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HomeDistrict CourtsDelhi District CourtVidyadhar Singh vs State on 20 February, 2026

Vidyadhar Singh vs State on 20 February, 2026


Delhi District Court

Vidyadhar Singh vs State on 20 February, 2026

       IN THE COURT OF MS. SHEFALI BARNALA TANDON,
     ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-06, NEW DELHI DISTRICT,
              PATIALA HOUSE COURT, NEW DELHI

                                               Crl. Revision No. 449/2025
                                           CNR NO. DLWT01-006590/2025




Vidhyadhar Singh
S/o Sh. Jai Sukh Ram
Office at F.R.R.O. Office, Sector-1,
R.K. Puram,
New Delhi                                                      ..... Revisionist

                                    VERSUS

1.      The State
2.      Yashoda (Complainant)
        W/o Sh. Ashok Kumar
        R/o House No. S17/141, Jharera Village,
        Delhi.
                                                                      ..... Respondent

Date of Institution                        : 21.08.2024

Date of reserving order                    : 17.02.2026

Date of pronouncement                      : 20.02.2026




Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025   Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr.       Page 1 of 28
                                    ORDER

1. Vide this order, this Court shall dispose off the present
revision petition filed by the revisionist/accused under Section 438 of
BNSS, 2023 (Old Section 397 Cr.PC) assailing the order dated
21.05.2025 (herein after referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’) passed
by Ld. JMFC-08, Patiala House Court, New Delhi (herein after
referred to as the ‘Ld. Trial Court’) in case Ct. Case No. 185/2020
titled as Yashoda Vs. State whereby Ld. Trial Court had directed to
summon the accused persons for the offences under Section
354
/506(1)/325 IPC, in a complaint case preferred by the respondent
No.2 herein.

Arguments addressed on behalf of revisionist

2. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist submitted that the revisionist
is a respected police officer having service of more than 29 years; that
one Subhash Sansi @ Om Prakash and his wife Sunita @ Babita are
BC of PS-Delhi Cantt. being involved in numerous cases of selling
illicit liquor; that they purchased a Jhuggi at Kirbi Place, Delhi in the
neighbourhood of respondent No. 2/Complainant; that on 28.12.2017,
Subhash Sansi @ Om Prakash and his wife along with 4-5 associates
including son of the respondent No. 2/Complainant namely Gaurav
started selling illicit liquor in two cars and a quarrel took place
between them and local residents and they fled away from the spot
after firing; that a case FIR No. 323/2017 under Section
323
/452/307/506/34 IPC and Section 27/54/59 Arms Act was
registered against them; that when the the revisionist along with

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 2 of 28
ACP/Delhi Cantt and 10-12 police officials went to the residence of
Subhash Sansi @ Om Prakash, the respondent No.2/Complainant
along with supporters of said Subhash Sansi @ Om Prakash assaulted
the revisionist and other police officials and a separate case FIR was
registered; that Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that a case was
registered against the complainant/Respondent and her family
members and the present case is nothing but a counterblast as a gross
misuse of process of law by the complainant on false, frivolous and
concocted story; that Ld. Trial Court has passed the impugned order in
an arbitrary and mechanical manner without following the due process
of law; that the impugned order passed by the Ld. Trial Court is bad in
law and deserves to be set aside on the sole ground of non-compliance
of the provisions of Section 197 Cr. PC and Section 140 of the Delhi
Police Act as the revisionist being police officer was discharging his
duty and protected under Section 197 Cr. PC, hence, a prior Sanction
from the competent authority is required before summoning the
revisionist; that no doctor has been examined in pre-summoning
evidence led by the complainant or by the Court itself for verifying the
MLC filed on record; that the MLC of Ashok filed on record only
mentions suspicion/of (S/O-As mentioned in the MLC) rib fracture,
however, no corresponding opinion or X-ray has been putforth by the
complainant or called by the Court for even prima facie proving the
medical documents of Ashok on record; that no enquiry was initiated
by Ld. Magistrate under Section 202 Cr. PC for verification of the
allegations as putforth by the complainant though it is apparent on
record that the complaint was motivated and was against the police

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 3 of 28
officers/officials not by a common man but by the person involved in
criminal activities; that even the allegations under Section 354 IPC is
totally motivated which have been leveled by the daughter of accused
Ashok, who was arrested by the police and the mens rea essential for
the said offence is totally missing in the testimony of the said witness
as CW5 in her pre-summoning evidence;

3. To substantiate his arguments, Ld. Counsel for revisionist
has placed reliance upon the following judgments :

a. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as
Anil Kumar and Ors. Vs. M. K. Aiyappa and Anr.
reported in (2013) 10 SCC 05 has held that a Special
Judge/Magistrate cannot refer a Complaint for
investigation under section 156(3) of the CrPC against a
Public Servant without a valid sanction order from the
Government.

b. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Crl. M. C. No.
2120/2018 case titled as Anjani Gupta Vs. The State NCT
of Delhi and Anr.
, wherein it has been held that :

26. The above-mentioned observation of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court read with Section 397 of
the Cr.P.C., elucidates that the powers of
Revisional Court are limited to the appreciation of
the judgment/ order of the court below to the
question whether there is any gross illegality, error
apparent on record or error of law. The Revisional
Court ought to have appreciated that the Court
below did not consider that prima facie an offence

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 4 of 28
of theft was not made out against the Petitioner as
the very ingredients of the offence under Section
380
of the IPC were not met. There was an
apparent error of law while passing the Order of
summons and the Revisional Court wrongly
upheld the Order dated 20th June, 2015 vide its
Order dated 17th March, 2018.”

c. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as
M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. Vs. The Special Judicial
Magistrate & Ors.
reported in AIR 1998 SUPREME COURT
128, wherein it has been held that :

“Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a
serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into
motion as a matter of course. It is not that the
complainant has to bring only two witnesses to
support his allegations in the complaint to have the
criminal law set into motion. The order of the
magistrate summoning the accused must reflect
that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case
and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine
the nature of allegations made in the complaint and
the evidence both oral and documentary in support
thereof and would that be sufficient for the
complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to
the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent
spectator at the time of recording of preliminary
evidence before summoning of the accused.
Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence
brought on record and may even himself put
questions to the complainant and his witnesses to

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 5 of 28
elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the
allegations or otherwise and then examine if any
offence is prima facie committed by all or any of
the accused.

d. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as
Lalankumar Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra (Dated
11.10.2022), it has been held that
“28. The order of issuance of process is not an
empty formality. The Magistrate is required to
apply his mind as to whether sufficient ground for
proceeding exists in the case or not. The formation
of such an opinion is required to be stated in the
order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no
reasons are given therein while coming to the
conclusion that there is a prima facie case against
the accused. No doubt, that the order need not
contain detailed reasons. A reference in this respect
could be made to the judgment of this Court in the
case of Sunil Bharti Mittal Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation
; 9 (2015) 4 SCC 609 , which reads
thus:

“51. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code
deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of
the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence,
there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This
section relates to commencement of a criminal
proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of
a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the
complaint or to whom it has been transferred under
Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 6 of 28
before him (i.e. the complaint, examination of the
complainant and his witnesses, if present, or report
of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie
case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he
shall issue process against the accused.

52. A wide discretion has been given as to grant or
refusal of process and it must be judicially
exercised. A person ought not to be dragged into
court merely because a complaint has been filed. If
a prima facie case has been made out, the
Magistrate ought to issue process and it cannot be
refused merely because he thinks that it is unlikely
to result in a conviction.

53. However, the words “sufficient ground for
proceeding” appearing in Section 204 are of
immense importance.

It is these words which amply suggest that an
opinion is to be formed only after due application
of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding
against the said accused and formation of such an
opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order
is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein
while coming to the conclusion that there is prima
facie case against the accused, though the order
need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the
order would be bad in law if the reason given turns
out to be ex facie incorrect.”

e. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as
Sunil Bharti Vs. CBI (Dated 09.01.2015);

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 7 of 28

f. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as
M/s. JM Laboratories and Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
& Anr. (Dated 30.01.2025);

g. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Crl. M.C. No.
6195/2023 titled as Omlata & Ors. Vs. State of NCT of
Delhi & Anr. (Dated 28.08.2023);

h. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Crl. Appeal No.
1347/2020 case titled as Mehmood Ul Rehman Vs. Khazir
Mohammad Tunda (Dated
31.03.2015);

i. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as
Punjab National Bank Vs. Surendra Prasadd Sinha reported
in 1992 AIR 1815; and
j. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as
Birla Corporation Ltd. Vs. Adventz Investments and
Holdings Ltd. (Dated
09.05.2019).

Arguments addressed on behalf of respondent No. 1 & 2

4. Per contra, Ld. Prosecutor as well as Ld. Counsel for
respondent No. 2 supporting the Impugned Order argued that there is
no infirmity and illegality done by the Ld. Trial Court and has rightly
directed to summon the accused persons including the present
revisionist under Section 354/506(1)/325 IPC.
4.1 It has been argued by Ld. Counsel for the respondent No.
2/complainant that the act of breaking bones, outraging modesty
of/assaulting a woman and even threatening to destroy the career of a
young boy does not fall within the ambit of official duty, hence, no

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 8 of 28
sanction is required in the instant case. He further argued that despite
40-50 in the alleged mob, the FIR was only registered against the
complainant/respondent No. 2 and her family members, which shows
the malafide intentions of the revisionist. He has also argued that all
the witnesses examined in Pre-summoning have proved prima facie
case against the revisionist, which is corroborated by the MLC of
Sh.Ashok filed on record.

4.2 To substantiate his arguments, Ld. Counsel for the
respondent No. 2/complainant has placed reliance upon following
judgments :

a. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as Pyare
Lal & Anr. Vs. Sita Ram Mamgoi & Anr.
reported in 1987
DKT 31140, wherein it has been held that :

” 12. The offence complained of against the
respondent accused who was a police officer at the
relevant time does not appear to be protected under
section 197 of the code, as the allegations are
abusive language and beatings which were in no
way connected with the discharge of his official
duties. In Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1973
S.C 2591 where the appellant, a postal clerk, was
alleged to have been kicked in the abdomen and
abused by a superior officer when the former met the
latter to request for the cancellation of his transfer,
the Supreme Court reversed the High Court decision
and held that the acts attributed to the accused in the
complaint filed by the clerk did not come within the
scope of the official duty and no sanction under

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 9 of 28
section 197 of the code was needed which authority
of the Supreme Court clearly covers the case in hand
and there was no necessity of any sanction of the
Government under section 197 of the code for filing
the complaint by the petitioners against the accused
respondent Sita Ram Mamgoi.”

b. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as G.
C. Manjunath & Ors. Vs. Seetaram
reported in 2025 INSC
439, has observed that :

“30. ……..The protective mantle of Section 197 of
the CrPC, however, is not absolute; it does not
extend to acts that are manifestly beyond the scope
of official duty or wholly unconnected thereto. Acts
bereft of any reasonable nexus to official functions
fall outside the ambit of this safeguard and do not
attract the bar imposed under Section 197 of the
CrPC.

xxxxxxxx

34. While dealing with the provisions of Section 197
of the CrPC, read with Section 170 of the Police Act,
this Court in D. Devaraja observed that not every
offence committed by a police officer automatically
gets this protection. The safeguard under Section
197
of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is
limited. It applies only if the alleged act is
reasonably connected to the officer’s official duties.
The law does not offer protection if the official role
is used as a mere excuse to commit wrongful acts.
However, it was held that the protection of prior

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 10 of 28
sanction will be available when there is a reasonable
connection between the act and their duty. …….”

c. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in SLP (Crl.) Nos.
8656-8657 of 2019 titled as Head Constable Raj Kumar etc.
Vs. The State of Punjab & Anr., has observed that
” 16. An act that is per se directed to erasing a
potential exhibit, if ultimately proved, cannot be
regarded as reasonably connected with any bona-
fide police duty. The test consistently applied by this
Court is whether the impugned act bears a direct and
inseparable nexus to official functions. We believe
that where the very accusation is suppression of
evidence, the nexus is absent on the face of the
record. In such a situation the bar of Section 197
CrPC is not attracted, and sanction is not a condition
precedent to cognizance.”

Relevant Law

5. The Court heard the arguments as advanced by Ld. Counsel
for both the parties and have gone through the material available on
record including the Trial Court Record.

6. The main thrust of arguments raised by Ld. Counsel for the
revisionist is that the revisionist is a Public Servant and Ld. Trial
Court erred in summoning the revisionist in the absence of necessary
Sanction under Section 197 Cr.PC which is mandate of law.

7. At this juncture, this Court deems is to refer the observation
made by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as Suneeti

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 11 of 28
Toteja Vs. State of UP and Another
(Dated 25.02.2025) Relevant
portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow :

“25. For the sake of convenience, the provisions of Section 197
CrPC are reproduced hereinunder:

“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.–
(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a
public servant not removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of
such offence except with the previous sanction save as otherwise
provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013— (a) in the case
of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the
time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in
connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central
Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State
Government:

Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a
person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a
Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the
Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for
the expression “State Government” occurring therein, the
expression “Central Government” were substituted.
Explanation.–For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that
no sanction shall be required in case of a public servant accused of
any offence alleged to have been committed under section 166A,
section 166B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section
354C, section 354D, section 370, section 375, section 376A,

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 12 of 28
section 376AB, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA,
section 376DB or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860).

(2) xxxxx
(3) xxxxxx
(3A) xxxxxx
(3B) xxxxxx
(4) xxxxxx

26. The object and purpose of the aforesaid provision was recently
reiterated by this Court in the case of Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender
Gupta
, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761, which reads as follows: “22.

… the object and purpose of the said provision is to protect
officers and officials of the State from unjustified criminal
prosecution while they discharge their duties within the scope and
ambit of their powers entrusted to them. A reading of Section 197
of the CrPC would indicate that there is a bar for a Court to take
cognizance of such offences which are mentioned in the said
provision except with the previous sanction of the appropriate
government when the allegations are made against, inter alia, a
public servant. There is no doubt that in the instant case the
appellant herein was a public servant but the question is, whether,
while discharging her duty as a public servant on the relevant date,
there was any excess in the discharge of the said duty which did
not require the first respondent herein to take a prior sanction for
prosecuting the appellant herein. In this regard, the salient words
which are relevant under subsection (1) of Section 197 are “is
accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with
the previous sanction”. Therefore, for the purpose of application of

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 13 of 28
Section 197, a sine qua non is that the public servant is accused of
any offence which had been committed by him in “discharge of his
official duty”.

The said expression would clearly indicate that Section 197 of the
CrPC would not apply to a case if a public servant is accused of
any offence which is de hors or not connected to the discharge of
his or her official duty. However, there are a line of judgments
which have considered this expression in two different ways which
we shall now advert to.”

27. In Amod Kumar Kanth vs. Association of Victim of Uphaar
Tragedy
, 2023 SCC Online SC 578 disposed of by a three-Judge
Bench of this Court on 20.04.2023, of which one of us
(Nagarathna, J.) was a member, it was observed that the question
of cognizance being taken in the absence of sanction and thereby
Section 197 of the CrPC being flouted is not to be conflated and
thereby confused with the question as to whether an offence has
been committed. The salutary purpose behind Section 197 of the
CrPC is protection being accorded to public servants. In
paragraphs 28, 29 and 31, it was observed as under:

“(28) The State functions through its officers. Functions of
the State may be sovereign or not sovereign. But each of the
functions performed by every public servant is intended to
achieve public good. It may come with discretion. The
exercise of the power cannot be divorced from the context in
which and the time at which the power is exercised or if it is
a case of an omission, when the omission takes place.
(29) The most important question which must be posed and
answered by the Court when dealing with the argument that
sanction is not forthcoming is whether the officer was acting
in the exercise of his official duties. It goes further. Even an

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 14 of 28
officer who acts in the purported exercise of his official
power is given the protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C.

This is for good reason that the officer when he exercises the
power can go about exercising the same fearlessly no doubt
with bona fides as public functionaries can act only bona fide.
In fact, the requirement of the action being bona fide is not
expressly stated in Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., though it is
found in many other statutes protecting public servants from
action, civil and criminal against them.

x x x x xxxxxxxx

28. In another case titled Amrik Singh vs The State of PEPSU,
AIR 1955 SC 309, this Court explained the scope of Section 197
of CrPC as follows:

8. … It is not every offence committed by a public servant
that requires sanction for prosecution under section 197(1) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure; nor even every act done by
him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his
official duties; but if the act complained of is directly
concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it
could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office,
then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so,
irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of
his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence
on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the
trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction,
which must precede the institution of the prosecution.”
The Court thereunder further concluded that:

“12 … The result then is that whether sanction is necessary to
prosecute a public servant on a charge of criminal
misappropriation, will depend on whether the acts

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 15 of 28
complained of hinge on his duties as a public servant. If they
do, then sanction is requisite. But if they are unconnected
with such duties, then no sanction is necessary.”

29. As per the aforementioned proposition, it is only to be seen if
the accused public servant was acting in the performance of his/her
official duties, and if the answer is in the affirmative, then prior
sanction for their prosecution is a condition precedent to the
cognizance of the cases against them by the courts . It is therefore
largely a disputed question of fact here and not a question of law. ”

8. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as Jayasingh
vs K.K. Velayutham & Anr.
reported in AIR 2006 Supreme Court
2407, has observed that
“In Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari [(1955) 2 SCR 925] a
Constitution Bench of this Court held that the provisions of
Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code would be attracted if
the offence alleged to have been committed [by the accused] must
have something to do or must be related in some manner with the
discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection
between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must
bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a
reasonable (claim), but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he
did it in the course of the performance of his duty.
Whether for prosecution of a public servant sanction is necessary
to be obtained or not would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. Similarly, whether in view of the
allegations made in the complaint an order of sanction would be
essential or not would again depend upon facts and circumstances
of each case.

In Romesh Lal Jain Vs. Naginder Singh Rana & Ors. [(2006) 1

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 16 of 28
SCC 294] a Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Sinha, J. was
a member), relying upon Matajog Dobey (Supra) and various other
decisions, opined :

“The question as to whether an order of sanction would be
found essential would, thus, depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. In a case where ex facie no order
of sanction has been issued when it is admittedly a pre-
requisite for taking cognizance of the offences or where such
an order apparently has been passed by the authority not
competent therefor, the court may take note thereof at the
outset. But where the validity or otherwise of an order of
sanction is required to be considered having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case and furthermore when a
contention has to be gone into as to whether the act alleged
against the accused has any direct nexus with the discharge of
his official act, it may be permissible in a given situation for
the court to examine the said question at a later stage.
xxx xxxx
Yet again, in Rakesh Kumar Mishra Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.
[(2006) 1 SCC 557], this Court held:

“Use of the expression “official duty” implies that the act or
omission must have been done by the public servant in the
course of his service and that it should have been in discharge
of his duty. The section does not extend its protective cover to
every act or omission done by a public servant in service but
restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions
which are done by a public servant in discharge of official
duty. It has been widened further by extending protection to
even those acts or omissions which are done in purported
exercise of official duty; that is under the colour of office.

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 17 of 28

Official duty, therefore, implies that the act or omission must
have been done by the public servant in the course of his
service and such act or omission must have been performed
as part of duty which further must have been official in
nature. The section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while
determining its applicability to any act or omission in the
course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those
duties which are discharged in the course of duty. But once
any act or omission has been found to have been committed
by a public servant in the discharge of his duty then it must
be given liberal and wide construction so far its official
nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not
entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the
section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted
manner. But once it is established that an act or omission was
done by the public servant while discharging his duty then
the scope of its being official should be construed so as to
advance the objective of the section in favour of the public
servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection
to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For
instance a police officer in the discharge of duty may have to
use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of
which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer
commits an act in the course of service but not in the
discharge of his duty and without any justification therefor
then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. …
There must be a reasonable connection between the act and
the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation
to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim),
but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 18 of 28
course of the performance of his duty.”[See Sankaran Moitra
vs. Sadhna Das & Anr. (JT
2006 (4) SC 34.]

9. Accordingly, as regards to sanction to prosecute a
Government servant, sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C is
necessary when the offences alleged against the public servant are
committed by him “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge
of his ocial duty” and in order to ascertain whether the alleged offence
is committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty, the yardstick to be followed is to form a prima facie view
whether the act or omission for which the accused was charged had a
reasonable connection with the discharge of his duties. From the
above, it is abundant clear that in the absence of requisite sanction, a
public servant cannot be prosecuted for acts done in connection with
his official duty.

Court’s Observation

10. The complainant/Respondent No. 2 sent a written complaint
to Ld. District Judge through Speed Post, which was marked to Ld.
Trial Court, wherein she has made certain allegations against the
police officers/officials including present revisionist. Relevant portion
of the complaint is reproduced hereinbelow :

“1. दिनांक 28.12.2017 xxxxxxx
xxxxxx

6. एस.एच.ओ. साहब के कहने पर पुलिस वालों ने मेरा घर का ताला
तोडने लगे और उसके बाद घर की तालाशी लेने लगे , मगर घर में कोई

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 19 of 28
शराब की बोतल नहीं मिली। उसके बाद एस.एच.ओ. साहब ने सुभाष
सॉसी के घर की तालाशी ली। xxxxxxxxxxxx

7. जब मेरे पति अशोक को मेडिकल कराने के लिए दीन दयाल
अस्पताल ले गये तो अस्पताल के डाक्टर ने पुलिस वालों को कहा कि
अशेक की हड्डी टूट गई है फिर दीन दयाल अस्पताल ने सफदरजंग
अस्पताल को रे फर कर दिया। वहाँ भी सफदरजंग अस्पताल के डाक्टर ने
पुलिस वालों को यह बताया कि अशोक की हड्डी टूट गई है।
xxxxxxxxxx”

11. The aforesaid complaint was treated as per Section 200
Cr.PC and pre-summoning evidence was led wherein the complainant
was examined as CW-1 and deposed that on 28.12.2017, the
revisionist/the then SHO PS – Delhi Cantt. along with the then ACP
and police officials visited their house and asked for the keys of their
house from her husband Ashok but when he stated that he does not
have the same, the police wanted to break open the lock but her son
intervened and a brawl took place between them and the police. In the
meantime, her daughter also reached at the spot and
intervened/resisted but the revisionist slapped her, pushed her aside by
her breasts. Her son Gaurav started recording the incident but they
were apprehended by the police and were taken to police station.
Thereafter, their house was searched but no liquor bottle was found.
The house of Subhash Saansi was also raided by the police.
Thereafter, her husband was taken to DDU Hospital for medical
treatment but was referred to Safdarjung Hospital where he was told
that he has suffered fracture.

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 20 of 28

11.1 She further deposed that Constable Rajpal, who is one of
the accused in the present matter made a complaint against her and her
family member for obstructing the police officers in performing public
duty and a case under Section 186/353/332/34 IPC and Section 33 of
Delhi Excise Act was registered against them. She further deposed
that on 05.01.2018, the revisionist threatened her husband in Patiala
House Court that he will ruin the future of her son Gaurav and family
members.

12. PW-2 Smt. Asha (Sister-in-law of complainant), PW-3
Sh.Ashok (Husband of the complainant), PW-4 Sh.Gaurav (Son of the
complainant) and PW-5 (Daughter of the complainant), deposed on
the same lines of PW-1. CW-4 Gaurav has also proved FIR registered
against them bearing No. 0325/2017 as CW4/A.

13. PW-6 Medical Record Clerk, DDU Hospital, New Delhi
proved MLC No. 12742 of Sh. Ashok Kumar dated 28.12.2017 as
Ex.CW6/1.

14. Therefore, admittedly, the revisionist along with other
police officials went to the house of the complainant to conduct raid
for illicit liquor, which has also been the case of the revisionist and an
FIR has been registered against the complainant and her family
members for obstructing the police in discharge of their official duty
and for illicit liquor.

15. At this stage, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce
the relevant portion of order dated 09.01.2025, which is part and
parcel of the impugned order, which reads as under :

“Arguments heard.

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 21 of 28

The matter is at the stage of order on summoning and
it is alleged by the complainant that husband of the
complainant was forcibly beaten by the then SHO of
the area due to which he sustained injuries.
The SHO also without any warrant entered the house
of the complainant and injured the son and daughter of
the complainant. All this was done while SHO was
investigating FIR no. 323/2017 PS Delhi Cantt.
The Ld. counsel for complainant has also produced an
MLC showing that the husband of the complainant
suffered fracture in his ribs due to the beatings given
by the SHO and his associates.

He further submits that the incident took place on
28.12.2017 and the husband of the complainant was
not in the custody of the police. He was later taken into
custody and his arrest was affected on the same day.
Therefore, the MLC is relevant in the present case as
the ribs could not have been fractured by anyone else.
After going through the submissions and perusing the
records, the court is of the opinion that there is
sufficient material on record to summon the proposed
accused persons namely the then SHO Vidhyadhar
Singh, HC Rajpal and HC Mahender u/s
354/506(1)/325 IPC.

All these acts were allegedly done color of office.
Therefore, before issuing the summons sanction is
required from relevant authority to prosecute the
proposed accused persons.

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 22 of 28

Ld. Counsel for complainant seeks short
accommodation to file the relevant judgments on
NDOH.

Put up for further proceedings on 09.04.2025.

16. From the perusal of aforesaid order, it is clear that
cognizance of offence was taken by the Ld. Trial Court vide the
aforesaid order itself and mentioned that summons cannot be issued
without prior sanction from the concerned authority since all these acts
were allegedly done color of office. However, the law is in total
contrast to the same as Section 197 Cr. PC, which is already discussed
above, has relevant portion as “…..no Court shall take cognizance of
such offence except with previous sanction…”

17. “Cognizance” in general meaning is said to be ‘knowledge’
or ‘notice’ and taking ‘cognizance of offences’ means taking notice, or
becoming aware of the alleged commission of an offence. The
dictionary meaning of the word ‘cognizance’ is judicial hearing of a
matter’. The judicial officer will have to take cognizance of the
offence before he could proceed with the conduct of the trial. Taking
cognizance does not involve any kind of formal action but occurs as
soon as a magistrate as such applies his mind to the suspected
commission of an offence for the purpose of legal proceedings. So,
taking cognizance is also said to be application of judicial mind. It
includes the intention of starting a judicial proceedings with respect to
an offence or taking steps to see whether there is basis for starting the
judicial proceedings. It is trite that before taking cognizance that
Court should satisfy that ingredients of the offences charged are there

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 23 of 28
or not. A court can take cognizance only once, after that is become
functus officio.

18. Accordingly, the Ld. Trial Court took the cognizance of
the offence vide order dated 09.01.2025 despite mentioning itself that
all the offences were committed within the colour of duty by the
proposed accused persons, hence, previous sanction was required and
postponed the issuance of process/summons to them. However, vide
the impugned order dated 21.05.2025, issued summons to accused
persons including revisionist and relevant portion of the impugned is
reproduced hereinbelow :

“Ld. counsel for complainant submits that as per
judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in “Pyare Lal
and Anr. Vs. Sita Ram Mamgoi and Anr
“, 1986 SCC
online Del-285, it has been categorically stated that
inhuman behavior like use of abusive language and
giving beatings cannot be connected with discharge of
official duties in case of a violation by police officer.
In the present case, argument have already been heard
via order dated 09.01.2025.

It is noted that in the present case, it has been alleged
that the husband of the complainant was beaten by
police officials when he was not even in custody. MLC
of the victim is also on record.

The court is satisfied by the submissions made by the
Ld. counsel for complainant.

Therefore, there is sufficient material on record to
summons the propose accused person namely the then

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 24 of 28
SHO Vidhyadhar Singh, the then HC Rajpal and the
then HC Mahender u/s 354/506(1)/325 IPC.
Let summons be issued to proposed accused persons for

– filing of PF/RC within two weeks from today.
Put up on 25.08.2025.”

19. Vide the aforesaid impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court
reviewed its own order that previous sanction is required in the
present matter since the alleged offence is committed in the colour of
duty, however, review of a judicial order is neither recognized nor
permissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure except due to
arithmetical or clerical error and also as per ratio decendi by Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Adalat Prasad Vs. Rooplal Jindal reported
in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 4674 that criminal courts, including the
Magistrate’s court, do not possess any inherent or statutory power to
review or reconsider their own judicial orders.

20. Moreover, the Ld. Trial Court has lost its sight over the
MLC of Sh. Ashok proved on record as Ex.CW6/1 wherein only
suspicion of 10th Rib Fracture has been mentioned and the patient was
advised for X-ray and no opinion on the same has been proved on
record as ‘grievous injury’ but the cognizance has been taken for the
offence under Section 325 IPC presuming the fracture without proving
on record the X-ray report or opinion thereto.

21. During the course of arguments, Ld. Counsel for the
revisionist has filed photocopy of X-report of Sh. Ashok dated
29.12.2017 wherein it has been clearly mentioned that “on X-ray
Chest no fracture noted”. The same has not been disputed by Ld.

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 25 of 28
LAC for the complainant/respondent No. 2. It seems that the said
X-ray report has been deliberately concealed from the Ld. Trial Court
since, it is totally contrary to the evidence putforth by the
complainant. It was the duty of the Court to call for the opinion upon
the injury for invoking the aforesaid section but there has been total
disregard to the same

22. Further, as pointed out by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist
that the complaint is motivated and a counterblast to the case
registered against the complainant and her family members, and also
that only family members have been examined during Pre-summoning
evidence, though admittedly, 40-50 public persons gathered at the spot
but none of the public person has been examined which also points
towards false and an afterthought concocted story in order to raise a
false defence in the FIR case.

23. Even the allegations of Section 354 IPC lacks requisite
mens rea and the Section is reproduce hereinbelow :

354. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to
outrage her modesty.–

Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman,
intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he
will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which shall not be less than one year but which may
extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.

24. As per the testimony of witnesses, the police wanted to
search the residential premises of the complainant but they objected to
it and the daughter of the complainant intervened and resisted, hence,

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 26 of 28
she was alleged to be pushed aside from chest/breast by the
revisionist. No witness including the victim herself has testified that
the revisionist intended or with knowledge outraged her modesty. At
this juncture, this Court is guided by the judgment rendered by
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as Naresh Aneja @
Naresh Kumar Aneja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (Dated 02.01.2025),
wherein it has been held that:

“12.4 It is well settled that for mens rea to be established,
something better than vague statements must be produced
before the court. As evidenced by the annexures referred to
above, i.e. the FIR, the preliminary investigation report as
also the concluding portion of the chargesheet, no direct
allegation nor any evidence in support thereof can be found
attributing intent to the appellant. It cannot be said, then,
that a case u/s 354 IPC is made out against the appellant. ”

25. Again reference is made to the fact that the Ld. Trial Court
has itself stated that all the offences were done in the colour of duty
and cognizance was taken without previous sanction from the
competent authorities. Moreso, there have been many
irregularities/discrepancies in establishing the present matter even
prima facie for taking cognizance including the proof of complete
medical treatment record for the offence under Section 325 IPC and
vague/bald allegations of molestation for the offence under Section
354
IPC and threatening for the offence under Section 506 IPC.

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 27 of 28

Conclusion

26. In light of aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the impugned order is bad in law and suffers
illegality, irregularities and impropriety, hence, the impugned order
dated 21.05.2025 is hereby set aside and the complaint is dismissed
being devoid of any merit.

27. The Trial Court Record along with the copy of this order
be sent back to the learned Trial Court.

28. The file of this revision petition be consigned to record
Digitally signed
SHEFALI by
room after due compliance.

                                                          SHEFALI
                                                       BARNALA
                                               BARNALA TANDON
                                               TANDON Date: 2026.02.20
Pronounced in the open                                 17:53:21 +0530

Court on 20.02.2026                      (Shefali Barnala Tandon)
                                       Additional Sessions Judge -06,
                                   New Delhi District, Patiala House Court,

It is to certify that this order contains 28 pages and each
page bears the signatures of the under signed.

Digitally signed

SHEFALI by SHEFALI
BARNALA
BARNALA TANDON
TANDON Date: 2026.02.20
17:53:27 +0530

(Shefali Barnala Tandon)
Additional Sessions Judge -06,
New Delhi District, Patiala House Court,

Criminal Revision Nos. 449/2025 Vidhyadhar Singh Vs. State & Anr. Page 28 of 28



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