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HomeCriminal LawPage No.# 1/ vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited on 18 February, 2026

Page No.# 1/ vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited on 18 February, 2026


Gauhati High Court

Page No.# 1/ vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited on 18 February, 2026

                                                               Page No.# 1/11

GAHC010202962025




                                                          2026:GAU-AS:2380

                       THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
  (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                        Case No. : WP(C)/5235/2025

         SRI RAJU CHOWHAN
         SON OF LATE ISHAWAR DAYAL CHOUHAN, R/O- 409, SONAI ROAD, SHIV
         MANDIR, SILCHAR, SONABARIGHAT PT- I, CACHAR, SILCHAR, ASSAM,
         PIN799013.



         VERSUS

         INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED
         REGISTERED OFFICEINDIAN OIL BHAVAN, G-9, ALI YAVAR JUNG MARG, D
         BLOCK BKC, NAUPADA, BANDRA (EAST), MUMBAI- 400051,
         REPRESENTED BY THE CHAIRMAN.

         2:THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (LPG)

          IOCL
          INDIAN OIL BHAVAN
          SECTOR- III NOONMATI
          GUWAHATI781020
          ASSAM.

         3:THE DIVISIONAL RETAIL SALES HEAD

          IOCL
          SILCHAR DIVISIONAL OFFICE
          MOINARBOND DOPOT
          P.S.- UDHARBOND
          P.O.- GOSSAIPUR
          SILCHAR
          DISTRICTCACHAR
          ASSAM
          PIN788303
                                                                         Page No.# 2/11

            4:THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
             CACHAR DISTRICT
             SILCHAR
            ASSAM.

            5:THE ADDL DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
             CACHAR DISTRICT
             SILCHAR
            ASSAM

            6:SRI SHAWMITRA NATH
             SON OF LATE SANAT KUMAR NATH
             RESIDENT OF VILLAGE- CHIBITA BICHIA PT- IV
             P.O.- CHIBITA BICHIA
             P.S.- SILCHAR
             DISTRICT- CACHAR
            ASSAM
             PIN-78815

Advocate for the Petitioner   : MR. D CHAKRABARTY, MS D.CHAKRABARTY

Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, MISS R A CHOUDHURY(R-6),MR E AHMED(R-

6),MR. K N CHOUDHURY (R-6),MR R I BHUYAN(R-6),MS. L WAJEEDA(R-6),MR. M H SAIKIA
(R-6),MR. N H MAZARBHUIYAN(R-6),SC, I O C

BEFORE
THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY

For the Petitioner : Mr. D. Chakrabarty, Advocate.

For the Respondents : Mr. K. N. Choudhury, Senior, Advocate
assisted by Mr. E. Ahmed, Advocate for
the respondent Mo.6
Mr. M. Sharma, Standing Counsel, IOCL
for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

Mr. K. Gogoi, for respondent Nos. 4 and 5.

                                                                          Page No.# 3/11

      Date of Hearing                        : 16.02.2026

      Date of Judgment & Order               : 18.02.2026

                            JUDGMENT & ORDER(CAV)

1. Heard Mr. D. Chakrabarty, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also

heard Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. E.

Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondent No. 6, Mr. M. Sharma, learned

Standing Counsel for the Indian Oil Corporation representing the

respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Mr. K. Gogoi, learned counsel for the

respondent Nos. 4 and 5.

2. By the present writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the Letter of

Intent bearing Ref. No. R 2024/IN000129/AS/000002/7503/00001 dated

07.06.2024, issued by respondent No. 3 in favour of respondent No. 6 for

appointment of Retail Outlet Dealership for the location from

Sonabarighat Point to Sonai Police Outpost on Silchar-Sonai PWD Road.

3. The challenge arises from a selection process initiated by the IOCL,

pursuant to an advertisement dated 28.06.2023, inviting applications for

the appointment of Regular/Rural Outlet (Petrol Pump Dealership) across

notified locations.

4. The subject matter of the present writ petition is the location from
Page No.# 4/11

Sonabarighat Point to Sonai Police Outpost on Silchar-Sonai PWD Road.

5. The petitioner assails the process on three grounds.

6. Firstly, it is argued by Mr. D. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the

petitioner that though respondent No. 6 produced a lease deed for 20

years as required for candidate under Group-1, the Stamp duty paid

thereon is deficient to what is statutorily required under provisions of Indian

Stamp Act, 1899 as applicable to the State of Assam, thereby rendering

the lease legally infirm, disentitling the respondent No. 6 from being

treated as a valid Group-1 applicant. However, it is argued that, for

reasons other than bona fide, the respondent IOCL has accepted the

lease deed in total violation of the prescription set out in the selection

brochure.

7. It is contended by Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the petitioner,

that there was non-compliance of Clause 4 (vii) (b) and 4(vii)(1) of the

brochure governing OBC (Non Creamy Layer) certification. According to

the learned counsel for the petitioner, the OBC certificate initially

produced by the respondent No. 6 was dated 28.01.2014, which predates

the advertisement and thus failed to satisfy the stipulation that the

relevant certificate must be issued subsequent to the advertisement. Thus,

disentitling the respondent No. 6 from any LOI.

Page No.# 5/11

8. It is further contended that the respondent No. 6 committed fraud by

submitting two certifications in the format prescribed under Appendix-

VII(B)(1), one dated 21.12.2023 and another dated 06.09.2023. According

to the petitioner, based on information obtained under the Right to

Information Act, the issuing authority of the certificate dated 06.09.2023

denied the issuance of any such certificate. Accordingly, it is contended

that the entire process stands vitiated by fraud, which strikes at the root of

the administrative action, warranting judicial interference.

9. Per contra, Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the respondent No. 6, raises an objection as to the locus standi of the

petitioner. Relying on Clause 18.I.(f), it is urged that the selection scheme

creates a clear hierarchy: Group-2 candidates acquire the right of

consideration only after the exhaustion or disqualification of Group-1

applicants. The petitioner, having applied under Group-2 and lost at the

threshold, cannot challenge the selection of the successful Group-1

candidate. Even if the candidature of the respondent No. 6 is invalidated,

the next eligible candidate within Group-1 would be entitled to

consideration, not the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, suffers no

enforceable injury to invoke this Court’s writ jurisdiction, argues Mr

Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel.

Page No.# 6/11

10. On the issue of deficient Stamp duty, learned senior counsel contends

that the lease deed in favour of the respondent No. 6 is a registered

instrument and any question as to the deficient stamp duty or its legal

consequence lies within the statutory framework of revenue authorities or

a competent civil court and not under the power of judicial review.

11. As regards compliance with OBC certification, it is submitted that the

relevant Appendix VII(A) certificate relied on by the Corporation is dated

21.12.2023, which is subsequent to the last date of submission of the

application, i.e., 17.10.2023, and satisfies the prescription of the brochure.

Since the certificate dated 06.09.2023 is not the basis of consideration, the

administrative action cannot be interfered with on the basis of such

alleged fraud.

12. This Court has given anxious consideration to the arguments advanced

by the Learned Council for the parties, and also perused the record

produced by Mr. M. Sharma, Learned counsel for the Respondent

Corporation.

13. The advertisement and brochure structured eligibility into three distinct

groups, based on the nature of land availability.

14. Group 1 comprises applicants who possess a suitable parcel of land in
Page No.# 7/11

the advertised location, either by ownership or by long-term lease for a

minimum period of 19 years and 11 months; Group 2 comprises applicants

with a firm offer to purchase or to long-term lease of similar duration;

Group 3 addresses residual contingencies.

15. Clause 18.1.f of the brochure mandates that the draw of lots would be

first conducted among eligible applicants of Group 1 and only in the

absence of eligible Group 1 candidates or upon their collective

disqualification or withdrawal of issued LOIs, would the candidature of

Group 2 applicants be considered.

16. Respondent No. 6 applied under Group 1, asserting a 20-year leasehold

interest, whereas the petitioner applied under Group 2. The draw of lots

was conducted among eligible Group 1 applicants, and the Respondent

No. 6 was declared the winner.

17. The petitioner, having participated under Group 2, did not enter the

zone of consideration, and a letter of intent was directly issued in favour of

Respondent No. 6.

18. The aforesaid facts are undisputed.

19. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, let this Court first deal with the

question of locus standi. It is well settled that the doctrine of locus standi, in
Page No.# 8/11

a competitive selection process, is not a mere technical rule but a

jurisdictional threshold.

20. A participant who stands outside the zone of consideration cannot

predicate a challenge upon a speculative or remote possibility of

advantage.

21. The architecture of Clause 18.1.f clearly subordinates Group 2 to Group

1. Unless the entire cohort of Group 1 candidates is eliminated, a Group 2

applicant cannot claim a contingent right to consideration.

22. Admittedly, the petitioner participated in the process under Group 2,

keeping his eyes open and without any challenge to the classification of

Group 1 and Group 2, with an advantage to Group 1 over Group 2.

23. In the given facts of the present case, even if the petitioner is not held

to be ineligible, until and unless the other candidates who are already in

Group 1 are exhausted, the petitioner’s case cannot be considered.

Therefore, this court finds force in the argument of Mr. Choudhury, learned

Senior Counsel, in this regard.

24. As regards the issue of an alleged deficient stamp duty in the registered

lease deed submitted by the petitioner, it raises a question embedded in

the statutory mechanism under the Stamp Law. The writ court does not
Page No.# 9/11

operate as a substitute for Civil or Revenue adjudication where disputed

questions of fact and statutory remedies exist. Therefore, so long as the

fact that the instruments in question stand registered is not disputed and

so long as the same has not been invalidated by a competent forum, the

respondent IOCL cannot be faulted for acting upon it in the administrative

assessment of eligibility. Therefore, the arguments advanced by Mr

Chakrabarty, learned counsel for the petitioner, on this count stand

negated.

25. Now, coming to the argument of fraud, it is true that fraud vitiates all

solemn acts; yet the allegation of fraud must be established with cogent

material and must bear a proximate nexus to the decision.

26. In the case at hand, the record reveals that the administrative

authority has demonstrably relied on the undisputed valid certificate

dated 21-12-2023, fulfilling the requirement of the brochures regarding the

candidate’s OBC status. Therefore, the existence of another allegedly

forged document that did not form the basis of the decision cannot ipso

facto vitiate the outcome.

27. A writ court does not embark upon a roving enquiry into disputed

factual allegations, particularly when the decision-making process, on the

face of the record, reflects adherence to prescribed norms.

Page No.# 10/11

28. It is reiterated that in matters of allotment of retail outlet dealerships by

public sector oil marketing companies, the court’s scrutiny is confined to

examining whether the process is arbitrary, malafide or in patent violation

of the governing guidelines. It is equally well settled that judicial review

concerns the decision-making process, not the decision itself.

29. This court, after perusal of the material and for the reasons recorded

hereinabove, can not term the exercise of power to be arbitrary, malafide

or in patent violation of the governing guidelines

30. In conclusion, the selection of the Respondent No. 6 under Group 1 has

been made in accordance with the express stipulation that Group 2

would be considered only upon non-availability or disqualification of

Group 1 applicants and when the documents relied upon by the

corporation satisfy the textual requirement of the Brouchure, in the opinion

of this Court, invocation of Article 226 cannot change the character of a

contingent aspiration into an enforceable right.

31. Though the writ jurisdiction is expansive, it does not extend to

challenging a final selection on the basis of an anticipated injury or to

collateral disputes over an instrument not invalidated in accordance with

the law.

Page No.# 11/11

32. Based on this anvil, the issuance of the letter of intent does not disclose

any infirmity warranting interference with the impugned LOI in the exercise

of the power of judicial review by this Court.

33. Accordingly, being devoid of any merit, the writ petition stands

dismissed. The earlier interim order stands vacated. The parties should bear

their own costs.

34. Record produced by Mr. Sharma, learned Standing Counsel for the

IOCL is returned back.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant



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