Himachal Pradesh High Court
Yog Raj vs Bodh Raj @ Bitu on 1 May, 2025
( 2025:HHC:11932 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 488 of 2015
Reserved on: 22.4.2025
Date of Decision: 01.5.2025.
Yog Raj ...Appellant
Versus
Bodh Raj @ Bitu ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Debender Ghosh, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. K.D. Sood, Senior Advocate,
with Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 13.7.2015, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Manali, District Kullu, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide
which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was
acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act). (Parties
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2
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shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were
arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was
asserted that the complainant and the accused were known to
each other. The accused required money in August 2010. He
approached the complainant for the financial assistance of
₹10.00 lacs. The complainant advanced ₹10.00 lacs, and the
accused promised to repay the amount within three months. The
complainant demanded the money, and the accused issued a
cheque of ₹10.00 lacs for discharging his legal liability. The
complainant presented the cheque before Punjab National Bank,
Mandi, which forwarded it to the bank of the accused, however,
the bank of the accused returned the cheque with the
endorsement ‘Payment Stopped by the Drawer’. Memo
(Ex.CW1/D) was issued. The cheque and the memo were returned
by Punjab National Bank to the complainant vide memo
(Ex.CW1/C). The complainant issued notice (Ex.CW1/E) asking
the accused to pay the amount of ₹10.00 lacs within 15 days from
3
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the date of receipt of the notice. This notice was sent by
registered post, and the receipt (Ex.CW1/F) was obtained from
the Postal Department. Notice was delivered to the accused, and
an acknowledgement (Ex.CW1/G) was signed by the accused. The
accused failed to pay the amount within the stipulated period.
Hence, the complainant filed a complaint before the Court to
take action against the accused as per the law.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. When the accused
appeared, notice of accusation was put to him, to which he
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The complainant examined himself (CW1) in support
of his complaint. The accused, in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C., stated that he had borrowed a sum of
₹1,50,000/-, which was returned by him. He admitted that the
cheque was signed by him. He stated that he was innocent and
that nothing was payable to the complainant. He examined Nand
Lal (DW1) in defence.
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5. Learned Trial Court held that the complainant
mentioned different dates in his statement on oath, which was
omitted by him from his complaint. The complainant failed to
show that he had the financial capacity to lend ₹10.00 lacs to the
accused. No document was produced in support of the
transaction. The amount of ₹10.00 lacs advanced by the
complainant was more than the limit of ₹20,000/- prescribed in
Section 269(b) of the Income Tax Act. All these aspects made the
complainant’s case doubtful. Hence, the accused was acquitted
of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of
the NI Act.
6. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court, the complainant filed the present appeal,
asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the
accused. It was wrongly held that the cheque was issued as
security. The cheque was issued by the accused to discharge
legal liability to repay the money taken by him from the
complainant. The accused admitted the signatures on the
cheque, and presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI
Act would apply to the present case. The amount stated to have
been paid in the statement of account (Ex.DW1/A) was never
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paid to the complainant. The accused had initially issued the
instructions to the bank to stop payments. The accused had filed
a reply to the demand notice served upon him. Therefore, it was
prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment
passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside and the accused be
convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act.
7. I have heard Mr. Debender Ghosh, learned counsel
for the appellant/complainant and Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior
Counsel, assisted by Mr. Vivek Thakur, learned counsel for the
respondent/accused.
8. Mr. Debender Ghosh, learned counsel for the
appellant/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court
erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved on record
that the accused had issued the cheque. There is a presumption
that the cheque was issued in discharge of legal liability, and the
burden was upon the accused to rebut this presumption by
leading satisfactory evidence. The learned Trial Court had erred
in holding that since the payment was not made by means of a
cheque, therefore, such a payment could not be recognised by
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the Court. The complainant was not supposed to lead any
evidence regarding his financial capacity in view of the
presumption, and the accused had to rebut the presumption
regarding the construction. Learned Trial Court erred in shifting
the burden of proof upon the complainant, and this vitiated the
findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he
prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment
passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the
judgment of this Court in Amar Chand Bhutail and Sons v. Yash
Pal Ranta, Cr. Appeal No. 137 of 2011, decided on 29.12.2023 in
support of his submission.
9. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent/accused, submitted that the complainant admitted
in his cross-examination that he had not advanced any other
loan to the accused. The accused had returned ₹1,50,000/-,
which fact was proved by the statement of Nand Lal (DW1). The
cheque could not have been presented for a sum of ₹10.00 lacs,
and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the accused had
no subsisting liability to pay the amount of ₹10.00 lacs. This was
a reasonable view taken by the learned Trial Court, and this
Court could not interfere with it while deciding the appeal
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against acquittal. He relied upon the judgment of Bhupatbhai
Bachubhai Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523 in
support of his submission.
10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
11. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment
of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176:
(2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of
acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on
misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and no
reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on
the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed:
“11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda
Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC
4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a
Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the
legal position with regard to the scope of interference in
an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:
“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the
principles laid down by this Court governing the scope
of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by
the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused
recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh
Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC
8( 2025:HHC:11932 )
(Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the
field after considering various earlier judgments and
held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)
“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this
Court culled out the following general principles
regarding the powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal
in the following words: (Chandrappa
case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC
415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42)
’42. From the above decisions, in our considered
view, the following general principles regarding
the powers of the appellate court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to
review, reappreciate and reconsider the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts
no limitation, restriction or condition on the
exercise of such power and an appellate
court, on the evidence before it, may reach its
own conclusion, both on questions of fact and
law.
(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial
and compelling reasons”, “good and
sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to
curtail the extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of
“flourishes of language” to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere
with an acquittal than to curtail the power of
9( 2025:HHC:11932 )
the court to review the evidence and to come
to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind that in case of acquittal, there is a
double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly,
the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by
the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible
on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court should not disturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D.
Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3
SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles
governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section
378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)
“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further
strengthens the presumption of innocence.
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral
and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence,
is required to consider whether the view taken by
the trial court is a possible view which could have
been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
10
( 2025:HHC:11932 )
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the
appellate court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order
of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the
only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis
of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the
accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and
no other conclusion was possible.”
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope
of interference by an appellate court for reversing the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in
favour of the accused has to be exercised within the
four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from
patent perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission
to consider material evidence on record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused
is possible from the evidence available on record.”
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position
that the interference with the finding of acquittal
recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by
the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers
from patent perversity; that the same is based on a
misreading/omission to consider material evidence on
record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is
possible from the evidence available on record.”
12. A similar view was taken in Bhupatbhai Bachubhai
Chavda (supra), wherein it was observed:-
11
( 2025:HHC:11932 )
“6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the
evidence. After re-appreciating the evidence, the first
question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court
is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a
plausible view that could have been taken based on the
evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of
the High Court shows that this question has not been
adverted to. The Appellate Court can interfere with the
order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating
the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that
the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn
the order of acquittal only on the ground that another
view is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal
must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court
records such a finding, no interference can be made with
the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the
well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further
strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused.
After having perused the judgment, we find that the High
Court has not addressed itself on the main question.”
13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
14. The complainant stated in his cross-examination
that he had paid ₹3.00 lacs on 20.8.2011. He had paid ₹3.00 lacs
on 5th September and ₹4.00 lacs on 21st September, 2011. He had
not paid any money to the accused before August 2010. He had
also not advanced any other money to the accused except ₹10.00
lacs.
12
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15. The cross-examination of the complainant shows
that he had only advanced ₹10.00 lacs to the accused on
different dates and not any other amount. Nand Lal (DW1)
proved that as per the statement of account (Ex.DW1/A), the
accused had issued Cheque No. 28792 to the complainant for
₹50,000/- and Cheque No. 28793 to the complainant for ₹1.00
lac. This statement is duly corroborated by the statement of
account wherein the entries of payment made to Yog Raj by
means of cheque Nos. 28792 and 28793 have been recorded.
Thus, it is duly proved that the accused had paid ₹1.5 lacs to the
complainant.
16. It was submitted that this payment was made in July
2011 and is regarding some other transaction between the
parties, however, this submission is not acceptable in view of
the categorical statement made by the complainant that he had
not advanced any other amount except ₹10.00 lacs. The
complainant denied in his cross-examination that ₹1.50 lacs
were returned by the accused to him. Therefore, he did not
provide any explanation for the amount of ₹1.50 lacs received by
him, and the plea that the payment might have been regarding
13
( 2025:HHC:11932 )
some other transaction cannot be accepted without any
explanation from the complainant.
17. Therefore, even if the version of the complainant is
accepted as correct that he had advanced ₹10.00 lacs to the
accused, the accused has returned ₹1.50 lacs to the complainant.
Hence, the cheque could not have been presented for a sum of
₹10.00 lacs. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel,
(2023) 1 SCC 578: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1376 that when the amount
is paid, the cheque cannot be presented for the whole amount
and the payment received by the complainant has to be endorsed
on the cheque. It was observed: –
“16. Based on the above analysis of precedent, the
following principles emerge:
16.1. Where the borrower agrees to repay the loan
within a specified timeline and issues a cheque for
security but defaults in repaying the loan within the
timeline, the cheque matures for presentation.
When the cheque is sought to be encashed by the
debtor and is dishonoured, Section 138 of the Act
will be attracted.
16.2. However, the cardinal rule when a cheque is
issued for security is that between the date on
which the cheque is drawn to the date on which the
cheque matures, the loan could be repaid through
any other mode. It is only where the loan is not
repaid through any other mode within the due date
14
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that the cheque would mature for presentation.
16.3. If the loan has been discharged before the due
date or if there is an “altered situation”, then the
cheque shall not be presented for encashment.
17. In Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat [Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat,
(2022) 16 SCC 762: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1174], a two-Judge Bench
of this Court expounded the meaning of the phrase “debt or
other liability”. It was observed that the phrase takes within its
meaning a “sum of money promised to be paid on a future day
by reason of a present obligation”. The Court observed that a
post-dated cheque issued after the debt was incurred would be
covered within the meaning of “debt”. The Court held that
Section 138 would also include cases where the debt is
incurred after the cheque is drawn but before it is presented for
encashment. In this context, it was observed: (SCC para 30)
“30. The object of the NI Act is to enhance the
acceptability of cheques and inculcate faith in the
efficiency of negotiable instruments for the transaction of
business. The purpose of the provision would become
otiose if the provision is interpreted to exclude cases
where debt is incurred after the drawing of the cheque but
before its encashment. In Indus Airways [Indus Airways (P)
Ltd. v. Magnum Aviation (P) Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539: (2014)
5 SCC (Civ) 138: (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 845], advance payments
were made but since the purchase agreement was
cancelled, there was no occasion of incurring any debt.
The true purpose of Section 138 would not be fulfilled if
“debt or other liability” is interpreted to include only a
debt that exists as on the date of drawing of the cheque.
Moreover, Parliament has used the expression “debt or
other liability”. The expression “or other liability” must
have a meaning of its own, the legislature having used
two distinct phrases. The expression “or other liability”
has a content which is broader than “a debt” and cannot
be equated with the latter. In the present case, the cheque
was issued in close proximity to the commencement of
the power supply. The issuance of the cheque in the
context of a commercial transaction must be understood
15( 2025:HHC:11932 )
in the context of business dealings. The issuance of the
cheque was followed close on its heels by the supply of
power. To hold that the cheque was not issued in the
context of a liability which was being assumed by the
company to pay for the dues towards power supplied
would be to produce an outcome at odds with the business
dealings. If the company were to fail to provide a
satisfactory LC and yet consume power, the cheques were
capable of being presented for the purpose of meeting the
outstanding dues.”
18. It was further held that when the payments were
made after taking of debt, the presentation of the cheque for the
whole amount of the debt is bad. It was observed: –
20. The judgments of this Court on post-dated cheques,
when read with the purpose of Section 138, indicate that
an offence under the provision arises if the cheque
represents a legally enforceable debt on the date of
maturity. The offence under Section 138 is tipped by the
dishonour of the cheque when it is sought to be encashed.
Though a post-dated cheque might be drawn to represent
a legally enforceable debt at the time of its drawing, for
the offence to be attracted, the cheque must represent a
legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment. If
there has been a material change in the circumstances
such that the sum in the cheque does not represent a
legally enforceable debt at the time of maturity or
encashment, then the offence under Section 138 is not
made out.
24. It was the contention of the first respondent that the
cheque was not dated. On the other hand, it was the
contention of the appellant that the cheque was dated 17-
3-2014. The courts below did not record a finding on
whether the cheque was undated or was dated 17-3-2014.
However, it was conclusively held that the cheque was
issued by the first respondent for security on the date
16
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when the loan was borrowed. It was also categorically
recorded by the courts below that a sum of Rs 4,09,315
that was paid by the first respondent was paid to partly
fulfil the debt of rupees twenty lakhs. The appellant, in
his cross-examination, has stated that a “cheque against
a cheque” was given when he loaned the sum of rupees
twenty lakhs. Thus, it can be concluded that the cheque
was given as a security to discharge the loan, either
undated or dated as 17-3-2014. Merely because the sum
of Rs 4,09,315 was paid between 8-4-2012 and 30-12-
2013, which was after 17-3-2014, it cannot be concluded
that the sum was not paid in discharge of the loan of
rupees twenty lakhs. The sum of Rs 4,09,315 was
paid after the loan was lent to the first respondent. The
appellant, in his cross-examination, has not denied the
receipt of the payments. He has also stated it was not
received as a “gift or reward”. In view of the above
discussion, at the time of the encashment of the cheque,
the first respondent did not owe a sum of rupees twenty
lakhs as represented in the cheque at the time of
encashment of the cheque that was issued for security.
34. In view of the discussion above, we summarise our
findings below:
34.1. For the commission of an offence under
Section 138, the cheque that is dishonoured must
represent a legally enforceable debt on the date of
maturity or presentation.
34.2. If the drawer of the cheque pays a part or
whole of the sum between the period when the
cheque is drawn and when it is encashed upon
maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the
date of maturity would not be the sum represented
on the cheque.
34.3. When a part or whole of the sum represented
on the cheque is paid by the drawer of the cheque, it
must be endorsed on the cheque as prescribed in
Section 56 of the Act. The cheque endorsed with the
17( 2025:HHC:11932 )
payment made may be used to negotiate the
balance, if any. If the cheque that is endorsed is
dishonoured when it is sought to be encashed upon
maturity, then the offence under Section 138 will
stand attracted.
34.4. The first respondent has made part-payments
after the debt was incurred and before the cheque
was encashed upon maturity. The sum of rupees
twenty lakhs represented on the cheque was not the
“legally enforceable debt” on the date of maturity.
Thus, the first respondent cannot be deemed to
have committed an offence under Section 138 of the
Act when the cheque was dishonoured for
insufficient funds.
34.5. The notice demanding the payment of the
“said amount of money” has been interpreted by
judgments of this Court to mean the cheque
amount. The conditions stipulated in the provisos
to Section 138 need to be fulfilled in addition to the
ingredients in the substantive part of Section 138.
Since in this case, the first respondent has not
committed an offence under Section 138, the
validity of the form of the notice need not be
decided.”
19. Hence, the version of the complainant that accused
had a legal liability to pay an amount of ₹10.00 lacs on the date
of presentation of the cheque is not acceptable.
20. Even otherwise, the learned Trial Court had rightly
held that the version of the complainant was suspect and he had
failed to establish his version in the Court. The complainant had
specifically stated in para-2 of the complaint that the accused
18
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was in dire need of money in August 2010, and he approached
the complainant to seek financial assistance. The complainant
advanced money to him, and the accused agreed to repay the
amount within three months. These averments show that
money was advanced in the month of August, 2010. The
complainant, on the other hand, stated in his cross-
examination that the amount was advanced in August 2010 and
September 2010, therefore, he had changed his whole version on
oath, and the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the
complainant’s version. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Dattatraya v. Sharanappa, (2024) 8 SCC 573, that when
there were contradictions in the statement of the
complainant, mere proof of the signatures on the cheque is
not sufficient. It was observed: –
30. Admittedly, the appellant was able to establish that
the signature on the cheque in question was of the
respondent and in regard to the decision of this Court
in Bir Singh [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197:
(2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40], a
presumption is to ideally arise. However, in the above-
referred context of the factual matrix, the inability of the
appellant to put forth the details of the loan advanced,
and his contradictory statements, the ratio therein would
not impact the present case to the effect of giving rise to
the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act,
1881. The respondent has been able to shift the weight of
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the scales of justice in his favour through the
preponderance of probabilities.
21. The complainant stated in the complaint that the
accused promised to repay the amount within three months
from the date of the advancement of money. He stated in para-3
that the complainant demanded the amount from the accused,
and the accused issued a cheque to discharge his liability. This
cheque was dated 21.9.2011. The complainant nowhere
mentioned in the complaint on which date the cheque was
issued. He only stated that the cheque was dated 21.9.2011,
however, he stated in his cross-examination that the cheque
was presented on 21.9.2011. The failure to mention the date of
issuance of the cheque and the mention of the same in the
cross-examination will make the complainant’s version
suspect. Dealing with a similar situation, it was held in
Dattatraya (supra) as under: –
“29. Applying the aforementioned legal position to the
present factual matrix, it is apparent that there existed a
contradiction in the complaint made by the appellant as
against his cross-examination relatable to the time of
presentation of the cheque by the respondent, as per the
statements of the appellant. This is to the effect that while
the appellant claimed the cheque to have been issued at
the time of advancing of the loan as a security, however,
as per his statement during the cross-examination it was
revealed that the same was presented when an alleged
20( 2025:HHC:11932 )
demand for repayment of alleged loan amount was raised
before the respondent, after six months of
advancement…”
22. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a
reasonable view, which was possible based on the evidence led
before the learned Trial Court and no interference is required
with such a view while deciding an appeal against acquittal.
23. In Amar Chand Butail (supra), the Court had not
noticed any contradictions and relied upon the presumption
contained in Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, which is not
possible in the present case.
24. No other point was urged.
25. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and
the same is dismissed.
26. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned
Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
01st May, 2025
(Chander)
Digitally signed by KARAN SINGH GULERIA
DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL
KARAN PRADESH, OU=HIGH COURT OF
HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA,
Phone=e5d61f6599be410af7c5f0b57379e22
5878f23c9ea27b281046985b3b1fe0b75,
SINGH PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal Pradesh,
SERIALNUMBER=f72cf9165791d55ec93937
5291962d0d90d094876bd59591426c0b1ce6
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GULERIA Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
Date: 2025-05-01 17:34:06
