Chattisgarh High Court
Ravi Kumar Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 30 April, 2025
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
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2025:CGHC:19618-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 638 of 2021
1 - Ravi Kumar Yadav S/o Shri Panchuram Yadav Aged About 30 Years R/o
Rampur Para, Kapan, Out Post - Naila, Police Station Janjgir, District Janjgir
Champa, Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
2 - Panchuram Yadav S/o Late Maniram Yadav Aged About 50 Years R/o
Rampur Para, Kapan, Out Post - Naila, Police Station Janjgir, District Janjgir
Champa, Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
3 - Bhagwat Yadav S/o Shri Panchuram Yadav Aged About 22 Years R/o
Rampur Para, Kapan, Out Post - Naila, Police Station Janjgir, District Janjgir
Champa, Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
...Appellants(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Police Station Janjgir, District Janjgir
Champa, Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
...Respondent(s)
For appellants : Mr. Ashutosh Trivedi, Advocate.
For Respondent/State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Dy. G.A.
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge
30.04.2025
1. Heard Mr. Ashutosh Trivedi, learned counsel for the appellants.
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Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Dy. G.A., appearing for the
respondent/State.
2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellants/accused under Section
374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is
directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 05.04.2021, passed by the learned Special Judge,
Prevention of Atrocities Act, Janjgir-Champa, District Janjgir-Champa
(C.G.) in Special Session Trial No. 23/2019, whereby the appellants have
been convicted and sentenced as under:
Conviction under Section Sentence
Section 302/34 of the Indian Rigorous imprisonment (for short,
Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC‘) ‘R.I.’) for life (for all the appellantss)
and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of
payment of fine, 01 month additional
R.I.
3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant Umrav
Patle went to police outpost Naila and has made a oral complaint to the
effect that on the date of incidence i.e. on 28.05.2019 around 09:00 with
he and his brother namely Mithlesh sat in the house of deceased
Shashikant at Village Saajapali. After a while Shashikant the deceased
asked them to have a walkaround and all of three went together to village
Rampurkapan where three persons were standing looking to which the
deceased asked the Ravi (accused) why they are standing on which the
accused started abusing the deceased and went inside and brought a
Tangiya, the accused along with the other co-accused started assaulting
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the deceased and looking to which the complainant and the other person
who came with the deceased ran away from the spot. The accused
persons threatened the complainant that they would kill them if the
complainant discloses the incident to anyone. The deceased was taken to
District Hospital Janjgir for treatment and from where he was referred to
Higher institute for medical treatment and thereafter the deceased
succumbed to death due to injury. After the said complaint was lodged,
the police outpost Naila registered a unnumbered FIR against the
accused persons. The case was registered at the City Kotwali Police
Station in Janjgir Champa, and the body panchnama was prepared and
an application for the postmortem examination was recorded vide
Ex.P/27.
4. Based on this, since the incident occurred within the jurisdiction of
the Janjgir Champa Police Station, a First Information Report (FIR) was
registered vide Ex.P/15. A spot map (Ex.P/01) was prepared by the
Patwari. The accused was taken into custody vide Ex.P/21 to 23, and
tangiya was seized vide Ex.P/10. A crime details form was prepared by
the Police vide Ex.P/7 & 07A. . The seized property was sent to the State
Forensic Laboratory for examination and the report was received vide
Ex.P/19.
5. Dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to CIMS
Hospital, Bilaspur (C.G.), where Dr. Shiv Narayana Gole (PW-16)
conducted postmortem over the body of the deceased vide Ex.P/27 and
found following injuries:-
Injuries:
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1. Stiches of caniotonmy were present on left
frontoparietal temporal region of head, measuring 08
cms swollen with blood stain and irregular margins.
2. Five stitches were present on occipital scalp
3. There were four stitches in front of the left ear.
4. Green contusion measuring 14x 06 cm was present
over the suprascapular region of the left region.
5. There was a contusion of 10x 8 cm on the outer part of
the left hipAll the above injuries were antemortem (before death).
Dr. Shiv Narayana Gole (PW-16) opined that the death of the
deceased was caused due to the impact of a blunt and hard object on the
head, leading to cardiac and respiratory arrest. The death of the
deceased occurred within 12-18 hours of the examination.
6. After due investigation, the Police filed charge-sheet against the
appellants before the trial Court. The trial Court has framed charges
against the appellants for the offences punishable under Section 294,
506(B), 302/34 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(5) of SC/ST (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act 1989 and proceeded on trial. The appellants abjured the
guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any
offence and he has been falsely implicated.
7. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as
many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 48 documents. The
appellants/accused examined none in his defence.
8. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence
available on record, by its judgment dated 05.04.2021, convicted the
accused/appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the
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IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal
appeal has been filed.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned trial
Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for the offence
punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to
prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that if the
case of the prosecution is accepted on the face of it, then also the
appellants is said to have caused injuries to deceased on the spur of the
moment because the deceased himself came to the appellants and talked
to them and thereafter altercation between them has been commenced.
There was no motive or intention on the part of the appellants to cause
death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat
of passion and in anger, the appellants caused injuries to the deceased,
which caused his death. Therefore, the case of the present appellants
falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and the
act of the appellants is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and
therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellants for the
offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered
to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Further, the
appellants No. 1 and 3 are in jail since 04.06.2019 and they have
completed near about 05 years and 10 months, and the appellant No. 2 is
in jail since 05.04.2021 and he has completed near about 04 years,
therefore, considering the period he had already undergone, he be
awarded the sentence of the period already undergone by him. Hence, the
present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part.
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10. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the
prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading
evidence of clinching nature. He further submits that Mithlesh Kumar
Patle (PW-1) and Umrao Patle (PW-5), who are the eyewitnesses of the
incident, have stated that they saw that the accused assaulted the
deceased by Tangiya, due to which the deceased died, therefore, in view
of the statements of the prosecution witnesses coupled with other material
available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the
appellants for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. It has been
contended that appellants has committed heinous crime of murder and in
such circumstances, it is not the case where conviction of the appellants
for offence under Section 302 of IPC requires to be altered to Section 304
Part-I or Part-II of IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be
dismissed.
11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went
through the records with utmost circumspection.
So far as conviction of the appellant No. 1 Ravi Kumar Yadav &
appellant No. 3 Bhagwat Yadav for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of IPC is concerned.
12. The first question for consideration would be, whether death
of deceased was homicidal in nature ?
13. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence
available on record particularly relying upon the statement of Dr. Shiv
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Narayana Gole (PW-16), who conducted postmortem had opined that
death of the deceased was caused due to the impact of a blunt and hard
object on the head, leading to cardiac and respiratory arrest. The injuries
were antemortem in nature. The Doctor ultimately opined through his
report the nature of death to be homicidal. After hearing learned counsel
for the parties and after considering the submissions, we are of the
considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that death
of deceased was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on
evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record.
We hereby affirm that finding.
14. Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the
accused/appellants herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question,
which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by relying upon
the testimony of Dr. Shiv Narayana Gole (PW-16), who conducted
postmortem has opined that death of the deceased was caused due to the
impact of a blunt and hard object on the head, leading to cardiac and
respiratory arrest. The injuries were antemortem in nature. The Doctor
ultimately opined through his report the nature of death to be homicidal
and the testimonies of Mithlesh Kumar Patle (PW-1) and Umrao Patle
(PW-5), who are the eyewitnesses of the incident and they clearly
deposed in their statement that on the date of incident they saw the
accused assaulted the deceased due to which the deceased died. Thus,
on the basis of testimonies of Dr. Shiv Narayana Gole (PW-16), Mithlesh
Kumar Patle (PW-1) and Umrao Patle (PW-5), it is clear that it is the
appellants herein who on the fateful date and time has caused grievous
injuries to the deceased, due to which he died. As such, the learned trial
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Court has rightly held that it is the appellants/accused who has caused
injuries over the body of the deceased and caused his death. Accordingly,
we hereby affirm the said finding.
15. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for
consideration, whether the case of the appellants is covered within
Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not
amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304
Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the
appellants ?
16. The cause of death assigned in the postmortem report of the
deceased as already noticed are ‘cardiac arrest and respiratory failure
caused by a head injury’. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a
genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable
homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of
actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the
circumstances.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev v. State of
Pepsu2 has made the following observations :
“Of course, we have to distinguish between motive,
intention and knowledge. Motive is something which
prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is
an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many
cases intention and knowledge merge into each other1 (2012) 8 SCC 289
2 AIR 1956 SC 488
9and mean the same thing more or less and intention
can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating
line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin
but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote
different things. Even in some English decisions, the
three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led
to a certain amount of confusion.”
18. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the
aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different
terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are
provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is
likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his
act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in
equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the
circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or
inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that
there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear
that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death,
the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 of the
IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal
Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a
thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to
constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that
the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of
extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to
bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 of the IPC, it must be proved that
there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the
10
ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words,
that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be
inflicted.
19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v.
State of Haryana3 has observed as under:-
“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of
the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of
the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is
proved to have committed the offence of culpable
homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in
the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not
act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is
covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is
punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The
finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid
appellants guilty of offence of murder punishable
under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held
guilty for the commission of offence of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable under
Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine
of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.”
20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v.
State of Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken
into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused
with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which
state as under :-
3 (2002) 3 SCC 327
4 (2009) 15 SCC 635
11“23. These are some factors which are required to be
taken into consideration before awarding appropriate
sentence to the accused. These factors are only
illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case
has to be seen fro its special perspective. The
relevant factors are as under :
(a) Motive or previous enmity;
(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the
spur of the moment;
(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while
inflicting the blow or injury;
(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or
the victim died after several days;
(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
(f) The age and general health condition of the
accused;
(g) Whether the injury was caused without
premeditation in a sudden fight;
(h) The nature and size of weapon used for
inflicting the injury and the force with which the
blow was inflicted;
(i) The criminal background and adverse history
of the accused;
(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death but
the death was because of shock;
(k) Number of other criminal cases pending
against the accused;
(l) Incident occurred within the family members or
close relations;
(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused
after the incident.
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Whether the accused had taken the injured/the
deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure
that he/she gets proper medical treatment ?
These are some of the factors which can be
taken into consideration while granting an
appropriate sentence to the accused.
24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is
only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered
view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused
is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The
endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the
accused receives appropriate sentence, in other
words, sentence should be according to the gravity of
the offence. These are some of the relevant factors
which are required to be kept in view while convicting
and sentencing the accused.”
21. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their Lordships
of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to
cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then
jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine
or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence
punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to
prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by
the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to
cause death.
22. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of
Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in
paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-
5 (2012) 8 SCC 450
6 (2017) 3 SCC 247
13“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that
are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in
Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 :
1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :
(SCC p. 220, para 7)“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must
be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii)
there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done
in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not
taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel
manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant
nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or
started the assault. The number of wounds caused
during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but
what is important is that the occurrence must have
been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender
must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the
offender must not have taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a
sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the
moment picks up a weapon which is handy and
causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he
would be entitled to the benefit of this exception
provided he has not acted cruelly.”
21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 :
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition
of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to
Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it
has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9)“9. …. ’18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked
if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in
a sudden fight; (c) without the offender’s having
taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been
14with the person killed. To bring a case within
Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must
be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring
in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in
the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight.
Heat of passion requires that there must be no
time for the passions to cool down and in this
case, the parties had worked themselves into a
fury on account of the verbal altercation in the
beginning. A fight is a combat between two or
more persons whether with or without weapons. It
is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to
what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is
a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden
or not must necessarily depend upon the proved
facts of each case. For the application of
Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there
was a sudden quarrel and there was no
premeditation. It must further be shown that the
offender has not taken undue advantage or acted
in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue
advantage” as used in the provisions means
“unfair advantage”.
23. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if
there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304
Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention
to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section
304 Part-II of the IPC.
24. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT
of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring
a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which
7 (2019) 6 SCC 122
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reads as under:
“16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC shows that the following four ingredients are
required:
(i) There must be a sudden fight;
(ii) There was no premeditation;
(iii) The act was committed in a heat of
passion; and
(iv) The offender had not taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner."
25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of
Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in
Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 disposed off on 20.07.2023 has
defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention
or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under:
“60. Few important principles of law discernible from
the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the
question, what offence the accused could be said
to have committed, the true test is to find out the
intention or knowledge of the accused in doing
the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as
is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300
of the IPC, the act will be murder even though
only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is
bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his
revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his
16head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will
be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in
shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single
injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be
of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300
of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks
into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter
is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest
of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest
of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter.
The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in
ordinary course of nature to cause death. There
may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally
inflicted the particular injury found to be caused
and that the said injury was objectively sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of
Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of
the offence of murder although only single injury
was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the
accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of
Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused
which would otherwise be murder, will be taken
out of the purview of murder, if the accused’s
case attracts any one of the five exceptions
enumerated in that section. In the event of the
case falling within any of those exceptions, the
offence would be culpable homicide not
amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of
Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused
is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of
Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under
17
Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall
within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC.
Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused
may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section
299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of
the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that
situation also, the offence would be culpable
homicide not amounting to murder under Section
304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part
I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of
Section 299, while it would be an offence under
Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd
part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an
accused person falls within the first two clauses of
cases of culpable homicide as described in
Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the
first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within
the third clause, it is punishable under the second
part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first
part of this section would apply when there is
‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would
apply when there is no such intention, but there is
‘guilty knowledge’.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that
particular injury was intended, and objectively that
injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, the requirements of
Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are
fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the
following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls
18
under one or the other of the clauses of Section
300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to
that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of
the higher degree of likelihood which is covered
by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower
degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of
as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case
does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of
the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the
knowledge that death is likely to ensue but
without intention to cause death or an injury likely
to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between
the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that
under the first part, the crime of murder is first
established and the accused is then given the
benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of
the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of
murder is never established at all. Therefore, for
the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the
offence punishable under the second part of
Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not
bring his case within one of the exceptions to
Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is
distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When
chances of happening are even or greater than its
not happening, we may say that the thing will
‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the
court has to place itself in the situation of the
accused and then judge whether the accused had
the knowledge that by the act he was likely to
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cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide
(Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300
of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in
mind while dealing with a charge under Section
302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful
homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide
amounting to murder and those not amounting to
murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not
murder when the case is brought within the five
exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even
though none of the said five exceptions are
pleaded or prima facie established on the
evidence on record, the prosecution must still be
required under the law to bring the case under
any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC
to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution
fails to discharge this onus in establishing any
one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC,
namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would
not be made out and the case may be one of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder as
described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question
of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to
be applied, the assailant must intend the
particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This
ingredient could rarely be proved by direct
evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to
be drawn from the proved circumstances of the
case. The court must necessarily have regard to
the nature of the weapon used, part of the body
injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used
20
in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the
circumstances preceding and attendant on the
attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that
makes a culpable homicide a murder. The
intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the
ordinary cause of nature to cause death also
makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has
actually been caused and intention to cause such
injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or
acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused
results in the death of the victim, no inference, as
a general principle, can be drawn that the
accused did not have the intention to cause the
death or that particular injury which resulted in the
death of the victim. Whether an accused had the
required guilty intention or not, is a question of
fact which has to be determined on the facts of
each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the
accused had the intention to cause death of any
person or to cause bodily injury to him and the
intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a
single injury which results in the death of the
victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause
thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the
exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an
accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge
in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by
21
him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the fact that the
act is done without premeditation in a sudden
fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify
that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or
that he only intended a simple injury, would lead
to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the
offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of
the IPC.”
26. In the present case, Mithlesh Kumar Patle is the eyewitness (PW-
01) stated that on the date of incident, the deceased Shashikant Patle told
him that let’s go for a walk, then he along with deceased and Umrao went
to village of the incident, where Ravi (accused) was standing near his
house, the deceased Shashikant Patle asked him “how are you”, then
Ravi told him that the deceased has eloped his sister, on this they both
started using abusive language, thereafter accused Ravi went to his
house and brought a tangia and hit him on the head with the tangia,
thereafter co-accused came and hit the deceased with sticks, thereafter
he and his cousin out of fear ran away from the spot and informed about
the incident to deceased’s father Reshamlal and brother Surendra. The
deceased was admitted in the hospital and he died during treatment.
27. Likewise Umrao Patle (PW-5), has narrated the same version and
he corroborated the statement of Mithlesh Kumar Patle (PW-1). During
their cross-examination, the statements of the witnesses remain
unbroken, and there are no inconsistency in their statements that would
make them unreliable.
28. Dr. S.N. Gole (PW-16), who has conducted the postmortem of the
22
deceased vide (Ex.P27). After the postmortem, he found the injuries as
stated in paragraph 05 of this appeal and he opined that the death of the
deceased was caused due to the impact of a blunt and hard object on the
head, leading to cardiac and respiratory arrest.
29. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of principles of law
laid down by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-
stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that as per evidence of Mithlesh
Kumar Patle(PW-1) and Umrao Patle (PW-5), it is evident that the on the
date of incident, the accused/appellants quarrelled with deceased and the
and on account of sudden fight the accused assaulted the deceased with
the help of tangia. There was no premeditation on the part of the
appellants to cause death of deceased as the deceased himself went to
the place of the appellants. The appellants did not had any intention to
cause death of deceased, but by causing such injuries, he must had the
knowledge that such injuries inflicted by him would likely to cause death of
deceased, as such, his case would fall within the purview of Exception 4
of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of the appellants herein completely
satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC
i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii)
the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellants had not
taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
30. So far as conviction of the appellants No. 1 & 3 Ravi Kumar Yadav
and Bhagwat Yadav is concerned, considering the above-stated facts,
also considering the evidence of witnesses and taking into consideration
that appellant No. 1 Ravi Kumar Yadav and appellant No. 3 are in jail
since 04.06.2019, the conviction of the appellants No. 1 & 3 under Section
23
302/34 of the IPC can be altered/converted to Section 304 Part-II of the
IPC. Accordingly, conviction and sentence of the appellants No. 1 & 3
under Section 302/34 of the IPC is set aside, however, appellants No. 1 &
3 Ravi Kumar Yadav and Bhagwat Yadav convicted under Section
304 Part-II of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for 10 years. The appellants No. 1 & 3 are in jail and they shall served out
the sentence as modified above.
31. So far as conviction of appellant No. 2 Panchuram Yadav is
concerned, taking into consideration that at present appellant-
Panchuram Yadav is aged about 56 years and he is in jail since
05.04.2021, looking to the role played by the appellant No. 2 that he was
not knowledge of act committed by the appellant No. 1 & 3 and also
considering the fact that he has not made any assault or participated in
the said crime and no any witnesses examined before the trial Court has
stated against him, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has
not proved its case beyond reasonable shadow of doubt against the
appellant No. 2 for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of IPC.
Therefore, the appellants No. 2 Panchuram Yadav is liable to be and
is hereby acquitted of the charges framed against him under Section
302/34 by the court of Special Judge, Prevention of Atrocities Act,
Janjgir-Champa, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Special Session Trial
No. 23/2019 The appellant 2 Panchuram Yadav in jail since 05.04.2021.
he shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other criminal case.
32. In the result, as regards criminal appeal in respect of the appellant No. 1
Ravi Kumar Yadav and appellant No. 3 Bhagwat Yadav is partly allowed and
as regards criminal appeal in respect of the appellant No. 2 Panchuram Yadav
24
is allowed.
33. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now
Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant No.
2 Panchuram Yadav is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of
Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.
25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which
shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the
event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant
of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
34. The criminal appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated herein-
above.
35. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with
the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for
necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to
the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants is undergoing his jail
sentence to serve the same on the appellants informing him that he is at liberty
to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if so advised, with the assistance of High
Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Jyoti