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HomeUncategorizedDebasish Dey (Das) & Ors vs Rabindra Nath Pal & Ors on...

Debasish Dey (Das) & Ors vs Rabindra Nath Pal & Ors on 13 February, 2026


Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Debasish Dey (Das) & Ors vs Rabindra Nath Pal & Ors on 13 February, 2026

Author: Supratim Bhattacharya

Bench: Supratim Bhattacharya

                    1




13.02.2026
 Ct. No.21
 Item No.2
   (PA)             SA 148 of 2007
                       with
                    CAN 1 of 2006
                    CAN 2 of 2017

                 Debasish Dey (Das) & Ors.
                            Vs
                 Rabindra Nath Pal & Ors.

                 Mr. Kallol Basu
                 Mr. Nilanjan Pal.
                             ...for the
                             defendant/appellant

                 Mr. Ashok Banerjee, Sr. Adv.
                 Mr. Subrata Datta,
                 Ms. S. Sanyal,
                 Ms. K. Sinha.
                                   ...for the
                                      plaintiff/respondent

The present appeal has been preferred by

the defendant/ tenant being aggrieved by and

dissatisfied with the judgment and decree

passed by the Ld. Additional District Judge, Fast

Track Court 1 Alipore, in Title Appeal No. 233 of

2003 dated 30.06.2006.

Factual matrix of the lis is that the

plaintiff/landlord filed a Title Suit being T.S. 26

of 1995 seeking eviction of the tenant from a

self contained flat consisting of three rooms, one

kitchen, one bath-cum-privy and verandah

situated in the ground floor of the building being

12-B, Indra Roy Road, PS Bhawanipur, Kolkata-

700025.

The said title suit has been dismissed by a
2

judgment dated 31.07.2003.

In the present appeal an application has been

filed being CAN 1 of 2006 ( bearing the old No

6410 of 2006) seeking stay of operation of the

judgment and decree passed in the title appeal

and title execution case no. 12 of 2006.

Affidavit-in-opposition has been filed against

the said application for stay and affidavit-in-

reply has also been filed by the petitioners.

Subsequently an application being CAN 2 of

2017 (bearing old No. 7644 of 2017) has been

filed on behalf of the landlords seeking

occupational charges. In respect of this

application also affidavit-in-opposition and

affidavit-in-reply have been filed.

Mr. Kallol Basu, Ld. Senior Counsel

representing the tenant during his exhaustive

submission has stressed upon the fact that the

application seeking occupational charges filed

by the respondent/landlord has been preferred

at a much belated stage. He has stressed upon

the fact that the present appeal was initially

tendered in the year 2006 being SAT 3305 of

2006 which has been renumbered as SA 148 of

2007. He has further submitted that at the time

of filing of the present appeal the application

being CAN 1 of 2006 was filed seeking stay of

operation of the impugned judgment. He has
3

further submitted that the present appeal has

been admitted on 22nd March 2007 and three

substantial questions of law have been framed.

He has also submitted that on the self same day

the application for stay was taken up and stay

of all further proceedings of the Title Execution

case no. 12/2006 pending in 4th Court of the

learned Civil Judge, (Senior Divn.), 4th Court at

Alipore was passed till the disposal of the

application. He has further stressed upon the

point that at the time of passing of an order of

stay the Hon’ble Division Bench did not pass

any order of occupational charge and there was

no cause for implementation of occupational

charge as at that relevant point of time there

was no application filed by the

respondents/landlords seeking occupational

charge. He has further submitted that just in

the year 2017 after a gap of more than ten years

the application seeking occupational charges

have been preferred on behalf of the

respondents/landlords and further submitted

that the present application is time barred and

occupational charges cannot be imposed as per

the provisions of the Limitation Act. In this

context the learned counsel has placed Section 3

(2) (b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and also

Article 137 of the said Act. In support of his
4

contention, the learned counsel has relied upon

a judgment passed by Hon’ble three judges

bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case

between the Kerala State Electrcity Board,

Trivandrum Vs. T.P. Kunhali Umma reported in

(1976) 4 SCC 634. Another judgment passed by

the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case between

State of Punjab Vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar

and ors. and Sumedh Singh Saini Vs. Davinder

Pal Singh Bhullar and Ors. published in (2011)

14 SCC 770 has also been relied. Another

judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

the case between Sameer Kapoor and anr. Vs.

State through Sub-Division Magistrate South,

New Delhi and ors. reported in (2020) 12 SCC

480 has also been placed. He has also relied

upon a judgment of a single bench of this court

in the case between M/s. P. L. Mullick & Co.

Vs. Khaitan Consultation Ltd. and ors. He has

further submitted that the landlords have not

provided any basis on which the occupational

charges can be assessed.

Relying upon the aforementioned judgment

the learned counsel has prayed for dismissal of

the said prayer for occupational charges.

Mr. Ashok Banerjee, learned senior counsel

representing the respondent/landlord during

his exhaustive submission has submitted that
5

the tenant is enjoying the property and stay of

operation of the execution proceedings without

paying any occupational charges. He has

stressed upon the point that in spite of the

judgment of eviction passed by the First

Appellate Court during the year 2006 the

tenants are residing in the suit property that is a

self contained flat without paying any

occupational charge. He has further submitted

that as a consequence of stay, occupational

charges are to imposed and the tenant is to pay

the same. He has further submitted that the

landlord is unable to receive the fruits of the

litigation. Per contra to the submission of the

Ld. Counsel representing the tenant/appellant

the Ld. Counsel has submitted that imposition

of occupational charges is a consequence to the

impleading of stay to the execution proceedings.

He has further submitted that the provisions of

the limitation Act does not come into force as

regards to occupational charges when execution

proceeding has been stayed. In support of his

contention he has relied upon the following

judgments:

First of all Ld. Counsel has relied upon the

judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

the case between Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd.

Vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. and has relied upon
6

Paragraph 7 of the said judgment reported in

(2005) 1 SCC 705, which has dealt with Order

XLI Rule 5 (1) and (3) of the Code of Civil

Procedure. He has further submitted that an

appeal does not operate as a stay of proceedings

under a decree or order appealed from except for

as the appellate court may order. He has

further submitted that no order of stay of

execution shall be made unless the Court

making it is satisfied that substantial loss may

result to the party applying for stay of execution

unless the order is made and that security had

been given by the applicant for due performance

of such decree or order as may ultimately be

binding upon him.

He has also relied upon another judgment

passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case

between Anderson Wright and Company Vs.

Amar Nath Roy and ors. published in AIR 2005

SC 2457. Relying upon the said judgment the

Ld. Senior counsel has submitted that an order

of stay is subject to payment of compensation

for use and occupation.

He has also relied upon another judgment

passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case

between the State of Rajasthan and Ganeshi Lal

published in AIR 2008 SC 690.

He has further relied upon another judgment
7

of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case between

Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar (HUF) Vs. Ashwin

Bhanulal Desai published in (2024) 8 SCC 668.

He has stressed upon the point to ensure

complete justice inter se the parties deposit

has to be made.

He has further submitted that through the

said judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has

opined that it cannot be lost sight of the fact

that the very purpose for which the property is

rented out is to ensure that the landlord by way

of the property is able to secure some income.

He has also relied upon few judgments of this

Court. Among those are a judgment of the

Division Bench passed in the case between

Debonair Vanijaya Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Esrat Jahan @

Ishrat Jahan and another reported in (2024)

SCC Online Calcutta 1178. In this case relying

upon Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd (supra) the

court has imposed money as mesne profit. In

the said judgment it has been stated that the

question of awarding interim mesne profit comes

when the defendant occupying the suit premises

has no defence to contest the case. He has also

relied upon three judgments passed by Hon’ble

Single Bench of this Court reported in 2012 (1)

CHN (CAL) 247, 2015 (4) ICC 17 (CAL) and 2017

(2) ICC 632 (CAL). Relying upon the
8

aforementioned facts and circumstances the

Ld. Senior Counsel representing the landlord

has submitted that occupational charges is to be

imposed while granting stay.

From the contentions of the learned counsels

it transpires that there are two issues which are

to be dealt with.

First issue is as to whether the occupational

charges claimed by the landlord is barred by

limitation or not.

Second issue is as to how much quantum of

money is receivable by the landlord and payable

by the tenant as regards to occupational

charges.

As regards to the occupational charges it has

been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court through

the judgment passed in the case between Atma

Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. Federal Motors (P)

Ltd. published in (2005) 1 SCC 705. In

Paragraph 9 of the said judgment it has been

laid down that “The power to grant stay is

discretionary and flows from the jurisdiction

conferred on an appellate court which is equitable

in nature. To secure an order of stay merely by

preferring an appeal is not a statutory right

conferred on the appellant. So also, an appellate

court is not ordained to grant an order of stay

merely because an appeal has been preferred
9

and an application for an order of stay has been

made. Therefore, an applicant for order of stay

must do equity for seeking equity. Depending on

the facts and circumstances of a given case, an

appellate court, while passing an order of stay,

may put the parties on such terms the

enforcement whereof would satisfy the demand

for justice of the party found successful at the

end of the appeal.”

In Paragraph 19 of the said judgment

following has been laid down :

“(1) While passing an order of stay under Rule

5 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908, the appellate court does have jurisdiction to

put the applicant on such reasonable terms as

would in its opinion reasonably compensate the

decree-holder for loss occasioned by delay in

execution of decree by the grant of stay order, in

the event of the appeal being dismissed and

insofar as those proceedings are concerned. Such

terms, needless to say, shall be reasonable.

(2) In case of premises governed by the

provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in

view of the definition of tenant contained in

clause (l) of Section 2 of the Act, the tenancy does

not stand terminated merely by its termination

under the general law; it terminates with the

passing of the decree for eviction. With effect from
10

that date, the tenant is liable to pay mesne profits

or compensation for use and occupation of the

premises at the same rate at which the landlord

would have been able to let out the premises and

earn rent if the tenant would have vacated the

premises. The landlord is not bound by the

contractual rate of rent effective for the period

preceding the date of the decree.

(3) The doctrine of merger does not have the

effect of postponing the date of termination of

tenancy merely because the decree of eviction

stands merged in the decree passed by the

superior forum at a latter date.”

Thus, from the aforementioned authority it

transpires that tenancy terminates with the

passing of the decree for eviction and with effect

from that date the tenant is liable to pay mesne

profits or compensation for use and occupation

of the premises at the same rate at which the

landlord would have been able to let out the

premises and earn rent if the tenant would have

vacated the premises.

From the judgment passed in Atma Ram

Properties (P) Ltd. (supra) it is crystal clear that

order of stay under Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 and implementation of

mesne profit or compensation or occupational

charge in respect of the suit property go hand in
11

hand and these two are intermingled and

cannot be separated from the other. So a Court

cannot pass an order of stay without passing an

order for occupational charge. A Court has to

provide equity to the parties and to give effect to

the same an order of stay subject to

occupational charges is required to be passed so

that neither the landlord nor the tenant is

deprived of equity. Court has to see that neither

of the parties get prejudiced and to give effect

to that the occupational charges which is to be

imposed has also to be in accordance with the

situation of the suit property.

The occupational charge which has been

sought for by the landlord which is under

challenge by the appellant being barred under

the law of limitation has been filed by the

landlord as compensation for use and

occupation of the premises by the appellant in

spite of having an order of eviction against the

appellant. The appellant has preferred an

application seeking stay of execution

proceedings, which is under Order XLI Rule 5 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in

Paragraph 19 (1) of the said judgment the

Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to state

that while passing an order of stay under Order

XLI Rule 5 (2) and (3) of the said Code the
12

appellate Court does have jurisdiction to put the

applicant on such reasonable terms as would in

its opinion reasonably compensate the decree

holder for loss occasioned by delay in execution

of decree by the grant of stay order, in the event

of the appeal being dismissed and insofar as

those proceedings are concerned such terms

shall be reasonable. So the question of limitation

does not come into effect.

The judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex

court in the case between the Kerala State

Electricity Board, Trivandram Vs. T.P.

Kunhaliumma published in (1976) 4 SCC 634

has dealt with Article 137 of the Limitation Act,

1963. Article 137 of the Limitation Act has laid

down that for any other application for which no

period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this

division the period of limitation is three years

from the time when the right to apply accrues.

So this judgment does not apply in this present

situation.

The other judgment cited been passed by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case between State of

Punjab Vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Ors.

with Sumedh Singh Saini Vs. Davinder Pal

Singh Bhullar and Ors. reported in (2011) 14

SCC 770 has been passed in a criminal

proceeding. In the said judgment waiver of right
13

has been dealt with but in the present case

there has not been any waiver or right by the

landlord. So this judgment is not at all

applicable in this present lis.

The third judgment referred to by the

appellant is the judgment published in (2020)

12 SCC 480 passed in the case between Sameer

Kapoor and another Vs. State through

Sub-Divisional Magistrate South, New Delhi and

Ors. This citation is also not applicable as it

deals with succession proceeding. The said

judgment is not at all applicable in the present

case.

Lastly a judgment passed by a Ld. Single

Judge of this Court in the case between M/s. P.L

Mallick and Company Vs. Khaitan Consultation

Ltd. and Ors. which has been cited is also not

applicable as because in the said case

modification of an order of occupational charge

passed by a Hon’ble Division Bench had been

sought for which has been dismissed by the

learned Single Judge. The said judgment is also

not at all attracted in the present lis.

Thus from the aforementioned discussion it is

clear that the issue of limitation is not attracted

herein as regards to implementation of

occupational charge
14

Now as regards to the quantum of

occupational charge. From the schedule set out

in the decree that is the description of the suit

property it transpires that it is one self

contained flat in the ground floor of the premises

No.12-B Indra Roy Road, PS- Bhawanipur,

Calcutta-700025 comprising of three rooms

together with one kitchen one bath-cum-privy

and one verandah. In support of his contention

the landlord has furnished a tenancy agreement

dated 18.08.2014 in respect flat No.1 situated in

the ground floor at 12-B, Indra Roy Road,

Kolkata -700025, revealing the rent to be Rs.

14,000/- but nowhere in the said agreement the

area/extent of tenancy has been mentioned.

Through the said application for

occupational charge the landlord has sought for

RS. 21,000/-, per month and has mentioned

that the flat in question is measuring about 600

sq. ft. In response to the contentions of the

landlord the appellants have provided photocopy

of challans revealing deposition of rent of Rs.

207/- per month in respect of a ground floor flat

consisting of two bed rooms, one kitchen, one

verandah, one bath and privy and one store

room of the same building that is 12-B Indra

Roy Road and has also furnished two rent

receipts in respect of one tenancy comprising of
15

one room , kitchen and common verandah privy

in the ground floor of the premises No.7/B Indra

Roy Road, Kolkata -700025, wherefrom it

reveals that monthly rent is Rs. 1200/- per

month during the year 2023.

Taking into consideration all the documents

furnished by both the parties including the

photocopy of the rent receipts and also

considering the locality, number of rooms,

separate usage of amenities such as bath and

verandah this Court is of the view that Rs.

8000/- per month as occupational charge is

justiceable and will not prejudice either of the

parties.

Accordingly I.A. No. CAN 1 of 2006 (old

CAN NO. 6410 of 2006) being an application

filed by the appellants seeking stay of operation

of judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal

No. 233 of 2003 and Title Execution case No. 12

of 2006 and the interim application No. CAN 2

of 2017 (Old CAN No. 7644 of 2017) filed by

the respondents for payment of occupational

charges are disposed of without any order as to

costs, by granting stay of operation of impugned

decree and execution proceeding till disposal of

the appeal on condition that the appellants

shall pay to the respondents Rs. 8000/- per

month as occupation charge.

16

The first of the current payment for the

month of February, 2026 shall be made by 28th

of February, 2026 and thereafter the current

payment of occupation charge for each month

shall be made by the last day of the said month.

The arrears of occupation charge at the same

rate that is Rs. 8000/- per month from the

month of the impugned decree till January,

2026 shall be paid to the respondents by the

appellants in six equal monthly installments

(rounded of to the nearest whole number), the

first of which shall be paid by the 15th day of

March 2026 and thereafter within the 15th day

of each succeeding month till the entire arrear

is cleared of.

In default of any of the above payments, the

stay order shall stand automatically vacated

without further reference to the Court.

All such payments shall be made by online

transfers to the account of the respondents, the

particulars of which shall be communicated in

writing to the Ld. Advocate on record for the

appellants by the Ld. Advocate on record for the

respondents within 20th February, 2026.

Trial Court record and First Appellate Court

record be called for. On arrival of both the

records and if both the records are found to be

in order the learned counsel representing the
17

appellants is to be intimated.

Requisite number of informal paper books are

required to be prepared within 4 (four) weeks

from the date of intimation to the learned

counsel by the department.

After all the formalities being completed the

parties are at liberty to mention.

(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)



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