Punjab-Haryana High Court
Nitin Kumar vs State Of Punjab on 19 February, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
232 CRM-M-8652-2026 (O&M)
Date of decision: 19.02.2026
Date of uploading: 19.02.2026
Nitin Kumar ....Petitioner
V/s
State of Punjab ....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Kunwar Rajan, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Baljinder Singh Sra, Addl. AG, Punjab.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
1. Present petition is the second attempt, which has been filed
under Section 483 of BNSS for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case
bearing FIR No.170 dated 12.08.2023 registered for offences punishable
under Sections 379, 379-B, 411 of IPC and Section 22 of the NDPS Act,
1985, at Police Station Tibba, District Police Commissionerate Ludhiana.
2. The case set up in the FIR in question (as set out by the
petitioner in the present petition) is as follows:-
“SHO P.S. Tibba Ludhiana. Jai Hind. Today I ASI along
with ASI Manjit Singh 2737, ASI Rajesh Kumar 2109, HC
Baljinder Singh 670, HC Amarjit Singh 214, Constable
Amandeep Singh 749 on govt. vehicle Tavera bearing
No.PB10BK-0616 whose driver was PHG Jang Bahadur No.
16046, in connection with patrolling and checking of suspicious1 of 8
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CRM-M-8652-2026 (O&M) Page |2persons and vehicles and were present near Mohalla Baba
Namdev Colony near Red Rose School, Tibba Road Ludhiana.
Then special informer came to me ASI and gave information to
me separately that Nitin Kumar son of Ram Lal and Sumail son
of Sher Singh resident of Gali No.0, Mohalla Baba Namdev,
Tibba Road Ludhiana and both these persons used to commit
offence of theft and snatching of gold chains from people and
used to sell intoxicant tablets. Now Nitin Kumar and Sumail
above said are present in the street outside the house and they
will go on stolen motorcycle make Pulsar, colour black bearing
No.PB10CV-8404. If the raid is conducted right now then Nitin
Kumar and Sumail above said can be apprehended along with
huge quantity of intoxicant tablets and stolen motorcycle and
from them more intoxicant tablets and stolen motorcycles along
with snatched articles can be recovered. Information is true and
reliable. On the information, by committing theft, snatching and
selling the intoxicant tablets without permit and license,
ingredients of Sections 379, 379-B, 411 of IPC and Section
22/61/85 of NDPS Act are fulfilled. So by got typing ruqa from
private laptop from Constable Amandeep Singh 749 and by
taking out print out with the help of inverted installed on govt.
vehicle, same is being sent by hand through HC Amarjit Singh
214 to police station. After registration of case, FIR number be
informed. I ASI along with fellow officials am proceeding
towards place of occurrence via road. Sd/ Raj Kumar CIA-2,
Ludhiana dated. 12.8.2023.”
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
petitioner was initially arrested on 12.08.2023. Learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in
question. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has further argued
that the co-accused namely Sumer @ Sumail has since been granted the
concession of regular bail by this Court in CRM-M-59665-2024 vide order
dated 14.02.2025 (Annexure P-3). Learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner has further contended that the petitioner has suffered
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incarceration for more than 2 ½ years and conclusion of trial will take long.
Thus, regular bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has vehemently opposed the present
petition by arguing that the allegations raised are serious in nature and,
hence, the petitioner does not deserve the concession of regular bail.
5. I have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the
available records of the case.
6. It is not in dispute that the petitioner came to be arrested on
12.08.2023 whereinafter investigation was carried out and challan was
presented on 09.11.2023. Total 18 prosecution witnesses have been cited
and out of which only one has been examined till date. The rival
contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues, which shall be
ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it
appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it
may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to
indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of
justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be
saddled upon the petitioner. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder
versus State of Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024
(2025:PHHC:002695); after relying upon the ratio decidendi of the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home
Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S.
Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of
Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @
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Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal
Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias
Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal“; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The
State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated
22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of
Gujarat“; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as
Gopal Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur
Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has
held, thus:
“7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a
vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to
mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to
curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but
there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial.
This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio
decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid
down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights.
The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and
preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with
the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and
consequent incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the
stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any
possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable
delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal
proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy
trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal
jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of
work and the resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police,
indubitably keeps the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under
stress and strain. However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the
sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of
time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it
makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is
intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the
Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a
reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly,
it protects the accused against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment;
secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due
to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that
evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus,
impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes without
saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused,
presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological
and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions.
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Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently
falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail
petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep
in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985
which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after
hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin
conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused
is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of
the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the
backdrop of accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to
life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted
delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is neither
attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by
cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an
inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its wisdom, in
order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act,
has provided for the constitution of special Courts under Section 36-A of
the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s eye to the protracted
delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this legislative purpose.
A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not become complicit
in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights, notwithstanding
anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail petition in a
case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the
Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to
curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a
fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable
cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment,
an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life
and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other
words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the
ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section
37 of the NDPS Act, 1985.”
6.2. Indubitably, the present petition is the second attempt on
behalf of the petitioner for securing regular bail. The first one bearing no.
CRM-M-32633-2025 was dismissed 023.09.2025 (Annexure P-4).
However, keeping in view the entirety of facts and circumstance of the case
in hand especially keeping in view the extended custody and pace of trial,
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this Court is inclined to favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A
profitable reference, in this regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court
passed in CRA-S-2332-2023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana
and another; relevant whereof reads as under:
“10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following
principles emerge:
I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is
maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be
rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is
maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as
withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-
prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.
III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to
succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently
required to show substantial change in circumstances and
showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not
suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive
bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of
petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential
change in circumstances.
IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to
what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as
every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such
an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue
is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court
dealing with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).
V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive
regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently
required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a
plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the
cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained
such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly
decipherable from the said order passed.”
6.3. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was arrested qua the FIR
in question on 12.08.2023 and is in continuous custody since then & the
custody certificate filed by the State seems to be reflecting otherwise, since
the petitioner is involved in other cases. Further as per custody certificate
dated 18.02.2026 filed by the learned State counsel the petitioner is shown
to be involved in multiple other cases/FIRs. However, this factum cannot
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be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the concession of regular bail to
the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case is made out for grant of
regular bail qua the FIR in question by ratiocinating upon the
facts/circumstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this regard can be placed
upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maulana Mohd. Amir
Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586; a
Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in case of
Sridhar Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 & judgments of this
Court in CRM-M No.38822-2022 titled as Akhilesh Singh v. State of
Haryana, decided on 29.11.2021, and Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3)
RCR (Criminal) 191. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
Suffice to say, the further detention of the petitioner in custody
is not required in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the petition is allowed. The petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to
the satisfaction of the learned concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate. However,
in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned CJM/Duty
Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:-
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence,
oral or documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date
before the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while
on bail.
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(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with
the trial Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cell phone number to
the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police
Station and shall not change his cell-phone number
without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa
Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay
the trial.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate as directed
hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the
State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the
petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression
of opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
February 19, 2026
Naveen
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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