Punjab-Haryana High Court
Pradeep Kumar Tomar And Another vs State Of Haryana And Another on 19 February, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
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Pradeep Kumar Tomar and another
....Petitioners
V/s
State of Haryana and another
....Respondents
Date of Reserve: 12.02.2026
Date of pronouncement:
pronouncement: 19.02.2026
Date of Uploading : 19.02.2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Ms. Amrita Garg, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Gurmeet Singh, AAG Haryana.
Ms. Anjali Sheoran, Advocate for respondent No.2.
*****
SUMEET
SUMEET GOEL,
GOEL, J.
1. The present petition has been preferred by the accused under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking quashing of
the FIR No.0392
No. of 2021 dated 07.10.2021 (hereinafter to be referred as the
‘impugned FIR’), registered under Section 304-A
A of the Indian Penal Code,
1860, at Police Station Ferozepur Jhirka
Jhirka, as also the charge-sheet
sheet dated
24.10.2021 (Annexure P-2)
2) alongwith the consequential proceedings
emanating therefrom on the basis of a compromise deed dated 09.05.2023
(copy whereof is appended as Annexure P
P-5 with the present petition).
2. The factual matrix of the case in hand reflects that on
06.10.2021 at about 6:00 PM, two workmen, namely
namely, Om son of Mohan
Singh and Rampal, who were stated to be working at the fac
factory
tory premises,
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met with an accident while walking on a beam of the shuttering structure. It
has been further alleged that only one portion of the shuttering collapsed
while the remaining portion remained intact, as a result of which both the
workmen sustained injuries. Immediately, they were taken to a local
hospital whereby Om son of Mohan Singh succumbed to the injuries
whereas Rampal was shifted to Blossom Hospital, Agra, from where he was
later taken home by his family but he expired later on. On the complaint of
the brother-in-law of the deceased Om, the impugned FIR was got
registered.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has iterated that the
petitioners have been falsely implicated into the impugned FIR on account
of the fact that they are contractual employees at the factory premises where
the unfortunate accident took place and have no supervisory, managerial or
technical role in the execution of the shuttering work. Learned counsel has
further iterated that there is not even a whisper in the impugned FIR or in
the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. indicating any specific act or
omission on the part of the petitioners which could constitute criminal
negligence as employed in Section 304-A of the IPC. Learned counsel has
emphasized that during the course of investigation, the Director of the
factory as well as the foreman, who were originally named in the impugned
FIR have been found innocent and placed in Column No.II of the challan.
Learned counsel has further submitted that the incident in question was
accidental in nature inasmuch as the deceased persons were walking on a
beam of the shuttering structure on their own and only a portion of the
shuttering collapsed while the remaining structure remained intact. It has
been further contended that the petitioners, immediately after the incident,
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extended financial assistance of Rs.3,00,000/- to the family of deceased Om
and also bore the medical expenses of Rampal during his treatment at
Blossom Hospital, Agra, besides paying a sum of ₹3,00,000/- to his family
after his demise, which demonstrate the bona fide conduct of the petitioners.
It has been further submitted that respondent No. 2, who is the complainant
and brother-in-law of deceased Om, has executed an affidavit stating therein
that the impugned FIR has been lodged on account of some
misunderstanding and under the influence of local persons. Learned counsel
has contended that since the parties have amicably resolved their disputes
and have entered into a written compromise dated 09.05.2023 out of their
own free will without any coercion, the continuation of criminal
proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law and would serve
no useful purpose. On the strength of these submissions, learned counsel has
prayed that the impugned FIR in question along with all consequential
proceedings be quashed.
4. Per contra, learned State counsel has opposed the grant of
petition in hand on the ground that the instant case pertains to an offence
under Section 304-A of IPC involving the death of two workmen and,
therefore, the matter cannot be treated as a private dispute between the
parties. Learned State counsel has iterated that the allegations in the
impugned FIR and the material collected during the course of investigation
prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence relating to
criminal negligence and the same has direct bearing on public safety.
Learned State counsel has emphasized that the inherent powers of this Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are to be exercised sparingly and only in cases
where the allegations do not disclose any offence or where the proceedings
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are manifestly an abuse of the process of law. Furthermore, the compromise
entered into between the petitioners and respondent No. 2 cannot form the
basis for quashing of the impugned FIR inasmuch as the offence under
Section 304-A IPC is not compoundable and involves loss of human life.
According to learned State counsel, such offences are against the society at
large and not merely against an individual and the legal heirs of the
deceased cannot, by way of a compromise, absolve the accused of criminal
liability arising out of an act of alleged negligence which resulted in death.
On these grounds, learned State counsel has prayed for the dismissal of the
present petition.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2-
complainant submits that the dispute between the parties has been amicably
resolved and that a compromise deed dated 09.05.2023 has been executed
voluntarily and without any coercion or undue influence. It has been
contended that respondent No. 2 has initially lodged the impugned FIR
under a misconception and under the influence of certain local persons
without being fully aware of the factual position regarding the occurrence.
Learned counsel has further submitted that upon gaining proper knowledge
of the circumstances in which the accident took place, respondent No. 2 has
come to the conclusion that the incident was purely accidental in nature and
not attributable to any negligence on the part of the petitioners. Furthermore,
in view of the compromise in question, the respondent No. 2 does not wish
to pursue the criminal proceedings and has no objection if the impugned
FIR in question and the consequential proceedings, are being quashed.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone
through the record.
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7. This Court, while relying upon the judgments passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another,
2012(10) SCC 303; Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2014(6) SCC 466;
Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors. Vs. State of
Gujarat and anr. AIR 2017 SUPREME COURT 4843; State of Madhya
Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and others AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 1296
and by this Court in Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab & another, decided on
CRM–M-40769
02.06.2016 in CRM 40769–2014, has observed in Satnam Singh Vs.
State of Punjab and Another; 2025 (4) Law Herald 3188 as under:
“Analysis
Analysis (re law)
10. The conventional view, premised upon the statutory framework,
was that criminal offence(s) could be settled only by way of
compounding, as per the provisions of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., 1973
(now Section 359 of BNSS, 2023). In ordinary parlance, “compounding”
is known as “compromise” or “settlement”. This expression is ordinarily
understood as condoning a felony in exchange for repatriation received by
the victim-complainant from the felon. In other words, no
compounding/compromise of a criminal offence could be permitted by the
Court, except for an offence which met with the rigours of Section 320 of
Cr.P.C. Therefore, the question arose whether the High Court, by
exercising its plenary/inherent jurisdiction, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,
could quash ongoing FIR/criminal proceedings, on the basis of
compromise/settlement having been arrived at between the rival parties,
pertaining to the offences which do not fall within the ambit of
‘compoundable’.
10.1. Before proceeding further, it would be germane to delve into the
nature, scope and ambit of powers of the High Court under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C., 1973.
10.2. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
10.3 xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh (supra) has
enunciated that the powers of the High Court for quashing of criminal
proceedings on the basis of settlement are materially different from
compounding of offence in terms of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. (Now Section
359 of BNSS, 2023) as a Court while exercising power under Section 320
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of Cr.P.C. (Now Section 359 of BNSS, 2023) is circumscribed by the
statutory provision but the High Court may proceed to quash a criminal
offence/criminal proceedings if the ends of justice justify exercise of such
power. It was thus held that the criminal cases having overwhelmingly
and predominantly civil flavor; offences arising out of matrimonial
dispute; offences arising out of family dispute as also offences which are
basically private or personal in nature, could be quashed by the High
Court in case the parties have resolved their entire dispute(s). Further, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) has held
that the possibility of conviction being remote and bleak, whereas
continuation of the criminal case putting the accused to oppression and
prejudice & the parties being put to general inconvenience, as also
prejudice could be considered as factors by the High Court, while
examining a plea for quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of
settlement/compromise. To the same effect is the dicta of the judgment of
three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Parbatbhai Aahir case (supra). Further, a three Judge Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment of Laxmi Narayan case (supra)
reiterated the principles laid-down in cases of Gian Singh (supra),
Narinder Singh(supra) and Parbatbhai Aahir (supra).
11.1. It is, thus, unequivocal that the plenary powers vested in a High
Court, by virtue of its very constitution, are to be exercised with
circumspection and in a manner befitting judicial propriety. The
invocation of inherent jurisdiction must serve the ends of justice,
necessitating a holistic evaluation of all the attendant circumstances. The
criminal justice system is not merely a forum for resolving interpersonal
disputes; it embodies the sovereign obligation of the State to safeguard the
fundamental rights of its citizens, including the protection of life, liberty,
and property. In adjudicating petitions seeking quashing of criminal
proceedings on the basis of a purported compromise between the parties,
the court must transcend the immediate assertions of harmony. While the
absence of current grievances between parties may be a material
consideration, it cannot be the determinative criterion. The court is duty-
bound to scrutinize the gravity of the allegations, the nature of the
offences, and their ramifications on the public order and societal welfare.
This judicial responsibility is accentuated in cases involving heinous or
egregious offences, where the broader societal interest outweighs private
settlements. Compromising such cases on the ground of mutual accord
risks undermining the public confidence in the justice delivery system and
jeopardizing the larger interest of law enforcement.
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11.2. The aureate enunciation of law, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
above judgments, essentially points out that the prime factors for
consideration of quashing of FIR/criminal proceedings on the basis of
compromise/settlement is that the dispute/offence is essentially private in
nature; continuation of criminal proceeding would be an exercise in
futility as its fate-accompli is known; pendency of such proceedings
would be an undesirable burden on the police/prosecution as also the
Courts, which are already struggling hard to manage the ever increasing
and unmanageable docket and/or such quashing would ensure the ends of
justice.
12. The basic and essential edifice of a plea seeking quashing of
FIR/criminal proceedings, on the basis of compromise, is the consent of
the victim. In other words, the consent on the part of the victim for
compromise/settlement of FIR/criminal proceedings is sine-qua-non for
such petition to succeed.
12.1. For an extended period of time, criminal jurisprudence was, by
and large, acquisitive, placing the crime and criminal act at its epicenter.
The jurists have preoccupied themselves with the rights and safeguards
concerning the accused, concomitantly, the victim, i.e. the de facto and
real sufferer whose very misery put the criminal law into motion,
remained a forgotten figure. Conscious of this critical lacunae in the
criminal justice administration system, J. Krishna Iyer, rendered the
following seminal observation:
“It is a weakness of our jurisprudence that the victims of crime,
and the distress of the dependents of the prisoner, do not attract the
attention of the law. Indeed, victim reparation is still the vanishing
point of our criminal law. This is a deficiency, which must be
rectified by the legislature.”
-(J. Krishna Iyer;
Vide (para 9) Rattan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1980) AIR Supreme
Court 84)
Until recently, a victim was rendered almost entirely passive,
relegated to the periphery of judicial process and compelled to remain an
outsider, mute spectator, with virtually no substantive role in the
prosecutionof criminal trial. With the development of ‘victimology’ as a
distinct and vital domain of jurisprudence, a transformative shift has
occurred. Unfolding with the coinage of the term ‘victimology’ by
Benjamin Mendelsohn in 1947, this evolution reflects a belated
acknowledgment of a victim’s inherent right to participate and have a
meaningful voice in the prosecution of a criminal trial. In recognition of
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this evolving jurisprudence, seminal amendments were introduced to the
Cr.P.C., 1973, vide Cr.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 2008, resulting into
insertion of Section 2(wa) which defines a victim’ and various other
provisions (such as Section 24(8) and proviso to Section 372, etc.),
thereby, giving statutory recognition to the rights evolved in favour of a
victim.
Pertinently, a victim can no longer be relegated to the periphery or
rendered a forgotten entity once the machinery of criminal law has been
set into motion. The terminus of criminal justice system must transcend
beyond the mere safeguarding of rights of an accused and must
encompass the preservation and effective vindication of the rights of a
victim. The law must adopt an equipoise approach, harmoniously
balancing the competing interests of the accused and the victim. It is a
bounden duty of the courts of law to ensure that justice embraces the
injured and afflicted. Jurisprudentially, the guarantee under Article 21
embraces both the life and liberty of the accused as well as interest of the
victim, his near and dear ones as well as of the community at large and
therefore cannot be alienated from each other with levity. As an age-old
adage, which has met with approval by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, reads
thus:
“We cannot remain oblivious to the substantial suffering of
the victims. It stands as a fact that criminal justice reform and civil
rights movement in India has historically only paid considerable
attention to the rights of the accused and neglected to address to
the same extent the impact of crime on the victims. It is not only
the victims of crime only that require soothing balm, but also the
incidental victims like the family, the co-sufferers and to a
relatively larger extent the society too. The judiciary has a
paramount duty to safeguard the rights of the victims as diligently
as those of the perpetrators.””
With impunity, a further reference in this regard can be
made to an observation made by J. F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, in a Five judge
Bench dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which reads as under:
“….While considering the problem of penology we should not
overlook the plight of victimology and the sufferings of the people who
die, suffer or are maimed at the hands of criminals.”
-(J. F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla;
Vide (para 72) Union of India Vs.V. Sriharan @ Murugan &Ors., (2016)
7 SCC 1)
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13. Conceptually; FIR-complainant/informant is different from victim,
though, in a given case, they may be same person. In a case pertaining to
an offence, as a result whereof a death has occurred, it is the deceased
who is the real victim. In such a case, the surviving family members of
the deceased including the spouse/parents/children/guardian/care-giver
etc. nay the FIR-complainant/informant cannot adorn the mantle of
primary victim for purpose of settlement/compromise. The jurisprudential
foundation for quashing criminal proceedings on the basis of a
compromise, rests upon the absence of grievance by the victim, against
the accused. In offence under Section 304-A of the IPC/Section 106 of
BNS involving death due to rash and negligent act/ driving, the primary
victim is the deceased, whose demise is directly attributable to the
accused’s alleged rash and negligent act/ driving. The deceased, being the
primary aggrieved party (i.e. the real victim), is no longer capable of
expressing consent or grievance, rendering any compromise with the
informant or complainant incongruous with this foundational principle. A
settlement between the accused and the complainant, who merely initiated
the criminal process, fails to satisfy the underlying rationale for such a
quashing to succeed. It disregards the irreversible harm inflicted upon the
deceased and the broader societal interest implicated in crime(s) of this
gravity. Thus, permitting quashing in such instances undermines the rule
of law and trivializes the serious nature of the offence, warranting judicial
circumspection and restraint.
13.2. A pertinent issue which craves attention of this Court is the
probable erosion of judicial integrity when criminal proceedings,
particularly involving grave and serious offences (such as Section 304-A
IPC/Section 106 BNS), are quashed solely on the basis of a
compromise/settlement ,having been arrived at between rival
parties. This practice of entering into compromise, more often than not,
involves pecuniary consideration; proferred as reparation or compensation
to the victim’s family; creates deeply deleterious impact on the societal
psyche that the criminal justice system is available for commodification.
Such a scenario suggests that penal absolution is a purchasable
commodity, thereby, implying that serious public wrongs, in which
society as a whole has stakes, can be put to naught by the accused
person’s financial capacity. Such an outcome is antithetical to the Rule of
Law, which demands that the severity of a crime and penal consequences
must remain insulated from the private financial arrangements of the
parties, thereby, maintaining public confidence in the impartiality and
deterrent efficacy of the justice delivery system. The law, being a
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guarantor of equity and fairness, cannot afford to be subjugated to the
influence of wealth, lest it compromise its sacrosanct essence and
institutional integrity. The inherent powers of this Court, ought not be
employed for privatization of criminal liability. An old age adage reads
thus:
“Why in history has everyone always focused on the guy
with the big stick, the hero, the activist, to the neglect of the poor
slob who is at the end of the stick, the victim, the passivist – or
maybe, the poor slob (in bondages) isn’t all that much of a
passivist victim – maybe he asked for it?””
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Daxaben (supra) has
held that an FIR/criminal proceedings qua an offence under Section 306
of the IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise/settlement since
such an offence falls in the category of heinous and serious offences and
is to be treated as crime against the Society and not against an
individual(s). To the same effect is the dicta of the Division Bench of this
Court in Baldev Singh‘s case (supra) wherein; dealing with a FIR under
Section 304-A of the IPC; this Court has held that there can be no
quashing of an offence registered under Section 304-A of the IPC and
subsequent proceedings emanating therefrom, solely on the basis of a
compromise arrived at between the legal heirs/representatives of the
victim (deceased) and the accused.This Court must sound a word of
caution herein, viz., a plea for quashing an FIR under Section 304-A of
the IPC/ Section 106 of the BNS, filed solely on the basis of merits
thereof is very much maintainable and ought to be considered and
ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
15. As a result of above-said rumination, it is clear nay crystal clear
that an FIR (as also proceedings emanating therefrom) under Section 304-
A of the IPC/Section 106 of the BNS cannot be quashed on the basis of a
compromise/settlement arrived at between the accused on one hand and
FIR-complainant/informant/surviving family of the victim (including
spouse/parents/children/guardian/care-giver etc.) on the other hand. Even
if credence is sought to be lend to such a compromise/settlement, by way
of raising plea(s) on merits, including the plea that the offence of Section
304-A of the IPC /Section 106 of the BNS is not made out in the
facts/circumstances of a given case, still such petition ought to be
rejected. ”
8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has laid great emphasis on
the aspect that the facts of the Satnam Singh (supra) are distinguishable
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qualitatively distinct from a road side accident. This Court finds the said
carved distinction without a legal difference. It is to be borne in mind that
while the factual conspectus may vary, the ratio decidendi remains identical
as the core issue is not the geography of the incident but the legal
impossibility of a compromise where the primary victim is no longer present
to offer his/her consent. The essential edifice of quashing criminal
proceedings on the basis of a compromise, rests upon the absence of any
subsisting grievance by the victim against the accused. However, in cases of
homicidal negligence, the deceased remains the primary aggrieved party.
Any settlement entered into by the relatives is, at best, a secondary
resolution that cannot supersede the interest of the state, acting as parens
patriae, in prosecuting an act that has extinguished a human life.
8.1. Pertinently, while Section 2(x) of the BNSS, 2023 employs a
statutory fiction to include ‘guardians’ and ‘legal heirs’ within the definition
of a ‘victim’, this inclusion is intended for the purpose of compensation and
procedural standing, rather than to afford them the moral or legal authority
to condone a death on behalf of the departed. To allow such a compromise
to terminate criminal proceedings would be to treat a ‘lost life’ as a purely
private commodity and negating the deterrent effect of law and public safety
element inherent in such tragedies. The power to quash an FIR/criminal
proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS is an equitable remedy
that must not be used to bypass the gravity of an irreversible harm.
Pertinently, crimes involving death transcend the boundaries of a private
injury and rather fall in the category of crime against society at large.
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happening at a factory premises, being distinct from vehicular road side
accident in Satnam Singh (supra), the underlying legal principle remains
akin: the silence of the grave cannot be substituted by the signatures of the
heirs on a compromise/settlement deed, and the petition for quashing must
fail on the altar of this foundational legal truth.
9. Indubitably, from the material placed on record, it emerges that
the incident in question occurred at a workplace involving shuttering and
structural activity, where two labourers have lost their lives after allegedly
falling from a beam. The gravamen of the allegations in the impugned FIR
and the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is that proper safety measures
were not ensured at the site which resulted in the fatal accident. The
determination of the role of the petitioners, the nature of their duties and
whether there was any omission amounting to criminal negligence are
matters which require appreciation of evidence during trial. The primary
ground urged seeking quashing of the impugned FIR as well as charge-sheet
alongwith the consequential proceedings, is on the basis compromise
between the petitioners and respondent No. 2. Learned counsel for the
petitioners has argued that once the entire matter has been settled, there
would be no fruitful purpose would be served by allowing the proceedings
to continue. It is settled law that the inherent powers of this Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. are to be exercised sparingly and with caution. The
offence under Section 304-A of IPC is not merely between the accused and
the complainant but have a direct nexus with public safety. The acceptance
of a compromise in such matters would be contrary to the larger public
interest. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi
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Narayan (supra) has held that offences which have serious impact on
Society cannot be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the
parties. The said judgment, rather than supporting the case of the petitioners,
reinforces the principle that the Court must consider the nature and gravity
of the offence and its societal impact.
10. The contention that certain accused have been placed in
Column No.II does not ipso facto entitle the petitioners to similar relief in
proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The plea that the petitioners were
contractual employees and had no role in the alleged negligence is
essentially a defence which can be examined only on the basis of evidence
before the trial Court. Furthermore, the payment of compensation or
financial assistance to the families of the deceased cannot be treated as a
ground for quashing criminal proceedings arising out of an offence under
Section 304-A IPC. Indubitably, the impugned FIR pertains to the death of
Om son of Mohan Singh and Rampal, who, of-course, cannot possibly be a
party to the compromise. This Court is of the considered view that the
compromise between the petitioners and respondent No. 2 does not efface
the allegations relating to criminal negligence resulting in death, nor does it
render the continuation of the prosecution an abuse of the process of law.
11. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:
(i) The petition in hand; seeking quashing of FIR No. 0392 of 2021
dated 07.10.2021 registered under Sections 304-A of the Indian Penal Code,
1860, at Police Station Ferozepur Jhirka, as also the chargesheet dated
24.10.2021 (Annexure P-2) alongwith the consequential proceedings
emanating therefrom on the basis of a compromise deed dated 09.05.2023;
is dismissed.
dismissed
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(ii) Any observations made and/or submissions noted hereinabove
shall not have any effect on the merits of the case and the concerned Court
shall proceed further, in accordance with law, without being influenced with
the same.
(iii) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
February 19, 2026
Ajay/mahavir
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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