Kerala High Court
Mathew Idiculla vs Union Of India on 18 February, 2026
RP NO. 1355 OF 2025 IN OP (CAT) NO.101 OF 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BASANT BALAJI
WEDNESDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2026 / 29TH MAGHA, 1947
RP NO. 1355 OF 2025
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 12.09.2025 IN OP (CAT) NO.101 OF 2025 OF HIGH COURT OF
KERALA
REVIEW PETITIONER/S:
1 MATHEW IDICULLA, AGED 76 YEARS
S/O MATHAI IDICULLA, MASTER CRAFTSMAN (RETIRED), MES 109008, OFFICE OF THE
GARRISON ENGINEER, MILITARY ENGINEERING SERVICE, WILLINGDON ISLAND,
COCHIN- 4. RESIDING ATERAMLLADI HOUSE, THYKOODAM, VYTTILA, ERNAKULAM,
KOCHI, PIN - 682019
2 N. RAMACHANDRAN NAIR, AGED 74 YEARS
S/O NARAYANAN NAIR. MASTER CRAFTSMAN (RETIRED), MES 168881, OFFICE OF THE
GARRISON ENGINEER, MILITARY ENGINEERING SERVICE, WILLINGDON ISLAND,
COCHIN- 4. RESIDING AT SREERAGOM, NETTOOR P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN -
682040
3 RADHAKRISHNAN NAIR N.B., AGED 68 YEARS
S/O.K.K.BHASKARAN PILLAI, MASTER CRAFTSMAN (RETIRED), MES 109221 OFFICE OF
THE GARRISON ENGINEER, MILITARY ENGINEERING SERVICE, WILLINGDON ISLAND,
COCHIN- 4. RESIDING AT IA, B BLOCK, SOUPARNIKA GARDEN, MARKET ROAD,
TRIPUNITHURA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 682301
4 JOGI C.P., AGED 67 YEARS
S/O. C.P.POULOSE, MASTER CRAFTSMAN (RETIRED), MES 109296, OFFICE OF THE
GARRISON ENGINEER, MILITARY ENGINEERING SERVICE, WILLINGDON ISLAND,
COCHIN- 4. RESIDING AT CHANDANATHIL, IRUMPANAM P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 682309
RP NO. 1355 OF 2025 IN OP (CAT) NO.101 OF 2025
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BY ADVS. SHRI.SASI M.R.; SMT.N.P.SILPA
SMT.DHARMYA M.S; SHRI.LEJO JOSEPH GEORGE
SHRI.KURIAN MAXIE
RESPONDENT/S:
1 UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY THE DEFENCE SECRETARY, 101-A, SOUTH BLOCK,
NEW DELHI, PIN - 110011
2 ENGINEER IN CHIEF, MILITARY ENGINEER SERVICES, KASHMIR HOUSE, RAJAJI MARG,
NEW DELHI, PIN - 110011
3 HEADQUARTERS CHIEF ENGINEER, MILITARY ENGINEER SERVICES, SOUTHERN
COMMAND, PUNE, MAHARASHTRA., PIN - 411001
4 THE CHIEF ENGINEER,
MILITARY ENGINEER SERVICES, KATARIBAGH, NAVAL BASE P.O., KOCHI, ERNAKULAM,
PIN - 682004
5 COMMANDER WORKS ENGINEER (NS),
MILITARY ENGINEER SERVICES, KATARIBAGH, NAVAL BASE P.O., KOCHI, ERNAKULAM,
PIN - 682004
6 CONTROLLER OF DEFENCE ACCOUNTS,
AN PAY SECTION, 618, ANNA SALAI, TEYNAMPET, CHENNAI, TAMILNADU, PIN - 600018
BY ADV O.M. SHALINA, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
THIS REVIEW PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 18.02.2026, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
RP NO. 1355 OF 2025 IN OP (CAT) NO.101 OF 2025
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ORDER
Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J.
The present Review Petition is filed under Order XLVII Rule 1 read
with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking review of
the judgment dated 12.09.2025 in O.P. (CAT) No. 101/2025, whereby the
Original Petition filed by the petitioners was dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners approached
the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench in O.A. No.
180/0096/2024 seeking a direction to the respondents to re-fix their pay
in the scale of Rs. 330-480 for the period of the Third Pay Revision and
to grant consequential revision of pay for the periods covered by
subsequent pay revision orders, along with other consequential reliefs.
2.1 The petitioners approached the Tribunal with a delay of
14,528 days. The Tribunal dismissed the Original Application as time-
barred. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners filed an Original
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Petition before this Court, which was also dismissed on the ground that
the delay was inordinate and huge. Being aggrieved by the same, the
present Review Petition has been filed.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that both
the Courts failed to consider the fact that it was only during 2024-25 that
the petitioners came to know that the Department had finally
implemented Annexure-A5 and extended the upgraded scale to other
similarly situated Refrigerator Mechanics pursuant to the orders passed
in O.A. No. 378/2023. This would clearly indicate that the order passed
in the year 1983 was implemented only during 2024-25. Therefore, there
is no question of delay, as the petitioners are similarly situated persons
and are entitled to the same relief.
3.1 It is further contended that both the Courts failed to consider
that the matter involves a continuing cause of action. Immediately upon
knowing of the implementation, the petitioners approached the learned
Tribunal, explaining the continuous representations made by them and
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the recent discovery of such implementation. However, both the Courts
rejected the prayer for condonation of delay on the ground that the
petitioners had not satisfactorily explained the delay.
3.2 In view of the above, it is submitted that this Review Petition
deserves to be allowed, the judgment passed in the Original Petition is
liable to be recalled, and thereafter, by condoning the delay, the matter
may be decided on merits.
4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents
opposed the prayer and submitted that the learned Tribunal as well as
this Court had rightly come to the conclusion that there was a huge and
inordinate delay and had dismissed the petitions accordingly. Even in
the application seeking condonation of delay, the petitioners were
unable to satisfactorily explain the inordinate delay. Therefore, no
grounds for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure are made out. Hence, it is submitted that the Review Petition
deserves to be dismissed.
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5. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the
records.
6. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is the
substantive provision governing the power of review, provides as
follows:
Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved:-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but
from which no appeal has been preferred;
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code;
Or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply
for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made
the order, and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”
7. The grounds available for filing a review application against
a judgment are set out in Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure in
the following terms:
“I. Application for review of judgment (1) Any person considering himself
aggrieved –
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(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which
no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who,
from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after
the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not
be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order
made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of
the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of
judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or Order may apply for a
review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some
other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the
applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present
to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.
[Explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the
judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the
subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a
ground for the review of such judgment.”
8. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that a
review application is maintainable on any of the following grounds: (i)
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discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the
exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant
or could not be produced at the time when the decree was passed or the
order was made; (ii) existence of some mistake or error apparent on the
face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason.
Judicial Pronouncements on Review:
9. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon, the Apex Court observed that a
review of an earlier order cannot be undertaken unless the Court is
satisfied that a material error, apparent on the face of the order, would
result in a miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The
observations of the Court are as follows:
“12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri
Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt
without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless
satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order,1
1980 Supp SCC 562
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2026:KER:14889undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow
Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib reported in (1975) 1 SCC 674,
this Court observed:
“A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is
proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave
error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The present stage is not a
virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature
of finality.”
(emphasis added)
Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others2
10. In Parsion Devi, the Apex Court, while stating that an error
which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning
cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for
the Court to exercise its powers of review, held as follows:
“7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined
to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.6 Thungabhadra Industries
Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.1 reported in 1964 SCR (5) 174, this Court opined:
’11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement
in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any
substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’.
The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state2
(1997) 8 SCC 715
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2026:KER:14889of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be
conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even
if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error
apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real,
though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere
erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as
vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for
patent error.’
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury reported in
(1995) 1 SCC 170, while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam
Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389,
this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an
appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order
47 Rule 1 CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia
if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An
error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of
reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47
Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this jurisdiction under Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is
not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’.
A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and
cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise”
[emphasis added]
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10.1 The error referred to under the Rule must be apparent on the
face of the record and not one which has to be discovered or inferred. It
is also settled law that, in exercise of review jurisdiction, the Court
cannot re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion,
even if two views are possible in the matter.
Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower
Ltd. and Others3
11. In Kerala State Electricity Board, the Apex Court observed as
follows:
“10. ….In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the
evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible.
Learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the
correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the
conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot
be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of
evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on
appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact3
(2005) 6 SCC 651
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2026:KER:14889and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review
petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of
the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended
before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To
permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of
evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in
disguise.”
(emphasis added)
Jain Studios Ltd. V. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd.4
12. Under the guise of filing a review petition, a party cannot be
permitted to repeat old or already considered arguments for reopening
the conclusions arrived at in a judgment. The power of review is distinct
from the appellate power, which enables a superior Court to correct
errors committed by a subordinate Court. This principle has been
elucidated in Jain Studios Ltd. where the Court held as follows:
“11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the
learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the
applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of
arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had4
(2006) 5 SCC 501
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2026:KER:14889been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert
rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of
review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a
superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate
court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old
and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded
adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme
care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had
been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was
rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing
a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of
‘second innings’ which is impermissible and unwarranted and
cannot be granted.”
(emphasis added)
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others5
13. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in
Kamlesh Verma, the Apex Court observed that review proceedings must
be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC.
As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has
5
(2013) 8 SCC 320
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already been considered and answered, parties are not entitled to
challenge the impugned judgment merely because an alternative view is
possible. The principles governing the exercise of review jurisdiction
were succinctly summarized in the said case as follows:
“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are
maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the
exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or
could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju
Ram vs. Neki17, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors.18 to mean “a
reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the
rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v.
Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors reported in (2013) 8 SCC
337,
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen
concluded adjudications.
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(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of
the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the
face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of
justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous
decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground
for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error
which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain
of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the
review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time
of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”
Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma6
14. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma, the Apex Court examined an
order passed by the Judicial Commissioner reviewing an earlier
6
(1979) 4 SCC 389
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judgment that had gone in favour of the appellant. The review
application had been filed by the respondents, who contended that the
predecessor Court had overlooked two important documents showing
that the respondents were in possession of the sites through which the
appellant sought easementary rights to access his homestead. The said
appeal was allowed by this Court with the following observations:
“3… It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh and Others v.
State of Punjab reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389 there is nothing in Article
226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the
power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to
prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and pulpable errors
committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the
power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the
exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person
seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when
the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be
exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on
the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would
be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be
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2026:KER:14889confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court
to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.”
(emphasis added)
State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta and Another 7
15. In State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta and
Another, the Apex Court emphasized that a review petitioner
approaching the Court on the ground of discovery of a new matter or
evidence must demonstrate that such matter or evidence was not within
his knowledge earlier, and held as follows:
“21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought
on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or
evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the
same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other
words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not
sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party
seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence
was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence,
the same could not be produced before the court earlier.”
(emphasis added)
7
(2008) 8 SCC 612
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15.1 In the captioned judgment, the term ‘mistake or error
apparent’ has been discussed in the following words:
“22. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its very connotation
signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case
and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation
either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident
and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it
cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the
purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3) (f) of the Act. To put it
differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected
merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a
different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a
point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of
review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its
judgment/decision.”
(emphasis added)
S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another8
16. In S. Nagaraj and Others, the Apex Court explained the
circumstances under which review jurisdiction may be treated as
statutory or inherent, and held as follows:
8
1993 Supp (4) SCC 595
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2026:KER:14889“18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of
procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the
court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered
for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in
Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ
jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and
fairness. If the court finds that the order was passed under a mistake
and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the
erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its
perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on
any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is
accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the
nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of
fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety
to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is
available where the mistake is of the Court.”
(emphasis added)
Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others v. Shri Pradyuman Singhji
Arjunsinghji9
17. In Patel Narshi Thakershi, the Apex Court held as follows:
“4….. It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power.
9
(1971) 3 SCC 844
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2026:KER:14889It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary
implication. No provision in the Act was brought to notice from which it
could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own
order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is
obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order…….”
(emphasis added)
Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and
Others10
18. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others, the Apex Court,
while citing previous decisions and expounding on the scope and ambit
of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, observed that Section
114 CPC does not lay down any conditions precedent for the exercise of
the power of review, nor does it prohibit the Court from exercising such
power. However, an order can be reviewed by the Court only on the
grounds prescribed under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said power
cannot be exercised as an inherent power, nor can appellate power be
invoked under the guise of review jurisdiction.
10
(2020) SCC OnLine SC 896
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19. In our considered opinion, none of the grounds available for
successfully seeking review as recognized by Order 47 Rule 1 CPC are
made out in the present case. The Apex Court in the case of S. Bhagirathi
Amaal Vs. Palani Roman11 has held that in order to seek view, it has to be
demonstrated that the order suffers from an error contemplated under Order 47
Rule 1 CPC which is apparent on the face of record and not an error which is to
be fished out and searched. A decision or order cannot be reviewed merely
because it is erroneous.
Judicial Pronouncements on delay:
20. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, dealt with the
issue of delay and rendered judgments, which are reproduced below:
21.1 The learned Supreme Court in Karnataka Power Corporation
Ltd. held as under:
6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the
11
(2009) 10 SCC 464
12
(2006) 4 SCC 322
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2026:KER:14889High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article
226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse
to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission
on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction
with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is
still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v.
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports . Of course, the discretion has to
be exercised judicially and reasonably.”
M.P. Ram Mohan Raja v. State of Tamil Nadu13
21.2 The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja has
held as under:
“11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard and fast rule can
be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present
case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8-10-1996 an order was passed
by the Collector in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court,
rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for consideration of the
grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and
did not challenge the same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be
very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no
justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit.”
13
(2007) 9 SCC 78
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Nadia Distt. Primary School Council v. Sristidhar Biswas14
21.3 The Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School
Council held as under:
“11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the
petitioners approached the court in 1989 after the decision in Dibakar
Pal. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the court when they
allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is very significant in
matters of granting relief and courts cannot come to the rescue of the
persons who are not vigilant of their rights. Therefore, the view taken by
the High Court condoning the delay of nine years cannot be
countenanced.”
Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana15
21.4 The Supreme Court in Jagdish Lal held as under:
“18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles
the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the
Constitution.”
Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India16
21.5 The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass has held as under:
“6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to be
14
(2007) 12 SCC 779
15
(1997) 6 SCC 538
16
(2007) 9 SCC 274
RP NO. 1355 OF 2025 IN OP (CAT) NO.101 OF 202524
2026:KER:14889dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the factors to be borne in mind by the
High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court
may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence
or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes
prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is
involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed
out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of
course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.”
Mrinmary Maity v. Chhanda Koley17
22. The Supreme Court in its latest judgment in the case of
Mrinmary Maity in paragraph 11 has held thus:
“11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of
limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of
the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a
reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of
memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the
cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on
the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed17
2024 SCC OnLine 551
RP NO. 1355 OF 2025 IN OP (CAT) NO.101 OF 202525
2026:KER:14889or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ
petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss
the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are
not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of
his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental
right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226,
the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay
and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This
Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of West
Benchal – (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there
can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this
Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is
delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.
It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the
grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is
that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.”
23. Upon perusal of the record and in light of the various
judgments passed by the Apex Court, there is no error apparent on the
face of the record warranting interference with the impugned judgment.
We also find no justification to grant any indulgence to the review
RP NO. 1355 OF 2025 IN OP (CAT) NO.101 OF 2025
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2026:KER:14889
petitioners, as no plausible explanation has been put forth for the
condonation of delay.
The review petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. All
interlocutory applications pertaining to interim matters stand closed.
Sd/-
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
JUDGE
Sd/-
BASANT BALAJI
JUDGE
jjj
RP NO. 1355 OF 2025 IN OP (CAT) NO.101 OF 2025
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2026:KER:14889
APPENDIX OF RP NO. 1355 OF 2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 THE CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 12.09.2025 IN OP(CAT)
NO. 101/2025 PASSED BY THIS HON’BLE COURT
