Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Mritunjoy Roy vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 13 February, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR
CRR 3469 of 2017
IA No. CRAN 1 of 2018 (Old No. CRAN 309 of 2018)
Mritunjoy Roy
-Vs-
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Soumya Nag
For the State : Ms. Faria Hossain
Mr. Aritra Bhattacharya
Hearing concluded on : 05.02.2026
Judgment on : 13.02.2026
UDAY KUMAR, J.: -
1.
By this revisional application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter “the Code”), the petitioner seeks the quashing of
G.R. Case No. 806/2015, presently pending before the Learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Durgapur. The proceedings arise from Pandaveswar
P.S. Case No. 73/2015, registered under Sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 323,
and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner contends that the
proceedings are a mala fide exercise and an abuse of the process of the Court.
2. The case of the prosecution, as adumbrated in the First Information Report
(FIR) and supplemented by the materials collected during the course of
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investigation, is that the petitioner, while employing the Opposite Party No. 2
as a driver, induced him to allow a truck (No. WB 37-7276) to be purchased
and registered in the driver’s name. It is alleged that the petitioner
represented that he was unable to obtain finance in his own name and,
reposing trust in his employer, the driver executed various bank documents,
cheques, and loan agreements.
3. The narrative disclosed in the FIR, and substantiated by the materials in the
Case Diary, reveals a distressing case of alleged fiduciary breach. The
petitioner, while employing Opposite Party No. 2 as a driver, allegedly induced
him to register a truck (No. WB 37-7276) in his own name. The petitioner
represented that his own credit standing prevented him from securing
finance. Relying on this employer-employee trust, the driver executed loan
agreements and bank documents.
4. It is alleged that the petitioner withheld a portion of the driver’s salary for the
down payment and took responsibility for the EMIs. However, by March 2015,
the complainant was saddled with a default notice exceeding Rs. 8.6 lakhs.
When the driver sought redress, he was allegedly met with physical assault
and threats. The vehicle, significantly, is now untraceable.
5. The genesis of this criminal action lies in an application filed by the Opposite
Party No. 2 (complainant) under Section 156(3) of the Code. The complainant,
a driver formerly employed by the petitioner, alleged that the petitioner
induced him to purchase a truck (WB 37-7276) in his name, citing the
petitioner’s own inability to secure finance. It was alleged that the petitioner
withheld part of the complainant’s salary for the down payment and promised
to pay the monthly instalments to the finance company. Later, upon receiving
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a legal notice for default by non-payment of the dues, in March 2015, the
complainant discovered that the petitioner had stopped paying the EMIs while
retaining the profits from the vehicle. When confronted, the petitioner
allegedly threatened the complainant with dire consequences. The
investigation has since revealed a default to the tune of Rs. 8,61,554.93/-, and
the vehicle itself is reportedly untraceable.
6. Mr. Soumya Nag, Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
initiation of the case is a gross abuse of the process of law. He underscored
that the complainant failed to move the Superintendent of Police under
Section 154(3) before approaching the Magistrate. He argues that the
mandatory guidelines laid down by Apex Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State
of U.P. [(2015) 6 SCC 287] were ignored/violated. He further submitted that
the transaction is essentially civil and contractual in nature.
7. Conversely, Mr. Faria Hossain, Learned Counsel for the State and the
Complainant argued that the allegations are serious, involving the forgery of
signatures and cheating of a poor driver, and thus the investigation should
proceed.
8. It was also pointed out that the petitioner, by abusing a fiduciary relationship
of employment, misappropriated the complainant’s identity to secure an asset
and has now saddled the complainant with a massive liability while the
vehicle remains in the petitioner’s unauthorized possession.
9. Two questions arise for consideration: first, whether the procedural lapse in
invoking Section 156(3) is fatal; and second, whether the dispute is purely
civil.
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10. I have carefully considered the submissions and perused the materials on
record. The law regarding the invocation of Section 156(3) is no longer res
integra. In Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. [(2015) 6 SCC 287], the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held:
“30. …a stage has come where Section 156(3) applications are
becoming a routine. They are filed for settling scores… there has to be
prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a
petition under Section 156(3).”
11. The Court further mandated that such applications must be supported by an
affidavit to prevent the criminal law from being set in motion on a whim.
12. In the present case, a perusal of the application under Section 156(3) reveals
a total absence of any reference to Section 154(3). The complainant moved the
Learned Magistrate straightway after allegedly approaching the Police Station.
There is no proof that the higher police authorities were ever informed.
13. The law as declared in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) is intended to serve as a
filter against frivolous litigation. However, a procedural irregularity in
invoking Section 156(3) cannot be treated as a jurisdictional guillotine if the
materials on record prima facie disclose the commission of a serious
cognizable offence. The “affidavit” requirement is a rule of caution, not a tool
to grant immunity to a perpetrator where the Case Diary reveals substantial
incriminating evidence.
14. The distinction between a mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating
is dependent on the intention of the accused at the time of inducement. If the
petitioner induced the complainant to sign documents with the pre-meditated
intent of utilizing the asset for himself while shifting the liability onto a
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subordinate, the “dishonest intention” is present at the inception. In the
present case, the fact that the petitioner facilitated the finance in the name of
a driver who could not afford it, and subsequently defaulted while keeping the
vehicle, points towards a fraudulent design.
15. Even if one were to argue that the finance transaction has civil overtones, the
allegations of Section 323 (hurt) and Section 506 (criminal intimidation) are
distinct criminal acts. The Case Diary contains statements under Section 161
of the Code where witnesses describe the petitioner’s high-handedness. As
held in various decisions of this Court, the existence of a civil profile to a
dispute does not automatically oust the criminal jurisdiction if independent
criminal acts are committed during the course of such dispute.
16. The petitioner seeks to bring his case within the categories of State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335]. However, Category 1 and 5
of the said judgment do not apply here. The allegations are not “inherently
improbable.” On the contrary, in the socio-economic context of employment in
the transport sector, such exploitation of drivers by vehicle owners is a
plausible narrative that requires a full-scale trial.
17. From the extensive discussions above, the following distinctive conclusions
emerge:
a. Where a person in a dominant position (employer) utilizes the identity
of a dependent (employee) to secure financial benefits and
subsequently abandons the liability, such act constitutes a prima
facie case of criminal breach of trust.
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b. A criminal proceeding cannot be quashed merely because the remedy
of a civil suit for recovery is available. The two are not mutually
exclusive if the ingredients of an offence are met.
c. The inherent power of the High Court is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to prevent abuse. Quashing a case where an investigation
has revealed a loss of over Rs. 8 lakhs and physical assault would
itself constitute a failure of justice.
18. In view of the aforesaid discussions, it is clear that Rule of law requires the
Court must not conduct a “mini-trial” at this stage. The Investigating Officer
has seized the agreement and verified the defaults. To stifle the prosecution
now would be to deny the complainant his right to prove a complex fraud.
19. In view of the discussions above, the following orders are passed:
(i) The Criminal Revisional Application being 3469 of 2017 is dismissed.
(ii) I.A No. CRAN 1 of 2018 (Old No. CRAN 309 f 2018) is also disposed of
accordingly.
(iii)The proceedings in G.R. Case No. 806/2015 shall continue in
accordance with the law.
(iv) The Learned Magistrate is directed to expedite the trial and shall not
be influenced by any observations made herein regarding the factual
merits of the case.
20. There shall be no order as to costs.
21. All consequential Interim order/orders, if any, shall stand vacated.
22. The Trial Court Record (TCR), if any, shall be sent down to the Trial Court, at
once.
23. Case diary, if any, be returned forthwith.
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24. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the
parties, as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance with the necessary
formalities in this regard.
(Uday Kumar, J.)
