Telangana High Court
Mothukupally Karunakar Reddy vs Mothukupally Venkatram Reddy on 9 June, 2025
LNA,J
CRP No.1898 of 2024
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HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
CIVIL REVISION PETITON NO.1898 OF 2024
ORDER:
This Civil Revision Petition is filed assailing the docket order
dated 24.01.2024 passed in I.A.No.771 of 2022 in A.S.S.R.No.1725
of 2022 in O.S.No.111 of 2013 on the file of the Principal District
Judge, Vikarabad District.
2. Heard Sri V.Venkat Ram Narsaiah, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri P.Shiva Reddy, learned counsel for the
respondents.
3. The petitioner herein is the plaintiff, respondent Nos.1 and 2
herein are the defendant Nos.3 and 4, respondent Nos.3 and 4
herein are defendant Nos.1 and 2 in the suit. For convenience, the
parties are referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court.
4. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed suit for
declaration that he is the adoptive son of Late Narayan Reddy and
that registered sale deed vide document Nos.1057 of 2013 dated
26.03.2013 and 1142 of 2013 dated 30.03.2013 are not binding on
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the plaintiff and also for perpetual injunction in respect of the Suit
Schedule “A and B” properties. Defendant Nos.1, 3 and 4 failed to
contest the suit and defendant No.2 remained ex-parte. The trial
Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence placed on
record, decreed the suit vide judgment dated 17.09.2019.
5. The defendant Nos.3 and 4 filed appeal vide A.S.S.R.No.1725
of 2022 along with an application in I.A.No.771 of 2022 for
condonation of delay of 470 days in preferring the appeal. The trial
Court vide impugned docket order dated 24.01.2024 condoned the
delay on payment of costs of Rs.5,000/- with an observation that
though there is a lapse on the part of the petitioner in not
contacting the counsel to know the outcome of the suit, however
considering the fact that valuable rights in immovable properties
are involved, the application was allowed on heavy costs. Aggrieved
by the same, revision is filed.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the trial
Court without properly considering the scope and concept of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1955 and guidelines formulated by
the Hon’ble Apex Court has mechanically condoned the delay in
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filing the appeal, despite observing that there is lapse on the part of
the petitioner in pursuing the matter and contacting the counsel.
He would further submit that the appellate Court allowed the
application in a cryptic manner instead of passing a reasoned
order. He would further submit that petitioner/plaintiff though filed
detailed counter, the same was returned and the appellate Court
without considering the said aspect allowed the application. He
would further submit that the reasons stated by the defendants are
vague, baseless and therefore, the first appellate Court ought to
have dismissed the application as the same was devoid of any merit
and thus, prayed to allow the petition.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of
Division Bench of this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2021 in/and City Civil
Court Appeal No.110 of 2021 dated 27.06.2023, wherein, this
Court dismissed an application filed for condonation of delay of
(561) days after excluding the Covid pandemic lockdown period
with an observation that petitioner therein failed to explain the
reasons for condonation of delay and that the petitioners are not
diligent in pursuing the matter.
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8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit
that the appellate Court has rightly allowed the application since
valuable rights of respondents over the immovable properties are
involved. He would further submit that the respondents/
defendants have explained proper, cogent reasons for not filing the
appeal within the limitation period and first appellate Court has
rightly allowed the application on payment of heavy costs. He
finally contended that revision is devoid of any merit and no
grounds are made out to interfere with the impugned order and
hence, prayed to dismiss the revision.
9. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the judgment
of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petiton (C) No.3 of
2020, wherein, it was held that covid pandemic period from
15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded in computing the
period of limitation.
10. Perusal of record would discloses that the application filed for
condonation of delay of (470) days in preferring the appeal, the
defendants stated that defendant No.4 was residing in a village and
was doing agriculture and defendant No.3 was residing at
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Hyderabad for education of his children and after the death of their
mother, i.e., defendant No.1, the defendant No.4 shifted his family
to Kurnool for his children education and they are not aware of
passing of decree; that when the petitioner/plaintiff frequently
interfered with the possession, the respondent Nos.3 and 4 made
enquiries and came to know that a decree was obtained behind
their back; that immediately, they filed application for obtaining
certified copy of judgment and came to know that fraud has been
played by the plaintiff and that plaintiff did not bring to the notice
of the trial Court about the death of defendant No.1 and therefore,
judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is nullity; that they
approached the counsel on record and they were advised to file
appeal.
11. Perusal of counter filed on behalf of petitioner/plaintiff in
I.A.No.771 of 2022 in A.S.S.R.No.1721 of 2022 would disclose that
plaintiff filed a memo on 03.07.2017 bringing to the notice of the
trial Court about death of defendant No.1 along with death
certificate and it is further mentioned that defendant No.1 expired
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on 22.10.2015 leaving behind plaintiff and defendant No.2, who are
already on record.
12. Perusal of affidavit filed in support of the application for
condonation of delay i.e., I.A.No.771 of 2022 in A.S.S.R.No.1721 of
2022 disclose that suit was decreed on 17.09.2019, whereas the
appeal along with said application was filed on 15.03.2020 and in
fact, actual delay is of 1185 days. However, defendant No.3 and 4
while computing the delay excluded the covid pandemic lockdown
period of 715 days and thus, shown the delay as 470 days in
preferring the appeal.
13. It is relevant to note that suit was decreed on 17.09.2019
and time limit for preferring the appeal has elapsed much prior to
the Covid pandemic lockdown period i.e.,15.03.2020, therefore, the
exempted period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 cannot be
excluded while computing the delay in preferring the appeal since
the benefit is applicable only where the limitation period expires
during the lock down period.
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14. In I.A.No.1 of 2021 in/and CCCA No.110 of 2021, a Division
Bench of this Court had occasion to examine the above aspect and
has come to a conclusion that where the appeal period expired
prior to Covid pandemic lockdown period, the delay has to be
computed from the date of the order passed by the trial Court till
the date of filing of the appeal after excluding ’90’ days appeal
period.
15. Admittedly, in the present case the suit was decreed on
17.09.2019 and therefore, limitation for preferring the appeal had
expired much prior to Covid pandemic lockdown period and
therefore, defendant Nos.3 and 4 are not justified in excluding the
said period while computing the delay in filing the appeal.
Therefore, the delay in preferring the appeal would come to 1185
days and not 470 days as projected by the respondent Nos.1 and 2
and this aspect was not examined by the first appellate Court while
allowing I.A.No.771 of 2022 in A.S.S.R.No.1721 of 2022. It is also
relevant to note that except stating that respondent Nos.1 and 2
have shifted to Hyderabad for their children education and that
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they are not aware of passing of decree, no other reason has been
assigned for inordinate delay of 1185 days in preferring the appeal.
16. In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized the principles
to be applied while deciding a condonation of delay petition as
under:
“21.From the afore said authorities the principles that can
broadly be culled out are:
2.1 (i)There should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing
with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts
are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to
remove injustice.
(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose
regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically
elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the
obtaining fact- situation.
(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal
the technical considerations should not be given undue
and uncalled for emphasis.
(iv)No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence
on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
(v)Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause public
mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so
1 5
(2013)12SCC649
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that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of
justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
(viii)There is a distinction between
inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or
few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice
is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants
strict approach whereas the second calls for a
liberal delineation.
(ix)The conduct, behavior and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It
is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of
justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go by in the name
of liberal approach.
(x)If the explanation offered is concocted or
the grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
the courts should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets
away with fraud, misrepresentation or
interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
(xii)The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinized and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion
which is founded on objective reasoning and not
on individual perception.
(xiii)The State or a public body Oran entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.
2.2 To the aforesaid principles we may add some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: –
(a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern and not in a
half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of
the principle that adjudication of alison merits is
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10seminal to justice dispensation system.
(b) An application for condonation of delay should
not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual
philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard
being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious
effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the
adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
22.4(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a
non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can
be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed,
of course, within legal parameters.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. From the above decision, it is clear that the Court is vested
with power to condone the delay in filing an appeal if sufficient
cause is shown by the party and the Court has to adopt liberal
approach while condoning the delay. However, said power has to be
exercised only where valid reasons are shown and plausible
explanation is given for condonation of delay and in case of non-
satisfactorily explanation, there was deliberation, wanton delay in
prosecuting lis and where reasons are vague, devoid of any merit,
the discretionary power of the Court in condoning the delay could
not be exercised.
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and another v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR (SLP (Civil)
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No.21096 of 2019 dated 03.04.2024), by referring the judgment
of the same Court in Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), held that “delay
should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party”.
19. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition
Officer 2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only
so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has
been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case
and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal
[(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v.
Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the
court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but
it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor
to be considered while interpreting a statute.
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In2
2013 (14) SCC 81
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12case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
20. From a reading of the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the
Hon’ble Apex Court at paras-11 and 12 of the judgment interpreted
the expression “sufficient cause” and at para-15 summarized the law
with regard to the issue of limitation.
21. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India
Limited and another 3, Hon’ble Apex Court having considered catena
of decisions, including Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs. Vs.
Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another 4,
wherein it was held that,
“17……. The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right
for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into
belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats
equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and “do not
slumber over their rights” and observed that taking very lenient
view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the
Government and Government Undertaking, would not be proper
and observed as under:-
3
(2012) 3 SCC 563
4
(2008) 17 SC 448
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13“29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing
time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan
for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are
meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but
avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence
states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not
of the sleepy.
30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in
exercising the courts’ discretion wherever conferred upon it by the
relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of
proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and
timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their
rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public
policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of
acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge
in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by
resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of
deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any
fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what
is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers.
These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the
courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application
filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the
landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal
proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights
cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay
without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the
ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public
interest.”
22. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources
Department) rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers
Engineers and Contractors Private Limited 5, Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as under:
“63. …… In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted
bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond
such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned,5
(2021) 6 SCC 460
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14always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is
that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and
justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction,
negligence or laches.”
23. In the present case, the first appellate Court has observed
that respondent Nos.1 and 2 were not debarred from contacting the
counsel to know the disposal of the suit and that there is also lapse
on the part of the respondents in pursuing the matter, however,
allowed the application on payment of costs. It is pertinent to
mention that Appellate Court did not examine the aspect of actual
delay that occasioned in preferring the appeal and failed to note
that limitation for preferring the appeal expired much prior to Covid
lockdown and therefore, lockdown exempted period is not
applicable to the present case. The trial Court has also failed to
note about substantial rights accrued to the other party and thus,
committed error in allowing the application.
24. Therefore, in the light of above discussion and settled legal
position, the impugned docket order passed by the learned first
Appellate Court is unsustainable and the Revision Petition deserves
to be allowed.
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25. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting
aside the impugned docket order dated 24.01.2024 in I.A.No.771 of
2022 in A.S.S.R.No.1725 of 2022 in O.S.No.111 of 2013 on the file
of the Principal District Judge, Vikarabad. There shall be no order
as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand
closed.
___________________________________
LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J
Date: 09.06.2025
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HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
CIVIL REVISION PETITON NO.1898 OF 2024
Date: 09.06.2025
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