then, even if he or she participates in the
said process afterwards, it would not be considered as his or her
deemed waiver of the objection.
18] Thus, tested on the said anvil, it is found that the petitioner had
challenged the impugned order by filing this petition on 30.05.2017,
whereas, the impugned advertisement was also issued on
16.02.2015. In such circumstances, it is held that despite the
petitioner’s participation in the selection process, he cannot
challenged the said advertisement on the principle of estoppel. The
challenge was declined on the ground of estoppel as the petitioner,
without raising any objection to the alleged variations in the
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contents of the advertisement and the Rules, had submitted his
application and participated in the selection process by appearing
in it.”
7. The order dated 10.09.2025 of this Court in the case of Smt. Bhawna
Sharma Vs. State of M.P. and Ors. passed in W.P. No.2999/2014, relevant
paras 7 and 8 of which are quoted below for ready reference and convenience:
“7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Maharashtra Public
Service Commission through its Secretary Vs. Sandeep Shriram
Warade And Others reported in (2019) 6 SCC 362 has held as under:
“9. The essential qualifications for appointment to a post
are for the employer to decide. The employer may prescribe
additional or desirable qualifications, including any grant
of preference. It is the employer who is best suited to decide
the requirements a candidate must possess according to the
needs of the employer and the nature of work. The court
cannot lay down the conditions of eligibility, much less can
it delve into the issue with regard to desirable qualifications
being on a par with the essential eligibility by an
interpretive re-writing of the advertisement. Questions of
equivalence will also fall outside the domain of judicial
review. If the language of the advertisement and the rules
are clear, the court cannot sit in judgment over the same. If
there is an ambiguity in the advertisement or it is contrary
to any rules or law the matter has to go back to the
appointing authority after appropriate orders, to proceed in
accordance with law. In no case can the court, in the garb
of judicial review, sit in the chair of the appointing authority
to decide what is best for the employer and interpret the
conditions of the advertisement contrary to the plain
language of the same.
10. The fact that an expert committee may have been
constituted and which examined the documents before
calling the candidates for interview cannot operate as anSignature Not Verified
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estoppel against the clear terms of the advertisement to
render an ineligible candidate eligible for appointment.
11. The plain reading of the advertisement provides that
a degree in Pharmacy or Pharmaceutical Chemistry or in
medicine with specialisation in Clinical Pharmacology or
Microbiology from a university coupled with the requisite
years of experience thereafter in manufacturing or testing of
drugs were essential qualifications. Preference could be
given to those possessing the additional desirable
qualification of research experience in the synthesis and
testing of drugs in a research laboratory.
12. Manufacture has been defined as a process for
making, altering, ornamenting, finishing, packing, labelling,
breaking up or otherwise treating or adopting any drug or
cosmetic with a view to its sale or distribution. Therefore,
the experience of testing has to be correlated to the
manufacturing process which naturally will be entirely
different from the testing carried out in the research and
development laboratory before the product is released for
manufacture and sale in the market. To say that experience
in testing of drugs in a research and development
laboratory would be on a par with the testing done at the
time of manufacture before sale cannot be countenanced
and has to be rejected.
13. The preference clause in Clause 4.7 only means that
if a candidate with the required degree qualification and
practical experience in the manufacturing and testing of
drugs for stipulated period of years has an additional
desirable attribute of a research experience in a research
laboratory, other things being equal, preference could be
given to such a candidate. The term “preference”
mentioned in the advertisement cannot be interpreted to
mean that merely because a candidate may have had the
requisite experience of testing in a research and
development laboratory he/she possessed the essential
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eligibility and had a preferential right to be considered for
appointment.”
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Zahoor Ahmad Rather
and others Vs. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and others reported in (2019) 2
SCC 404 held in para 26 as follows:-
“26. We are in respectful agreement with the interpretation
which has been placed on the judgment in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti
K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC
596: (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] in the subsequent decision in
Anita [State of Punjab v. Anita, (2015) 2 SCC 170 :(2015) 1
SCC (L&S) 329]. The decision in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti K.K. v.
Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596:
(2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] turned on the provisions of Rule
10(a)(ii). Absent such a rule, it would not be permissible to
draw an inference that a higher qualification necessarily
presupposes the acquisition of another, albeit lower,
qualification. The prescription of qualifications for a post is a
matter of recruitment policy. The State as the employer is
entitled to prescribe the qualifications as a condition of
eligibility. It is no part of the role or function of judicial review
to expand upon the ambit of the prescribed qualifications.
Similarly, equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which
can be determined in exercise of the power of judicial review.
Whether a particular qualification should or should not be
regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the
recruiting authority, to determine. The decision in Jyoti K.K.
[Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15
SCC 596: (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] turned on a specific
statutory rule under which the holding of a higher
qualification could presuppose the acquisition of a lower
qualification. The absence of such a rule in the present case
makes a crucial difference to the ultimate outcome. In this
view of the matter, the Division Bench [Imtiyaz Ahmad v.
Zahoor Ahmad Rather, LPA (SW) No. 135 of 2017, decided on
12-10-2017 (J&K)] of the High Court was justified in
reversing the judgment [Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. State of
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J&K, 2017 SCC OnLine J&K 936] of the learned Single Judge
and in coming to the conclusion that the appellants did not
meet the prescribed qualifications. We find no error in the
decision [Imtiyaz Ahmad v. Zahoor Ahmad Rather, LPA (SW)
No. 135 of 2017, decided on 12-10-2017 (J&K)] of the
Division Bench.”
8. It is settled law that the State is entitled to prescribe the qualification as a
condition of eligibility and judicial review is not permissible to expand the ambit
of the prescribed qualification. Similarly, equivalence or non-equivalence of a
qualification is not a matter which can be decided in exercise of the power of
judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be
regarded as equivalent, is a matter for the State to determine and not for the
court. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted.
9. Ex. Consequential, petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
Monika
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