Supreme Court of India
Rakesh Mittal vs Ajay Pal Gupta, Alias Sonu Chaudhary on 17 February, 2026
2026 INSC 161 Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ……………. OF 2026
(@ Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 19708 of 2025)
Rakesh Mittal … Appellant
versus
Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary and another … Respondents
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KUMAR, J
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant is the complainant in FIR No. 0568 dated 29.12.2023,
registered under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 506 of the
Indian Penal Code, 18601, on the file of P.S. Risiya, District Bahraich, Uttar
Pradesh. He is aggrieved by the grant of bail to an accused therein., viz.,
Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary, respondent No.1, vide order dated
12.11.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 9871 of 2025 by
a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench.
3. The case of the complainant was that he had supplied foodgrains to
the four named accused in the FIR, including respondent No.1, but he was
Signature Not Verified
paid only ₹5,02,57,000/- out of the total sum due and payable to him, i.e.,
Digitally signed by
babita pandey
Date: 2026.02.17
17:09:11 IST
Reason:
1 For short, ‘IPC’
1
₹11,52,38,156/-. He claimed that cheques were issued but when those
cheques were presented, they were dishonoured for want of funds. He
further claimed that his inquiries had revealed that the accused conspired
with each other, prepared forged documents with false and fabricated
addresses, including Aadhaar Cards, and had cheated him. Documents
were filed in proof of respondent No.1 showing his own name and his
father’s name differently on separate occasions.
4. When notice was ordered in this matter on 24.11.2025, this Court
was informed that respondent No. 1 had not yet been released from prison
pursuant to the impugned bail order. Noting the same, this Court directed
that, if that be so, the impugned order should not be given effect to.
In consequence, respondent No.1 still remains incarcerated.
5. We may note that respondent No.1, being accused No.1 in the FIR,
was arrested only on 08.08.2025 after absconding for over one and a half
years. The learned Sessions Judge, Bahraich, rejected his plea for grant
of bail, vide order dated 29.08.2025 in Bail Application No. 2512 of 2025.
Therein, the learned Sessions Judge, apart from noting various other
aspects, found that respondent No.1 had deliberately made a false
statement before the Court by suppressing the fact that there were three
other FIRs registered against him in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi.
6. Respondent No.1 then approached the High Court by way of the
subject application on 03.09.2025. By the impugned order, the learned
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Judge noted his plea that he was entitled to parity, as his co-accused, viz.,
Devender Pal Singh was granted bail on 07.11.2025 and another
co-accused, Uma Shankar Mishra, had been granted anticipatory bail
even earlier on 18.08.2025. The learned Judge held that, in the light of the
co-accused’s bail orders; the period that respondent No.1 had remained
in prison; the fact that the chargesheet had been filed; and as the offence
was triable by a Magistrate, respondent No.1 was entitled to grant of bail,
subject to conditions. This order is the cause for grievance presently.
7. Notably, Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 644 of 2024 filed by
respondent No.1 before the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench,
seeking quashing of the subject FIR No. 0568 of 2023 was dismissed as
withdrawn on 30.01.2024.
8. The State of Uttar Pradesh, respondent No.2 herein, filed a counter
affidavit. Therein, it stated that after the registration of the FIR on
29.12.2023, after investigation and upon discovery of the ingredients of
criminal breach of trust, Section 409 IPC was also added. Notices were
stated to have been issued to all the four accused but respondent No.1
and his co-accused, Vijay Pal Gupta, could not be found as the furnished
addresses were incorrect and fictitious. The investigation was then
transferred to the Crime Branch, Bahraich, from P.S. Risiya, pursuant to
the order dated 31.07.2024 of the Senior Superintendent of Police, as the
offence involved cross jurisdictional operations resulting in loss of ₹6.5
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crores to the complainant. According to the State, respondent No.1 used
the following names/aliases – Ajay Pal Gupta, Sonu Chaudhary, Gautam
Agrawal, Shubham Gupta, Shivam Agarwal, Kamla Kant Tiwari, Shaurya
Dudulani and Sonu Seth. He was finally arrested on 08.08.2025 and three
Aadhaar cards, two showing his name as Sonu Chaudhary s/o Sobharam,
with different addresses in Delhi, and one showing his name as Gautam
Agarwal s/o Bhagwan Das Agarwal, with an address in Ghaziabad, Uttar
Pradesh, along with a PAN card in the name of Gautam Agarwal s/o
Bhagwan Das Agarwal, were recovered from his possession apart from
other incriminating documents. All the fake IDs had his picture and even
his father’s name was changed from Sobharam to Bhagwan Das Agarwal.
The chargesheet was filed against him on 23.10.2025.
9. The State pointed out that respondent No.1 had remained a fugitive
for more than 20 months since registration of the FIR and despite a picture
publication and raids conducted across Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, he
remained untraceable until 08.08.2025. It was stated that respondent No.1
was apprehended only after declaration and payment of a reward of
₹51,000/- to facilitate his capture. The State referred to the three known
criminal antecedents of respondent No.1 in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. It
stated that, insofar as FIR No. 229 of 2017 registered in Delhi was
concerned, respondent No.1 had secured bail and did not co-operate
thereafter during the trial. Even the address of the surety furnished by him
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was found to be fictitious. His co-accused, Vijay Pal Gupta @ Jivan Saini,
whose real name was found to be Jivan Kaushik, was also arrested on
12.11.2025. According to the State, respondent No.1 had been operating
under different names, as he had as many as 8 to 10 aliases with forged
Aadhaar cards and PAN card, making it difficult to track and verify his
criminal antecedents comprehensively against multiple jurisdictions. The
investigation conclusively established that respondent No.1 was the
principal offender and the master-mind behind the offence. The State
asserted that the High Court had failed to take a holistic view of the matter
while directing his release on bail. It was pointed out that even the surety
furnished by him in this case was not found at the given address.
10. In the affidavit filed in support of his application to vacate the stay
granted on 24.11.2025, respondent No.1 stated that his name was
correctly recorded as Sonu Chaudhary in FIR No.229 of 2017. He further
stated that his father’s name was correctly mentioned in his Aadhaar card,
PAN card, Passport and Vehicle Registration Certificate as Sh. Shobha
Ram. In a separate counter affidavit filed on his behalf, it was stated that
there were only 2 FIRs registered against respondent No.1, i.e., FIR
No.229 of 2020 [sic 2017] registered under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471,
506, 120B and 34 IPC on the file of P.S. Geeta Colony, District Shahdara,
Delhi, and the subject FIR No. 0568 of 2023 under Sections 406, 419,
420, 467, 468, 471 and 501 IPC on the file of P.S. Risiya, District Bahraich,
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Uttar Pradesh. According to the deponent, when the subject FIR was
registered, the details of the accused were provided by the complainant
or were procured by the Investigating Officer and respondent No.1,
therefore, had no control on how his father’s name was shown.
Respondent No.1 was stated to have been arrested on 26.05.2017 in
connection with FIR No.229 of 2017. He was granted bail on 10.08.2017,
but as he failed to appear before the Trial Court, a non-bailable warrant
was stated to have been issued against him on 26.04.2025.
11. Though the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.1
spoke of only 2 FIRs being registered against him, including the subject
FIR, the order dated 29.08.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge,
rejecting the bail application of respondent No.1, indicates that, apart from
FIR No. 229 of 2017 and the subject FIR No. 0568 of 2023, FIR No.254
of 2022 and FIR No.31 of 2020 were also registered against respondent
No.1. FIR No. 31 of 2020 was registered on the file of P.S. Secunderabad,
District Bulandshahr, under Sections 420 and 406 IPC, while FIR No.254
of 2022 was registered on the file of P.S. Commissionerate, Gautam Budh
Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, under Sections 406, 420 and 120B IPC. We may
also note that FIR No. 229 of 2017 is still dragging on and it appears that
charges have not even been framed in that case till date.
12. At this stage, we may note that one of the grounds that weighed with
the High Court was that the offences against respondent No.1 were triable
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by a Magistrate. However, the High Court overlooked the fact that the
offences now alleged against respondent No.1 include offences under
Section 409 IPC and Section 467 IPC also. Significantly, the punishment
for offences under these provisions can extend to imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term up to ten years. Similarly, some of the other
offences for which respondent No.1 has been hauled up for entail a
possible sentence of imprisonment over three years.
13. Under Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732, a
Magistrate of First Class can pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term
not exceeding three years, while a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass a
sentence of imprisonment, excepting imprisonment for a term exceeding
seven years or a sentence of death or imprisonment for life. A Metropolitan
Magistrate has the same powers as a Magistrate of First Class while a
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is equivalent to a Chief Judicial Magistrate.
14. In that view of the matter, it would always be open to a Magistrate,
if he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the case are exclusively
triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit the case to a Court of Sessions
under Section 209 CrPC or Section 323 CrPC. It may be noted that under
Section 323 CrPC, such power can be exercised by the Magistrate even
2 For short ‘CrPC’
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during the course of the trial. Therefore, the assumption of the High Court
that the case on hand is triable by a Magistrate is premature.
15. We are also conscious of the fact that this is not a case of
cancellation of bail but a challenge to the validity of an order granting bail.
Even in cases of cancellation of bail, the power to do so is not just limited
to occurrence of supervening circumstances as the Court has the inherent
power and discretion to cancel the bail of an accused even in the absence
of supervening circumstances (See Dolat Ram and others vs. State of
Haryana3). One of the grounds enumerated therein, as relevant for
exercise of such power, is where the past criminal record and the conduct
of the accused are completely ignored while granting bail.
16. Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another4 was a case
where bail had been granted to a history-sheeter, charge-sheeted for a
number of heinous offences, on the ground of parity. Observing that liberty
is a priceless treasure for a human being and is a cardinal value on which
civilization rests, this Court cautioned that liberty of an individual would
however not be absolute as society, by its collective wisdom and through
the process of law, can withdraw liberty that has been sanctioned to an
individual when such an individual becomes a danger to the collective and
to the societal order. It was further observed that the High Court must
3 (1995) 1 SCC 349
4 (2014) 16 SCC 508
8
exercise its discretion cautiously and when there is likelihood of offences
being repeated or there is a danger of justice being thwarted by grant of
bail, these are factors which should be taken into consideration while
dealing with an application for bail. It was further observed that
cancellation of bail if the accused misconducted himself or due to some
intervening circumstances is in a different compartment altogether from
examination of an order granting bail which was unjustified, illegal or
perverse. It was held that, if in a case, the relevant factors which should
have been taken into consideration while dealing with the application for
bail have not been taken note of or it is founded on irrelevant
considerations; indisputably, the superior court can set aside such a bail
order. Per this Court, such a case would belong to a different category and
in a separate realm, as it delves into the justifiability and soundness of the
order passed by the Court.
17. Again, in Neeru Yadav vs. State of UP and another5, this Court
observed that a crime, though committed against an individual, may not
retain an individual character as the victim may be an individual but, in the
ultimate eventuate, it is the society which is the victim. Further, observing
that a crime, as is understood, creates a dent in the law-and-order
situation and disturbs orderliness, this Court held that an individual can
5 (2016) 15 SCC 422
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enjoy his liberty which is definitely of paramount value but he cannot be a
law unto himself and he cannot cause harm to others. It was held that an
individual cannot be a nuisance to the collective or a terror to the society.
Reference was made to the observations of E. Barrett Prettyman, Chief
Judge of the US Court of Appeals (Retired), which read thus: –
“In an ordered society of mankind there is no such thing as unrestricted
liberty, either of nations or of individuals. Liberty itself is the product of
restraints; it is inherently a composite of restraints; it dies when restraints
are withdrawn. Freedom, I say, is not an absence of restraints; it is a
composite of restraints. There is no liberty without order. There is no order
without systematised restraint. Restraints are the substance without which
liberty does not exist. They are the essence of liberty. The great problem of
the democratic process is not to strip men of restraints merely because they
are restraints. The great problem is to design a system of restraints which
will nurture the maximum development of man’s capabilities, not in a
massive globe of faceless animations but as a perfect realisation, of each
separate human mind, soul and body; not in mute, motionless meditation
but in flashing, thrashing activity.”Noting that the High Court, in that case, had totally ignored the
criminal antecedents of the accused and what had weighed with the High
Court was only the doctrine of parity, this Court set aside the bail granted
to the accused therein.
18. In Sudha Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another6, a
3-Judge Bench of this Court was dealing with the validity of a bail order
passed in favour of an alleged contract killer. This Court found that the
High Court had simply ignored the criminal antecedents of that accused.
It was observed that though liberty is important, even that of a person
6 (2021) 4 SCC 781
10
charged with crime, it is equally important for the Courts to recognize the
potential threat to life and liberty of victims/witnesses, if such an accused
is released on bail.
19. Though the observations made in some of the above cases were in
the context of heinous offences, which is not the case presently, we may
note that the value of life and liberty of members of society is not limited
only to their ‘person’ but would also extend to the quality of their life,
including their economic well-being. In offences of a pecuniary nature,
where innocent people are cheated of their hard-earned monies by
conmen, who make it their life’s pursuit to exploit and feast upon the
gullibility of others, the aforestated factors must necessarily be weighed
while dealing with the alleged offenders’ pleas for grant of bail.
20. In the case on hand, the investigation against respondent No.1, as
is borne out by the counter affidavit filed by the State, clearly demonstrates
that he is a habitual offender. The number of diverse and unconnected
aliases, fake IDs and the deliberate changes of identity, including his
father’s name, clearly manifest his nefarious intention to dupe innocent
victims and cheat them.
21. Further, the fact that respondent No.1 was granted bail earlier but
chose to indulge in the same activities once again, resulting in the
registration of multiple FIRs over the years, demonstrates that he is a
career criminal and a menace to society. The impugned order reflects that
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his past antecedents were not even taken into consideration. Similarly, his
conduct in the context of the pending case was not noted. Having secured
bail in relation to FIR No. 229 of 2017, respondent No.1 chose to abscond,
resulting in issuance of a non-bailable warrant, which also brought to light
the fact that his surety was not to be found.
22. In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have blindly
extended the parity principle to him without considering the particular and
distinctive features of his individual case. Given the fact that respondent
No.1 has not turned over a new leaf, despite the indulgence shown by
grant of bail in relation to FIR No. 229 of 2017, as evidenced by the FIRs
registered against him over the years, we are of the opinion that letting
him loose on society would only pose a risk and hazard to others.
23. The case law cited on behalf of respondent No.1, in the context of
the value of liberty and the principles applicable to interference with bail
orders, would have to be applied on the strength of the individual facts of
each particular case and insofar as the present case is concerned, we find
that the same have no application, given his antecedents and his past and
present conduct.
24. The impugned order dated 12.11.2025 passed by the Allahabad
High Court, Lucknow Bench, granting bail to respondent No.1, therefore,
cannot be sustained either on facts or in law. The said order is accordingly
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set aside. The State shall, however, ensure that the trial in the case is
expedited by taking all necessary measures.
The appeal is allowed in the aforestated terms.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………………………., J.
SANJAY KUMAR
…………………………., J.
K. VINOD CHANDRAN
February 17, 2026
New Delhi.
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