Delhi District Court
Gobal Car Group Pte.Limited vs Vienna It Solutions Private Limited on 17 February, 2026
IN THE COURT OF ANUBHAV JAIN,
LD. DISTRICT JUDGE-05, NEW DELHI DISTRICT,
PATIALA HOUSE COURTS, NEW DELHI
DLND010011822018
ARBTN/299/2018
In the matter of
1. Global Car Group PTE. Ltd.
A company incorporated under
The Laws of Singapore,
Having its registered office at
1, Robinson Road, # 18-00,
AIA Tower, Singapore - 048542
Being Represented through its
AR Mr. Jai Abhilash
2. Cars24 Services Pvt. Ltd.
A company incorporated under
The Companies Act, 2013
Having its registered office at
Plot # 120, Industrial Area,
Sector 44, Gurugram, Haryana
Being Represented through its
AR Mr. Jai Abhilash ....Petitioners
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 1/24
Versus
Vienna IT Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
A Company incorporated under
The Companies Act 1956
Having its registered office at
# 493 Industrial Area, Phase-9,
Mohali, Punjab-160068. ... Respondent
Petition u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (amendment)
Act 2015 for seeking setting aside of the arbitral award dated
17.11.2017 passed by the Ld. Sole Arbitrator namely Mr. Ashok
Kumar Singh, in arbitration matter being INDRP/916 titled as
"Global Car Group Pte. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Vienna Solutions Pvt.
Ltd.", arbitration having been conducted in accordance with
the .in domain name dispute resolution policy and the INDRP
Rules of procedure framed thereunder.
Date of institution : 19.02.2018
Date when Judgment reserved : 23.01.2026
Date of Judgment : 17.02.2026
JUDGMENT
1. Present Petition u/s 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act
(hereinafter “Arbitration Act“) is filed by the Petitioners against
the Respondents seeking to set aside the arbitral award dt.
17.11.2017.
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 2/24
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. In brief, facts of the case as stated by the petitioners is
that petitioner no.1 is a company incorporated as per laws of
Singapore and petitioner No. 2 is a wholly owned subsidiary of
petitioner no.1 engaged in business of operating, developing and
managing “e-commerce portal” thereby rendering services for
sale and purchase of pre-owned cars in India. It is further stated
that petitioner no.1 is the registered proprietor and user of
Trademark “Cars24” and domain name “Cars24.com” in various
countries and has been using the said domain name for its
ongoing business since long. It is stated that since its
incorporation on 12.08.2015, petitioner no.2 has been operating
and conducting business under the name of “Cars24” and has
been using the domain name “Cars24.com”.
2.1. It is stated that during the month of June 2017, it came to
the notice of petitioners that the prospective customers of
petitioner no.2 and public at large are being misguided by the
domain of the respondent. It is stated that upon further inquiries
it was revealed that the respondent company was not carrying out
any business in the field of sale and purchase of used cars, but to
cause confusion in the minds of public, respondent was depicting
through its website “cars24.in” as if it were engaged in such
business across the country.
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 3/24
2.2. Being aggrieved by the conduct of respondent, petitioners
instituted a complaint against the respondent before the .IN
Registry seeking to get the disputed domain name
“www.cars24.com” be transferred to petitioner no.1 from the
respondent. Said complaint of the petitioners was dismissed by
the Ld. Arbitrator vide arbitral award dt. 17.11.2017.
2.3. As such, present objection petition u/s 34 of Arbitration
Act has been filed by the petitioners impugning arbitral award dt.
17.11.2017 on the following grounds:
a. That Ld. Arbitrator declined to grant an opportunity to the
petitioners to make their submissions in a personal hearing
without assigning any cogent reasons for the same and simply
observing that there was no need for a personal hearing as the
matter could be disposed off on the basis of the available record.
b. That Ld. Arbitrator accepted the respondent’s bald
assertions of business use of disputed domain name since 2007
without any documentary corroboration or evidence produced in
this regard.
c. That Ld. Arbitrator wrongly held that the disputed domain
name was not registered or used in bad faith, without
appreciating that the respondent was engaged in large-scale
domain squatting by registering multiple domain names identical
or confusingly similar to well-known brands, without any
functional websites.
d. That Ld. Arbitrator misapplied Paragraph 4 of the .IN
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (INDRP), despite theARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 4/24
Petitioners satisfying all three mandatory conditions specified
therein. Further, Paragraph 7 of the INDRP was also wrongly
interpreted, particularly the requirement of “bona fide offering of
goods or services.”
e. That Ld. Arbitrator wrongly dismissed the Petitioners’
claim on the basis that the Respondent was the “first user,”
ignoring material evidence that petitioners’ primary domain
“www.cars24.com” was registered in 2001, whereas the disputed
domain “www.cars24.in” was registered only in 2007, and that
respondent was neither commonly known by the mark “Cars24”
nor had applied for its registration.
f. That Ld. Arbitrator failed to return a clear finding on the
similarity between the disputed domain name “www.cars24.in”
and the Petitioners’ registered trademark “Cars24.” Further,
registered trademark rights of the Petitioners were not given due
weight, and despite acknowledging similarity, Ld. Arbitrator
incorrectly allowed the Respondent to continue using the domain
name.
g. That Ld. Arbitrator ignored crucial evidence such as trade
certificates and business establishment documents, proof of
extensive marketing and advertising expenditure (approx. ₹45
crore), and audio-visual advertisements and supporting
annexures.
h. That Ld. Arbitrator placed undue reliance on
“www.web.archive.org” to conclude continuous use by the
Respondent. At the same time, Ld. Arbitrator wrongly inferred
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 5/24
limited or non-legitimate use of the Petitioners’ domain, despite
insufficient basis.
REPLY ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
3. In reply to the present appeal, it has been stated by the
respondent that the disputed domain name www.cars24.in was
registered by the respondent on 03.01.2007 following the due
procedure and at the time, the domain name was vacant and not
in use. It is stated that respondent company has been registered
with ROC since 20.01.2006 and deals in IT solutions. It is further
stated that in 2007, respondent ventured into business of second-
hand cars and has spent significantly on promotions and ads. It is
further stated that respondent has also bought many other domain
names like fly24.in, parties24.in, mobile24.in, city24.in,
estates24.in, properties24.in, naukri24.in and is doing regular
work on these domain names.
3.1. It is stated that petitioners have been operating and
conducting its business activities under the name of “cars24” and
using its domain name “cars24.com” in India since 12.08.2015. It
is stated that the earliest trademark filed by petitioners in India
was in July 2015, the same got registered on 15.01.2016, and has
been in use w.e.f. 01.08.2015 only. It is further stated that even
though the domain name “cars24.com” was registered by
petitioner in 2001, there has been no actual use of the
trademark/name “cars24” till 2015 by the petitioner, and the
same was on sale in year 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005. It is
further stated that from 2007 till 2014, domain name
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 6/24
“cars24.com” of the petitioner merely posted ads for digital
cameras and other things and did not operate any legitimate
website on it. It is stated that however, respondent has used the
disputed domain name since 2007.
3.2. It is stated that the petitioner company is a foreign entity
attempting to hijack the domain of Indian business operating way
before its entry into the Indian market in 2015. It is further stated
that the petitioner’s domain name was earlier being managed and
administered by some entity in Korea and later by one Anna Hass
from Singapore.
3.3. It is further stated that the usage of the disputed domain
name by the respondent is w.r.t its business and has no intent for
commercial gain by misleading or diverting consumers or
tarnishing the trademark or service mark at issue. It is further
stated that the respondent did not get the disputed domain name
registered after starting operation of its business by the petitioner
but much prior to petitioner starting its operations in India and
registration of petitioner’s trademark.
3.4. It is stated that it is upon the petitioner to prove the bad
faith in registration of disputed domain name by the respondent.
It is stated that petitioner does not provide any basis for rights
that may pre-date the registration of the disputed domain name.
3.5. On the allegation of petitioner that Ld. Arbitrator wrongly
did not grant the opportunity for personal hearing, it is further
stated that petitioner confirmed the receipt of the reply of
Respondent sent vide email dt. 13.10.2017 but did not file
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 7/24
rejoinder within time prescribed and only kept requesting for
extension of time to file the same. It is stated that on 11.11.2017,
keeping in view the delay and repeated requests of petitioner for
extension without any plausible grounds, declined its request for
extension, however, the same day petitioner filed its rejoinder
and sent an email to the Tribunal for setting up an in-person
hearing for the matter, which was rejected by the Ld. Arbitrator.
FINAL ARGUMENTS
4. It has been argued by Ld. Counsel for the petitioner that
the impugned arbitral award passed is bad in law for not having
followed the correct interpretation of Para 4 of INDRP Rules as
laid down in Stephen Koenig v. Arbitrator, NIXI 2011 DHC 6410
wherein it was observed that Para 4 of INDRP is to be interpreted
to mean that a complainant can succeed if he proves that either
the ground in sub-para (i) exists by itself or grounds in sub-paras
(ii) and (iii) exist. It is further argued that there exists an ex-parte
interim order of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi passed in
favour of petitioners and against the respondent.
5. On the contrary it has been argued by Ld. Counsel for the
respondent that the challenges raised by the petitioners amounts
to seeking to question the factual findings of the Ld. Arbitrator
regarding prior use of the domain name and absence of cyber-
squatting or bad faith on the part of respondent, amounts to a re-
hearing on merits and is impermissible u/s 34 of Arbitration Act.
5.1. It is further argued that applying the settled principles as
regards rights of registered proprietor being subject to rights of a
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prior user, the Ld. Arbitrator has clearly found that the though
petitioner registered cars24.com in 2001, the domain name was
not used for business purposes until 2015; petitioners have
themselves claimed trademark use since 2015 only while
obtaining registration in 2016; respondent registered and used
‘cars24.in’ since 2007 much prior to petitioner’s entry into Indian
markets; and that the respondent had legitimate interest in the
disputed domain name as its use pre-dates the petitioner’s alleged
rights. It is argued that such findings of the Ld. Arbitrator are
based on pleadings and documents on record, and do not warrant
interference u/s 34 Arbitration Act.
5.2. It is further argued that the finding of Ld. Arbitrator as
regards respondent not acting in bad faith does not suffer any
patent illegality since there was no evidence of cyber-squatting. It
is further argued that reliance upon the judgment of Stephen
Koenig v. Arbitrator NIXI and Gulshan Khatri v. Google Inc. is
misplaced as the cases involved clear patterns of bad faith, bulk
registration of domain names and imitation of well-known marks,
which is absent in present matter. It is argued that the respondent
has transparently disclosed other domain names registered by it
which are all being legitimately used and not shown to have been
sold.
5.3. It is further argued that as per Rule 16 of INDRP Rules,
there shall be no in-person hearing unless the arbitrator considers
it necessary. It is further argued that Sec 24 of Arbitration Act
also permits the parties to agree that no oral hearing shall be held.
It is further argued that petitioners requested for a personal
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 9/24
hearing only belatedly after refusal of the extension for filing
rejoinder. It is argued that mere absence of oral hearing does not
amount to violation of natural justice especially when Ld.
Arbitrator even considered the belated rejoinder of petitioners.
6. I have heard the arguments so led by the Ld. Counsels for
both the parties and perused the case file carefully.
LAW ON SECTION 34 ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION
ACT
7. Before proceeding further with the present petition on
merits, this Court deems it appropriate to discuss in here law
with regards to scope of Section 34 of the Act. For the same, I
may gainfully refer to the observation made by Hon’ble Apex
Court in Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. vs. Delhi Metro
Rail Corporation Ltd. (09.09.2021 SC): MANU/SC/0623/2021
24. This Court has in several other judgments
interpreted Section 34 of the 1996 Act to stress on
the restraint to be shown by courts while
examining the validity of the arbitral awards. The
limited grounds available to courts for annulment
of arbitral awards are well known to legally
trained minds. However, the difficulty arises in
applying the well-established principles for
interference to the facts of each case that come up
before the courts. There is a disturbing tendency
of courts setting aside arbitral awards, after
dissecting and reassessing factual aspects of the
cases to come to a conclusion that the award
needs intervention and thereafter, dubbing the
award to be vitiated by either perversity or patent
illegality, apart from the other grounds available
for annulment of the award. This approach would
lead to corrosion of the object of the 1996 Act and
the endeavours made to preserve this object,
which is minimal judicial interference with
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 10/24
arbitral awards. That apart, several judicial
pronouncements of this Court would become a
dead letter if arbitral awards are set aside by
categorising them as perverse or patently illegal
without appreciating the contours of the said
expressions.
25. Patent illegality should be illegality which
goes to the root of the matter. In other words,
every error of law committed by the Arbitral
Tribunal would not fall within the expression
‘patent illegality’. Likewise, erroneous application
of law cannot be categorised as patent illegality.
In addition, contravention of law not linked to
public policy or public interest is beyond the
scope of the expression ‘patent illegality’. What is
prohibited is for courts to re-appreciate evidence
to conclude that the award suffers from patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award, as
courts do not sit in appeal against the arbitral
award. The permissible grounds for interference
with a domestic award Under Section 34(2-A) on
the ground of patent illegality is when the
arbitrator takes a view which is not even a
possible one, or interprets a Clause in the contract
in such a manner which no fair-minded or
reasonable person would, or if the arbitrator
commits an error of jurisdiction by wandering
outside the contract and dealing with matters not
allotted to them. An arbitral award stating no
reasons for its findings would make itself
susceptible to challenge on this account. The
conclusions of the arbitrator which are based on
no evidence or have been arrived at by ignoring
vital evidence are perverse and can be set aside on
the ground of patent illegality. Also, consideration
of documents which are not supplied to the other
party is a facet of perversity falling within the
expression ‘patent illegality’.
26. Section 34(2) (b) refers to the other grounds
on which a court can set aside an arbitral award. If
a dispute which is not capable of settlement by
arbitration is the subject-matter of the award or if
the award is in conflict with public policy of
India, the award is liable to be set aside.
Explanation (1), amended by the 2015
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Amendment Act, clarified the expression ‘public
policy of India’ and its connotations for the
purposes of reviewing arbitral awards. It has been
made clear that an award would be in conflict
with public policy of India only when it is induced
or affected by fraud or corruption or is in violation
of Section 75 or Section 81 of the 1996 Act, if it is
in contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law or if it is in conflict with the most basic
notions of morality or justice.
In Ssangyong (supra), this Court held that the
meaning of the expression ‘fundamental policy of
Indian law’ would be in accordance with the
understanding of this Court in Renusagar Power
Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.
MANU/SC/0195/1994 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644.
In Renusagar (supra), this Court observed that
violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
1973, a statute enacted for the ‘national economic
interest’, and disregarding the superior courts in
India would be antithetical to the fundamental
policy of Indian law. Contravention of a statute
not linked to public policy or public interest
cannot be a ground to set at naught an arbitral
award as being discordant with the fundamental
policy of Indian law and neither can it be brought
within the confines of ‘patent illegality’ as
discussed above. In other words, contravention of
a statute only if it is linked to public policy or
public interest is cause for setting aside the award
as being at odds with the fundamental policy of
Indian law. If an arbitral award shocks the
conscience of the court, it can be set aside as
being in conflict with the most basic notions of
justice. The ground of morality in this context has
been interpreted by this Court to encompass
awards involving elements of sexual morality,
such as prostitution, or awards seeking to validate
agreements which are not illegal but would not be
enforced given the prevailing mores of the day.
27. In light of the principles elucidated herein for
interference with an arbitral award by a court in
exercise of its jurisdiction Under Section 34 of the
1996 Act, we proceed to consider the questions
that arise in these Appeals as to whether the
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Division Bench of the High Court was right in
setting aside the award of the Arbitral Tribunal
dated 11.05.2017.
SCOPE OF SECTION 34 OF THE ACT
8. In judgment Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd (supra),
Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically observed that every error
of law committed by the Arbitral Tribunal would not fall within
the expression ‘patent illegality’ nor erroneous application of law
or contravention of law not linked to public policy or public
interest is within the scope of the expression ‘patent illegality’.
Furthermore, courts are further restrained from re-appreciating
the evidence to conclude that the award suffers from patent
illegality. However, courts u/s 34 of the Act can interfere into the
award on the ground of patent illegality when:
a) The arbitrator takes a view which is not even a possible
or interprets a Clause in the contract in such a manner which no
fair-minded or reasonable person would; or
b) If the arbitrator commits an error of jurisdiction by
wandering outside the contract and dealing with matters not
allotted to them; or
c) Where an arbitral award failed to state reasons for its
findings; or
d) The conclusions of the arbitrator which are based on no
evidence or have been arrived at by ignoring vital evidence are
perverse; orARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 13/24
e) On the ground of conflict with public policy of India
i.e. when it is induced or affected by fraud or corruption or is in
violation of Section 75 or Section 81 of the 1996 Act; or
f) If it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian Law i.e. contravention of a statute only if, it is linked to
public policy or public interest; or
g) If an arbitral award shocks the conscience of the court;
h) If it is in conflict with the most basic notions of
morality or justice i.e. awards involving elements of sexual
morality, such as prostitution, or awards seeking to validate
agreements which are not illegal but would not be enforced
given the prevailing mores of the day.
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS
9. In light of the law discussed above, coming to the present
objections so raised by the petitioner, it is the first contention that
despite specific request from the petitioner, Ld. Arbitrator refused
to hold personal hearing by merely observing that there was no
need for one as the matter could be disposed on the basis of the
available record.
10. In this regard, this Court finds it pertinent to refer to Rule
11 of the INDRP Rules of Procedure (placed on record by the
petitioner), reproduced as follows for the sake of convenience:
“11. In-person hearings
There shall be no in-person hearings (including
hearings by teleconference, videoconference, andARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 14/24
web conference), unless the Arbitrator agrees on
request of either or both parties, that such a
hearing is necessary for deciding the Complaint.
In event , a personal hearing takes place; the same
shall be subject to maximum of two hearings.”
11. As such, from the said provision it is apparent that the
Arbitrator is at the discretion to allow in-person hearing on the
request of one or both parties, if Arbitrator considers the same to
be necessary for deciding the complaint. In the present case,
Arbitrator having found that an in-person hearing is not
necessary for disposal of the matter before him, and material
available on record is sufficient for the purpose, the same is
reason enough in the opinion of this Court to decline the request
for an in-person hearing made by the petitioner.
12. However, for the sake of arguments even if it is taken that
the Ld. Arbitrator indeed failed to provide cogent reasons for
declining to hold an in-person hearing despite request of
petitioner, it is pertinent to note herein the observations of
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Naresh Kumar Bajaj v. Bunge
India Pvt. Ltd. OMP (Comm) 228/2019 which are as follows:
“70. The ground of “patent illegality” is applied
when there is a contravention of the substantive
law of India, the Arbitration Act or the rules
applicable to the substance of the dispute. In
Hindustan Zinc Limited vs Friends Coal
Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445, The Hon’ble
Apex Court referred to the principles laid down in
Saw Pipes (supra) and clarified that it is open to
the court to consider whether an award is against
the specific terms of contract, and if so, interfere
with it on the ground that it is patently illegal and
opposed to the public policy of India. Though the
Supreme court in State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. vs.
SAL Udyog Pvt. Ltd. (2022) 2 SCC 275 as well,
held that an award in blatant disregard of theARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 15/24
express terms of the agreement suffers from
patent illegality, the court had also made a
reference to Associate Builders (supra) wherein it
was observed that the term “patent illegality” does
not apply to every legal mistake made by the
arbitral tribunal. Furthermore, the term “patent
illegality” does not apply to legal violations that
are unrelated to matters of public policy or
interest.”
13. In view of the above law, it is apparent that patent
illegality u/s 34 of Arbitration Act is limited to contraventions of
substantive law only. Furthermore, not every legal mistake of the
arbitral tribunal falls within the scope of patent illegality. As
such, even if it is taken that the Ld. Arbitrator failed to assigned
cogent reasons for declining a request for in-person hearing, the
same, if at all, being a procedural irregularity will not be covered
under the scope of Section 34 of Arbitration Act as ground
enough for setting aside of the impugned arbitral award dt.
17.11.2017. Therefore, this Court finds no merit in the said
contention of the petitioner.
14. It is the further contention of petitioner that Ld. Arbitrator
placed undue reliance on “www.web.archive.org” to conclude
continuous use by the Respondent. In this regard, it is pertinent to
note the observation of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Hulm
Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Fantasy Sports Myfab11 Pvt.
Ltd. & Ors. CS (COMM) 244/2022 which are as follows:
“30. Similar documents in the nature of website
details, Facebook posts, WhoIS and Wayback
Machine screenshots have been filed by the
Defendants with respect to some of the other apps
to demonstrate that these apps were created andARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 16/24
existed prior to that of the Plaintiffs. Wayback
Machine is a tool offered by the website “Internet
Archive” that provides access to a digital library
of internet sites in digital form and the said
service makes it possible to serve the records of
saved URLs on the web archives of internet
archives. In order to avoid burdening the
judgment, this Court is not extracting the
screenshots of the said documents, but as is prima
facie evident from the afore-extracted screenshots
in respect of app SIXER, gaming mobile apps
containing the stock market feature, permitting
buying and selling of players, existed prior to
Plaintiffs’ app. For the sake of completeness, I
may only refer to a few features brought out by
the Defendants, with respect to the other mobile
apps and which the Defendants have shown to
exist prior to that of the Plaintiffs. ‘World Cup
Cricket Stock Market APK’ as admitted by the
Plaintiffs was an application created for cricket
world cup, 2015 albeit the stand is that the
application cannot be accessed as on 04.05.2022,
when the written note was filed. The
distinguishing feature according to the Plaintiffs is
the feature in EXCHANGE22, which allows the
player to buy/sell stocks only for the duration of
the match. Defendants claim that screenshots
show listing of players with ‘price’ and users are
allowed to buy and sell stocks of their favourite
cricket players and see the value rise and fall
based on real life performance during cricket
world cup 2015. In respect of ‘Prediction Strike’
while Plaintiffs claim that it was launched in
September, 2019 i.e. subsequent to Plaintiffs’
launch and have attempted to highlight the feature
that players are initially valued by the developer
and thereafter prices are guided by market forces
of demand and supply, Defendants urge that the
WhoIs dated 19.05.2018 and Wayback Machine
dated 11.10.2018 show the launch prior to that of
Plaintiffs’ app and the commonality in the feature
is buy and own shares of favourite players as a
real stock and value depends on their performance
and supply and demand. Screenshots of the
application show ‘number of shares’, ‘total
holdings’, ‘portfolio’ and ‘account’. In the same
fashion, Defendants have pointed out the launch
of applications Trade Stars, TradeFan, CricStocksARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 17/24
etc. prior to EXCHANGE22 and have placed on
record supporting documents. It is thus prima
facie evident and needs to be reiterated that from
the documents filed by the Defendants,
particularly, the screenshots of the Wayback
Machine and WhoIs data that some of the
applications of the third parties, as referred to
above, were launched prior to EXCHANGE22
and do incorporate the trading/stock features,
whereby players could be bought and sold by the
user. As a further illustration, I may refer to
‘Prediction Strike’, which has the feature of “Buy
and own ‘shares’ of your favourite players just like
you would a real stock”, the value of players
depends on their performance as well as supply
and demand.”
15. From the above observations of the Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi, it is apparent that the www.web.archive.org. i.e., Wayback
Machine is a source of internet sites in digital form and serves as
a record of saved URLs on web archives of internet archives.
Further, the same has been seen as a reliable source in legal
proceedings evident from the aforementioned observations of
Hon’ble High Court relying upon the same to determine the
factual dispute between the parties therein. As such, the
contention of the petitioner that undue significance has been
given to said website to come to a finding of fact by the Ld.
Arbitrator holds no merit.
16. Further, it is the contention of the petitioner Ld. Arbitrator
has misapplied Para 4 of the INDRP Rules as laid down in
Stephen Koenig v. Arbitrator, NIXI 2011 DHC 6410 wherein it
was observed that Para 4 of INDRP is to be interpreted to mean
that a complainant can succeed if he proves that either the ground
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 18/24
in sub-para (i) exists by itself or grounds in sub-paras (ii) and (iii)
exist.
17. In this regard, petitioner has contended that it did satisfy
the conditions in sub-para (i), however
a. Ld. Arbitrator wrongly dismissed the Petitioners’ claim on
the basis that the Respondent was the “first user,” ignoring
material evidence that petitioners’ primary domain
“www.cars24.com” was registered in 2001, whereas the disputed
domain “www.cars24.in” was registered only in 2007, and that
respondent was neither commonly known by the mark “Cars24”
nor had applied for its registration.
b. Ld. Arbitrator failed to return a clear finding on the
similarity between the disputed domain name “www.cars24.in”
and the Petitioners’ registered trademark “Cars24.”
c. Registered trademark rights of the Petitioners were not
given due weight, and despite acknowledging similarity, Ld.
Arbitrator incorrectly allowed the Respondent to continue using
the domain name.
d. Ld. Arbitrator ignored crucial evidence such as trade
certificates and business establishment documents, proof of
extensive marketing and advertising expenditure (approx. ₹45
crore), and audio-visual advertisements and supporting
annexures.
e. That Ld. Arbitrator accepted the respondent’s bald
assertions of business use of disputed domain name since 2007
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 19/24
without any documentary corroboration or evidence produced in
this regard.
18. Before proceeding further with said contention, this Court
deems it appropriate to discuss in here the observations of
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Stephen Koenig v. Arbitrator,
NIXI 2011 DHC 6410 as regards the interpretation of Para 4 of
INDRP Rules, which is as follows:
“29. Para 4 INDRP is different from Para 4 (a)
UNDRP in a significant way. While each of the
sub-paras (i) to (iii) of Para 4 (a) of UNDRP are
required to be ‘proved’ by the complainant
cumulatively, as far as Para 4 INDRP is concerned
the complainant can file a complaint on the
‘premises’ outlined in sub-paras (i) to (iii) of Para
4. There is no requirement that “each of the three
elements” are shown to exist. If this is understood
in light of the fact that the conjoint “and” is
missing at the end of sub-para (i) of Para 4
INDRP, then it is possible to interpret Para 4
INDRP to mean that a complainant can succeed if
he proves that the ground in sub-para (i) exists by
itself. Alternatively, he can succeed if he proves
that the grounds in sub-paras (ii) and (iii) exist.
30. Taking up the ground in Para 4 (i) INDRP, it is
seen that Respondent No. 2 was required to
establish that (a) the domain name registered in
favour of the Petitioner was identical or
confusingly similar to the registered trademark of
Respondent No. 2 and (b) that Respondent No. 2
had rights in the trademark. By and large Para 4
(i) INDRP mirrors the law relating to passing off
and infringement of trademarks. In Satyam
Infoway Limited v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Limited
(2004) 6 SCC 145 the Supreme Court held that “a
domain name may have all the characteristics of a
trademark and could found an action for passing
off”. It was observed that “Ordinary
consumers/users seeking to locate the functions
available under one domain name may be
confused if they accidentally arrived at a different
but similar website which offers no such services.
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 20/24
Such users could well conclude that the first
domain name had misrepresented its goods or
services through its promotional activities, and the
first domain owner would thereby lose its
custom.” For the purpose of passing off, it was
necessary that the complaint has to establish that
there was likelihood of confusion in the minds of
the public (the word ‘public’ being understood to
mean actual or potential customers or users)
allowing for ‘imperfect recollection of a person of
ordinary memory’.”
19. In view of the above law, it is apparent that the petitioner
herein was required to satisfy either conditions laid down in sub-
para (i) of Para 4 INDRP or conditions in sub-para (ii) and (iii)
cumulatively. To satisfy the requirements in sub-para (i) of Para 4
INDRP, the petitioner was required to establish that firstly, the
domain name of the respondent was identical or confusingly
similar to the registered trademark of the petitioner and secondly,
the petitioner had rights in the trademark.
20. The petitioner does not seem to contend the finding of Ld.
Arbitrator on similarity of the disputed domain name of the
respondent to the trademark of the petitioner but heavily contests
that the rights of the petitioner in the trademark were ignored by
Ld. Arbitrator by holding that the respondent was a “first user”
without giving due consideration to the fact that domain name of
the petitioner was registered way back in 2001.
21. As regards the contention of the petitioner, the condition
for satisfaction of the sub-para (i) of Para 4 INDRP is right of the
petitioner in the registered trademark. The same has been
exhaustively dealt with by the Ld. Arbitrator by observing as
follows:
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 21/24
“The tribunal considers that even though the
Complainant is a registered proprietor of the
trademark “Cars24” since 2016 and using the
same since 2015, it cannot prevent the respondent
from using the disputed domain name which is in
Respondent’s use since 2007. The tribunal for its
finding gets strength from the provisions of
Section 34 of the Trademarks Act 1999, which
provides that the proprietor of a trademark does
not have right to prevent the use by another party
of an identical or similar mark where that user
commenced prior to the user or date of
registration of the registered proprietor. It is
settled law that the “first user” rule is a seminal
part of the Trademarks Act 1999 and has always
enjoyed pre-eminence.
Keeping the above in view the Tribunal holds that
even though the disputed domain name of the
respondent is identical or similar to the registered
trademark of the Complainant, it does not
preclude the Respondent from using the same.”
22. This finding of the Ld. Arbitrator is contested by petitioner
by stating that the Ld. Arbitrator did not consider that the domain
name of the petitioner was registered in 2001 while the domain
name of the respondent was registered only in 2007. In this
regard, it is pertinent to mention that for satisfaction of sub-para
(i) of Para 4 INDRP, the rights in a registered trademark are to be
established not the domain name. Since the trademark “Cars24”
was registered by the petitioner admittedly in 2015-16, this Court
find no fault in the aforementioned finding of the Ld. Arbitrator
as regards rights of the petitioner in the registered trademark
“Cars24”. Further, said finding of the Ld. Arbitrator also gives a
clear observation as regards the similarity between disputed
domain name and trademark of the petitioner.
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 22/24
23. Further petitioner’s contention that Ld. Arbitrator accepted
the respondent’s bald assertions of business use of disputed
domain name since 2007 without any documentary corroboration
or evidence produced in this regard finds no merit. Perusal of the
impugned arbitral award clearly reveals that the finding of the
Ld. Arbitrator on use of disputed domain name by respondent is
supported by his assessment of www.web.archive.org wherein it
was found that the disputed domain name was in continuous
operation since 2007. As such, the finding of the Ld. Arbitrator is
not based on bald assertions of the respondent as contested by the
petitioner and does not require any interference of this Court.
24. Further, it is the contention of the petitioner that Ld.
Arbitrator wrongly held that the disputed domain name was not
registered or used in bad faith, without appreciating that the
respondent was engaged in large-scale domain squatting by
registering multiple domain names identical or confusingly
similar to well-known brands, without any functional websites.
Further, it is contended that Ld. Arbitrator did not appreciate that
the respondent had failed to prove that disputed domain name
was being used in connection with any “bona fide offering of
goods or services” as required by Paragraph 7 of the INDRP
Rules.
25. Both these contentions have already been considered by
the Ld. Appellate Arbitral Tribunal and findings thereon have
been recorded with reasons. Further, these contentions of the
petitioner are outside the purview of objections under Section 34
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 23/24
Arbitration Act as the same requires re-appreciation of evidence
and material on record by this Court.
26. As such, the entire impugned award does not show or
reflect that the same is against the public policy or there is any
patent illegality in the same so as to find interference of this
Court with the observations made therein by the Ld. Arbitrator.
27. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no
ground to interfere in the impugned order dated 17.11.2017 so
passed by Ld. Arbitrator. Accordingly, objection so filed by the
petitioner u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act stands
dismissed.
28. File be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Announced in the open Court Digitally signed
by ANUBHAV
ANUBHAV JAIN
on 17.02.2026 JAIN Date:
2026.02.17
15:57:29 +0530
(Anubhav Jain)
District Judge-05 (New Delhi District)
Patiala House Courts, New Delhi
Note: This Judgment contains 24 pages and each page has been
signed by me.
ARBTN/299/2018 GLOBE CAR GROUP v. VIENNA SOLUTIONS Page nos. 24/24
