Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
State vs Lokesh Kothari And Anr on 7 August, 2026
Author: Kuldeep Mathur
Bench: Kuldeep Mathur
[2026:RJ-JP:35896]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 814/2015
CNR: RJHC010182262015 | URN: CRLR / 1763U / 2015
State of Rajasthan
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Shri Lokesh Kothari S/o Shri Surajmal Kothari, resident of
Hiranmagari, Section No.11, House No.97, Udaipur, presently
Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, Dungarpur (Raj.).
2. Shri Shashikant Khetan S/o Shri Ramavtar Khetan, resident of
Azad Nagar, Dungarpur Firm, Owner M/s. Jhunjhunu Construction
Company, Dungarpur (Raj.).
----Respondent
Connected With
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 88/2016
CNR: RJHC010205342016 | URN: CRLR / 223U / 2016
Lokesh Kothari S/o Shri Surajmal Kothari, aged about 65 years, the
then Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department, Dungarpur, resident
of Dungarpur (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
State of Rajasthan.
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sudhir Suruparia
Mr. Ravindra Singh
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sri Ram Choudhary, PP
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP MATHUR
ORDER
Reserved on: 28/07/2026
Pronounced on: 07/08/2026
1. Both of these criminal revision petitions are being decided by
this common order.
2. Heard learned Public Prosecutor and learned counsel
appearing for the accused respondents. Perused the material
available on record.
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3. Having considered rival submissions and facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court finds that in the present
case, in the year 2001, an amount of Rs.15,00,000/- was
sanctioned for undertaking river desalting work at Gap Sagar
Lake. Respondent Lokesh, while posted as Executive Engineer,
issued a short-term tender and thereafter awarded the work in
favour of respondent Shashikant without obtaining prior approval
from the higher authorities and without strictly following the
prescribed procedure governing issuance of tenders. On the
allegation that such action was contrary to the financial rules and
caused loss to the State exchequer, prosecution sanction came to
be accorded and after investigation, charge-sheet was filed
against the respondents for offences punishable under Sections
13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as
well as Sections 120-B and 420 IPC. The learned trial Court, after
considering the material available on record at the stage of
framing charge, discharged respondent Lokesh for offences under
Sections 120-B and 420 IPC while framing charges against him
under Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act vide order dated 13.03.2015 and respondent Shashikant was
discharged from all the offences alleged against him.
4. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of framing of
charge, the Court is neither required nor expected to meticulously
appreciate the evidence or record a finding regarding the guilt or
innocence of the accused. At the same time, it is equally well
settled that the order framing charge cannot be founded upon
mere conjectures or suspicion alone. The material collected during
investigation must disclose sufficient grounds giving rise to a
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grave suspicion that the accused has committed the alleged
offence. Where the material, even if accepted at its face value,
fails to disclose the essential ingredients of the offence alleged,
the Court would be justified in discharging the accused rather than
subjecting him to an unnecessary criminal trial.
5. A perusal of the record would reveal that the entire case of
the prosecution rests upon the allegation that respondent Lokesh
deviated from the prescribed procedure while inviting tenders and
issuing the work order. The charge-sheet indicates violation of
certain financial rules and tender conditions and alleges that the
prescribed procedure for issuance of work order was not strictly
adhered to. However, the material collected during investigation
does not prima facie indicate that respondent Lokesh had received
any illegal gratification, valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by
abusing his official position while issuing the work order in favour
of respondent Shashikant. Likewise, no material has been placed
on record to indicate any prior meeting of minds or agreement
between the accused respondents so as to constitute offences
under Sections 120-B or 420 IPC. Mere non-compliance with
procedural requirements, in the absence of any material indicating
dishonest intention, wrongful gain or abuse of official position for
obtaining any pecuniary advantage, would not by itself attract the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
6. Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
as applicable to the present case, reads as under:
“13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.–
(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal
misconduct–
(d) if he,–
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(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other
person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself
or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person
any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public
interest.
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be
punishable…”
7. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that
the prosecution must prima facie disclose that the public servant,
either by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his official
position, obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage. Mere departure from the prescribed
procedure or violation of departmental rules, without any material
indicating abuse of official position for personal gain or obtaining
any pecuniary advantage, would not satisfy the statutory
ingredients constituting criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)
(d) of the Act.
8. This Court further notices that the learned trial Court has
categorically observed that, at the highest, the material available
on record only indicates breach of Rule 311 while issuing the work
order. Looking to the nature and urgency of the work involved, the
learned trial Court held that such breach constituted merely an
administrative irregularity. Admittedly, no departmental inquiry
whatsoever was ever initiated against respondent Lokesh in
relation to the alleged violation. The learned trial Court has also
observed that no complaint whatsoever regarding the quality of
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work executed by respondent Lokesh was ever recorded by the
competent departmental authority.
9. It is also significant to notice that the material collected
during investigation does not indicate that the work in question
was concocted or remained unexecuted. There is no allegation
that payment had been released without execution of work or that
the State exchequer suffered any pecuniary loss on account of the
procedure adopted by respondent Lokesh. The prosecution case is
confined only to the allegation that the prescribed procedure
governing issuance of tender and work order was not strictly
followed. Such allegations, in the absence of any material
disclosing dishonest intention, wrongful gain, abuse of official
position or receipt of any pecuniary advantage, cannot prima facie
constitute the offence of criminal misconduct under Section 13 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act.
10. This Court also cannot overlook that the alleged incident
pertains to the year 2001. The accused respondents have faced
criminal proceedings for more than two decades. This Court is of
the firm opinion that in the absence of any direct material
disclosing the essential ingredients of the offences alleged,
compelling the accused respondents to continue facing criminal
prosecution, would not advance the ends of justice. The distinction
between an administrative irregularity and criminal misconduct
cannot be obliterated merely because some other procedure could
have been adopted by the public servant. Criminal prosecution
must necessarily rest upon fulfilment of the statutory ingredients
of the offence and cannot be sustained merely on account of
procedural deviation.
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11. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court is undoubtedly
confined to examining the legality, correctness and propriety of
the impugned order and interference is warranted only where the
order suffers from patent illegality, manifest perversity or results
in miscarriage of justice.
12. Having examined the entire material available on record, this
Court is of the considered opinion that though the learned trial
Court rightly discharged respondent Lokesh from the offences
under Sections 120-B and 420 IPC and respondent Shashikant
from all the offences alleged against him, it committed an error in
proceeding to frame charges against respondent Lokesh for
offences under Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. Even if the entire prosecution case is accepted at
its face value, the material collected during investigation does not
prima facie disclose the essential ingredients constituting criminal
misconduct under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. The allegations
merely disclose procedural irregularities in the matter of issuance
of tender and work order and fall short of establishing abuse of
official position for obtaining any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained to
the extent it directed framing of charges against respondent
Lokesh under Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act and deserves to be set aside to that extent.
13. Consequently, S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.814/2015
preferred by the State of Rajasthan is dismissed. The order dated
13.03.2015 passed by the learned Special Judge (Prevention of
Corruption Act Cases), Udaipur, to the extent it directed framing of
charges against respondent Lokesh for offences under Sections
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13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is
hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the order dated
05.08.2015, whereby charges came to be framed against
respondent Lokesh pursuant to the aforesaid order, being purely
consequential in nature, is also quashed and set aside.
Accordingly, S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.88/2016 preferred
by respondent Lokesh stands allowed.
14. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.
15. A copy of this order be placed in each file.
(KULDEEP MATHUR),J
-/TarunG-
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