Delhi High Court
Dharmender Singh vs State on 16 February, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on : 18.12.2025
Judgment pronounced on : 16.02.2026
+ CRL.REV.P. 285/2014
DHARMENDER SINGH .....Petitioner
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr. Attin Shankar Rastogi, Mr. Archit
Chauhan & Ms. Asmi Verma, Advs.
For the Respondent : Mr. Raj Kumar, APP for the State
SI Ashok, PS- Anand Vihar
CORAM
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition is filed against the judgment dated
22.03.2014 (hereafter ‘impugned judgment’) passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge (‘ASJ’), Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in
Criminal Appeal No. 52/2014.
2. By the impugned judgment, the learned ASJ upheld the
judgment dated 21.12.2012 and order on sentence dated 22.12.2012
passed by the learned Magistrate whereby the petitioner was convicted
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for the offence under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(‘IPC‘) and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of 1 year and to pay a fine of ₹2,000/- and in default of
payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 2
months.
3. Briefly stated, on 01.04.2004, FIR No. 126/2004 was registered
at Police Station Anand Vihar on a complaint given by one Kusum
Verma for the offence punishable under Section 380 of the IPC
regarding theft of Nokia 8310 mobile phone belonging to the then
Presiding Officer, MACT Court, Karkardooma Court from the
Chamber attached with Court No. 4. During the course of
investigation, the details of the SIM used in the said mobile phone was
obtained and the IMEI number of the stolen mobile phone was also
found.
4. Thereafter, the phone was kept under surveillance and on
07.05.2004, the report was received from Airtel Company that the said
mobile phone was used on a different mobile number from 02.04.2004
– 07.04.2004 and the user of the said mobile phone was found to be
Mahendra Singh and Surinder Pal Singh. On enquiry, the said
Surinder Pal Singh stated that the above mobile phone was given to
him by the petitioner on 01.04.2004 for checking the phone which was
returned to the petitioner after using for 3-4 days. The petitioner was
thereafter arrested on 15.05.2004 and the mobile phone was also
recovered from his possession. Consequently, FIR No. 126/2004 was
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registered against the petitioner for the offences under Sections
380/411 of the IPC.
5. By the impugned judgment, the learned ASJ upheld the
judgment on conviction dated 21.12.2012 and order on sentence dated
22.12.2012 passed by the learned Magistrate whereby the petitioner
was convicted for the offence under Section 411 of the IPC and was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 1 year and
to pay a fine of ₹2,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of 2 months. The learned ASJ noted
that the petitioner only refuted the allegations levelled against him in
his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC and stated that nothing
was recovered from him. It was noted that the mobile phone was
recovered from the possession of the petitioner.
6. The learned ASJ noted that while the petitioner had taken the
plea that he had purchased the said mobile phone from one Sunil
Kumar for a sum of ₹1,000/-, the same could not be substantiated. It
was further noted that the said plea was not taken by the petitioner in
his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC. It was noted that the Call
Records reflected that another sim card was used in the said mobile
phone from 02.04.2004 to 06.04.2004. It was further noted that sim
card belonged to the father of PW5 and as per the testimony of PW5,
the said phone was given to them by the petitioner for checking the
condition of the battery and that as soon as PW5 and his father learnt
that the phone was a stolen article, the same was returned to the
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petitioner. It was noted that the stolen mobile phone was thereafter
recovered from the possession of the petitioner on 15.05.2004. The
learned ASJ noted that there existed nothing on record to doubt the
factum of the recovery of the stolen mobile phone. It was
consequently noted that the onus was on the petitioner to explain as to
how and in what circumstances the mobile phone was found in the
possession of the petitioner. It was noted that while at some stage the
petitioner had taken a defence that the said mobile phone was
purchased by him from one Sunil Kumar for ₹1,000/- and that the said
stance was not taken by the petitioner in his statement under Section
313 of the CrPC, even if were to be assumed that the said stance was
correct, yet considering the paltry sum that was claimed to have been
paid as consideration by itself showed that the said phone, if at all,
was not purchased bona fidely. Consequently, considering the
aforesaid, the learned ASJ upheld the conviction and sentence of the
petitioner.
7. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed the present
petition.
8. By order dated 17.09.2025, this Court requested Mr. Attin
Shankar Rastogi, Advocate who was present in Court to address
arguments on behalf of the petitioner. He submitted that the
petitioner’s conviction is based on conjectures and surmises. He
submitted that once the petitioner was acquitted of the offence under
Section 380 of the IPC, he could not have been convicted for the
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offence under Section 411 of the IPC. He relied upon the decision of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sd. Shabuddin v. State of
Telangana : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1734 to contend that once the
learned Trial Court reached a conclusion that there was no
commission of theft on the part of the petitioner, there arose no
question of the petitioner committing an offence of dishonestly
receiving a stolen property under Section 411 of the IPC. He further
submitted that the prosecution failed to show that the petitioner
dishonestly received or retained the stolen property knowing that the
same was stolen.
9. Without conceding on the merits of the case, the learned
counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petitioner’s
sentence may be reduced to the period already undergone by him. He
submitted that the petitioner has no other antecedents and submitted
that considering that more than two decades have passed since the
incident, the petitioner would be severely prejudiced if he is subjected
to suffer the remaining period of his sentence.
10. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the
State submitted that there exists no infirmity in the petitioner’s
conviction in the present case. He further submitted that the learned
Trial Court as well as the learned Appellate Court have rightly
appreciated the material on record, however, he conceded that the
State had no objection if this Court were to take a lenient view in
regard to the sentence of the petitioner.
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ANALYSIS
11. It is pertinent to note that since the petitioner has preferred a
revision petition before this Court thereby challenging the concurrent
findings of the learned ASJ and learned Magistrate, the role of this
Court is limited to assessing the correctness, legality and propriety of
the impugned judgment. It is well settled that this Court ought to
exercise restraint, and should not interfere with the findings of the
impugned orders or reappreciate evidence solely because another view
is possible unless the impugned orders are wholly unreasonable or
untenable in law. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri : (1999) 2 SCC
452 discussed the scope of revisional jurisdiction and held as under:
“5. …… In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for
and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any
finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be
equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated
even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it
would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the
evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well
as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is
brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise
tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice….”
(emphasis supplied)
12. In the case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander : (2012) 9 SCC
460, the Hon’ble Apex Court had also expounded upon the scope of
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interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The relevant portion
of the judgment is as under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call
for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of
satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings
or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right
a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be
a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to
scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If
one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges
that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the
decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no
compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is
based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not
exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would
have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction
of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in
a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should
not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to
keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself
should not lead to injustice ex facie…
xxx
18. …Basically, the power is required to be exercised so that
justice is done and there is no abuse of power by the court. Merely
an apprehension or suspicion of the same would not be a sufficient
ground for interference in such cases.
xxx
20. The jurisdiction of the court under Section 397 can be
exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of
an order passed by the trial court or the inferior court, as the case
may be. Though the section does not specifically use the expression
“prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice”, the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited
one. The legality, propriety or correctness of an order passed by a
court is the very foundation of exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 397 but ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The
jurisdiction could be exercised where there is palpable error, non-
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compliance with the provisions of law, the decision is completely
erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised
arbitrarily…”
(emphasis supplied)
13. In the present case, the conviction of the petitioner under
Section 411 of the IPC was sustained considering that the stolen
mobile phone was recovered from the possession of the petitioner and
considering that the petitioner failed to account for the possession of
the said mobile phone or produce any document/witness pertaining to
its ownership in the petitioner’s name.
14. The learned counsel representing the petitioner emphasised that
once the petitioner was acquitted of the offence of theft, he could not
have been convicted for the offence under Section 411 of the IPC. In
doing so, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sd. Shabuddin v.
State of Telangana (supra). The said case, in the opinion of this
Court, does not aid the case of the petitioner.
15. In the case of Sd. Shabuddin v. State of Telangana (supra), the
allegation against one accused person called Moulana was that he
murdered the deceased out of jealously by slitting his throat and
thereafter concealed the deceased’s body, stole his belongings
including cash of ₹2,92,629/-, bike and phone and thereafter fled the
scene. Further, it was alleged that on the following day, accused
Moulana, with the help of another accused person who had agreed to
help him for a consideration of ₹30,000/-, threw the body of the
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deceased on the burning pyre to obliterate the evidence. Thereafter, on
the following day, accused Moulana partially deposited a sum of
₹2,40,000/- in the bank and retained the remaining amount. Accused
Moulana was thereafter charged with the offences under Sections 302,
201 and 379 of the IPC and the other accused was charged with
offences under Sections 379 and 201 of the IPC. The Trial Court
thereafter acquitted both the accused persons of the charges under
Sections 379/302/201 of the IPC but convicted them for the offence
under Section 411 of the IPC considering that the accused persons
were found in possession of cash and because they were not able to
account for the possession of such a huge amount of cash. The said
conviction was upheld by the High Court while noting that a mere
claim by the accused persons that the cash belongs to them is
insufficient to prove that the cash belonged to the accused persons.
While setting aside the conviction of the accused person, the
Hon’ble Apex Court noted that the conviction under Section 411 of
the IPC solely on the ground that the accused persons were unable to
account for the huge amount of cash is untenable. In that, the Hon’ble
Apex Court further noted as under:
“15.3. Thus, to establish culpability under Section 411 IPC, it must
be proved that the accused had dishonestly received or retained the
stolen property and in doing so, he either had knowledge or reason
to believe that the same is a stolen property. The natural corollary
being if the courts upon trial reach a conclusion that the property
in question is not a stolen property, therefore, the accused cannot
be charged for the offence punishable under Section 411 IPC
especially when the whole case of the prosecution relates to the
events forming part of the same transaction.
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15.4. Since the very beginning, the case of the prosecution is that
accused-Moulana committed the homicide of the deceased, stole
his belongings, including the sum of Rs. 2,92,629/-, while the
deceased was on a business trip to the distant town of Warangal.
The accused-Moulana had also paid Rs. 30,000/- out of the total
money that he had stolen from the deceased to the present
appellant. During the trial, the Trial Court has outrightly rejected
this theory of theft, against which no appeal till date has been
preferred by the prosecution or the complainant before the High
Court.
15.5. Therefore, once the Trial Court has acquitted both accused-
Moulana and the present appellant under Section 379 IPC, we fail
to understand how the Trial Court reached a conclusion that the
accused persons are liable under Section 411 IPC. In order to
uphold conviction under Section 411 IPC, it is sine qua non that
the property in the possession of accused is a stolen property. If
the property is not a stolen property, the charge under Section
411 IPC cannot be sustained.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. Unlike the case as quoted supra which pertained to recovery of
allegedly unaccounted cash from the accused persons, the present case
relates to the theft of a mobile phone. The contents of the complaint of
the stolen mobile phone were proven by the complainant (PW3).
Further, PW-2 identified the stolen mobile phone and specifically
deposed that he was the owner of the said phone. Despite opportunity
being given, no question was put to PW2 by the learned counsel
representing the petitioner.
17. As per the testimony of the PW5, the petitioner had given the
said mobile phone to him soon after the date of the incident to check
the battery condition of the phone. PW5 further deposed that the said
phone was used by his father for some time and was thereafter
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returned to the petitioner. No question was put to the said witness as
well by the learned counsel representing the petitioner. The seizure
memo indicates that the mobile phone was thereafter recovered from
the possession of the petitioner on 15.05.2004. Evidently, the aspect
that the mobile phone was a stolen property and that the same was
recovered from the possession of the petitioner stood established.
Consequently, the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Sd. Shabuddin v. State of Telangana (supra), in the opinion of this
Court, is not applicable to the facts of the present case considering that
the property found to be in possession of the petitioner was a stolen
one.
18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further emphasised
that the prosecution failed to show that the petitioner dishonestly
received or retained the stolen property knowing that the same was
stolen one.
19. In the present case, as noted above, the recovery of the stolen
mobile phone from the possession of the petitioner stood established.
In that regard, it is pertinent to note that Section 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 lays down that the Court may presume the
existence of certain facts. Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 lays as under:
“The Court may presume —
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(a) that a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon, after the
theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to
be stolen, unless he can account for his possession…”
20. As rightly noted by the learned ASJ, the petitioner failed to
explain as to under what capacity and in what circumstances the
petitioner was in possession of the said mobile phone. Further, as
rightly noted by the learned ASJ, while at some stage, the petitioner
claimed that the said phone was purchased by him (though the said
stance was not taken in the petitioner’s statement under Section 313 of
the CrPC), no evidence was led to show that the petitioner was in bona
fide possession of the stolen mobile phone. Further, even in his
statement under Section 313 of the CrPC, the petitioner merely refuted
the allegations raised against him. Considering that the mobile phone
was stolen and the same was also found in possession of the petitioner,
amongst the other attendant circumstances, a presumption is raised
against the petitioner in terms of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 which the petitioner has failed to rebut. In the absence of
any material to indicate to the contrary, mere denial of allegations
does not tantamount to rebuttal of the presumption raised against the
petitioner.
21. As noted above, at the stage of revision, this Court is not
required to reappreciate evidence and it can interfere only in face of
palpable and glaring perversity. As discussed above, the Courts below
have aptly appreciated the material on record and the petitioner’s
conviction is backed by rational reasoning. This Court is thus of the
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opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out any case which
warrants interference with the impugned judgment.
22. Insofar as the sentence of the petitioner is concerned,
pertinently the incident took place way back on 01.04.2004 and more
than two decades have elapsed since then. It is also relevant to note
that by order dated 19.08.2014, this Court suspended the sentence of
the petitioner noting that out of the total sentence of one year, the
petitioner had already suffered incarceration for more than 5 months 4
days besides remission earned for 20 days. Evidently, the petitioner
has suffered a significant portion of his sentence in custody.
23. Considering the same, this Court is of the opinion that no
purpose would be served by relegating the petitioner to undergo the
remaining period of carceral punishment after more than twenty years
have passed since the incident. Interests of justice would be met if the
sentence imposed upon the petitioner is reduced to the period already
undergone by him.
24. In view of the above, without interfering with the conviction of
the petitioner, his sentence is reduced to the imprisonment already
suffered by him and payment of fine of ₹2,000/-. Fine amount, if not
already paid, is directed to be paid within a period of eight weeks from
date.
25. This Court appreciates the efforts put in by Mr. Attin Shankar
Rastogi, Advocate in assisting the Court.
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26. The Delhi High Court Legal services Committee is directed to
pay the fees of the learned counsel as per its scheduled rates and rules.
27. The present petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
28. The bail bond and surety furnished by the petitioner stands
discharged.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
FEBRUARY 16, 2026
SS
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