Chattisgarh High Court
Smt. Sushmita Amishra vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 12 June, 2025
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2025:CGHC:23636
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 3863 of 2025
1 - Smt. Sushmita Amishra W/o Shri Sachin Mishra Aged About 46 Years
Terminated From The Post Of Tourist Officer At Chhattisgarh Tourism
Department Raipur District Raipur R/o H. No. A-36, P.S. City Colony New
Changorabhata District- Raipur (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Tourism
Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur
(C.G.)
2 - Managing Director Chhattisgarh Tourism Board Udyog Bhawan, Iind Flore,
Ring Road No. 01, Telibandha, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)
3 - General Manager Chhattisgarh Tourism Board, Udyog Bhawan, Iind Flore,
Ring Road No. 01, Telibandha, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Jitendra Nath Nande, Advocate
For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Vinay Pandey, Deputy A.G. and Mr.
Akhilesh Kumar, Govt. Advocate
For Respondents No.2 and 3 : Ms. Anuja Sharma, Advocate on behalf of
Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Senior Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
Order on Board
Digitally
signed by
VEDPRAKASH
VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN
DEWANGAN Date:
2025.06.13
19:15:27
+0530
212/06/2025
1. Challenge in the present petition is the order rated 06-09-2019, by which
the services of the petitioner from the post of Assistant Grade-3 from
Chhattisgarh Tourism Board, Raipur has been terminated.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that despite the
termination order dated 06-09-2019, the respondent No. 3 has taken
work from the petitioner, but her services have not been regularized and
she is claiming her regularization in the service. But no decision has
been taken by the respondent authorities, therefore, she is claiming
quashment of the impugned order dated 06-09-2019.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/State would
submit that the services of the petitioner have been terminated since
06-09-2019 and after about 06 years, she is challenging her termination
order and the petition is suffered from delay and leches.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
annexed with the petition.
5. From perusal of the impugned order, it reveals that the services of the
petitioner have been terminated vide order dated 06-09-2019 from the
post of Assistant Grade-3 from Chhattisgarh Tourism Board, Raipur, but
the petitioner has challenged her termination order after about 06 years,
which apparently a highly belated claim.
6. In the matter of “Bichitranand Behra v. State of Orissa and others”
2023 Live Law SC 883, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 21 has held
as under:-
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“21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages
from certain decisions of this Court:
(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related
claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and
laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ
petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an
application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the
exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a
continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is
based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted
even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with
reference to the date on which the continuing wrong
commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a
continuing source of injury. But there is an exception
to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any
order or administrative decision which related to or
affected several others also, and if the reopening of
the issue would affect the settled rights of third
parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For
example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation
of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of
delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties.
But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or
promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render
the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be
applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery
of arrears for a past period is concerned, the
principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will
apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict
4the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to
a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the
writ petition.” (emphasis supplied) (B) Union of India v
N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:”
7. In the matter of “Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak v. Bhavnagar
Municipal Corporation” 2022 SCC OnLine SC 64, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Para 9 has held as under:-
“”9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that
matter statutes of limitation, are considered to bestatutes of repose and statutes of peace, though
some contrary opinions have been expressed. 4 The
courts have expressed the view that the law of
limitation rests on the foundations of greater public
interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the
evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that
persons with good causes of action (who are able to
enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable
diligence. 5 Equally, change in de facto position or
character, creation of third party rights over a period
of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure
certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy
considerations why period of limitation is prescribed
by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ 4 See
Nav Rattanmal and Others v. State of Rajasthan, AIR
1961 SC 1704 5 State of Kerala and Others v. V. R.
Kalliyanikutty and Another, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying
on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para
5605; Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 68 (2021) para
1005 petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a
constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay
and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure
the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and
perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression. 6
Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look
upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially
and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from
adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for
relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the
rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have
observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest
and are founded on public policy. There must be a
lifespan during which a person must approach the
court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be
unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations
of the parties.7 Referring to the principle of delay and
laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mills Ltd. v.
M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay and
Others,8 had referred to the view expressed by Sir
Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company
AND. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and
John Kemp,9 in the following words:
6 See Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of
India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510 7 See N.
Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 8
AIR 1967 SC 1450 9 (1874) LR 5 PC 221 “Now the
doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
6arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the
party has, by his conduct, done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must
be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances, always important in such cases, are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval, which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking
the one course or the other, so far as relates to the
remedy.”
8. In view of the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties,
further considering that the petitioner is hopelessly time-barred, I do not
find any ground to admit the petition. Accordingly, the present writ
petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved