Patna High Court
Central Board Of Trustees, Employees … vs M/S Electronic Net on 17 February, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.10385 of 2008
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Central Board of Trustees, Employees Provident Fund Organization, Through
Kawaljeet Singh Saini, Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner (Legal),
EPFO, R.O., Patna.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
M/s Electronic Net, 18, Telegraph Colony, Kidawaipuri, Patna.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Prashant Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Ravi Shankar Ganguli, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE JUSTICE SMT. G. ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 17-02-2026
1. The petitioner has filed the instant
application for the following relief(s):
"For quashing the order
dated-10.1.08 passed in ATA Nos-
507(3)/2006 by The Employees'
Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New
Delhi as contained in Annexure-4
whereby and whereunder the
respondent no-1 has set aside the order
dated-28.7.06 (Annexure-3) passed by
the A.P.F.C, Patna under section 7A of
the Act.
II. Any other writ/writs,
direction/ directions, order/orders, in
respect of any other relief or reliefs to
Patna High Court CWJC No.10385 of 2008 dt.17-02-2026
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which the petitioner may be deemed
entitled, may also be issued."
2. The case of the petitioner as culled
out from Writ petition is that M/s Impex Kompt
Soft (India) Pvt. Ltd. was an establishment covered
under the provisions of the Employees Provident
Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952
(hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1952") with
effect from 01.04.1997. The said establishment
discontinued payment of statutory dues and
submission of statutory returns from April 2001 on
the plea that it had ceased its activities with effect
from 31.03.2001.
3. It is the case of the petitioner that
immediately thereafter, another establishment,
namely M/s Electronic Net, commenced business
from 01.04.2001 from the same premises and was
carrying on identical activities which were earlier
undertaken by M/s Impex Kompt Soft (India) Pvt.
Ltd. M/s Electronic Net, however, claimed that it
was an entirely separate legal entity and,
therefore, the provisions of the Act, 1952 were not
applicable to it. Thereafter, an inquiry was
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conducted by the Enforcement Officer, who
submitted his report dated 07.03.2002 stating inter
alia that upon cessation of the earlier
establishment, M/s Electronic Net started
functioning from 01.04.2001 and the Attendance
Registers for April, May and June 2001 reflected
employment strength of 19, 19 and 20 employees
respectively. The records bear the signature of the
Director, Mr. Sanjeev Kumar. On the basis of the
inquiry and materials on record, proceedings under
Section 7A of the Act culminated in an order dated
30.07.2004
determining statutory dues amounting
to Rs. 2,08,875/- for the period June 2001 to June
2003 against M/s Electronic Net.
4. An application under under Section
7B Sub Section (1) of the Act was filed by
respondent no.2 for a review of the order passed
under Section 7A(1) which was disposed of on
28.07.2006 without disturbing the order dated
30.07.2004. Aggrieved by it, respondent no.2
preferred an appeal bearing ATA No. 507(3)/2006
before the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate
Patna High Court CWJC No.10385 of 2008 dt.17-02-2026
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Tribunal, New Delhi. The Tribunal,vide ex parte
order dated 10.01.2008, allowed the appeal and
set aside the order passed by the authority dated
28.07.2006. The petitioner challenged the said
order primarily on the grounds that the Tribunal
acted beyond jurisdiction, failed to consider
material evidence, passed a cryptic and non-
reasoned order, and misread the attendance
register.
5. The Learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that the materials on record
clearly demonstrate that M/s Electronic Net was
merely a continuation of M/s Impex Kompt Soft
(India) Pvt. Ltd., functioning from the same
premises and engaged in identical business
activities. A mere change in nomenclature cannot
defeat statutory liability.
6. It is further submitted that the
attendance register for June 2001 shows 20
employees. The Tribunal erred in accepting the
plea that one employee remained absent
throughout the month. A bare perusal of the
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attendance register indicates that the said
employee was present. Even otherwise, casual
absence does not reduce the statutory employee
strength.
7. It is further contended that the
impugned order is cryptic and bereft of reasoning.
The Tribunal failed to analyse documentary
evidence and passed the order mechanically.
8. The Learned counsel further submits
that the Tribunal exceeded its statutory jurisdiction.
Under the Employees’ Provident Funds Appellate
Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997, the period for
filing an appeal is 60 days, extendable by another
60 days only. Beyond 120 days, there is no power
to condone delay.
9. The Learned counsel for the
petitioner in support of his case relied on the
judgments passed by different coordinate Bench of
this Court reported in (1) 2014 SCC Online Pat
5024 (The Employee Provident Fund
Organization Vs. M/s Janta Cold Storage
Patna High Court CWJC No.10385 of 2008 dt.17-02-2026
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Mahnar & Anr.),
(2) 2017 SCC Online Pat 967 (M/s
Janta Cold Storage Mahnar Vs. The
Employees Provident Fund Organization &
Anr,
(3) 2015 SCC OnLine Pat 7557
(Central Board of Trustees, Employees
Provident Fund Organization V. M/S
S.K.Nasiruddin Biri Merchhant Pvt. Ltd.
Shaluganj).
10. The Learned counsel for the
petitioner refers paragraphs 18 and 19 of the
judgment reported in 2014 SCC Online Pat 5024
(supra) which reads as follows:
“18. Now, question arises as
to whether Tribunal has got jurisdiction to
extend the period of limitation as
prescribed in rule 15 of the Rules. A
similar question arose before Apex Court
in the case of Commissioner of Custom
and Central Excise (supra). The aforesaid
case was of Central Excise Act and there
was provision in section 35H of the
Central Excise Act that appeal and
Patna High Court CWJC No.10385 of 2008 dt.17-02-2026
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within 180 days from the date of
communication of the decision of the
order. The Apex Court took note of the
aforesaid provision and held that time
limit prescribed for making reference to
the High court is absolute an
unextendable by the court under section
5 of the Limitation Act is to be judged
from the terms of the special law and in
the very terms of Limitation Act. It has
further been held that the court is bound
to respect legislative intention and not to
extend limitation period by giving liberal
interpretation.
19. Admittedly, the
Employees’ Provident Funds and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 has
been brought into existence to protect the
interest of the employees of the factories
and other Establishments and the
aforesaid Act is self contained Act. The
aforesaid Act prescribes 30 days
limitation for filing restoration petition, if
any appeal is dismissed in default. There
is no provision in the above stated Act or
Rules which gives power to court to
extend the period of limitation beyond 30
days. If Legislature had intention to give
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certainly would have framed the aforesaid
provision either in the Act or in the Rules.
Therefore, in my view, the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to extend the period of
limitation beyond the period of 30 days to
entertain restoration petition against the
order of dismissal of appeal in default. It
is well known maxim that, however, a law
is hard but after all, it is the law and,
therefore, in the aforesaid circumstance,
Tribunal was bound to entertain
restoration petition against the order of
dismissal of appeal in default within the
prescribed period of 30 days and in no
case, Tribunal has got power to extend
the aforesaid period of 30 days in
entertaining restoration petition against
the order of dismissal of appeal in default
making the provision of Limitation Act
applicable to the case.”
11. The Learned counsel for the
petitioner refers paragraph 4 of the judgment
reported in 2017 SCC Online Pat 967 (supra)
which reads as follows:
“4. The learned single
Judge went through the entirety of the
facts, the relevant provisions relating
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especially Rule 15 of the Employees
Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal
Procedure Rules, 1997, and a catena of
different decisions not only of this
Court, but even the Hon’ble Apex Court
and then came to the considered
opinion that the Tribunal had no
business or power to entertain a
second restoration application after
much delay and then decide the
matter on merits.”
12. The Learned counsel for the
petitioner refers paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the
judgment reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Pat 7557
(supra) which reads as follows:
“9. Without going into the
merit of the case, the Court is
persuaded to decide the present writ
petition only on the ground of
preliminary objection raised by learned
counsel for the petitioner. It is true that
period of limitation is liberally required
to be examined and for substantial
justice a petition may not be rejected
only on the ground of limitation.
However, if for condoning delay there
is special Act prescribing period for
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certainly in that event beyond
legislation the Court may not exercise
its jurisdiction. It is a settled law that if
Statute states to do a thing in a
particular manner then every thing is
to be done in the same manner not in
any other way. Before proceeding it
would be appropriate to quote the
provisions which deals with limitation
in such situation. In respect of cases
arising out of the Employees’ Provident
Funds And Miscellaneous Provisions
Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as
the “Act 1952”) a Rule has been
framed exercising power under sub
Section 1 of Section 21 of the Act
1952. The Central Government has
framed a Rule in respect of procedure
to be adopted by the Appellate Tribunal
which is called as Employees’ Provident
Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure)
Rules, 1997. Rule 7 of the Rules 1997
deals with the time of filing of Appeal,
deposit of amount etc. For just decision
in the matter it would be appropriate
to quote Rule 7 as follows : –
“7. Fee, time for filing appeal,
deposit of amount due on filing appeal.-
(1) Every appeal filed with the Registrar
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five hundred to be remitted in the form of
Crossed Demand Draft on a nationalized
bank in favour of the Registrar of the
Tribunal and payable at the main branch
of that Bank at the station where the seat
of the said Tribunal situate.
(2) Any person aggrieved by
a notification issued by the Central
Government or an order passed by the
Central Government or any other
authority under the Act, may within 60
days from the date of issue of the
notification/order, prefer an appeal to the
Tribunal:
Provided that the Tribunal
may if it is satisfied that the appellant
was prevented by sufficient cause from
preferring the appeal within the
prescribed period, extend the said period
by a further period of 60 days:
(3) Provided further that no
appeal by the employer shall be
entertained by a Tribunal unless he has
deposited with the Tribunal a Demand
Draft payable in the Fund and bearing 75
per cent of the amount due from him as
determined under section 7-A:
Provided also that the
Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded
in writing, waive or reduce the amount to
be deposited under section 7-O.”
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10. On perusal of the
aforesaid provisions it is evident that
an aggrieved person can file an Appeal
within a period of 60 days from the
date of issuance of order/notification.
However, the Appellate Tribunal has
been authorized to condone further
delay of 60 days. Meaning thereby,
that in any event after expiry of 120
days from the date of issuance of the
order no Appeal can be entertained nor
delay can be condoned by the
Appellate Tribunal. In view of
observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court
in paragraph no. 32 of COMMISSIONER
OF CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE
CASE (Supra) and paragraph no. 16 of
(2013) 10 SCC 765 (POPAT BAHIRU
GOVARDHANE v. SPECIAL LAND
ACQUISITION OFFICER) it is sufficient
for coming to the conclusion that in
absence of any special power to
condone delay beyond 120 days as
prescribed under Rule 7 of Rule 1997,
the Appellate Tribunal has grossly erred
in condoning the delay in filing Appeal
and allowing the same. It is true that
such restriction may cause hardship or
inconvenience to the party but as held
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this Court has no option but to
inference. The Maxim dura lex sed lex
which means “law is hard but it is the
law” stands attracted in such a
situation. Accordingly, without going
into the merit of the case the court is
satisfied that the learned Appellate
Tribunal was not justified in
entertaining the Appeal after expiry of
statutory period of limitation.
Accordingly, the Order Dated 24th
September 2014 passed in ATA No.
346(3) of 2014 passed by the
Employees Provident Fund Appellate
Tribunal, New Delhi is hereby set aside.
11. So far as the
submission of learned counsel for the
respondent regarding maintainability
of the present writ petition on the
ground that the petitioner was not
authorized to file the writ petition is
concerned, the Court is of the opinion
that the Act 1952 has primarily been
enacted for the welfare of the
employees and to protect the right and
interest of the employees, certainly the
petitioner is entitled to assail
illegal/incorrect order passed by
Appellate Tribunal.”
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13. It is contended on behalf of the
petitioner that when a special statute prescribes a
specific period of limitation and extent of
condonable delay, the same is mandatory. The
Tribunal cannot extend limitation beyond the
statutory framework. The Act, 1952 is a welfare
legislation intended to protect employees. Any
interpretation defeating its object must be avoided.
14. From perusal of the earlier orders of
the Court dated 31.10.2025, 10.11.2025 and
09.01.2026 passed in the present proceedings, it
would reveal that no one had appeared on behalf
of the respondent on the aforesaid dates. It is
further evident from the record that, despite
adequate opportunity, no counter affidavit has
been filed by the respondent till date. However, on
27.01.2026, the Learned counsel appearing for the
respondent entered appearance and submitted
that the order passed in ATA No. 507(3)/2006 by
the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal,
New Delhi, as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ
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petition, is legal, valid and calls for no interference
by this Court.
15. Heard the learned counsel for the
petitioner as well as the Learned counsel for the
respondent.
16. The main issues which arise for
consideration are:
Whether M/s Electronic Net was a
separate entity or a continuation of the earlier
establishment;
Whether the Tribunal acted within its
jurisdiction;
Whether the impugned order suffers
from non-application of mind.
17. From the materials available on
record, particularly the inquiry report and
attendance registers, it is evident that immediately
upon the cessation of M/s Impex Kompt Soft (India)
Pvt. Ltd., M/s Electronic Net commenced operations
from the same premises and engaged in identical
activities. The employment strength during the
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relevant period met the statutory requirement. The
inference drawn by the authority under Section 7A
was based on cogent evidence.
18. The Tribunal, however, accepted
the plea regarding absence of one employee
without proper scrutiny of the attendance register.
The finding is contrary to the documentary
evidence and amounts to misreading of record.
19. A quasi-judicial authority is duty-
bound to assign reasons in support of its
conclusions. The order of the Tribunal lacks
reasons and cannot be sustained in law. Though,
the Act, 1952 is a beneficial social welfare
legislation, any attempt to defeat its object must
be discouraged.
20. On the question of limitation, the
law is well settled that when a statute prescribes a
specific period for condonation of delay the same
cannot be extended by judicial interpretation. The
Tribunal is a creature of statute and must function
within the four corners of the Act and Rules. The
Tribunal cannot extend the period of limitation
Patna High Court CWJC No.10385 of 2008 dt.17-02-2026
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beyond the statutory framework.
21. In view of the foregoing discussion,
this Court is satisfied that the impugned order
dated 10.01.2008 passed by the Employees’
Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in ATA
No. 507(3)/2006 suffers from illegality,
jurisdictional error and non-application of mind,
and is liable to be set aside.
22. Accordingly, the writ petition is
allowed. The order dated 10.01.2008 passed by the
Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New
Delhi in ATA No. 507(3)/2006 is hereby quashed
and set aside.
23. Interlocutory Application(s) , if any,
shall stands disposed of.
(G. Anupama Chakravarthy, J)
Spd/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR CAV DATE NA Uploading Date 20.02.2026 Transmission Date
