Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
State Of Rajasthan vs M/S Consulting Engineers Group Ltd. … on 13 February, 2026
[2026:RJ-JD:8427]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 5053/2011
State Of Rajasthan through the Executive Engineer, Public Work
Department, National Highway No.8, Rajsamand Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
----Appellant
Versus
M/s Consulting Engineers Group Ltd., E-12 Moji Colony, Malviya
Nagar, Jaipur (Rajasthan)
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Ms. Aishwarya Anand
Mr. Tushar Jain
For Respondent(s) : Mr. M.S. Singhvi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Akhilesh Rajpurohit
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH
Order
13/02/2026
1. The present appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of
1996”) has been filed by the State Government, challenging the
order dated 04.08.2011 passed by the learned District Judge,
Udaipur, in Civil Miscellaneous Case No.56/07 “State of Rajasthan
v. M/s Consulting Engineers Group Ltd.”, whereby the application
filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was
rejected, and the challenge to the arbitral award was dismissed.
2. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that the
respondent was awarded the work of survey, investigation and
project preparation for roads, bridges and culverts for the Udaipur
Bypass on NH-8, starting from kilometer 263/400 and terminating
at kilometer 278/0.
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3. As per the appellant, the work was to be completed by
30.08.1990, however, it was actually completed on 06.12.1990,
and even then it was found to be incomplete, due to which,
certain bills were not paid. The respondent, being aggrieved
against the non-payment sought for appointment of Arbitrator
and, thereafter, Mr. S.R. Mehta was appointed as a sole Arbitrator
to adjudicate the dispute between the parties vide order dated
21.12.1995 issued by the Chief Engineer (PWD). Post
consideration of the claim, the Arbitrator vide its award dated
15.11.2004, held the respondent entitled for a sum of
Rs.5,02,098/- along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
4. Against the award so passed, the appellant preferred an
application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside
the award and, along with the same, filed an application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 43 of the Act of
1996, explaining the reasons for delay in filing the appeal.
5. Learned District Judge proceeded to adjudicate the
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and vide its order
dated 04.08.2011, refused to condone the gross delay of 1460
days in filing the appeal and consequently the appeal was
dismissed. Being aggrieved against the same, the present appeal
under Section 37 of the Act of 1996 has been filed. 6. Learned
counsel for the appellant- Ms. Aishwarya Anand submits that the
dispute pertains to the year 1990; Arbitrator was appointed in the
year 1995 and, thereafter, the claim was filed when the Act of
1996 came into force, however, the learned District Judge, while
deciding the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996,
treated the appeal to be under the then existing Arbitration Act of
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1940 and not under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. Counsel further
referred to Section 85 of the Act of 1996, which is the repeal and
saving clause while asserting that if the parties agreed that the
Act of 1996 shall apply in relation to the arbitration proceedings,
which commenced on or after the Act of 1996, came into force,
then the provisions of Act of 1996 were to be applied and not the
provisions of Act of 1940. He asserts that both the parties have
admittedly agreed for undertaking the proceedings under the Act
of 1996, however, the learned Court below has proceeded to
decide the issue of limitation as per the Act of 1940. He submits
that the order impugned is ex facie illegal and deserves to be
quashed and set aside while remanding the matter back to the
learned District Judge a direction be issued to decide the issue of
limitation in consonance with the provisions applicable as per the
Act of 1996.
6. Per contra, Mr. M.S. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respondent submits that whether the matter is
considered under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 or under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996, would make no difference
whatsoever insofar as the issue of limitation is concerned. He
asserts that the application has admittedly been filed beyond the
prescribed period of limitation and that the delay in filing the
appeal is huge, inasmuch as, there is a delay of 1460 days in filing
the appeal and no justification for the same has been given. The
learned Court below has rightly rejected the appeal filed under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 being beyond the period of
limitation. Learned counsel for the respondent places reliance
upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
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of “Union of India v. Popular Construction Ltd.” reported in
(2001) 8 SCC 470 and “Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union
of India” (2019) 2 SCC 455.
7. Learned Senior Counsel contends that even assuming the Act
of 1996 to be the applicable, there is no provision for condonation
of delay under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and the provisions of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable thereto.
8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
9. The issue raised by the counsel for the appellant regarding
the applicability of Act of 1940 or the Act of 1996 is not at all
relevant for adjudication of the present case. Learned counsel for
the appellant has contended that the provisions of Act of 1996
ought to have been considered by the learned District Judge while
deciding the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, in
view of the consensus between the parties. Even if, the said
arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant are
accepted, then too, no reason for delay of 1460 days in filing the
appeal have been specified and, further, if the arguments are
accepted then it is clear in view of the authoritative judgments of
the Hon’ble Apex Court that the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act have got no application when the award is
challenged under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.
10. In this regard, in the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of “Union of India v. Popular Construction
Ltd.” reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470, it was held as under:-
“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in
the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would(Uploaded on 18/02/2026 at 03:01:24 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JD:8427] (5 of 6) [CMA-5053/2011]amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the
application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to
go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application
to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the
proviso, would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly
otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such aresult.”
11. Relying upon the above-mentioned judgment, the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of “Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v.
Union of India” (2019) 2 SCC 455 has held as under:-
“18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso
to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for
setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-
section (2) of Section 34 could be made within three months
and the period can only be extended for a further period of
thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The
use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso makes it
clear that the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Even if
the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is given to the
respondent, there will still be a delay of 131 days in filing the
application. That is beyond the strict timelines prescribed in
sub-section (3) read along with the proviso to Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be condoned. To
do so, as the High Court did, is to breach a clear statutorymandate.”
12. A perusal of the above-mentioned judgments will clearly
reveal that even a delay of 131 days was held to be not
condonable in view of the specific provisions of Section 34 of the
Act of 1996.
13. In the present case, the delay in filing the application is
staggering 1460 days and in view of the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act have got no application to a challenge to an arbitral award
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.
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14. In that view of the matter, when the delay in filing the
application is admittedly 1460 days, there was no question of
entertaining the same. The learned District Judge has, therefore,
rightly dismissed the appeal under Section 34 of the Act filed by
the appellant after a gross delay of 1460 days. No case for
interference is made out.
15. The present appeal is therefore dismissed.
16. The record of the case be sent back forthwith.
(SANDEEP SHAH),J
27-charul/-
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