Supreme Court of India
Narayan Das vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 17 July, 2025
2025 INSC 872
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
EXTRAORDINARY CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. OF 2025
[Diary No. 30825/2025]
NARAYAN DAS Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Delay condoned.
2. The petitioner was put to trial in the Court of Special
Judge (NDPS Act), Surguja, Ambikapur, District-Surguja (C.G.)
in Special Criminal (NDPS) Case No.04/2019 for the offence
punishable under Section 21(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short “the NDPS Act”).
3. It is the case of the prosecution that on 20 th September,
2018, the Investigating Officer attached with the Ambikapur,
police station received information that two individuals namely
Ambika Vishwakarma and Narayan Das (petitioner herein) were
standing on the side of the main road of Parsa and were in
possession of psychotropic substance in a bag.
4. A search was undertaken of the two individuals and the
same resulted in seizure of R.C. Kuff cough syrup in all 143
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
CHANDRESH
Date: 2025.07.18
vials each containing 100ml, Codectus cough Syrup 70 vials each
17:35:13 IST
Reason:
containing 100ml and Elderqurex cough syrup 23 vials each
1
containing 100ml with labels containing a substance CodeinePhosphate. In all 236 vials were recovered from the possession
of the petitioner herein along with the co-accused.
5. At the end of the trial the petitioner herein stood
convicted and was sentenced to undergo 12 years of rigorous
imprisonment with fine of Rs.1,00,000/-. The petitioner went in
appeal before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the
appeal. However, while dismissing the appeal, the High Court
reduced the sentence of 12 years as imposed by the trial court
to 10 years i.e. the minimum as provided under the NDPS Act.
6. We heard Mr. Ashish Pandey, the learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner.
7. This is a legal aid matter.
8. Manifold contentions were raised by the learned counsel
to persuade us to take the view that the entire seizure was
vitiated as the same suffered from serious infirmities.
9. There is no good reason for us to disturb the impugned
judgment of the High Court dismissing the appeal. However,
there is something which we have noticed and must not be
ignored. The High Court seems to be labouring under a serious
misconception of law so far as the interpretation of Section
32-B of the NDPS Act is concerned.
10. The High Court from paragraph 25 onwards has observed
thus:-
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“25. The last contention that has been raised on behalf of
the appellants is that without assigning any special
reason, the learned trial Court has awarded sentence for a
period of 12 years to the appellants, which is more than
the minimum sentence prescribed for offence under Section
21(c) of the NDPS Act.
26. Section 32B of the NDPS Act states about the facts to
be taken into account for imposing higher than the
minimum punishment, which reads as under:
“Where a minimum term of imprisonment or amount
of fine is prescribed for any offence committed
under this Act, the court may, in addition to
such factors as it may deem fit, take into
account the following factors for imposing a
punishment higher than the minimum term of
imprisonment or amount of fine, namely:–
(a) the use or threat of use of violence or arms
by the offender;
(b) the fact that the offender holds a public
office and that he has taken advantage of that
office in committing the offence;
(c) the fact that the minors are affected by the
offence or the minors are used for the commission
of an offence;
(d) the fact that the offence is committed in an
educational institution or social service
facility or in the immediate vicinity of such
institution or faculty or in other place to which
school children and students resort for
educational, sports and social activities.;
(e) the fact that the offender belongs to
organised international or any other criminal
group which is involved in the commission of the
offences; and
(f) the fact that the offender is involved in
other illegal activities facilitated by
commission of the offence.”
27. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rafiq Qureshi (supra)
has held that in a case where the court imposes a punishment
higher than minimum relying on an irrelevant factor and no
other facts as enumerated in Sections 32B(a) to (f) is
present, award of sentence higher than minimum can be
interfere with and observed in Para-23 & 24 as under:
“23. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of
the view that punishment awarded by the trial court
of a sentence higher than the minimum relying on the
quantity of substance cannot be faulted even though
the Court had not adverted to the factors mentioned
in clauses (a) to (b) as enumerated under Section
32B. However, when taking any factor into3
consideration other than the factors enumerated in
Section 32B, (a) to (f), the Court imposes a
punishment higher than the minimum sentence, it can
be examined by higher Courts as to whether factor
taken into consideration by the Court is a relevant
factor or not. Thus in a case where Court imposes a
punishment higher than minimum relying on a
irrelevant factor and no other factor as enumerated
in Section 32B(a to f) are present award of sentence
higher than minimum can be interfered with.
24. In the present case The High Court held that
although gross quantity of 8.175 Kg. of Heroin was
alleged to have been recovered from the appellant
but actual quantity of Heroine which was found to be
in possession was only 609.6 gm. The High Court held
that since the appellant was found in possession of
Narcotic Drugs as per the analysis report to 609.6
gm. which is much higher than the commercial
quantity, punishment higher than the minimum is
justified. The High Court reduced the punishment
from 18 years to 16 years. We, thus, uphold the
judgment of the trial court and the High Court
awarding the punishment higher than the minimum,
however, looking to all the facts and circumstances
of the present case including the fact that it was
found by the High Court that the appellant was only
a carrier, we find that the ends of justice will be
sub-served in reducing the sentence from 16 years to
12 years. Thus, while maintaining the conviction of
the appellant the appellant is sentenced to undergo
12 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2
lakh and in default of payment of such fine the
appellant shall further undergo for a simple
imprisonment for six months. The appeal is partly
allowed to the extent as indicated above.”
28. As such, in view of discussion made hereinabove, in
light of Section 32B of the NDPS Act coupled with above-
quoted principle of law laid down in Rafiq Qureshi (supra),
since no specific or any special reason has been assigned by
the learned trial Court for awarding sentence higher than
minimum to the appellants for having committed offence under
Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act, in the considered opinion of
this Court, while affirming the conviction of the appellants
for offence under Section 20(c) of the NDPS Act, we deem it
appropriate to reduce his sentence of 12 years rigorous
imprisonment, as awarded to them by the learned trial Court,
to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. So far as the default
sentence is concerned, the same is modified to the extent
that in case of failure to deposit the fine amount awarded
by the trial Court, the appellants shall undergo further
rigorous imprisonment for one year instead of three years,
as awarded by trial Court. It is ordered accordingly.
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29. Consequently, both the criminal appeals are partly
allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. It is stated
that the appellants are in jail, they shall serve out the
remaining sentence as modified by this Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. According to the High Court if the trial court wants to
impose sentence more than the minimum prescribed under the NDPS
Act, then it is obliged to assign reasons. This according to
the High Court is because of the provision of Section 32-B of
the NDPS Act.
12. Section 32-B of the NDPS Act reads thus:-
“32-B. Factors to be taken into account for imposing
higher than the minimum punishment.—Where a minimum term
of imprisonment or amount of fine is prescribed for any
offence committed under this Act, the court may, in
addition to such factors as it may deem fit, take into
account the following factors for imposing a punishment
higher than the minimum term of imprisonment or amount of
fine, namely:—
(a) the use or threat of use of violence or arms by the
offender;
(b) the fact that the offender holds a public office and
that he has taken advantage of that office in committing
the offence;
(c) the fact that the minors are affected by the offence
or the minors are used for the commission of an offence;
(d) the fact that the offence is committed in an
educational institution or social service facility or in
the immediate vicinity of such institution or faculty or
in other place to which school children and students
resort for educational, sports and social activities;
(e) the fact that the offender belongs to organised
international or any other criminal group which is
involved in the commission of the offence; and
(f) the fact that the offender is involved in other
illegal activities facilitated by commission of the
offence.”5
13. While interpreting Section 32-B of the NDPS Act, the High
Court also looked into the decision of this Court in the case
of Rafiq Qureshi vs. Narcotic Control Bureau Eastern Zonal
Unit, (2019) 6 SCC 492. According to the High Court, at the
time of imposing sentence the trial court need to keep in mind
the factors as provided in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 32-B
respectively.
14. We are afraid the understanding of the High Court is not
correct. Section 32-B provides that the court in addition to
various relevant factors may also take into account the factors
as prescribed in Clauses (a) to (f).
15. Therefore, in a given case, the trial court may not find
it necessary to consider the factors as prescribed in Section
32-B. Having regard to the quantity of the contraband, the
nature of the narcotic or the psychotropic substance, as the
case may be, the antecedents, if any, etc., may deem fit to
impose punishment which can be more than the minimum. In such
circumstances, there was no good reason for the High Court to
reduce the sentence from 12 years to 10 years relying on Rafiq
Qureshi (supra). The dictum as laid down in Rafiq Qureshi
(supra) has not been understood in its true perspective.
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16. In Rafiq Qureshi (supra), this Court observed as follows:-
“12. Section 32-B is also inserted by Act 9 of 2001.
It is useful to refer to the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of Amendment Act 9 of 2001 which is to the
following effect:
“Statement of Objects and Reasons.— Amendment
Act 9 of 2001.— The Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances Act, 1985 provides deterrent
punishment for various offences relating to il-
licit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psycho-
tropic substances. Most of the offences invite
uniform punishment of minimum ten years’ rigor-
ous imprisonment which may extend up to twenty
years. While the Act envisages severe punish-
ments for drug traffickers, it envisages re-
formative approach towards addicts. In view of
the general delay in trial it has been found
that the addicts prefer not to invoke the pro-
visions of the Act. The strict bail provisions
under the Act add to their misery. Therefore,
it is proposed to rationalise the sentence
structure so as to ensure that while drug traf-
fickers who traffic in significant quantities
of drugs are punished with deterrent sentences,
the addicts and those who commit less serious
offences are sentenced to less severe punish-
ment. This requires rationalisation of the sen-
tence structure provided under the Act. It is
also proposed to restrict the application of
strict bail provisions to those offenders who
indulge in serious offences.”
13. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reveals that
the Amendment Act has inserted provisions for ratio-
nalisation of the sentencing structure. Section 32-B
is a provision which is brought in the statute to ra-
tionalise the sentencing structure. Section 32-B from
clauses (a) to (f) enumerates various factors for im-
posing a punishment higher than the minimum term of
imprisonment.
14. The submission made by the counsel for the appel-
lant is that unless in the facts of a case, any of
the factors mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) are not
present, the Court cannot impose punishment higher
than the minimum term of the imprisonment. It is sub-
mitted that the factors have been brought in the
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statute for the purpose of imposing the punishment
higher than the minimum, hence, in the absence of any
such factor only minimum punishment should be
awarded.
15. We have to first see the actual words used in the
statute to find out the object and purpose of insert-
ing Section 32-B. The court after conviction of an
accused hears the accused and takes into considera-
tion different circumstances of the accused and the
offence for awarding the appropriate sentence. Sec-
tion 32-B uses the phrase
“the court may, in addition to such factors as it
may deem fit, take into account the following
factors for imposing a punishment higher than the
minimum term of imprisonment”.
The above statutory scheme clearly indicates the fol-
lowing:
15.1. The court may where minimum term of punishment
is prescribed take into consideration “such factors
as it may deem fit” for imposing a punishment higher
than the minimum term of imprisonment or fine.
15.2. In addition, take into account the factors for
imposing a punishment higher than the minimum as enu-
merated in clauses (a) to (f).
16. The statutory scheme indicates that the decision
to impose a punishment higher than the minimum is not
confined or limited to the factors enumerated in
clauses (a) to (f). The Court’s discretion to con-
sider such factors as it may deem fit is not taken
away or tinkered. In case a person is found in pos-
session of a manufactured drug whose quantity is
equivalent to commercial quantity, the punishment as
per Section 21(c) has to be not less than ten years
which may extend to twenty years. But suppose the
quantity of manufactured drug is 20 times of the com-
mercial quantity, it may be a relevant factor to im-
pose punishment higher than minimum. Thus, quantity
of substance with which an accused is charged is a
relevant factor, which can be taken into considera-
tion while fixing quantum of the punishment. Clauses
(a) to (f) as enumerated in Section 32-B do not enu-
merate any factor regarding quantity of substance as
a factor for determining the punishment. In the event
8
the Court takes into consideration the magnitude of
quantity with regard to which an accused is con-
victed, the said factor is relevant factor and the
court cannot be said to have committed an error when
taking into consideration any such factor, higher
than the minimum term of punishment is awarded.
17. This Court in Sakshi v. Union of India [Sak-
shi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518 : 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1645], held that it is a well-settled principle
that the intention of the legislature is primarily to
be gathered from the language used, which means that
attention should be paid to what has been said as
also to what has not been said. A construction which
requires for its support addition or substitution of
words has to be avoided. In para 19 of the judgment
the following was laid down: (SCC p. 537)
“19. It is well-settled principle that the inten-
tion of the legislature is primarily to be
gathered from the language used, which means that
attention should be paid to what has been said as
also to what has not been said. As a consequence
a construction which requires for its support ad-
dition or substitution of words or which results
in rejection of words as meaningless has to be
avoided. It is contrary to all rules of construc-
tion to read words into an Act unless it is abso-
lutely necessary to do so. Similarly it is wrong
and dangerous to proceed by substituting some
other words for words of the statute. It is
equally well settled that a statute enacting an
offence or imposing a penalty is strictly con-
strued. The fact that an enactment is a penal
provision is in itself a reason for hesitating
before ascribing to phrases used in it a meaning
broader than that they would ordinarily bear.
(Justice G.P. Singh: Principles of Statutory In-
terpretation, pp. 58 and 751, 9th Edn.)”
18. The specific words used in Section 32-B
that court may, in addition to such factors as it may
deem fit clearly indicates that court’s discretion to
take such factor as it may deem fit is not fettered
by factors which are enumerated in clauses (a) to (f)
of Section 32-B.
19. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied
on a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Raj Ku-
9
mar Bajpaee v. Union of India [Raj Kumar Ba-
jpaee v. Union of India, (2016) 95 ACC 896]. A Single
Judge of the Allahabad High Court referring to Sec-
tion 32-B of the Act stated the following in paras 39
and 40:
“39. After going through the impugned judgment
and order very carefully, I find that the trial
court while imposing higher than the minimum pun-
ishment prescribed under the NDPS Act on convic-
tion under Sections 8/20 of the NDPS Act, upon
the appellants has failed even to advert to the
factors enumerated in Section 32-B of the NDPS
Act. In fact, no reason whatsoever is forthcoming
in the impugned judgment which lead the trial
court to impose higher than the minimum punish-
ment prescribed under the Act upon the appel-
lants.
40. After going through the evidence on record, I
am satisfied that in the present case none of the
factors as spelt out in Section 32-B of the Act
exist which could have prompted the trial court
to award higher than the minimum punishment pre-
scribed under the Act. The sentence awarded to
the appellants thus cannot be sustained. While
maintaining the conviction of the appellants un-
der Sections 8/20, I allow this appeal in part
and modify the sentence awarded to them by the
trial court by the impugned judgment and order to
10 years’ RI and a fine of Rs 1 lakh and in de-
fault of payment of fine the appellants shall be
liable to undergo further simple imprisonment for
one month. The impugned judgment stands modified
accordingly.”
20. Although in the above judgment it has not been
categorically held that punishment higher than the
minimum cannot be awarded unless any of the factors
spelt out in Section 32-B are present but the Court
proceeded to set aside the award of higher punishment
on the above ground. There are two other judgments of
the learned Single Judges of the Allahabad High Court
which have been brought to our notice. First is the
judgment of the Single Judge in Krishna Murari
Pal v. State of U.P. [Krishna Murari Pal v. State of
U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 4909], where the learned
10
Single Judge in para 13 has considered Section 32-B
in the following words: (SCC OnLine All)
“13. The trial court has awarded the sentence of
12 years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 1
lakh to the appellant-accused under Sections
8/20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act on the ground that
huge quantity of the said contraband (ganja) has
been recovered from the possession of the appel-
lant-accused. There is nothing on record to show
that the appellant-accused had committed any act
which may lie under any of the clauses of Section
32-B of the NDPS Act hereinabove mentioned. But
that does not mean that the Court cannot award
the sentence more than the minimum sentence in
the absence of any of the above conditions men-
tioned in clauses (a) to (f) because these condi-
tions are in addition to the factors as the Court
may deem fit in awarding higher punishment to the
accused. In the case at hand, there is nothing on
record to show that the appellant-accused and
previous criminal history or he is a previous
convict and that the appellant is now advanced in
years and is aged about 56 years as mentioned in
the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of
the appellant-accused. Undisputedly the appel-
lant-accused had licence of the retailer shop of
bhang. Thus, regard being had to all the facts
and circumstances of the case I think that reduc-
tion of sentence of 12 years’ rigorous imprison-
ment awarded to the appellant to the period of
imprisonment already undergone by him and in de-
fault of payment of fine, reduction of sentence
of one year imprisonment to six months’ simple
imprisonment would meet the ends of justice.”
21. Another case which has been relied by the counsel
is in Ram Asre v. State of U.P. [Ram Asre v. State of
U.P., 2017 SCC OnLine All 2891], where a learned
Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court after refer-
ring to Section 32-B made the following observation:
(SCC OnLine All para 61)
“61. … In opinion of this Court, if the said sec-
tion be read with greater attention, it would re-
veal that the words used in it are “it may deem
fit”, therefore word “may” would indicate that it
would be discretionary for the Court to take the11
grounds into consideration which are mentioned in
sub-sections (a) to (f) of the said section,
while awarding punishment higher than the minimum
prescribed. Therefore there is no force found in
the argument in this regard made by the learned
amicus curiae that in the case at hand the pun-
ishment awarded needs to be curtailed keeping in
view that the lower court did not take into con-
sideration the above factors.”
22. The views expressed by the learned Single Judges
in Krishna Murari Pal [Krishna Murari Pal v. State of
U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 4909] and Ram Asre [Ram
Asre v. State of U.P., 2017 SCC OnLine All 2891] cor-
rectly notice the ambit and scope of Section 32-B.
23. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of
the view that punishment awarded by the trial court
of a sentence higher than the minimum relying on the
quantity of substance cannot be faulted even though
the court had not adverted to the factors mentioned
in clauses (a) to (f) as enumerated under Section 32-
B. However, when taking any factor into consideration
other than the factors enumerated in Sections 32-B(a)
to (f), the court imposes a punishment higher than
the minimum sentence, it can be examined by higher
courts as to whether factor taken into consideration
by the court is a relevant factor or not. Thus in a
case where the court imposes a punishment higher than
minimum relying on an irrelevant factor and no other
factor as enumerated in Sections 32-B(a) to (f) is
present, award of sentence higher than minimum can be
interfered with.” (Emphasis supplied)
17. The seminal issue in Rafiq Qureshi (supra) revolved around
the interpretation of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act. In other
words, whether the absence of any factors enumerated in Section
32-B in Clauses (a) to (f) restricts the trial courts from
imposing sentence higher than the minimum prescribed. This
Court in Rafiq Qureshi (supra) clarified that the language of
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Section 32-B inherently preserves the court’s discretion to
consider other relevant factors beyond those listed.
Specifically, the quantity of the narcotic substance was deemed
a pertinent factor warranting a sentence above the statutory
minimum, despite the absence of any enumerated aggravating
factors in Section 32-B. Referring to Sakshi vs. Union of
India, reported in (2004) 5 SCC 518, this Court emphasized the
principle that legislative intent is derived from the explicit
language of the statute, avoiding the insertion of words not
present. Since Section 32-B uses “may deem fit” in addition to
the enumerated factors, it does not restrict the courts to only
those factors but allows broader discretion in sentencing.
18. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Gurdev
Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 558. In the
said case, it was held that the court should be guided by the
factors mentioned in Section 32-B of the NDPS Act and other
relevant factors while imposing a sentence higher than the
minimum. Therefore, factors mentioned in Section 32-B of the
NDPS Act are in addition to other relevant facts, and it cannot
be said that the minimum sentence under the NDPS Act is to be
considered as a maximum sentence. It was observed at page 564:
“7. Therefore, while imposing a punishment higher
than the minimum term of the imprisonment or an
amount of fine, the court may take into account the
factors enumerated in Section 32-B of the Act
referred to hereinabove. However, it is required to
be noted ( 2025:HHC:2309 ) that Section 32-B of the
Act itself further provides that the court may, in13
addition to such factors as it may deem fit, take
into account the factors for imposing a punishment
higher than the minimum term of imprisonment or
amount of fine as mentioned in Section 32- B of the
Act. Therefore, while imposing the punishment higher
than the minimum term of imprisonment or amount of
fine, the court may take into account such factors as
it may deem fit and also the factors
enumerated/mentioned in Section 32-B of the Act.
Therefore, on fair reading of Section 32-B of the
Act, it cannot be said that while imposing a
punishment higher than the minimum term of
imprisonment or amount of fine, the court has to
consider only those factors which are
mentioned/enumerated in Section 32-B of the Act.
xx xx xx xx xx xx
10. Therefore, the quantity of substance would fall
into “such factors as it may deem fit” and while
exercising its discretion of imposing the
sentence/imprisonment higher than the minimum, if the
court has taken into consideration such factor of
larger/higher quantity of substance, it cannot be
said that the court has committed an error. The court
has a wide discretion to impose the
sentence/imprisonment ranging between 10 years to 20
years and while imposing such sentence/imprisonment
in addition, the court may also take into
consideration other factors as enumerated in Sections
32-B(a) to (f). Therefore, while imposing a
punishment higher than the minimum sentence, if the
court has considered such factor as it may deem fit
other than the factors enumerated in Sections 32-
B(a) to (f), the High Court has to only consider
whether “such factor” is a relevant factor or not.”
19. It appears that the understanding of the High Court so
far as Section 32-B of the NDPS is concerned is that the mini-
mum sentence should be considered as maximum sentence. That is
not the correct understanding of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act.
14
20. Be that as it may. We do not want to interfere with that
part of the order of the High Court reducing the sentence.
21. However, we do not find any merit in this petition. The
petition, accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed.
22. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
…………………………………………J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
…………………………………………J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI
17th JULY, 2025.
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