Madhya Pradesh High Court
M/S. Rachit Daga Through Its Proprietor … vs M/S. Saluja Road Lines Through Its … on 17 February, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4784
1 MCRC-44686-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 17th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 44686 of 2025
M/S. RACHIT DAGA THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR RACHIT DAGA
Versus
M/S. SALUJA ROAD LINES THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR
RANJITSINGH SALUJA
Appearance:
Shri. Varun Mishra - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri. Nilesh Dave - Advocate for the respondent.
WITH
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 44682 of 2025
M/S. RACHIT DAGA THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR RACHIT DAGA
Versus
M/S. SALUJA ROAD LINES THROUGH ITS PROPREITOR
RANJITINGH SALUJA
Appearance:
Shri. Varun Mishra - Advocate for the petitioner.ri
Shri. Nilesh Dave - Advocate for the respondent.
ORDER
1 Both the petitions M.Cr.C. No. 44686/2025 and M.Cr.C. No.
44682/2025 involve identical issue. Therefore, they were being heard and
considered together.
M.Cr.C. No. 44686/2025
2 This petition under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 is filed feeling
aggrieved by order dated 01.08.2025(Annexure-P/1), passed in CRR No.
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NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
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124/2024 by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Biaora, District Rajgarh
(M.P.) whereby the learned Sessions Judge has rejected the revision petition
filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 04.11.2024 (Annexure-
P/2) passed in Case No. 1316/2019 (SCNIA No.176/2019) by the Judicial
Magistrate First Class Biaora, District – Rajgarh.
M.Cr.C. No. 44682/2025
3. This petition under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 is filed feeling
aggrieved by order dated 01.08.2025(Annexure-P/1) passed in Case No.
CRR No.125/2024 by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Biaora, District –
Rajgarh (M.P.) whereby the learned Sessions Judge has rejected the revision
petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 04.11.2024
(Annexure-P/2), passed in Case No.1317/2019 (SCNIA No.175/2019) by the
Judicial Magistrate First Class Biaora, District – Rajgarh.
4. The accused assailed the orders dated 4.11.2024 in revision before
the Court of Sessions. The learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Biaora in
CRR. No.124/2024 and CRR. No.125/2024 affirmed the order of Judicial
Magistrate and rejected the revision petitions. Feeling aggrived by orders
dated 01.08.2025 and orders dated 04.11.2024, the present petitions have
been filed.
5. The exposition of the facts giving rise to the present petitions is as
under :-
(A) Ranjitsingh Saluja, Proprietor of M/s. Saluja Road Lines filed a
complaint for offence punishable under Sections 138 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act, 1881(hereinafter referred to as “NI Act“) against M/s.
Rachit Daga inter alia stating that he transported wheat at the direction
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NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
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of accused M/s. Rachit Daga for three years. Accused has given Cheque
No.978148 of amount Rs.24.00 Lacs dated 07.05.2019 and Cheque
No.978151 for amount of Rs.26.00 Lacs dated 06.05.2019. The
Cheques were dishonoured for the reason of “insufficient fund” in the
account of accused.
(B) The complainant Ranjitsingh Saluja issued statutory demand notice
dated 16.05.2019 for dishonour of Cheque No.978148 for amount of
Rs.24.00 Lacs . The accused failed to pay the amount of cheques,
therefore, the private complaint for offence punishable under Section
138 of the NI Act was filed. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Biaora, District Rajgarh took cognizance and passed the summoning
order directing registration of the private complaint at SCNIA
No.176/2019(Case No.1316/2019).
(C) The complainant Ranjitsingh Saluja issued statutory demand notice
dated 30.09.2019 for dishonour of Cheque No.978151 for amount of
Rs.26.00 Lacs. The accused failed to pay the amount of cheques,
therefore, the private complaint for offence punishable under Section
138 of the NI Act was filed. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Biaora, District Rajgarh took cognizance and passed the summoning
order directing registration of the private complaint at SCNIA
No.175/2019(Case No.1317/2019) .
6. The accused filed an application under Section 219 of Cr.P.C. in
both the matters. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class rejected the
application vide impugned orders dated 04.11.2024 on the ground that the
cheques in question in both the matters were issued on different dates. The
complainant has given statutory demand notice on different dates. The
complaints were filed based on different cause of action. So, it wold not be
proper to conduct joint trial in both the matters.
7. The order dated 04.11.2024, passed in SCNIA No.176/2019 (Case
No.1316/2019) and the affirming Order dated 01.08. 2025 passed in CRR
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NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
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No. 124/2024 are assailed in M.Cr.C. No.44686/2025 and the order dated
04.11.2024 passed in SCNIA No.175/2019 (Case No.1317/2019) and the
affirming Order dated 01.08. 2025 passed in CRR No. 125/2024 are assailed
in M.Cr.C. No.44682/2025 on identical grounds that :
(i) the trial Court has committed grave error of law in rejecting the application.
(ii) the Case No.1316/2019 and Case No.1317/2019 have arisen out of one and same
transaction between the parties. The petitioner has allegedly issued two cheques i.e.
Cheque No.978148 and Cheque No.978151 drawn on his account with State Bank of
India towards payment of transport work carried out by the petitioner. The causes of
action as pleaded in both the complaints is based on same business transaction and
arise out of same course of hearing. Therefore, issuance of two cheques of different
amount does not relate to distinct and independent causes of action.
(iii) The allegations parties transaction in both the trials is same. Therefore, joint trial
was necessary to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting judgments.
(iv) The dismissal of the application under Section 219 of Cr.P.C. is erroneous and
unsustainable in law.
On these grounds, it is requested that the impugned order be set aside
and the application under Section 219 of Cr.P.C. filed by the
petitioner/accused be allowed.
8 . Learned counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the grounds
mentioned in the petition, contended that the parties of alleged transaction
are same. The cheques in question were issued towards same transaction
between the same parties although, they were issued on different dates. The
demand notices were given on same date and the petitioner had filed joint
reply with regard to issuance of both these cheques. The defence of the
petitioner would be seriously prejudiced, if separate trials are held. His
defence would be opened in cross-examination of the complainant in first
trial, thereby causing miscarriage of justice to the petitioner. Learned
counsel, referring to the judgments delivered by the Supreme Court in Ref :
SUO MOTU WRIT PETITION (Cri.) NO. 2 of 2020 (In Ref: Expeditious
trial of cases under section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881), Nasib Singh Vs. StateSignature Not Verified
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NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
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of Punjab and another reported in (2022) 2 SCC 89 and the judgment
delivered by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Dalip
Kumar Vs. Sachin Singal [CRM-M-35360-2022], submitted that joint trial is
a norm and separate trial is an exception in the facts situation of the present
case. Therefore, the trial Court and the Revisional Court had committed error
in rejecting the application / petition for joint trial.
9. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the
petition and contended that both the cases are based on different cause of
action. The cheques in question were issued on different dates. They were
presented to the Bank on different dates. They were dishonoured on different
dates. Thereafter, the complainant issued demand notices to the petitioner
and filed separate complaints with regard to separate cheques in question.
Both the matters are being prosecuted before the same Court on same dates
of hearing, therefore, there is no question of prejudice to the petitioner for the
reason that the cross-examination of the complainant may be undertaken on
same date. The petition is meritless.
10. Heard rival contentions, perused the record.
11. The NI Act does not contain any express provision for joint/one
trial of complaint cases arising from distinct cheques, it would be apposite to
refer to Sections 219 and 220 of the Cr. P.C. which read as under:–
“Section 219. Three offences of the same kind within year may be charged together : (1)
When a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within
the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of
the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of
them not exceeding three.
(2) Offences are of the same kind when they are punishable with the same amount of
punishment under the same section of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) or of any special
or local law :
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NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
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xxx”
“Section 220. Trial for more than one offence : (1) If, in one series of acts so connected
together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the
same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence.
12. The aforesaid provisions provide for joint/one trial of offences
which in terms of the general legal principle would have to be tried
separately. While Section 219 Cr. P.C. has a restriction that a maximum of
three offences of the same kind can be tried together, Section 220 does not
expressly impose any such bar but simply states that offences must form part
of the same transaction. It is trait law that the dishonour of each cheque
constitutes a distinct offence, giving rise to a separate cause of action.
However, provision contained in Sections 219 and 220 act as exceptions to
the general rule requiring separate charges and trials for distinct offences.
The primary objective of these exceptions is to ensure expediency and
efficiency in legal proceedings while avoiding any prejudice to the parties
involved.
13. In the matter of Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab , reported in
(2022) 2 SCC 89, the Supreme court held as under-
42. Section 239(d ) of the old Code which corresponds to Section 223( d ) CrPC 1973 was
interpreted by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati
Ganeswara Rao , AIR 1963 SC 1850 by juxtaposing the provision with Section 225(1) of
the old Code, which is Section 219(1) CrPC 1973. In that case, two respondents along
with two others were tried together for offences under the Penal Code. The High Court set
aside the convictions on the ground that inter alia the joint trial of two or more offences
committed by each of them is illegal. Mudholkar, J. speaking for the Bench observed that
the phrase “offence committed in the course of the same transaction” would mean
offences that are committed in the proximity of time or place, or unity of purpose and
design :
“27. According to Mr Chari Section 235(1) cannot be construed as having an
overriding effect on Section 239 because whereas it contemplates acts so
connected together as to form the same transaction resulting in more offences
than one, Section 239(d ) contemplates offences committed in the course of the
same transaction and nothing more. The question is whether for the purposes of
Section 239(d ) it is necessary to ascertain anything more than this that the
different offences were committed in the course of the same transaction orSignature Not Verified
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NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
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whether it must further be ascertained whether the acts are intrinsically connected
with one another. Under Section 235(1) what has to be ascertained is whether the
offences arise out of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction,
but the words “so connected together as to form” are not repeated after the words
“same transaction” in Section 239. What has to be ascertained then is whether
these words are also to be read in all the clauses of Section 239 which refer to the
same transaction. Section 235(1), while providing for the joint trial for more than
one offence, indicates that there must be connection between the acts and the
transaction. According to this provision there must thus be a connection between a
series of acts before they could be regarded as forming the same transaction. What
is meant by “same transaction” is not defined anywhere in the Code. Indeed, it
would always be difficult to define precisely what the expression means. Whether
a transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon the
particular facts of each case and it seems to us to be a difficult task to undertake a
definition of that which the Legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have
not come across a single decision of any Court which has embarked upon the
difficult task of defining the expression. But it is generally thought that where
there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of
action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part
of the same transaction. It is, however, not necessary that every one of these
elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if
several acts committed by a person show a unity of purpose or design that would
be a strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of the same
transaction. The connection between a series of acts seems to us to be an essential
ingredient for those acts to constitute the same transaction and, therefore, the mere
absence of the words “so connected together as to form” in clauses (a), (c) and (d)
of Section 239 would make little difference. Now a transaction may consist of an
isolated act or may consist of a series of acts. The series of acts which constitute a
transaction must of necessity be connected with one another and if some of them
stand out independently they would not form part of the same transaction but
would constitute a different transaction or transactions. Therefore, even if the
expression “same transaction” alone had been used in Section 235(1) it would
have meant a transaction consisting either of a single act or of a series of
connected acts. The expression “same transaction” occurring in clauses (a), ( c)
and (d ) of Section 239 as well as that occurring in Section 235(1) ought to be
given the same meaning according to the normal rule of construction of statutes.”
43. The Bench held that holding a separate trial is the rule and a joint trial is the
exception. However, in case the accused persons commit different offences forming a part
of the same transaction, a joint trial would be the rule unless it is proved that joint trial
would cause difficulty : State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao, AIR 1963 SC
1850 –
“30. … No doubt, as has been rightly pointed out in this case, separate trial is the
normal rule and joint trial is an exception. But while this principle is easy to
appreciate and follow where one person alone is the accused and the interaction or
intervention of the acts of more persons than one does not come in, it would where
the same act is committed by several persons, be not only inconvenient but
injudicious to try all the several persons separately. This would lead to
unnecessary multiplicity of trials involving avoidable inconvenience to the
witnesses and avoidable expenditure of public time and money. No corresponding
advantage can be gained by the accused persons by following the procedure of
separate trials. Where, however, several offences are alleged to have been
committed by several accused persons it may be more reasonable to follow the
normal rule of separate trials. But here, again, if those offences are alleged not to
be wholly unconnected but as forming part of the same transaction the only
consideration that will justify separate trials would be the embarrassment or
difficulty caused to the accused persons in defending themselves.” (emphasisSignature Not Verified
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supplied)
47. While interpreting the provisions of Section 223 CrPC, the Court speaking through
I.D. Dua, J. observed : Chandra Bhal v. State of U.P., (1971) 3 SCC 983“5 . Turning to the provisions of the Code, Section 233 embodies the general
mandatory rule providing for a separate charge for every distinct offence and for
separate trial for every such charge. The broad object underlying the general rule
seems to be to give to the accused a notice of the precise accusation and to save
him from being embarrassed in his defence by the confusion which is likely to
result from lumping together in a single charge distinct offences and from
combining several charges at one trial. There are, however, exceptions to this
general rule and they are found in Sections 234, 235, 236 and 239. These
exceptions embrace cases in which one trial for more than one offence is not
considered likely to embarrass or prejudice the accused in his defence. The matter
of joinder of charges is, however, in the general discretion of the court and the
principle consideration controlling the judicial exercise of this discretion should
be to avoid embarrassment to the defence by joinder of charges. On the appellant’s
argument the only provision requiring consideration is Section 235(1) which lays
down that if in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same
transaction more offences than one are committed by the same person then he
may be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence. This exception
like the other exceptions merely permits a joint trial of more offences than one. It
neither renders a joint trial imperative nor does it bar or prohibit separate trials.
Sub-section (2) of Section 403 of the Code also provides that a person acquitted or
convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for
which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial
under Section 235(1). No legal objection to the appellant’s separate trial is
sustainable and his counsel has advisedly not seriously pressed any before us.”
(emphasis supplied)
51.From the decisions of this Court on joint trial and separate trials, the following
principles can be formulated:
51.1. Section 218 provides that separate trials shall be conducted for distinct
offences alleged to be committed by a person. Sections 219-221 provide
exceptions to this general rule. If a person falls under these exceptions, then a
joint trial for the offences which a person is charged with may be conducted.
Similarly, under Section 223, a joint trial may be held for persons charged with
different offences if any of the clauses in the provision are separately or on a
combination satisfied.
51.2. While applying the principles enunciated in Sections 218-223 on conducting
joint and separate trials, the trial court should apply a two-pronged test, namely,
(i) whether conducting a joint/separate trial will prejudice the defence of the
accused; and/or (ii) whether conducting a joint/separate trial would cause judicial
delay.
51.3. The possibility of conducting a joint trial will have to be determined at the
beginning of the trial and not after the trial based on the result of the trial. The
appellate court may determine the validity of the argument that there ought to
have been a separate/joint trial only based on whether the trial had prejudiced the
right of accused or the prosecutrix.
51.4. Since the provisions which engraft an exception use the phrase “may” with
reference to conducting a joint trial, a separate trial is usually not contrary to law
even if a joint trial could be conducted, unless proven to cause a miscarriage of
justice. (emphasis added)
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14. While dealing with a similar situation in the matter of Ranchhod
Lal v. State of M.P. reported in AIR 1965 SC 1248, their Lordships of the
Apex Court had observed thus:
“15. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied on section 234, Criminal Procedure
Code and urged that three offences of criminal breach of trust could have been tried at
one trial as section 234 provides that when a person is accused of more offences than one
of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of
such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and
tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three. This again, is an enabling
provision and is an exception to section 233, Criminal Procedure Code. If each of the
several offences is tried separately, there is nothing illegal about it.
16. Lastly, reference was made, on behalf of the appellant to section 235, Criminal
Procedure Code, and it was urged that all these offences were committed in the course of
the same transaction, and, therefore, they should have been tried at one trial. Assuming,
without deciding, that these offences could be said to have been committed in the course
of the same transaction, the separate trial of the appellant for certain specific offences is
not illegal. This section too is an enabling section.”
15. The Hon’ble Single Judge of High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at Chandigarh in the case of Dalip Kumar (supra) considered the necessity of
joint trial in case of two cheques issued to repay the liability regarding
purchase of clothes and directed joint trial. The learned Judge considered the
law laid down in the case of Shyam Pal Vs. Dayawati Besoya & another,
2016(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 790, Benson Vs. State of Kerala, 2016(4) R.C.R.
(Criminal) 602 and V.K. Bansal Vs. State of Haryana & Others, 2013(3)
R.C.R.(Criminal) 983. The law laid down in these cases relates to concurrent
running of sentence in case of conviction arising from same transactions.
16. The question for consideration before this Court is whether the
trial Court committed an error or illegality in exercising the discretion to
decline joint trial of the cases. Although, the issuance of cheques in question
relates to the continued transportation work (transportation of wheat by the
complainant for the accused), but both the cheques were issued on different
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dates for different amounts. The statutory demand notices giving rise to the
cause of action for filing complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, bear
different dates, therefore, the causes of action for both the complaints were
different. Learned Judicial Magistrate considered these aspects of the matter
and decided against joint trial in the matter.
17. The copies of the proceedings of the trial Court show that both
the trials are pending before the same Judicial Magistrate. The hearings in
both the matters are fixed on the same day. The interlocutory applications
were considered on the same day. Although there are separate trials, both the
matters are being tried simultaneously. Therefore, there is no possibility of
delay due to separate trial. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not make
out any substantial case that the defence of the accused would be prejudiced
by separate trial. Learned counsel merely contends that the defence of the
accused would be open if the cross-examination in other matter is deferred.
The apprehension is baseless as the accused may cross-examine the
complainant in both the cases on same day as both the trials are progressing
simultaneously. The trial Court may facilitate cross-examination of the
complainant in both the cases on same day. Therefore, there appears to be no
prejudice to fair trial. If both matters are tried jointly, there may be an
anomaly with regard to the evidence on cheque number, date of cheque, the
date and details of statutory notice. It may hamper fair trial in the case.
18. So far as, the imposition of separate sentence and concurrent
running of the sentences is concerned, the trial Court would be guided by the
law laid down in the cases of Shyam Pal, Benson, V.K. Bansal(Supra) and
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K. Padamaja Rani Vs. The State of Telangana & another, SPL(Cri.) No.
(s).6742/2023.
19. In view of the above discussions, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the impugned orders do not suffer from any manifest
impropriety or patent illegality necessitating interference in exercise of
inherent jurisdiction.
20. Consequently, both the petitions, being meritless, are dismissed.
21. A copy of this order be kept in the connected M.Cr.C.
No.44682/2025
C.C as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
amol
Signature Not Verified
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NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
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