Supreme Court – Daily Orders
The General Manager vs Sr. K .Eshappa on 16 February, 2026
Author: Rajesh Bindal
Bench: Rajesh Bindal
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1662 OF 2026
THE GENERAL MANAGER, ….APPELLANT(S)
M/s. NMDC LTD.
VERSUS
SR. K. ESHAPPA …RESPONDENT(S)
ORDER
Leave Granted.
2. The present appeal has been preferred by the Appellant-
Corporation challenging the Order dated 19.02.2024 (hereinafter
referred to as “Impugned Order”) passed in Writ Petition No. 104032
of 2022 (L-RES) by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench
(hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”) wherein the High Court
partly allowed the writ petition, and while setting aside the Order
dated 10.02.2009 passed by the Disciplinary Authority (hereinafter
referred to as “Removal Order”); Order dated 14.05.2009 passed by
the Appellate Authority (hereinafter referred to as “Appellate Order”);
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NISHA KHULBEY
Date: 2026.02.21
and Order dated 19.01.2021 passed by the Central Government
13:50:44 IST
Reason:
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (hereinafter referred to as
“CGIT”), directed the Disciplinary Authority to impose any otherpunishment on the proved charges of misconduct other than
punishment of removal, dismissal or compulsory retirement from
service. The High Court also held that the Respondent would be
entitled for reinstatement in service without backwages and continuity
of service.
3. The essential facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are
that on 24.07.1993, the Respondent joined the Appellant-Corporation
as a Class-IV employee. On 15.03.2008, the Respondent was issued a
charge memo, wherein charges were framed against the Respondent
on account of misconduct, misbehaviour and using filthy language
against his senior officials, and subsequently, enquiry was initiated
against him. The relevant portions from the memorandum of charge
are reproduced herein below:
“Article of Charge I
Sri K Eshappa TCO, UEC No.D2285 physically assaulted Sri
Jawaharlal, Manager (per) on 29/02/2008 at about 4.15 P.M while the
later was discharging duty 1 his office situated in the Administrative
office Building, DIOM.
The above act on the part of Sri.K Eshappa, TCO is a misconduct
under clause No.28(2)(vii) of the certified standing orders applicable to
all workmen of NMDC Ltd, which reads as under;
28(2)(vii): Drunkenness, fighting, riotous, disorderly or indecent
behavior within the premises of Management.
Articles of charge-II
Sri. K Eshappa TCO, UEC No.D2285 along with Sri.M Khadar Basha,
MCQ Gr.II, UEC No.D1593, Plant, entered into the office of Sri.K
Jawahar Lai, Manager (P) on 29/02/2008 at about 4.15 PM to enquire
about the tender related Toranagallu, Railway Station pickup vehicle.
Sri K Eshappa abused Sri K Jawaharlal, Manager (P) in filthy
language, became violent and slapped Sri. Jawaharlal, Manager (P)
with his chappal in presence of other Executives.
The above act on the part of Sri K Eshappa, TCO is a misconduct
under clause 28(2)(xii) of the certified standing orders applicable to all
Workmen of NMDC Ltd, which reads
as under;
28(2)(xii)- Assaulting, threatening or intimidating any workman or
officers of the Management within the
Mine/Feasibility/Promises/boundaries.
Article of Charge III
Shri K Eshappa, TCO, UEC No.D2285 physically assaulted and
abused Sri K Jawaharlal at about 4.15 PM on 29-02-2008 while he
was discharging his duties in his office.
The above acc on the part of Sr. K Eshappa is a misconduct under
clause No.28(2)(xxv) of the certified standing orders applicable to all
workmen of NMDC Ltd which reads as under;
28(2)(xxv)- An act of subversive discipline.”
4. On 10.02.2009, the Removal Order was passed by the
Disciplinary Authority wherein the Respondent was given the
punishment of “removal from service which does not disqualify from
future employment”. Aggrieved by the said Removal Order, the
Respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which
vide Order dated 14.05.2009 confirmed the punishment awarded by
the Disciplinary Authority. Aggrieved, the Respondent made a
reference before the CGIT.
5. In the meanwhile, criminal proceedings were also initiated
against the Respondent for the same incident in the Court of Civil
Judge and JMFC., Sandur, bearing CC No. 666 of 2008. In the said
criminal proceedings, the Respondent was acquitted vide Order dated
30.07.2011.
6. The CGIT vide Order dated 01.03.2019, held that the enquiry
conducted by the Appellant-Corporation was fair and proper. On
19.01.2021, the CGIT passed the Award rejecting the reference. The
CGIT concluded that the charges levelled against the Respondent were
successfully proved and it affirmed the Removal Order passed against
the Respondent.
7. Aggrieved, the Respondent filed Writ Petition No. 104032 of 2022
(L-RES) before the High Court. The High Court, vide the impugned
order, while discussing the scope of judicial review in the disciplinary
proceedings, has opined that the management had examined 4
witnesses to prove the charges against the Respondent and he was
also granted an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses but
nothing in favour of the Respondent was elicited in the cross-
examination. The High Court had further observed that it would not go
into the sufficiency of evidence and reappreciate the evidence but
would only examine as to whether there was evidence and also
whether the management was able to prove the charge on
preponderance of probabilities. Having observed that, the High Court,
after going through the evidence on record, held that the charges
against the Respondent with regard to using filthy language and
assaulting his superior official were proved and therefore, there was no
ground or material to interfere with the finding of the CGIT that the
charges stood proved. However, on the aspect of punishment awarded,
the High Court held that the punishment of removal from service was
disproportionate and hence, it set aside the orders of removal with a
direction to the Appellant-Corporation to impose any other
punishment other than the removal or dismissal or compulsory
retirement.
8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant-Corporation vehemently
submitted that the Respondent has committed serious misconduct by
assaulting a senior official and abusing him in a filthy language and
slapping him on his face with his chappal/shoe. The Respondent was
involved in acts of misconduct earlier as well and for one such
instance wherein the Respondent went on unauthorized leave for 331
days, he was terminated from service on 22.12.2006, but was later
reinstated on 13.08.2007 (on medical grounds). Even apart from this,
the Respondent was involved in serious misconduct such as
suppression about his training, and assaulting and abusing another
officer, for which he was also put under suspension vide order dated
04.10.2004.
9. Learned counsel also contended that the High Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot
sit in appeal over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and the
CGIT. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the
Appellant-Corporation that the High Court had erred in setting aside
the punishment when it itself held that the charges of misconduct
against the Respondent stood proven. The High Court also failed to
take note of the fact that the act of the Respondent classifies as a
grave misconduct as per the Standing Orders for Workmen of All
Projects & Feasibilities of National Mineral Development Corporation
Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Certified Standing Order”) and such
grave acts of misconduct should be treated strictly so as to ensure
that the same are not repeated in the future.
10. Learned counsel for the Appellant-Corporation relied upon the
judgments of this Court in Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v.
Jagdish Chandra Sharma, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 401 and
Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.N. Narawade, reported in (2005)
3 SCC 134.
11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondent submitted
that the High Court had considered all the relevant factors before
coming to the finding that the punishment of removal from service is
shockingly disproportionate to the nature and gravity of charges
against the Respondent. It was further contended that the High Court
while exercising its power under Article 226 has not exonerated the
Respondent or ignored his conduct, rather, it has confined its scrutiny
to examining the legality and proportionality of the punishment
imposed.
12. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the Respondent
that since the Respondent has been acquitted in the criminal case,
therefore, the Respondent is entitled for exoneration in the enquiry
proceedings as well since the allegations against him were not proven.
13. Having heard the learned counsel for both parties and having
gone through the materials on record, the sole question that falls for
our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in setting
aside the Removal Order, the Appellate Order and the Award of the
CGIT which had upheld the Removal Order.
14. It is clear from the findings recorded and the material available
before us that the charges framed against the Respondent in respect
of misbehaviour and using filthy language against his superior officials
were duly proved and amounted to “major misconduct” in terms of
Clause 28(2)(vii), 28(2)(xii), and 28(2)(xxv) of the Certified Standing
Order.
15. We are therefore, in the present appeal, only concerned with the
question of whether in the face of the charges proved, it was proper for
the High Court to interfere with the punishment imposed upon the
Respondent by the Disciplinary Authority. While the High Court found
the punishment of removal from service to be shockingly
disproportionate to the proved charges, learned counsel for the
Appellant-Corporation has vehemently contended that the punishment
was proportionate, having regard to the gravity of the misconduct and
the Respondent’s past record.
16. It is settled law that the High Court can only interfere with the
quantum of punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution when it finds that the punishment imposed by
the employer is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. In
this regard, reference can be made to the judgment of this Court in
M.P. Electricity Board (supra), wherein it was held that interference
by the Labour Court and the High Court with the punishment of
termination for charges of assaulting a superior officer and
subsequent unauthorized absence was unjustified. This Court
categorically observed that the physical assault of a superior official
constituted a clear breach of discipline within the organisation, and
therefore, the punishment of termination was justified and could not
be regarded as harsh or disproportionate. The relevant portion of M.P.
Electricity Board (supra) is extracted hereinbelow:
“8. Similarly, the High Court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the
punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution only when it finds that the punishment imposed, is
shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. These aspects are well
settled. In U.P. SRTC v. Subhash Chandra Sharma [(2000) 3 SCC 324 :
2000 SCC (L&S) 349] this Court, after referring to the scope of
interference with punishment under Section 11-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, held that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering
with the order of removal from service when the charge against the
employee stood proved. It was also held that the jurisdiction vested with
the Labour Court to interfere with punishment was not to be exercised
capriciously and arbitrarily. It was necessary, in a case where the
Labour Court finds the charge proved, for a conclusion to be arrived at
that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the nature of the
charge found proved, before it could interfere to reduce the punishment.
In Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh
[(2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067 : (2004) 7 Scale 608] this
Court after referring to the decision in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena
[(1996) 6 SCC 417 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1455] also pointed out the
difference between the approaches to be made in a criminal proceeding
and a disciplinary proceeding. This Court also pointed out that when
charges proved were grave, vis-à-vis the establishment, interference with
punishment of dismissal could not be justified. In Bharat Forge Co. Ltd.
v. Uttam Manohar Nakate [(2005) 2 SCC 489 : (2005) 1 Scale 345] this
Court again reiterated that the jurisdiction to interfere with the
punishment should be exercised only when the punishment is shockingly
disproportionate and that each case had to be decided on its facts. This
Court also indicated that the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as
the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, had to act within
the four corners thereof. It could not sit in appeal over the decision of the
employer unless there existed a statutory provision in that behalf. The
Tribunal or the Labour Court could not interfere with the quantum of
punishment based on irrational or extraneous factors and certainly not
on what it considers a compassionate ground. It is not necessary to
multiply authorities on this question, since the matter has been dealt
with in detail in a recent decision of this Court in Mahindra and
Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Narawade [(2005) 3 SCC 134 : (2005) 2 Scale
302] . This Court summed up the position thus: (SCC p. 141, para 20)
“20. It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-
A in the Industrial Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion
is vested with the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in
interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the
management where the workman concerned is found guilty of
misconduct. The said area of discretion has been very well
defined by the various judgments of this Court referred to
hereinabove and it is certainly not unlimited as has been
observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The
discretion which can be exercised under Section 11-A is
available only on the existence of certain factors like
punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of
misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the court, or
the existence of any mitigating circumstances which require
the reduction of the sentence, or the past conduct of the
workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce
the punishment.”It may also be noticed that in Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Adikanda Sahu
[(1960) 1 LLJ 518 (SC)] and in New Shorrock Mills v. Maheshbhai T. Rao
[(1996) 6 SCC 590 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1484] this Court held that use of
abusive language against a superior, justified punishment of dismissal.
This Court stated “punishment of dismissal for using abusive language
cannot be held to be disproportionate”. If that be the position regarding
verbal assault, we think that the position regarding dismissal for
physical assault, must be found all the more justifiable. Recently, in
Muriadih Colliery BCC Ltd. v. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union [(2005) 3
SCC 331 : JT (2005) 2 SC 444] this Court after referring to and quoting
the relevant passages from Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya
Chah Mazdoor Sangh [(2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067 :
(2004) 7 Scale 608] and Tournamulla Estate v. Workmen [(1973) 2 SCC
502 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 510] held: (SCC p. 336, para 17)“The courts below by condoning an act of physical
violence have undermined the discipline in the organisation,
hence, in the above factual backdrop, it can never be said
that the Industrial Tribunal could have exercised its
authority under Section 11-A of the Act to interfere with the
punishment of dismissal.”
9. In the case on hand, the employee has been found guilty of hitting
and injuring his superior officer at the workplace, obviously in the
presence of other employees. This clearly amounted to breach of
discipline in the organisation. Discipline at the workplace in an
organisation like the employer herein, is the sine qua non for the efficient
working of the organisation. When an employee breaches such discipline
and the employer terminates his services, it is not open to a Labour Court
or an Industrial Tribunal to take the view that the punishment awarded
is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. We have already
referred to the views of this Court. To quote Jack Chan,“discipline is a form of civilly responsible behaviour which
helps maintain social order and contributes to the
preservation, if not advancement, of collective interests of
society at large”.
Obviously this idea is more relevant in considering the working of an
organisation like the employer herein or an industrial undertaking.
Obedience to authority in a workplace is not slavery. It is not violative of
one’s natural rights. It is essential for the prosperity of the organisation
as well as that of its employees. When in such a situation, a punishment
of termination is awarded for hitting and injuring a superior officer
supervising the work of the employee, with no extenuating circumstance
established, it cannot be said to be not justified. It cannot certainly be
termed unduly harsh or disproportionate. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Learned counsel for the Appellant-Corporation has further drawn
the attention of this Court to the Respondent’s past record of
misconduct, emphasizing that on one occasion, he was terminated for
unauthorized absence, and on another, he was placed under
suspension for abusing and assaulting a senior official. Past
misconduct is a relevant factor to be considered while weighing the
proportionality of the punishment awarded. In Bharat Forge Co. Ltd.
v. Uttam Manohar Nakate, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 489, this Court
has held that past service record is a relevant factor for considering
whether the punishment awarded to the delinquent was shockingly
proportionate or not. The relevant portions of the said judgment are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“26. […] The past record of service, therefore, is a relevant factor for
considering as to whether the punishment imposed upon the delinquent
employee is shockingly disproportionate or not. As has been noticed
hereinbefore, before the learned Single Judge an attempt on the part of
the respondent to take recourse to clause (b) of Item 1 of Schedule IV
failed. In the absence of any plea of factual victimisation and furthermore
in the absence of any foundational fact having been laid down for
arriving at a conclusion of legal victimisation, in our opinion, the Division
Bench committed a manifest error in invoking clause (a) thereof.
xxx
32. In Regional Manager, Rajasthan SRTC v. Sohan Lal [(2004) 8
SCC 218 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1078] it has been held that it is not the
normal jurisdiction of the superior courts to interfere with the quantum of
sentence unless it is wholly disproportionate to the misconduct proved.
Such is not the case herein. In the facts and circumstances of the case
and having regard to the past conduct of the respondent as also his
conduct during the domestic enquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the
quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was wholly
disproportionate to his act of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Similarly, in the case of T.N. State Transport Corpn. v. P.
Thirunavukkarasu, reported in (2022) 15 SCC 320, wherein the
respondent-driver’s rash and negligent driving led to the death of three
persons and he was also found to be involved in similar instances in
the past, having already been awarded eighteen punishments, this
Court held that the punishment of dismissal was not disproportionate
and interference with the same was unsustainable and unwarranted.
19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the firm view that
the punishment of removal was by no means disproportionate,
particularly when assessed in light of the Respondent’s past record
and repeated delinquencies. The Respondent’s conduct indicated a
proclivity for abusing and assaulting his superiors, which reflects
extreme insubordination and disrespect, adversely affecting the
decorum and sanctity of the organisation. It is also to be noted that
removal from service is one of the prescribed punishments for “major
misconduct” as per Clause 29(2) of the Certified Standing Order.
20. Learned counsel for the Respondent has contended that, in view
of the Respondent’s acquittal in the criminal case, he is entitled to
exoneration in the disciplinary proceedings as well. This submission,
however, is wholly untenable and contrary to settled law. It is well
established that where departmental proceedings and criminal
proceedings are instituted on the same charge against the same
delinquent, acquittal in the criminal case does not automatically
conclude or nullify the departmental proceedings in respect of that
charge. On this aspect, reference may be made to SBI v. P. Zadenga,
reported in (2023) 10 SCC 675, wherein this Court held that:
“31. As a principle of law, we have already observed that a
departmental proceeding pending criminal trial would not warrant an
automatic stay unless, of course, a complicated question of law is
involved. Also, acquittal in a criminal case ipso facto would not be
tantamount to closure or culmination of proceedings in favour of a
delinquent employee.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. The High Court’s reliance on Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton
Cable India (P) Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 569, to hold that the punishment
of removal was shockingly disproportionate, is misplaced. The said
case concerned only the use of filthy language against a worker or
officer of the management, whereas the present case involves physical
assault of a superior official in addition to verbal abuse. Further, in
Ved Prakash Gupta (supra), this Court specifically noted the absence
of any previous adverse remark or past record of misconduct against
the delinquent employee. Similarly, the judgment in Ram Kishan v.
Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 157, which has also been
relied upon by the High Court, is factually distinguishable, as it too
dealt solely with a charge of abuse.
22. The High Court could not reasonably justify how the punishment
of removal was shockingly disproportionate to the proved charges and
committed an error while setting aside the Removal Order, as well as
the Appellate Order and the Award of the CGIT. Consequently, the
Impugned Order cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside as
the punishment awarded required no interference by the High Court.
23. As a result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The
Impugned Order is set aside and the Removal Order, the Appellate
Order, along with the Award passed by the CGIT are thus affirmed.
24. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
………………………., J.
(RAJESH BINDAL)
………………………., J.
(VIJAY BISHNOI)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 16, 2026.
ITEM NO.38 COURT NO.14 SECTION IV-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.13308/2024
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 19-02-2024
in WP No. 104032/2022 passed by the High Court of Karnataka Circuit
Bench at Dharwad]
THE GENERAL MANAGER, M/s. NMDC LTD. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
SR. K .ESHAPPA Respondent(s)
FOR ADMISSION and I.R.
IA No. 139644/2024 – PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES
Date : 16-02-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BINDAL
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOIFor Petitioner(s) :Ms. Aastha Mehta, Adv.
Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, AOR
Ms. Prerana Mohapatra, Adv.
Ms. Prina Sharma, Adv.
For Respondent(s) :Mr. Sarim Naved, Adv.
Ms. Sugandha Anand, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E RLeave granted,
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed
order.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also
stand disposed of.
(KRITIKA TIWARI) (AKSHAY KUMAR BHORIA)
SENIOR PERSONAL ASSISTANT COURT MASTER (NSH)
{Signed order is placed on file}
