Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal … vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 31 July, 2026
Date of reserved for orders : 21.04.2026
Date of pronouncement : 31.07.2026
Date of uploading : 05.08.2026
APHC010117602018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY, THE 31st DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM
WRIT PETITION NOs: 5306 and 11889 OF 2018
WRIT PETITION NO:5306 of 2018
Between:
1. Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, Rep., by its
Commissioner, Visakhapatnam, Visakhapatnam District.
...Petitioner
AND
1.The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by its Special Chief Secretary,
Revenue Department Secretariat, Velagapudi, Guntur, Guntur
District.
2. The District Collector, Visakhapatnam District, Visakhapatnam.
3. The Joint Collector cum Settlement officer, Visakhapatnam
District.
4. The Tahsildar Visakhapatnam Rural, Mandal, Visakhapatnam.
5. Kandipilli Abbulu died, as per Lrs. of R/o. D.No.6-116,
Adivivaram, Big market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal,
Visakhapatnam District
6. Kandipilli Guramma Died, As per Lrs. R/o. D.No.6-116,
Adivivaram, Big market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal,
Visakhapatnam District
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
7. Kandipilli Appa rao, S/o. Abbulu. R/o. D.No.6-116, Adivivaram,
Big market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam District
8. Kandipilli Bangar Raju Died as per L Rs RR 16 to 18, S/o.
Abbulu. R/o. D.No.6-116, Adivivaram, Big market, Visakhapatnam
Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam District
9. Kandipilli Sankar rao, S/o. Abbulu. R/o. D.No.6-116, Adivivaram,
Big market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam District
10. Kandipilli chinna rao, S/o. Abbulu. R/o. R/o.3-9041,
Gandhinagar, Ward-72, Advivaram, Visakhapatnam, Rural Mandal,
Visakhapatnam District.
11. Kandipilli Gopi, S/o Abbulu. R/o.3-9041, Gandhinagar, Ward-
72, Advivaram, Visakhapatnam, Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam
District.
12. Kandipilli Gurunath Died as per L Rs Rr 19 to 21, S/o Abbulu
R/o. D.No.6-116, Adivivaram, Big market, Visakhapatnam Rural
Mandal, Visakhapatnam District
13. Kolusu Kanaka Maha Lakshmi, S/o. Ramarao, R/o.D.no.9-116,
Adivivaram Big market, Visakhapatnam Rural mandal,
Visakhapatnam District.
14. Kandipilli Simhachachaloam, S/o. Appanna, . D.No.6-116,
Adivivaram, Big market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal,
Visakhapatnam District
15. Kandipilli Pydaiah Died as per L Rs Rr 22 to 25, S/o. Appanna, .
D.No.6-116, Adivivaram, Big market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal,
Visakhapatnam District
16. Kandipilli Venkata Lakshmi W/o Late Bangarraju, Aged about 54
years,R/o 6-85, Main Road, Government school back sides,
Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra
Pradesh - 530 028.
17. Kandipilli Mohan Rao S/o Lae Bangarraju, Aged about 37
years,R/o 6-85, Main Road, Government school back sides,
Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra
Pradesh - 530 028.
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18. Yellanki Dhanarupa C/o Kata raju, Aged about 32 years, R/o 59-
13-11, Near Market Road, Malkapuram, Visakhapatnam (Urban),
Andhra Pradesh -530 011.
19. Kandipilli Santhoshi W/o Late Gurunath, aged about 42 years,
R/o 5-133/4, Post Office Street, Adivivaram, Simhachalam,
Visakhapatnam Rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh - 530 028.
20. Kandipilli Jhansi Minor D/o Late Gurunath, Aged about 14 years,
R/o 9-116, Simhadrinagar, Simhachalam,Patha Adivivaram,
Visakhapatnam Rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh - 530 028.
21. Kandipilli Mokshith Minor S/o Late Gurunath, Aged about 8
years, R/o 5-133/4, Post Office Street, adivivaram, Simhachalam,
Visakhapatnam Rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh -530 028.
22. Kandipilli Bangaramma W/o Late Pydaiah, Aged about 62 years,
R/o 3-90, ward-72, adivivaram, Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam
Rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh -530 028.
23. Kandipilli Venkata Ramana S/o Late Pydaiah, Aged about 44
years, R/o 3-90, ward -72, adivivaram, Simhachalam,
Visakhapatnam Rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh -530 028.
24. Kandipilli Ganesh S/o Late Pydaiah, Aged about 42 years, R/o
3-90, ward -72, adivivaram, Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam Rural,
Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh -530 028.
25. Kandipilli Saradha D/o Late Pydaiah, R/o 3-90, ward -72,
adivivaram, Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam Rural, Visakhapatnam,
Andhra Pradesh -530 028. RR 16 to18,19 to 21, 22 to 25 are
brought on record as L.Rs of the deceased respondent nos. 8,12
and 15 as per the Court's Order dt.20.02.2026 in I.A.Nos.01,02 and
03 of 2026 respectively.
...Respondents
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying
that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the
High Court may be pleased to issue an Writ, order or direction, more
particularly one in the nature of Writ of certiorari calling for the
records pertaining to the Revision petition no. 54629/EA/AR/2006
dated 21-12-2017 passed by the 15 respondent and set aside the
same and pass
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
IA NO: 1 OF 2018
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,
the High Court may be pleased to suspend the order passed by the
1st respondent in Revision Petition no. 54629/EA/AR/2006 dated
21-12-2017 pending disposal of the above writ petition in this
Hon'ble court and pass
IA NO: 1 OF 2026
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,
the High Court may be pleased to bring the Legal Representatives
of the deceased/respondent no.8 on record in the above
W.P.No.5306 of 2018 as party respondents no. 23,24 and 25 and
pass
IA NO: 2 OF 2026
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,
the High Court may be pleased to bring the Legal Representatives
of the deceased/respondent no.12 on record in the above
W.P.No.5306 of 2018 as party respondents no. 16,17 and 18 and
pass
IA NO: 3 OF 2026
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,
the High Court may be pleased to bring the Legal Representatives
of the deceased/respondent no.15 on record in the above
W.P.No.5306 of 2018 as party respondents no. 19,20,21 and 22
and pass
Counsel for the Petitioner: A S C BOSE (SC FOR MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS AP)
Counsel for the Respondents: THOOM SRINIVAS
Counsel for the Respondents:GP FOR REVENUE (AP)
Counsel for the Respondents:PILLIX LAW FIRM
Counsel for the Respondents:SUDEEPTHI POTLURI
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
WRIT PETITION NO: 11889 OF 2018
Between:
1. The District Collector,, Visakhapatnam.
2. The Joint Collector-cum-Settlement Officer,, Visakhapatnam
District.
3. The Tahsildar,, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam
District.
...Petitioners
AND
1. The Special Chief Secretary Revenue EA and AR Department,
A.P. Secretariat, Velagapudi, Amaravathi, Guntur District.
2. Kandipilli Abbulu died, as per L.Rs R/o.D.No.6-116, Adivivaram
Big Market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam District.
3. Kandipilli Guramma, (died) as per L.Rs R/o.D.No.6-116,
Adivivaram Big Market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal,
Visakhapatnam District.
4. Kandipilli Appa Rao, S/o.Abbulu. R/o.D.No.6-116, Adivivaram
Big Market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam District.
5. Kandipilli Bangar Raju died as per L Rs RR 14 to 16, S/o.Abbulu
R/o.D.No.6-116, Adivivaram Big Market, Visakhapatnam Rural
Mandal, Visakhapatnam District.
6. Kandipilli Sankar Rao, S/o.Abbulu R/o.D.No.6-116, Adivivaram
Big Market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam District.
7. Kandipilli Chinna Rao, S/o.Abbulu R/o.D.No.6-116, Adivivaram
Big Market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam District.
8. Kandipilli Gopi, S/o.Abbulu R/o.D.No.6-116, Adivivaram Big
Market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam District.
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
9. Kandipilli Gurunath Died as per L Rs Rr 17 to19, S/o.Abbulu
R/o.D.No.6-116, Adivivaram Big Market, Visakhapatnam Rural
Mandal, Visakhapatnam District.
10. Kolusu Kanaka Maha Lakshmi, S/o.Ramarao, R/o.D.No.9-116,
Adivivaram Big Market, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal,
Visakhapatnam District.
11. Kandipilli Sirnhachalam, S/o.Appanna residents of 3-90/1,
Gandhinagar, Ward No.72, Adivivaram, Visakhapatnam Rural
Mandal, Visakhapatnam District.
12. Kandipilli Pydaiah Died as per L Rs Rr 20 to 23, S/o.Appanna
residents of 3-90/1, Gandhinagar, Ward No.72, Adivivaram,
Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam District.
13. The Commissioner, Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal
Corporation, Visakhapatnam.
14. Kandipilli Venkata Lakshmi W/o Late Bangarraju, Aged about 54
years,R/o 6-85, Main Road, Government school back sides,
Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra
Pradesh - 530 028.
15. Kandipilli Mohan Rao S/o Late Bangarraju, Aged about 37
years,R/o 6-85, Main Road, Government school back sides,
Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra
Pradesh - 530 028.
16. Yellanki Dhanarupa C/o Kata raju, Aged about 32 years, R/o 59-
13-11, Near Market Road, Malkapuram, Visakhapatnam (Urban),
Andhra Pradesh - 530 011.
17. Kandipilli Santhoshi W/o Late Gurunath, aged about 42 years,
R/o 5-133/4, Post Office Street, Adivivaram, Simhachalam,
Visakhapatnam Rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh - 530 028.
18. Kandipilli Jhansi Minor D/o Late Gurunath, Aged about 14 years,
R/o 9-116, Simhadrinagar, Simhachalam,Patha Adivivaram,
Visakhapatnam Rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh - 530 028.
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19. Kandipilli Mokshith Minor S/o Late Gurunath, Aged about 8
years, R/o 5-133/4, Post Office Street, adivivaram, Simhachalam,
Visakhapatnam Rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh -530 028.
20. Kandipilli Bangaramma W/o Late Pydaiah, Aged about 62 years,
R/o 3-90, ward-72, adivivaram, Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam
Rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh -530 028.
21. Kandipilli Venkata Ramana S/o Late Pydaiah, Aged about 44
years, R/o 3-90, ward -72, adivivaram, Simhachalam,
Visakhapatnam Rural, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh -530 028.
22. Kandipilli Ganesh S/o Late Pydaiah, Aged about 42 years, R/o
3-90, ward -72, adivivaram, Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam Rural,
Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh -530 028.
23. Kandipilli Saradha D/o Late Pydaiah, R/o 3-90, ward -72,
adivivaram, Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam Rural, Visakhapatnam,
Andhra Pradesh -530 028. RR 14 to16,17 to 19, 20 to 23 are
brought on record as L.Rs of the deceased respondent nos. 5,9 and
12 as per the Court's Order dt.20.02.2026 in I.A.Nos.01,02 and 03
of 2026 respectively.
...Respondents
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying
that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the
High Court may be pleased to issue a Writ, order or direction more
particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari calling for the
records relating to the order in Revision Petition No.54629/EA and
AR/2006 dt.21.12.2017 of the Special Chief Secretary to
Government, Revenue (EA and AR) Department, and quash the
same and pass
IA NO: 1 OF 2018
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,
the High Court may be pleased to suspend the operation of the
order in Revision petition No. 54629/EA and AR/2006 dt. 21-12-
2017 of the Special Chief Secretary to Government, Revenue (EA
and AR) Department, pending disposal of the above writ petition
IA NO: 1 OF 2026
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Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,
the High Court may be pleased to bring the Legal Representatives
of the deceased/respondent no.5 on record in the above
W.P.No.5306 of 2018 as party respondents no. 20,21 and 22 and
pass
IA NO: 2 OF 2026
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,
the High Court may be pleased to bring the Legal Representatives
of the deceased/respondent no.9 on record in the above
W.P.No.5306 of 2018 as party respondents no. 13,14 and 15 and
pass
IA NO: 3 OF 2026
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,
the High Court may be pleased to bring the Legal Representatives
of the deceased/respondent no.12 on record in the above
W.P.No.11889 of 2018 as party respondents no. 16,17,18 and 19
and pass
Counsel for the Petitioners: GP FOR REVENUE (AP)
Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR ASSIGNMENT (AP)
Counsel for the Respondents:THOOM SRINIVAS
Counsel for the Respondents:PILLIX LAW FIRM
Counsel for the Respondents:SUDEEPTHI POTLURI
This Court made the following:
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COMMON ORDER:
The controversy in the present writ petitions centers around
the validity of the order passed by the Government under the
proviso to Section 11 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estate
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short ―the
Estates Abolition Act‖). In deciding the said controversy, this Court
is required to examine the extent of the Government’s jurisdiction
under the Estates Abolition Act, the effect of the earlier proceedings
and the directions issued by this Court, the objection as to limitation,
the nature and classification of the subject land, the evidentiary
value of the revenue records relied upon by the parties, and
ultimately whether the impugned order warrants interference in
exercise of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India.
2. Both the writ petitions are filed challenging one and same
order passed by the Special Chief Secretary, Revenue (EA & AR)
Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh (Hereinafter refer to as
―the Revisional Authority‖), in Revision Petition No.54629/EA &
AR/2006, dated 21.12.2017, which is preferred against the order of
the District Collector, Visakhapatnam, in S.R.No.11 (Pro) 1 to 28/05
Rc.No.7780/95 F-2 dated 12.01.2006, made under Section 11(pro)
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
of the Estates Abolition Act, pertaining to Survey Nos. 32/4, 35/1,
35/2, 35/3, and 35/4, covering an area of Acs.11.15 cents in
Mudasarlova Village, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal, Visakhapatnam
District. Hence, they are heard together and being disposed of by
this common order.
3. W.P.No.5306 of 2018 is filed by Greater Visakhapatnam
Municipal Corporation (GVMC) while W.P.No.11889 of 2018 is filed
by the District Collector, Visakhapatnam, the Joint Collector-cum-
Settlement Officer, Visakhapatnam District, and the Tahsildar,
Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal.
4. The dispute arises under the Estates Abolition Act and
involves the grant of ryotwari patta to the unofficial respondents.
5. SUBMISSIONS OF THE WRIT PETITIONERS
(a). Mudasarlova Village is one of the villages in the erstwhile
Vizianagaram Estate, which was abolished following the enactment
of the Estates Abolition Act. Settlement rates and records were
introduced in the village with effect from 01.07.1959. Originally,
Mudasarlova Village consisted of only 27 survey numbers.
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
(b). Survey Nos. 28 to 71 were newly created by delineating land
from R.S.No. 26 and assigned to tribal families as well as certain
non-tribal families within Darapalem H/o Mudasarlova Revenue
Village. The D-form pattas issued in the year 1977 to both tribal and
non-tribal beneficiaries have been duly regularized.
(c). The Mandal Revenue Officer, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal,
by Rc. No. 1095/92/HA dated 27-12-1993, revoked the prior
assignment granted to the claimants due to gross violations of the
assignment conditions. Subsequently, the lands were officially
resumed by the Government and allocated to the Greater
Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation for the development of water
works, a botanical garden and a green belt, as per
Proc.Ac.No.881/93/A10 dated 23-01-1994 of the District Collector,
Visakhapatnam.
(d). Aggrieved by the cancellation of D-Form Pattas, the
assignees filed W.P. No.11747/1994, which was disposed of on
30.06.1994, directing the Appellate Authority, i.e., the Revenue
Divisional Officer, Visakhapatnam, to pass orders on the appeal.
(e). The claim petitions vide I.A.Nos.2/95 to 29/95, filed by the
predecessors of unofficial respondents (Jalumuri Appanna and 27
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
others) seeking the grant of Ryotwari Patta u/s. 11(a) of the Estates
Abolition Act were dismissed by the Settlement Officer,
Visakhapatnam, on 25.03.1995 on the ground of limitation.
(f). Being aggrieved by the orders, Jalumuri Appanna and others
filed a Revision Petition before the Director of Settlements, Andhra
Pradesh, which was dismissed on 04.04.1996, thereby confirming
the orders of the Settlement Officer.
(g). Challenging this, they filed a further revision before the
Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records, Andhra
Pradesh. This was also dismissed by order dated 20-06-1998 in
P1/357/96, thereby confirming the order of the Director of
Settlements.
(h). Subsequently, W.P. Nos.21730 of 1998 and W.P.No.9038 of
1999 preferred by V. Appanna & 25 others were disposed of by this
Court by orders dated 05.11.2002 and 24.01.2003 respectively,
whereby the matters were remanded to the District Collector,
Visakhapatnam, for fresh consideration.
(i). Pursuant to the remand orders of this Court, the District
Collector, Visakhapatnam, initiated an inquiry, verified the relevant
land records and examined the claims. Upon thorough verification,
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
the District Collector determined that the subject land is absolute
Government land. The prior land assignments granted to the
claimants have already been cancelled, due to gross violation of
assignment conditions, and the land was lawfully resumed by the
Government. The Claimants failed to establish that they were
inducted into possession by the landholders on or before the
statutory crucial date of 1st July 1945 and rejected the same vide
order dated 12-1-2006.
(j). The appeal preferred by the claimants Kasi Ramu and others
before the Commissioner of Appeals was remanded to the District
Collector vide Ref. P1/412/2006 order dated 01.09.2008. The Joint
Collector vide Rc.No.7780/1995 F2 dated 16.06.2012 rejected the
claim for ryotwari Patta. Questioning the said order, the L.Rs of Kasi
Ramu and others filed a revision before the Commissioner of
Appeals, who in turn, remanded the matter to the District Collector,
which was rejected on 12.07.2016, against which, the L.Rs of Kasi
Ramu and others filed revision before the Commissioner of Appeals,
who granted interim stay on 19.01.2017.
(k). At this stage, W.P.No.9032 of 2016 filed by Sri Kandapalli
Gopi, s/o Abbulu, for grant of Patta was disposed of on 06.04.2016
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
by directing the Settlement Officer to dispose of the revision petition
within a period of 12 weeks.
(l). Sri Kandipalli Gopi S/o Late Abbulu and others have filed a
revision petition before the Special Chief Secretary, Government of
Andhra Pradesh, against the orders of the District Collector,
Visakhapatnam in SR.No.11(Pro) 1 to 28 /2015/F2 dated
12.01.2006 which were passed under Sec 11 (Pro) of the Estates
Abolition Act pertaining to Sy.Nos.32/4, 35/1, 35/2, 35/3 and 35/4 to
an extent of Ac.11.15 cents in Mudasarlova Village of
Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal.
(m). The District Collector, Visakhapatnam, has filed a detailed
counter affidavit in the matter. After perusing the counter affidavit
filed by the District Collector and the affidavit filed by the revision
petitioners, the Revisional Authority by an order, dated 21.12.2017
has allowed the revision petition, which is impugned in the present
writ petitions.
6. GROUNDS ARGUED BY THE WRIT PETITONERS
i) The Revisional Authority failed to appreciate that the claim
was barred by an inordinate and unexplained delay as the claimants
offered no plausible explanation for waiting from 1959 to 1995 to file
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
their claim. They chose to agitate the claim after the District
Collector handed over the land to the GVMC for water works and
botanical garden vide proceedings dated 23.01.1994.
ii) The District Collector also rejected the claim on the merits,
identifying a fatal defect in the case that the Revisional Authority
chose to ignore for 22 years.
iii) Furthermore, the claimants’ plea of poverty and illiteracy is
completely unpersuasive and legally untenable. Their active
awareness of their rights is clearly demonstrated by their successful
acquisition of D-Form pattas in 1977 and their subsequent approach
to this Court in 1994.
iv) Additionally, the Revisional Authority misconstrued the narrow
and specific scope of the proviso to Section 11 of the Estates
Abolition Act. Raising a fresh claim under Section 11, after losing
before multiple competent authorities, is entirely beyond the purview
and intent of the Act. In doing so, the Revisional Authority
overlooked the finality of the settlement record published in 1959,
which had remained unchallenged for decades. The Revisional
Authority completely ignored the concurrent findings of the
Settlement Officer, the Director of Settlement, and the
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records, all of
whom found that the claim was time barred.
v) In support of their contentions, the learned Government
pleader relied on the following judgments:
1. Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of A.P. Vs. Collector
and others reported in (2003) 3 SCC 472. (para-13)
2. Enforcement Directorate Vs. State of Kerala in W.P.(C)
No.13112 of 2021(L). (paras 6 & 7)
3. State of A.P. Vs. Dulla Ramunaidu in W.A.No.292 of 2019
dated 07.04.2022 (paras 27 to 37)
4. State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha reported in (1969) 2
SCC 187. (paras 11 & 12)
5. Pamidimarri Chenchulakshmamma Vs. The Estates
Abolition Tribunal Nellore (District Court) and others
reported in AIR 1972 AP 1 FB (paras 18 to 29, 47 to 61)
6. Sarvepalli Ramaiah (Dead) through LRs Vs. District
Collector, Chittoor District reported in (2019) 4 SCC 500
(paras 41 to 49)
7. SUBMISSIONS OF THE UNOFFICIAL RESPONDENTS
(a). The unofficial respondents’ predecessors and the unofficial
respondents are in possession and enjoyment of the subject land by
cultivating the land.
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
(b). Mudasarlova village in Visakhapatnam Rural is a Zamindari
Village of the Erstwhile Vizianagaram Estate. Mudasarlova village
was abolished, along with its parent Vizianagaram Samstanam, by
the erstwhile Government of the Madras Presidency. The village
was taken over under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act
along with other villages of the Vizianagaram Estate.
(c). After the abolition of Estate, regular survey and settlement
operations were conducted, and new settlement cist rates were
introduced with effect from 01.07.1959.
(d). During the survey and settlement operations, the settlement
authorities prepared Settlement Fair Adangal (SFA) records by
recognizing all eligible persons as pattadars.
(e). The survey and settlement register pertaining to the year Fasli
1314 (i.e.,1904) prepared during the said survey operations, is
called ‗Gilman Register’ and contains 72 survey numbers for the
village of Mudasarlova in the then Pedagadi Thana of Vizianagaram
Samsthanam. It reveals that the subject lands were recognized as
ryotwari dry lands.
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(f). The survey and settlement of Mudasarlova village was
completed in the year 1959, and the was introduced and published
under Sections 22 and 23 of the Estates Abolition Act.
(g) The unofficial respondents’ ancestors’ rights were recognized
as ryots, and their names were incorporated in the Settlement Fair
Adangal. As such, they are pattadars of the subject land as on the
cut-off date, i.e., 01.07.1948, and became entitled to ryotwari
pattas.
(h). The unofficial respondents and their ancestors have been in
continuous possession of the subject land from 1929 till date, and
the unofficial respondents were under the impression that, in view of
the entries of their names in the Settlement Fair Adangal, 10/1
Adangal and Revenue Records, and the publication made under
Sections 22 and 23 of the Estates Abolition Act, they are owners of
the subject land.
(i). In 1993, for the first time, the authorities interfered with the
possession of the unofficial respondents, contending that the
unofficial respondents were issued D-Form pattas in their favour in
1979 and that the said D-Form pattas were cancelled in 1993 by the
Mandal Revenue Officer, Visakhapatnam Rural.
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(j). The unofficial respondents have come to know of the
provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, and to put an end to the
ongoing interference by the authorities, they preferred an application
under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act before the Joint
Collector & Settlement Officer for the grant of Ryotwari Pattas. The
said application was rejected by an order dated 25.03.1995 in I.A.
Nos.2/95 to 29/5 on the ground of delay and being barred by
limitation.
(k). Then, the unofficial respondents preferred a revision before
the Director of Settlement and the said revision petition was
dismissed on 04.04.1996 in R.P.No.11/95/VSP-B2. Aggrieved by
the same, they filed further revision before the Commissioner of
Survey, Settlements and Land Records, and the same was also
dismissed by an order dated 20.06.1998 in File No. P1/357/96.
(l). Aggrieved by the same, the unofficial respondents had
preferred a Writ Petition in W.P.No.9038 of 1999 before this Court,
and the same was disposed of by an order dated 24.01.2003,
directing the Revisional Authority to consider the representations of
the petitioners therein (unofficial respondents) for grant of pattas on
merits, without being influenced by any of the findings given in that
20
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order, after giving notice and opportunity to the petitioners therein
(unofficial respondents).
(m). Afterwards, the Revisional Authority sent the representations
to the District Collector, Visakhapatnam, through Memo No.
80138/JA2/2002-1 dated 22.01.2003. The request was rejected in a
decision dated 12.01.2006. The order explained that the lands
claimed by the individuals were actually lands that the Government
had taken back. It is also said that the claimants did not receive the
lands from the landowners on or after July 1, 1945, which is an
important date. Additionally, it mentioned that cases with larger land
claims could be reviewed by the Government under the Estates
Abolition Act.
(n). The Government of Andhra Pradesh has taken up a revision
against the order dated 12.01.2006 passed by the District Collector,
Visakhapatnam under Section 11 (Proviso) of the Estates Abolition
Act. After hearing the arguments of all the interested parties, the
revision petition filed by the unofficial respondents was allowed by
an order dated 21.12.2017 in Revision Petition No. 54629/EA &
AR/2006.
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8. GROUNDS ARGUED BY UNOFFICIAL RESPONDENTS
i) The Unofficial respondents raised a preliminary objection to
the maintainability of the writ petition in W.P.No.11889 of 2018,
contending that the writ petitioner, the District Collector, is only an
Officer of the State and he cannot maintain a writ petition against
the orders passed by the Government, the Revisional Authority, as
no specific consent or authorization is filed, and that the said writ
petition is misconceived and liable to be dismissed.
ii) The Revisional Authority has dealt with all the issues raised
by both the parties, including the nature of the land, possession of
the claimants (unofficial Respondents) prior to 01.07.1945, entries in
the Settlement Fair Adangal, classification of the land, and various
other factual issues, which were meticulously considered while
setting aside the order passed by the District Collector,
Vishakhapatnam, dated 12.01.2006.
iii) The unofficial Respondents’ forefathers (ancestors) were
inducted into the possession of the subject land by the erstwhile
landholder of Vizianagaram Estate. The predecessor in title has
paid the cist and available cist receipts are for the years 1929, 1939,
1945, 1946 and 1947 which are pre-abolition records. The unofficial
respondents or their predecessors in title have been in possession
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of the subject lands as on the notified date 01.07.1945 and paid
kadapu (kaulu) after abolition for the years 1949, 1953, 1954, 1955
and 1959 which clearly establishes that the land is a zeroity land
and same is in cultivation, possession and enjoyment of the
predecessors in title of unofficial respondents. The Gilman Register
shows that Mudasarlova village was divided into Survey Nos.1 to 72
and Sy.Nos.32/4, 35/1. 35/2, 35/3 and 35/4 are existing zeroity
lands in the said settlement register. The unofficial respondents’
ancestors’ names were shown as pattadars in the Settlement Fair
Adangal for an extent of Acs.11.15 cents.
iv) As per the report of the Advocate Commissioner dated
26.04.1995 in W.P.No.5355/1995, there are existing mango and
cashew plantation in the subject land which clearly establishes that
the land is a zeroity land under cultivation. The unofficial
respondents have filed various writ petitions against the Revenue
Authorities and GVMC (writ petitioners herein). In all the writ
petitions, the unofficial respondents have consistently pleaded that
their predecessors are the ryots of the subject land as defined under
the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act. Admittedly, this Court
had passed various orders protecting the possession of the
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unofficial respondents from the authorities, as such, the possession
of the unofficial respondents remains intact as on today.
v) The unofficial respondents have clearly established their
rights over the subject land, as the names of their predecessors are
recorded in the Settlement Fair Adangal as ryots. As such, the
unofficial respondents have fulfilled the requirements for grant of
pattas under Section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act. The entries in
the Settlement Fair Adangal clearly prove that the predecessors of
the unofficial respondents were put in possession of the subject
lands before the crucial date 01.07.1945.
vi) The proviso to Section 11 confers wider power on the
Government to grant patta even if a person admitted to possession
of any land on or after 01.07.1945 be entitled to a ryotwari patta in
respect of such land.
vii) The writ petitioners have not raised any ground of jurisdiction
before the Revisional Authority, as such, they have waived the right
of taking such a plea in the writ petitions.
viii) The writ petitioners had challenged the impugned order
seeking Writ of Certiorari but did not plead any substantial ground
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
amenable to the Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 for granting the
Writ of Certiorari.
ix) Further, the GVMC was only allotted land subject to certain
conditions and final approval by the Government. The GVMC has
not filed any document to show that the land was rightfully
transferred to them, as such, the Writ Petition W.P.No.5306 of 2018
filed by the GVMC is not maintainable, as the writ petitioner lacks
locus standi.
x) In support of their contentions, the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the unofficial respondents relied on the following
judgments:
1. Chief Conservator of Forests Vs. Collector reported in
(2003) 3 SCC 472
2. L. Ramesh and others Vs. The State of A.P. reported in
2021 (5) ALT 324
3. State of Haryana and another Vs. Amin Lal and others
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3368
4. Balwant N.Viswamitra and others Vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mule
and others reported in (2004) 8 SCC 706
5. Dokiseela Ramulu Vs. Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu and
others reported in (2017) 2 SCC 69
6. Indermani Kirtipal Vs. Union of India and others reported in
(1996) 2 SCC 437
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
7. Central Counsel for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences Vs.
Bikartan Das reported in (2023) 16 SCC 462
9. Heard the arguments advanced on both sides and perused
the material available on record including the written submissions
filed by both the counsels.
10. In opposition to the writ petitions, the unofficial respondents
raised an issue against the maintainability of the writ petitions. The
District Collector, being a subordinate Administrative Officer within
the State Government hierarchy, cannot legally challenge or
maintain a writ petition against an order passed by their own
superior authority, i.e., the Revisional Authority-Government.
11. It is relevant to state on record that this is the second round of
litigation, as earlier the subject land was dealt with by the Settlement
Officer, The Director of Settlements, and the Commissioner of
Survey, Settlements & Land Records, who had concurrently
rejected the claim as barred by limitation. Aggrieved by the same,
the unofficial respondents have approached this Court by filling
W.P.No.9038 of 1999. This Court, by order dated 24.01.2003,
disposed of the said Writ Petition, directing the Government to
consider the representation of the unofficial respondents herein on
merits, without influenced by any of the findings given in that order.
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There upon, the Government, by memo No.80138/JA2/2002-1,
communicated the representation of the unofficial respondents to
the District Collector, Visakhapatnam, for taking necessary action
and the said claim was rejected vide order dated 12.01.2006.
12. The learned Government Pleader representing the writ
petitioners had contended that the three lower authorities – the
Settlement Officer (1995), the Director of Settlements (1996), and
the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements & Land Records (1998),
had concurrently rejected the claim. The District Collector again
rejected the claim in 2006 after a detailed enquiry. The Special
Chief Secretary, sitting in a revisional capacity, upset all these
findings based on the same evidence. This is impermissible unless
there is a manifest error of law or perversity while invoking the
provisions of Section 11 proviso. The Revisional Authority cannot
exercise its power as an appellate Court. It cannot re-appreciate
evidence and substitute its own findings, unless the lower order is
without jurisdiction or perverse. The Revisional Authority’s order is a
classic case of overreach. It has acted as if it was the original
adjudicating authority, re-appreciating the Gilman Register and the
Settlement Fair Adangal without any fresh evidence. This is a
jurisdictional error and liable to be set aside.
27
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13. The learned senior Counsel, Sri V.R.Avula, representing the
unofficial respondents, while opposing the said contentions, submits
that the Revisional Authority had entertained the representations of
the unofficial respondents in compliance with the orders passed by
this Court in W.P.No.9038 of 1998 dated 24.01.2003. The said order
passed by this Court had attained finality and the writ petitioners
have participated in the case without raising the objection of
jurisdiction before the Revisional Authority. As such, the writ
petitioners are estopped from taking this plea.
14. This Court, upon careful consideration of the rival contentions
of the counsels representing the parties respectively and on facts of
the case, comes to the conclusion that the Revisional Authority had
taken up the enquiry on the directions of this Court to consider the
representation of the unofficial respondents on merits. In any event,
the earlier orders passed by the primary and appellant authorities
are solely on the ground of limitation/ time-barred claim, as such, in
the earlier round of litigation, none of the authorities have
considered the evidence submitted by the unofficial respondents.
The Revisional Authority, for the first time, after the directions
passed by this Court, has discussed the evidence of the case and
rendered findings based on the same. As such, the contention of the
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
writ petitioners that the Revisional Authority committed jurisdictional
error by re-appreciating the evidence cannot be accepted.
15. This Court has also considered the legal position as to the
nature of enquiry under Section 11 proviso of the Estates Abolition
Act. The grant of ryotwari is a statutory power conferred upon the
Government and the Government has delegated the power to the
Lower Authorities under the rules framed under the Estates
Abolition Act. Under Rule 3, under Section 67 (1) & (2), the powers
of the Government under the Act, ordered to be exercised by the
authorities specified in Column-3 in the schedule. As against
Section 11 proviso, the Collector of the District can exercise power
subject to revision by the Government, in the case of an extent
involved does not exceed Acs.2.50 cents of wet or garden land or
Acs.5.00 cents of dry land and subject to revision by Government.
On perusal of the above provisions of the Act and the Rules framed
there under, the Primary Authority is not empowered to deal with the
case of claim exceeding Acs.2.50 cents of wet or garden land or
Acs.5.00 cents of dry land. In the present case, the claim of the
unofficial respondents is exceeding the said extent specified under
the Rules, as such, the earlier orders passed by the Primary
Authority is hit by inherent lack of Jurisdiction. In view of the
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
foregoing discussion, as stated above, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from
any jurisdictional error and the same is not barred by principles of
constructive res judicata.
16. The Learned Government Pleader representing the writ
petitioners submits that it is the specific pleading of the writ
petitioners that the Revisional Authority has no Jurisdiction to
entertain the revision, because the revision itself is not maintainable,
as the Statute prescribes an appeal before the Commissioner of
Appeals since an appeal or revision lies to the Commissioner of
Appeals against the order of the District Collector under the Act. As
such, the Revisional Authority erred in allowing the revision without
having any jurisdiction to decide the same on the merits. It is his
further contention that other similarly situated claimants of similar
dispute have preferred appeals before the appellate authority. In
view of the same, the Revisional Authority ought not to have
entertained the revision and ought to have dismissed the same.
17. The Learned Senior Counsel representing the unofficial
respondents per contra submits that in fact, apart from other
grounds on merits of the impugned order, this is the only ground
urged by the writ petitioners in the affidavit filed in support of the writ
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
petition. The basis for this contention is that, after the directions
issued by this Court in W.P No. 9038 of 1999, the Government vide
memo No.80138/JA2/2002-1 directed the District Collector to take
necessary action. Upon which, the District Collector by order, dated
12.01.2006, has dismissed the claim of the unofficial respondents.
Against the said orders, a statutory appeal/revision ought to have
been filed before the Commissioner of appeals and not before the
Government. The said ground of the writ petitioners is flawed from
necessary facts and law. It is also submitted that the Government,
by a memo, had directed the District Collector to take necessary
action, this itself does not make the order of the District Collector as
an appealable order. As per the directions of this Court and also as
per the powers conferred upon the Government by Statute, the
Government is the Authority to grant ryotwari pattas. The District
Collector is only directed, by a memo, to conduct enquiry enabling
the Government to pass necessary orders in terms of the Statute
and in terms of the directions issued by this Court.
18. It is also submitted by the learned Senior Counsel
representing the unofficial respondents that the District Collector,
while passing the order dated 12.01.2006, had recorded a
categorical finding that in accordance with Rule 3 framed under
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
Section 67(1) and (2) of the Estates Abolition Act, revisions
involving claims not exceeding 2½ acres of wet/garden land or 5
acres of dry land shall lie with the Government. Insofar as the claim
of the predecessors of the unofficial respondents is concerned, it
exceeds the extent specified under the Rules. As it is more than 5
acres, the Government is the competent authority for issuance of
ryotwari pattas. Having recorded the above rule, the District
Collector has stated that the cases relating to the claim exceeding
the extent may be transferred to the Government with the above
findings for consideration under the provisions of the Estates
Abolition Act. The District Collector, having referred the above Rule,
ought to have refrained from giving any findings on merits of the
case. Any findings given by the District Collector in the order dated
12.01.2006 is without jurisdiction and nullity in the eye of law. As
such, this ground of the writ petitioners is misconceived. In any
event, the Government, while passing the orders in the revision, has
specifically referred the order passed by this Court in W.P No.9038
of 1999 under proviso to Section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act.
Therefore, the revision is taken up by the Government, pursuance to
the orders of this Court.
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19. This Court has scrutinized the order passed by the District
Collector dated 12.01.2006, and the findings recorded by the District
Collector in the conclusive paragraphs with regard to the Rules
framed under the Estates Abolition Act and also the extents claimed
by the predecessors of the unofficial respondents. Having admitted
in his order that the claim of the unofficial respondents is exceeding
the limit prescribed, the District Collector ought to have refrained
from rejecting the claim of the unofficial respondents and also
proceeded to discuss the case on merits.
20. The learned Senior Counsel representing the unofficial
respondents has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Balwant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (dead)
through LRs1, wherein it is held that the decree or order passed by
the Court or authority having no jurisdiction is nullity. This Court
holds that following the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the order passed by the District Collector dated 12.01.2006 is
nullity in law. In any event, the Government is directed by this Court
to consider the representation of the unofficial respondents, as
such, the impugned order passed by the Revisional Authority is in
conformity with law and warrants no interference on this ground.
1
(2004) 8 SCC 706
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
21. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
ground urged by the writ petitioners that the statutory
appeal/revision lies on the order passed by the District Collector
dated 12.01.2006 and not revision before the Government, is
unsustainable.
22. The Learned Government Pleader representing the writ
petitioners submits that after the Survey Settlement Records were
introduced in Mudasarlova Village, which consists of 27 Survey
Numbers, and the land in Survey No.26 admeasuring an extent of
Acs.270.00 cents was classified as ―water works poramboke‖ and
recorded as Government Land. The said land was partly
encroached by the Scheduled Tribes, as such, the District
Administration have newly carved out survey Nos.28 to 71 from
Survey No.26 and issued D-Form pattas in the year 1977. He
further submits that the predecessors of the unofficial respondents
were also issued D-Form pattas along with others in the year 1977.
Subsequently, for violation of conditions of assignment, the said D-
Form pattas were cancelled vide Rc.No.1095/92 HA dated
27.12.1993 by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Vishakhapatnam. After
cancellation of D-Form pattas, the land was resumed to the
Government by following due procedure of law.
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23. Further, aggrieved by the cancellation of D-Form pattas, the
assignees approached this Court by filing W.P No.11747 of 1994
and the said Writ Petition was disposed of by this Court directing the
Revenue Divisional Officer, Vishakhapatnam, to dispose of the
appeal pending before him. In view of the said facts, the unofficial
respondents admit to have come into the possession of the subject
land, only after the grant of D-Form pattas in the year 1977.
Similarly, the said fact of issuance of D-Form pattas in the year
1977 and subsequent cancellation of the said pattas in the year
1993 would clinchingly prove the case of the writ petitioners that the
predecessors of the unofficial respondents were not inducted into
the possession of land before the crucial date i.e., 01.07.1945.
24. The learned Senior Counsel representing the unofficial
respondents refutes the allegations made by the writ petitioners and
submits that the writ petitioners claim that the pattas were granted in
the year 1977 and the same was cancelled for violation of
conditions on 27.12.1993. But, copies of grant of D-form pattas,
proceedings of allotment, notice for cancellation and resumption
orders were neither filed before the Revisional Authority nor before
this Court to support the said allegation. Further, the contention of
the writ petitioners that the unofficial respondents have challenged
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
the cancellation of D-Form pattas before this Court in W.P.No.
11747 of 1994 and the dismissal of the said writ petition, is factually
incorrect. The allegation of the writ petitioners regarding the
issuance of D-Form pattas, cancellation of the pattas and
resumption of the land and handing over the same to the GVMC,
are only set up by the writ petitioners to deprive the unofficial
respondents of their lawful right over the subject property.
25. This Court, upon careful consideration of the rival contentions
of the counsels and on perusal of the facts and the material placed
before this Court, finds force in the arguments of the learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the unofficial respondents. The writ
petitioners did not place any record before this Court to support their
contention that the predecessors of unofficial respondents were not
inducted into the subject land before the crucial date i.e.,
01.07.1945 and have only came into the possession of the subject
land through the issuance D-Form pattas. The proceedings of
issuance of D-Form pattas and the proceedings of resumption of
land after cancellation of D-form pattas and the service of notices of
resumption is not filed before this Court.
26. Another aspect which this Court has perused is that
W.P.No.11747 of 1994, which is stated to have been filed by the
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
unofficial respondents challenging the cancellation of D-Form
Pattas, as contended by the writ petitioners, is lacking merit. The
counsel for the unofficial respondents have filed copies of Writ
petition in W.P.No.11747 of 1994, along with the order passed by
this Court by a Memo vide W.P (USR) No.39770 of 2026 in W.P No.
5306 of 2018 on 02.04.2026. The said record placed before this
Court manifestly establishes that the predecessors of the unofficial
respondents were not parties to the said Writ Petition as contended
by the writ petitioners herein. Therefore, the contention of the writ
petitioners insofar as the issuance of D-Form Pattas, cancellation
and resumption of land, would fail.
27. Insofar as the contention of the writ petitioners that the
predecessors of the unofficial respondents were not inducted into
the possession of land as on the cut off date i.e., 01.07.1945 is
factually incorrect and the same is against the record. This Court
has carefully examined the documents filed by the unofficial
respondents along with the counter affidavit. The unofficial
respondents have filed the cist receipts pertaining to the years 1929,
1939, 1946 and 1947 and Koulu Kada patram of the years 1945,
1949, 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1959. The unofficial respondents have
also filed the copy of the extract of 10(1) Adangal and also
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Settlement Fair Adangal record. It is also relevant to state that the
very same documents were filed by the unofficial respondents
before the District Collector as well as the Revisional Authority. In
fact, the Revisional Authority had categorically recorded the
documents filed by the unofficial respondents in support of their
claim. It is also recorded in the impugned order by the Revisional
Authority that the writ petitioners failed to produce the pre-abolition
records and settlement records before the adjudicating authority
from the date of inception. The Tahsildar is the Manager of the
estates. After the Estates Abolition Act came into force, he is the
custodian of the revenue records and failed to produce the
assignment records, such as, Form-D, D.R File, Provisional
Allotment, Appendix II, Check memo, Proceedings of the
assignment committee, original cancellation of assignment, proof of
service of cancellation orders, and proceedings of taking over of
possession by revenue authorities. This Court has also verified the
documents of Advocate Commissioner Report filed before this Court
in W.P.No.5355 of 1995 and pre and post abolition records filed by
the unofficial respondents before the Revisional Authority and this
Court. On perusal of the said records, this Court is of the firm
opinion that the possession of the unofficial respondents can be
traced back to the crucial cut off date i.e., 01.07.1945.
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28. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
ground taken by the writ petitioners regarding issuance of D-Form
pattaa, cancellation of D-Form pattas and resumption of land to the
Government has to be rejected. Further, the contention of the writ
petitioners that predecessors of the unofficial respondents were not
inducted into the possession prior to cut off date i.e., 01.07.1945 is
against the record and the same cannot be acceded to the entries in
the Settlement Fair Adangal record and 10(1) Adangal clearly
reflects the entries of names of the predecessors of the unofficial
respondents and their possession of subject land on the crucial date
of settlement operations. As per the Settlement Fair Adangal, the
subject survey numbers were recorded in the name of Kandipally
Abbulu and others as private patta lands.
29. The learned Government Pleader submits that the Estates
Abolition Act provides a clear statutory framework for the grant of
Ryotwari pattas only for specific categories of land. The Act
explicitly excludes certain categories of land from the definition of
‘ryoti land’ for which pattas can be granted. Poramboke lands–a
classification that includes river porambokes, tank beds (Ava tank
poramboke), communal lands, grazing lands, and waste lands are
statutorily vested in the Government and cannot be assigned to
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
private individuals. He further contends that since the classification
of land is recorded as ―Water Works Poramboke‖, the subject land
cannot be claimed by the unofficial respondents and not entitled for
grant of pattas. The learned Government Pleader places reliance on
the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarvepalli Ramaiah
(Dead) Through LRs v. District Collector, Chittoor District 2 and
the judgment of this Court in Pamidimarri Chenchulakshamma v.
The Estates Abolition Tribunal Nellore (District Court)3.
30. The learned Senior Counsel representing the unofficial
respondents asserts that neither the subject land is a poramboke/
tank bed land nor the classification of the subject land as ―Water
Works Poramboke.‖ The learned Senior Counsel representing the
unofficial respondents has taken this Court to the documents which
are filed as Annexures along with the counter affidavit. The
Settlement Fair Adangal extract shows that Survey No.32/4 of an
extent of Acs.3.80 cents is recorded as Ryotwari Punja standing in
the name of Kandipilli Gurramma W/o Appayya. Similarly, other
extents in Survey No. 35/1 to 4 to an extent of Acs.7.35 cents were
entered in the name of Kandipalli Abbulu and Kandipalli Appanna
and it was recorded as ryotwari punja. But the same is struck off
2
(2019) 4 SCC 500
3
AIR 1972 AP 1 (FB)
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
later and recorded as ―Banjar/ Municipal Water Works‖. The Banjar
was entered beside the name of the unofficial respondents’
forefathers without assigning any reasons and without showing any
corresponding details of proceedings.
31. This Court, upon careful consideration of rival contentions of
the counsels and on perusal of the citations relied by the learned
Government Pleader, finds that the citations submitted do not apply
to the present facts of the case. The Full Bench of this Court was
dealing with a dispute primarily involved whether landholders in an
inam estate could claim ryotwari pattas for lands that were originally
classified as tank beds, water bodies. The core question was
whether such lands, which may not have been used for irrigation for
some time, could be treated as roity (arable/private) land and
assigned to the landholders. In the other case of Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India, it is ruled that water bodies and tank bed lands are
inalienable public trust assets. The Court held that no ryotwari patta
can be granted on such lands. This Court finds that there is no
dispute in the above principle of law, but for this Court has to look
into the factual aspects, whether or not the present case falls under
any of the category referred above.
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32. This Court have gone through the material made available by
the unofficial respondents on record and satisfied that the
Settlement Fair Adangal extract has been modified without any
proceedings by striking off the relevant extracts. In fact, the
Revisional Authority in the impugned order has categorically
recorded that the unofficial respondents have placed settlement Fair
Adangal copy which is obtained under the RTI Act and filed for
consideration. In such a case, the writ petitioners being the
custodian of the revenue records did not offer any reasonable
explanation for the said corrections in the Settlement Fair Adangal
records. Therefore, the records clearly established that on the date
of survey and settlement operation and at the time of preparation of
Settlement Fair Adangal, the unofficial respondents’ forefathers
were in possession of the subject land and their names were
registered in the Settlement Fair Adangal as roitys. Further, a report
of the Advocate Commissioner dated 26.04.1995, which is filed
before this Court, confirms that the unofficial respondents were in
possession of the subject land where there are thick grown plants.
In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that the subject
lands are not ―Water Works Poramboke‖ as stated by the writ
petitioners.
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
33. The learned Government Pleader submits that the application
under Section 11 (proviso) is barred by an inordinate delay and
laches, as the Estate was abolished and taken over by the
Government on 07.09.1949 and the unofficial respondents allegedly
knew their rights, yet they filed the claim under Section 11(a) in
1995 and a delay of over 45 years from the date of the final
publication of settlement records. The Settlement Officer, the
Director of Settlements, and the Commissioner of Survey,
Settlements & Land Records had concurrently rejected the claim as
barred by limitation. The scope of Section 11 (proviso) is narrow, it
does not permit reopening of finalized settlement records. Where a
claim for patta has been rejected by the Settlement Officer, the
Government may, suo motu or on application, pass orders. This
power must be exercised within a reasonable time frame and cannot
be used to unsettle final records without new and compelling
evidence. Further, the unofficial respondents/claimants failed to
prove their induction into the land before the crucial date i.e.
01.07.1945 which is mandatory requirement, as the 29 unofficial
respondents must prove that their predecessors were in lawful
possession as ryots on the crucial date and the cist receipts filed by
the unofficial respondents are not conclusive proof of title, especially
when the land was classified as water works poramboke in the
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
Settlement Fair Adangal and the Gilman Register of 1904 cannot
override the final Settlement Fair Adangal of 1959, which is a
statutory record.
34. The learned Government Pleader for Revenue, having
submitted as above on limitation, inordinate delay and laches, has
relied on the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Hon’ble
Court and contends that the claim of the unofficial respondent is
barred by limitation. In State of Andhra Pradesh V. Dulla
Ramanaidu in (W.A.No.292 of 2019 dated 07.04.2022), it is held
thus:
―37. The Estates Abolition Rules, 1973, were framed
under Rule 47 vide G.O.Ms.No.50, Revenue (J-1), dated
16.01.1974, exercising the source of power conferred on
the Government under Section 67 (d) & (e) of the Estates
Abolition Act and those Rules still holds good. Therefore,
the principle laid down by High Court of Andhra Pradesh in
Appalanaidu vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (referred
supra) has no application. Even the principle laid down in
V. Bhaskar Rao and others vs. M.R.O (referred supra) is
not applicable to the present facts of the case, in view of
G.O.Ms.No.911, Revenue (J) dated 15.08.1983,
G.O.Ms.No.551, Revenue (J), dated 19.05.1986,
G.O.Ms.No.400, Revenue (JA), dated 24.04.1993
repealing the two provisos annexed to Sub-Rule (4) of
Rule 2 of Estate Abolition Rules, 1973. As on and from the
date of issue of G.O.Ms.No.911, Revenue (J), dated
15.08.1983, G.O.Ms.No.551, Revenue (J), dated
19.05.1986, G.O.Ms.No.400, Revenue (JA), dated
24.04.1993, the authorities under the Act are disentitled to
exercise power to condone delay and the provisions of
Limitation Act, more particularly, Sections 5 and 14 have
also no application to the proceedings under the Estates
44
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018Abolition Act. But the learned single Judge did not advert
to the G.Os referred above amending the Rules and based
on the principle laid down in Appalanaidu vs. Government
of Andhra Pradesh (referred supra), concluded that, there
is no limitation for filing applications for issue of settlement
patta under Section 11(a) of Estates Abolition Act. The
settlement of estate under Section 22 of Estates Abolition
Act was made in the year 1959. Therefore, the claim of the
petitioners is beyond limitation prescribed under Rule 47 of
the Estate Abolition Rules, 1973 read with G.O.Ms.No.50,
Revenue (J-1), dated 16.01.1974, G.O.Ms.No.911,
Revenue (J) dated 15.08.1983, G.O.Ms.No.551, Revenue
(J), dated 19.05.1986, G.O.Ms.No.400, Revenue (JA),
dated 24.04.1993. The petitioners or the learned
Government Pleader for Revenue might not have brought
to the notice of the learned single about omitting the two
provisos annexed to Sub Rule (4) of Rule 2 of Estate
Abolition Rules, 1973 by G.O.Ms.No.50, Revenue (J-1),
dated 16.01.1974, G.O.Ms.No.911, Revenue (J) dated
15.08.1983, G.O.Ms.No.551, Revenue (J), dated
19.05.1986, G.O.Ms.No.400, Revenue (JA), dated
24.04.1993. Therefore, learned single Judge committed an
error in holding that, no time is prescribed to make
appropriate applications under Section 11(a) of the
Estates Abolition Act for issue of ryotwari patta in favour of
the ryots/claimants. Hence, the finding of the learned
single Judge regarding limitation is hereby set-aside, while
holding that the claim of the petitioners/respondents herein
is hopelessly barred by limitation.‖
i) In State of Gujarat Vs. Patel Raghav Natha4, it is held thus:
―11. The question arises whether the Commissioner
can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It
is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under
Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must
be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the
reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the
case and the nature of the order which is being revised.
4
(1969) 2 SCC 187
45
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
12. It seems to us that Section 65 itself indicates the
length of the reasonable time within which the
Commissioner must act under Section 211. Under Section
65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the
applicant of his decision on the application within a period
of three months the permission applied for shall be
deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a
period of three months is considered ample for the
Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the
legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that
permission shall be deemed to have been granted.
Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that
the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers
within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is
reasonable time because after the grant of the permission
for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend
money on starting building operations at least within a few
months from the date of the permission. In this case the
Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on
October 12, 1961, i.e. more than a year after the order and
it seems to us that this order was passed too late.‖
35. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel representing the
unofficial respondents submits that in both the Writ Petitions,
limitation is not pleaded. The only ground taken by the writ
petitioners in the Writ Petitions apart from the merit of the findings
given by respondent No.1 is that respondent No.1 has no
jurisdiction to entertain the revision for the reason that against the
order passed by the District Collector dated 12.01.2006, appeal or
revision lies with the Commissioner of Appeals under the Estates
Abolition Act. In fact, the writ petitioners in W.P No.11889 of 2018
i.e., the District Collector and others had not taken the ground of
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
limitation even before respondent No.1. The ground has to be
pleaded with relevant material. Though the writ petitioner in
W.P.No.5306 of 2018 i.e., the GVMC has taken the ground of
limitation before the Revisional Authority, the same cannot be taken
into consideration for the following reasons given below:
(a) The initial application filed by the unofficial respondents under
Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act was rejected, both the
revisions filed before the Revisional Authorities were dismissed
solely on the ground of limitation and time barred claim. The Writ
Petition W.P No. 9038 of 1999 filed challenging the orders of all the
lower authorities was disposed of with a specific direction to the
Government to consider the applications filed by the unofficial
respondents on merits without being influenced by any of the
findings in the orders passed by the settlement officers/ Revisional
Authorities. The order passed by this Court in the said Writ Petition
had attained finality.
(b) The writ petitioners, having submitted themselves to the orders
of this Court and participated in the proceedings before the District
Collector and the Government of A.P in the Revision, are estopped
by conduct in agitating the ground of limitation which was not even
taken or adjudicated by the District Collector and the Government in
47
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018the revision. This Court’s direction in W.P.No.9038 of 1999 ―to
decide on merits without being influenced by any of the findings‖
itself is unambiguous and this Court was conscious while passing
the said order to decide the case on merits.
(c) This Court has directed the applications filed by the unofficial
respondents to be considered under Section 11 proviso of the
Estates Abolition Act by the Government. The difference being any
person being ryot can file a claim petition under section 11 (a) of the
Estates Abolition Act before the Settlement Officer claiming ryotwari
patta and any orders passed will be subject to revision by the
Director of Survey Settlement and further revision by CCLA. In the
present case, after disposal of the Writ Petition by this Court, the
applications filed by the unofficial respondents were considered by
the District Collector while passing an order dated 12.01.2006 and
the Government in the revisional order dated 27.12.2017 under
Proviso to Section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act, as such, the
contention of the writ petitioners that the limitation will apply to the
present case, is incorrect and not maintainable given the facts of the
case.
36. The learned Senior Counsel representing the unofficial
respondents has relied on a citation of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
Dokiseela Ramulu v. Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu5 wherein it
is held as under:
―17. Insofar as the instant issue is concerned, Original Suit
No. 32 of 1974 was decreed in favour of the appellant, and
it was duly declared that the appellant was in possession
of the land in question. The appellant and his ancestors
were also held to be in continuous possession of the land
in question, well before the notified date – 17-1-1959. That
being the position, in terms of Section 11 of the 1948 Act,
the appellant automatically became entitled to a “ryotwari
patta”. We say so because, it is only when the possession
and occupation of the agricultural land is subsequent to
the first day of July, 1945, that the State Government
would examine the circumstances of each case, and
thereupon, in an appropriate case, issue a direction that
“ryotwari patta” was to be extended to the tenant of such
agricultural land. However, since Original Suit No. 32 of
1974 clearly declared, that the agricultural land in question
was under the tenancy of the appellant and his ancestors
well prior to the notified date-17-1-1959, the appellant was
automatically entitled to “ryotwari patta”, in respect of the
land in question.
19. It is also relevant for us to notice that in order to
escape the binding liability emerging out of the judgment
and decree dated 31.10.1977 (passed in Original Suit Nos.
32 and 73 of 1974), wherein the relationship between the
appellant and Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu, was held
to be not as of tenant and landlord, the learned counsel for
respondent no.1, vehemently contended that the civil
courts had no jurisdiction in the matter, and as such, the
appellant could not derive any benefit from the above
judgment. It is not necessary for us to deal in any detail,
with the provisions relied upon by the learned counsel,
because the precise submission advanced on behalf of
respondent 1, was examined in State of T.N. v. Ramalinga
Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10, wherein this Court
held as under:
5
(2017) 2 SCC 69
49
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018―12. Now turning to the question raised in these
appeals for our determination, it is true that Section
64-C of the Act gives finality to the orders passed by
the Government or other authorities in respect of the
matters to be determined by them under the Act and
sub-section (2) thereof provides that no such orders
shall be called in question in any court of law. Even
so, such a provision by itself is not, having regard to
the two propositions quoted above from Dhulabhai’s
case, (1968) 3 SCR 662, decisive on the point of
ouster of the Civil Court’s jurisdiction and several
other aspects like the scheme of the Act, adequacy
and sufficiency of remedies provided by it etc., will
have to be considered to ascertain the precise
intendment of the Legislature. Further, having regard
to the vital difference indicated above, in between the
two sets of provisions dealing with grant of ryotwari
pattas to landholders on the one hand and ryots on
the other different considerations may arise while
deciding the issue of the ouster of Civil Court’s
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the true nature of
character of the land concerned. Approaching the
question from this angle it will be seen in the first
place that Section 64-C itself in terms provides that
the finality to the orders passed by the authorities in
respect of the matters to be determined by them
under the Act is “for the purposes of this Act” and not
generally nor for any other purpose. As stated earlier,
the main object and purpose of the Act is to abolish
all the estates of the intermediaries like Zamindars,
Inamdars, Jagirdars or under-tenure holders, etc.,
and to convert all land-holdings in such estates into
ryotwari settlements which operation in revenue
parlance means conversion of alienated lands into
non-alienated lands, that is to say, to deprive the
intermediaries of their right to collect all the revenues
in respect of such lands and vesting the same back in
the Government. The enactment and its several
provisions are thus intended to serve the revenue
purposes of the Government, by way of securing to
the Government its sovereign right to collect all the
revenues from all the lands and to facilitate the
recovery thereof by the Government and in that
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018process, if necessary, to deal with claims of
occupants of lands, nature of the lands, etc. only
incidentally in a summary manner and that too for
identifying and registering persons in the revenue
records from whom such recovery of revenue is to be
made. The object of granting a ryotwari patta is also
to enable holder thereof to cultivate the land specified
therein directly under the Government on payment to
it of such assessment or cess that may be lawfully
imposed on the land. Section 16 is very clear in this
behalf which imposes the liability to pay such ryotwari
or other assessment imposed upon the land to the
Government by the patta-holder. The expression “for
the purposes of this Act” has been designedly used in
the section which cannot be ignored but must be
given cogent meaning and on a plain reading of the
section which uses such expression it is clear that
any order passed by the Settlement Officer either
granting or refusing to grant a ryotwari patta to a ryot
under Section 11 of the Act must be regarded as
having been passed to achieve the purposes of the
Act, namely, revenue purposes, that is to say for
fastening the liability on him to pay the assessment or
other dues and to facilitate the recovery of such
revenue from him by the Government; and therefore
any decision impliedly rendered on the aspect of
nature or character of the land on that occasion will
have to be regarded as incidental to and merely for
the purpose of passing the order of granting or
refusing to grant the patta and for no other purpose.‖
(emphasis supplied)For reason of the above legal position declared by
this Court, it is not possible to accept that the
judgment and decree dated 31.10.1977, was not
binding on Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu.
20. It is also not possible for us to accept that the claim
raised by the appellant was barred by limitation. It was
never in dispute between the parties that the appellant
was in possession of the land. Only that respondent 1
claimed that the appellant was in possession of the land,
as its tenant. Our instant determination on the issue of
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
limitation emerges from the fact that the appellant had
preferred Execution Application No.18/2007 when
respondent 1 allegedly tried to interfere with the
possession of the agricultural land in question on
06.07.2005. There was no justification for determining
limitation, with reference to the date when the decree in
Original Suit No.32/1974 was passed. The relevant date
for determining limitation was 06.07.2005, when the
appellant’s possession was allegedly threatened. Viewed
as above, the claim raised by the appellant, was certainly
not barred by limitation.‖
37. This Court, upon careful consideration of the rival contentions
of the counsels and on perusal of the above discussed settled
position of law on limitation objection raised by the unofficial
respondents, this Court finds that initially, the authorities under the
Estates Abolition Act i.e., Primary Authority, Appellate Authority and
Revisional Authority concluded that the claim of the unofficial
respondents was barred by limitation. However, the matter was
remanded to the Government by this Court in W.P.No. 9038 of 1999
and the Government, in turn, relegated the matter to the District
Collector, Visakhapatnam, to take necessary action on the
representations as per the orders of this Court. It is rightly
contended by the learned Senior Counsel representing the unofficial
respondents that this Court was fully aware of the fact that the claim
petition filed before the Settlement Officer by the unofficial
respondents under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act was
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
dismissed solely on the ground of time barred claim / limitation,
which was confirmed by the appellate and the revisional authorities.
Even so, this Court, while disposing of the Writ Petition vide
W.P.No.9038 of 1999, had directed the Government to consider the
representations filed by the unofficial respondents, without being in
any way influenced by any of the findings given earlier. Admittedly,
the order passed in the said writ petition has attained finality, as no
challenge was made to the said order.
38. Even so, the District Collector in his order dated 12.01.2006
did not touch the aspect of limitation, even though limitation is not
set up as a ground before the District Collector while passing order
dated 12.01.2006. Nevertheless, this Court can examine the
question of limitation at any stage of the proceedings, subject to the
facts and circumstance of the case before the Court. Therefore, now
this Court deems it necessary to examine the present case basing
on the legal precedents submitted by the learned counsels to this
Court.
39. This Court has thoroughly examined the decision rendered in
State of A.P. Vs. Dulla Ramunaidu (supra), wherein the Division
Bench of this Court was dealing with an order passed by the learned
Single Judge of this Court allowing the claim of the petitioners
53
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
therein. In the said case also, the aspect of limitation was not set up
as a ground, but the Division Bench of this Court has proceeded to
decide the question of limitation on facts of the case therein. In
conclusion, the Division Bench of this Court has held that in view of
the Estates Abolition Rules, 1973, the authorities under the Estates
Abolition Act are disentitled to exercise the power to condone delay
and the provisions of Limitation Act, more particularly, Sections 5
and 14 have also no application to the proceedings under the
Estates Abolition Act. In view of the said Rules and G.Os. issued by
the Government from time to time, the Division Bench has held that
the claim of the petitioners therein is beyond limitation prescribed
under the Rules and barred by limitation.
40. On perusal of the above judgment passed by the Division
Bench of this Court, it is evident that the case which is dealt with by
the Division Bench of this Court is on an application under Section
11(a) of the Act, before the Primary Authority for grant of pattas. In
that context, the Division Bench of this Court has held that
applications Under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act filed
before the primary authority would attract limitation as prescribed
under the Rules.
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
41. Insofar as the present case on hand is concerned, it is only on
the directions of this Court that the representations filed by the
unofficial respondents were considered on merits without being
influenced by any of the rejection orders. This Court is of the view
that the directions issued in W.P.No.9038 of 1999, directing the
Government to consider the representations of the unofficial
respondents on merits, had put to rest the dispute of limitation once
for all. In fact, this is the reason that the writ petitioners had not
raised the issue of limitation before the District Collector and before
the Revisional Authority. As stated above, the writ petitioners did not
plead the ground of limitation even in the Writ Affidavits.
42. It is also relevant to understand the quite distinction between
the application filed under section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act
before the Primary Authority and the representation which is
considered by the Government under Section 11 proviso of the said
Act. The issue dealt with by the Division Bench of this Court in State
of A.P. Vs. Dulla Ramunaidu (supra) falls under the first category
i.e., an application under Section 11(a) filed before the Primary
Authority and the present case falls under the second category i.e.,
proviso to Section 11 of the Act, where the representations of the
unofficial respondents were considered, therefore, both the
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
applications are distinctly different. Further, the Estate Abolition
Rules are framed by the Government under Rule 67 of the Estates
Abolition Act, which disentitles the authorities acting under the
statute to entertain time barred claims. Here, in the present case,
the applications were considered by the Government which is
conferred powers under the statute and upon directions of this
Court. Therefore, this Court finds that the ground of limitation urged
by the learned Government Pleader does not apply to the present
case.
43. This Court finds that the grant of pattas is not restricted to
Section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act. It establishes that a
landowner’s right to a Ryotwari patta (a legal document proving land
ownership) is not lost, simply because they applied late. Various
Courts have ruled that the Government owes a duty to verify the
physical nature of the land and grant patta if it is a cultivable
Ryotwari property. In the case of S.Kulanthaivel Vs. The District
Revenue Officer, Namakkal6, it is held as under:
―32. ……………that the land owner’s right to a Ryotwari
patta was, by no means lost, merely because his
application under Section 13 was rejected as time barred.
This Court pointed out that in the event of Ryotwari Patta
not being granted, the land owner will not have a right of
appeal against such an order. Nevertheless, given the6
2010 WLR 356
56
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018nature of land as a cultivable land in respect of which the
land owner was entitled to Ryotwari patta, then,
independent of any enquiry conducted by the Settlement
Officer in the course of any proceedings before him
contemplated under Section 15 of the Act, the
Government owes a duty to the land owner to grant him
the Ryotwari patta.
33. The effect of the decision, as referred to above, is
irrespective of whether a claim was made for a grant of
patta by a land owner, the character of the land as a
Ryotwari land remains as it is either before or after the Act
unless the holding pattern undergoes a radical change
either by forces of nature, Act of God or of man. Secondly,
the fact that the petitioner like land owners have not
approached the authorities concerned on time does not
mean, the Government could, as such, take over the land
as a poramboke without conducting an enquiry and
survey. The duty cast on the Government is an inevitable
one, that the Government has to go in the character of the
land, which has to be surveyed and settled. If the survey
conducted by the Government discloses that the item in
question was one in respect of which the land owner was
entitled to Ryotwari Patta, then, independent of any
enquiry conducted by the Settlement Officer, in the course
of any proceedings, the Government has to grant the
owner, the Ryotwari patta.‖
44. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
aspect of limitation as argued by the learned Government Pleader
for the writ petitioners has no force and the said ground cannot be
accepted on the facts of this case.
45. Having noticed the issues that arise for consideration, this
Court shall first examine the question of maintainability of the Writ
Petition No.11889 of 2018 filed by the District Collector and others
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
and the Writ Petition No.5306 of 2018 filed by the GVMC
represented by its Commissioner.
46. The learned Government Pleader representing the petitioners
in W.P No.11889 of 2018 submits that a legal entity can sue or be
sued in its own name. A Government post or office (like “District
Collector”) is generally not recognized as a juristic person. For any
dispute involving the property or affairs of the State, the State itself
is the necessary party. Article 300 of the Constitution and Section
79 of C.P.C. mandates that the State must sue or be sued in the
name of “State”.
47. However, if the Estates Abolition Act confers upon the
“District Collector” (in his statutory capacity) a quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function that is independent of Government control,
and the Government Order interferes with the exercise of that
independent statutory power, then a writ petition is maintainable.
The District Collector being the statutory authority has enquired into
the claim of the unofficial respondents, and unsatisfied with their
claim, also rejected their applications under Section 11 on
12.01.2006 and 12.07.2016. The unofficial respondents, by
misrepresenting the facts and law, obtained the present impugned
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
order, therefore, the District Collector under the capacity of quasi-
judicial authority has assailed the present impugned order.
48. In support of his contention, the learned Government Pleader
has relied on the citation of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Chief
Conservator of Forests, Government of Andhra Pradesh v.
Collector7 wherein it is held thus:
―13. The question that needs to be addressed is,
whether the Chief Conservator of Forests as the appellant-
petitioner in the writ petition/appeal is a mere
misdescription for the State of Andhra Pradesh or whether
it is a case of non-joinder of the State of Andhra Pradesh –
a necessary party. In a lis dealing with the property of a
State, there can be no dispute that the State is the
necessary party and should be impleaded as provided in
Article 300 of the Constitution and Section 79 of C.P.C.,
viz., in the name of the State/Union of India, as the case
may be, lest the suit will be bad for non-joinder of the
necessary party. Every post in the hierarchy of the posts in
the Government set-up, from the lowest to the highest, is
not recognised as a juristic person nor can the State be
treated as represented when a suit/proceeding is in the
name of such offices/posts or the officers holding such
posts, therefore, in the absence of the State in the array of
parties, the cause will be defeated for non-joinder of a
necessary party to the lis, in any court or Tribunal. We
make it clear that this principle does not apply to a case
where an official of the Government acts as a statutory
authority and sues or pursues further proceeding in its
name because in that event, it will not be a suit or
proceeding for or on behalf of a State/Union of India but by
the statutory authority as such.‖7
(2003) 3 SCC 472
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
i) The learned Government Pleader also relied on the judgment
of the High Court of Kerala in Enforcement Directorate Vs. The
State of Kerala in W.P. (C) No.13112 of 2021 (L) dated
11.08.2021, wherein it is held as under:
―6. Insofar as the Directorate of Enforcement is a statutory
body, the contention that it is only a Department of the
Central Government is only to be rejected. The proposition
that a statutory body is entitled to file a writ petition
invoking Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be doubted.
In other words, the Directorate of Enforcement is certainly
entitled to institute a writ petition in its name.‖
49. Placing reliance on the said principle, the learned
Government Pleader submits that the District Collector being the
statutory authority under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act
has preferred W.P.No.11889 of 2018 assailing the impugned order
and the same is maintainable.
50. The learned Senior Counsel along with the counsel
representing the unofficial respondents per contra submits that the
subject matter was dealt with by the District Collector, upon
issuance of a Memo by the Government, in terms of orders passed
by this Court in W.P.No.9038 of 1999, therefore, it is on the specific
directions, the District Collector has acted upon the representations
filed by the unofficial respondents before the Government. In any
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
event, this Court has specifically directed the Government to
dispose of the representations filed by the unofficial respondents, as
such, the District Collector was acting under the instructions of the
Government and on behalf of the Government. Therefore, the
District Collector cannot be termed as a Statutory Authority under
the provisions of the Act. On this ground alone, the Writ Petition is
liable to be dismissed.
51. The learned Senior Counsel representing the unofficial
respondents is also relying upon the same judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Chief Conservator of Forests (7 supra), stating
that the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the issue that the State
concerned is a necessary party in a dispute relating to the property
of the State and must be impleaded in the suit or proceedings.
Conversely, it is the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that
the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner as District Collector,
Visakhapatnam, is not maintainable before this Court for a simple
reason that the District Collector being an officer of the State cannot
challenge the orders passed by the State represented by the
Principal Secretary.
52. In Chief Conservator of Forests case, the Chief
Conservator of Forests has questioned the order of the
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Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records. Before
the High Court, the writ petition was dismissed, against which, an
appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was filed by the Chief
Conservator of Forests. The Court held that it was not only
inappropriate but also illegal for the Chief Conservator of Forests,
though he might have done with a good faith, to have questioned
the order of the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land
Records before the High Court. The Chief Conservator of Forests as
the petitioner can neither be treated as the State of Andhra Pradesh
nor can it be a case of mis-description of the State of Andhra
Pradesh. The fact is that the State of Andhra Pradesh was not the
petitioner. The relevant paragraph in the case of Chief Conservator
of Forests (7 supra) is extracted as under:
―16. Now, reverting to the facts of the case on hand, we
are of the view that after the said statutory order of the
Commissioner of Survey, Settlement and Land Records,
the matter should have rested there. We have, therefore,
no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it was not
only inappropriate but also illegal for the Chief Conservator
of Forests, though he might have done so in all good faith,
to have questioned the order of the Commissioner of
Survey, Settlement and Land Records before the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition (C) No. 3414 of
1982. The Chief Conservator of Forests as the petitioner
can neither be treated as the State of Andhra Pradesh nor
can it be a case of misdescription of the State of Andhra
Pradesh. The fact is that the State of Andhra Pradesh was
not the petitioner. Therefore, the writ petition was not
maintainable in law. The High Court, had it deemed fit so
to do, would have added the State of Andhra Pradesh as a
62
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018party; however, it proceeded, in our view erroneously, as if
the State of Andhra Pradesh was the petitioner which, as a
matter of fact, was not the case and could not have been
treated as such. As the writ petition itself was not
maintainable, it follows as a corollary that the appeal by
the Chief Conservator of Forests is also not
maintainable…….‖
53. On consideration of rival submissions made by the counsels
representing the parties, this Court finds that the writ petitioners are
a part of the Revenue Department and cannot maintain the present
writ petition without permission from the Government, as a District
Collector generally does not have the locus standi to file a Writ
Petition against a revision order passed by the Chief Secretary of
the State without obtaining the prior permission or authorization
from the State Government. To have locus standi under Article 226
of the Constitution, an individual must be personally affected or
suffer a legal injury. The District Collector essentially acts as an
agent of the State Government. In the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Roop Chand Vs. State of Panjab8, it is observed
as follows:
―11. The question then arises, when the Government
delegates its power, for example, to entertain and decide
an appeal under Section 21(4), to an officer and the officer
pursuant to such delegation hears the appeal and makes
an order, is the order an order of the officer or of the
Government? We think it must be the order of the8
AIR 1963 SC 1503
63
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018Government. The order is made under a statutory power.
It is the statute which creates that power. The power can,
therefore, be exercised only in terms of the statute and not
otherwise. In this case the power is created by Section
21(4). That section gives a power to the Government. It
would follow that an order made in exercise of that power
will be the order of the Government for no one else has
the right under the statute to exercise the power. No doubt
the Act enables the Government to delegate its power but
such a power when delegated remains the power of the
Government, for the Government can only delegate the
power given to it by the statute and cannot create an
independent power in the officer. When the delegate
exercises the 26 power, he does so for the Government. It
is of interest to observe here that Wills, J. said in Huth v.
Clarke [LR (1890) 25 QBD 391] that ―the word delegate
means little more than an agent‖. An agent of course
exercises no powers of his own but only the powers of his
principal. Therefore, an order passed by an officer on
delegation to him under Section 41(1) of the power of the
Government under Section 21(4), is for the purposes of
the Act, an order of the Government. If it were not so and it
were to be held that the order had been made by the
officer himself and was not an order of the Government —
and of course it had to be one or the other — then we
would have an order made by a person on whom the Act
did not confer any power to make it. That would be an
impossible situation. There can be no order except as
authorized by the Act. What is true of Section 21(4) would
be true of all other provisions in the Act conferring powers
on the Government which can be delegated to an officer
under Section 41(1). If we are wrong in the view that we
have taken, then in the case of an order made by an
officer as delegate of the Government’s power under
Section 21(4) we would have an appeal entertained and
decided by one who had no power himself under the Act to
do either. Plainly, none of these things could be done.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
54. A close reading of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court as well as the Queen’s Bench would make it very clear that
64
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
an Officer designated by the Government to perform statutory
duties cannot file a writ petition to challenge the Government’s own
orders, as the Officer is fundamentally bound by the State’s
hierarchical decision. This is clearly impermissible in law besides
being an antithesis to the ‘doctrine of finality’ in view of the
judgment referred to supra. The Court ruled that the word
“delegate” means little more than an agent. An agent does not
exercise personal power, but rather acts on behalf of the principal.
Because the authority emanates from the statute directly to the
Government, any officer the Government appoints to exercise that
statutory power is doing so on behalf of the Government.
Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel representing the unofficial
respondents was right in his submission that, if there is a person
who is aggrieved by the order impugned in this writ petition, it must
be the State Government. The District Collector, who passed the
order, was delegated power under the statute by the Government,
as such, he is not exercising any administrative power. Therefore,
the contention of the learned Government pleader that the District
Collector is an aggrieved party by the order of the State
Government cannot be countenanced at all.
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
55. Insofar as Writ Petition vide W.P.No.5306 of 2018 filed by the
GVMC contending that a part of subject land was handed over to
them by the then District Collector, Vishakhapatnam, in Rc.No.
881/1993/A10, dated 23.01.1994, as it was clarified as Municipal
Water Woks Poramboke as per Settlement Fair Adangal, is
concerned, the learned Standing Counsel, Sri A.S.C.Bose,
representing the GVMC has submitted that in view of the land to an
extent of Acs.91.22 cents being handed over to them, they have
impleaded themselves in the proceedings before the Revisional
Authority (Government) and also filed their written statement. As
such, they are aggrieved by the impugned order and being a vested
interested party, the Writ Petition filed by GVMC is maintainable.
56. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel representing the
unofficial respondents contends that the land was allotted by the
District Collector by proceedings vide Rc.No.881/1993/A10, dated
23.01.1994, with certain terms and conditions subject to final orders
by the Government. As such, the GVMC cannot be termed as an
aggrieved party and cannot maintain the present Writ Petition, and
as such, the GVMC has no locus standi to challenge the impugned
orders passed by the Government. Though the unofficial
respondents had taken ground of maintainability of the writ petition
66
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
filed by the District Collector, the other writ petition filed by the
GVMC has to be dealt with on merits, as such, he submitted to this
Court that both the matters may be dealt with on merits including the
maintainability of the writ petition W.P. No.11889 of 2019 filed by the
District Collector.
57. This Court, upon careful consideration of the rival contentions
of the counsels representing the parties and on perusal of the above
discussed settled position of law on preliminary objection raised by
the unofficial respondents, this Court finds force in the submissions
of the learned Senior Counsel representing the unofficial
respondents that the Writ Petition filed by the District Collector in
W.P No.11889 of 2018 is not maintainable, but in view of the Writ
Petition in W.P.No.5306 of 2018 filed by the GVMC assailing the
very same order, the merits of the case are also being dealt with in
both the writ petitions.
58. The learned Senior Counsel representing the unofficial
respondents contends that the present Writ Petitions are filed
praying for the relief of Certiorari and the certiorari being a high
prerogative writ and should not be issued on mere asking. He relied
upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
67
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan
Das9, wherein it is held as under:
―58……….a writ of certiorari could be issued if an error of
law is apparent on the face of the record. To attract the
writ of certiorari, a mere error of law is not sufficient. It
must be one which is manifest or patent on the face of the
record. Mere formal or technical errors, even of law, are
not sufficient, so as to attract a writ of certiorari. As
reminded by this Court time and again, this concept is
indefinite and cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively
and so it has to be determined judiciously on the facts of
each case. The concept, according to this Court in K.M.
Shanmugam v. S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd., 1963 SCC OnLine SC
25, “is comprised of many imponderables……… it is not
capable of precise definition, as no objective criterion
could be laid down, the apparent nature of the error, to a
large extent, being dependent upon the subjective
element.” A general test to apply, however, is that no error
could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it
is not “self-evident” or “manifest”. If it requires an
examination or argument to establish it, if it has to be
established by a long-drawn out process of reasoning, or
lengthy or complicated arguments on points where there
may considerably be two opinions, then such an error
would cease to be an error of law.
63. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, we
have no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that a writ
of certiorari is a high prerogative writ and should not be
issued on mere asking. For the issue of a writ of certiorari,
the party concerned has to make out a definite case for
the same and is not a matter of course. To put it pithily,
certiorari shall issue to correct errors of jurisdiction, that is
to say, absence, excess or failure to exercise and also
when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there has
been illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the
decision or determination itself, if it is an error manifest on
the face of the proceedings. By its exercise, only a patent
error can be corrected but not also a wrong decision. It9
(2023) 16 SCC 462
68
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018should be well remembered at the cost of repetition that
certiorari is not appellate but only supervisory.
64. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, is
issued by a superior court in respect of the exercise of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions by another authority
when the contention is that the exercising authority had no
jurisdiction or exceeded the jurisdiction. It cannot be
denied that the tribunals or the authorities concerned in
this batch of appeals had the jurisdiction to deal with the
matter. However, the argument would be that the tribunals
had acted arbitrarily and illegally and that they had failed
to give proper findings on the facts and circumstances of
the case. We may only say that while adjudicating a writ
application for a writ of certiorari, the court is not sitting as
a court of appeal against the order of the tribunals to test
the legality thereof with a view to reach a different
conclusion. If there is any evidence, the court will not
examine whether the right conclusion is drawn from it or
not. It is a well-established principle of law that a writ of
certiorari will not lie where the order or decision of a
tribunal or authority is wrong in matter of facts or on
merits. (See: R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., (1922) 2 AC 128
(PC)‖
59. This Court had also the occasion to rely on a judgment
passed by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmad Ishaque10, in which the
Hon’ble Apex Court had elaborately discussed the power of High
Courts while granting Writ of Certiorari, the relevant paragraphs are
extracted hereunder:
―24.3. The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise
of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One
consequence of this is that the Court will not review10
(1954) 2 SCC 881
69
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal,
even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a
court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has
jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the
legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal
against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and
policy, if a superior court were to rehear the case on the
evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.
These propositions are well settled and are not in dispute.
28. It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of
certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law. But it
is essential that it should be something more than a mere
error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of
the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter,
however, is not so much in the statement of the principle
as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When
does an error cease to be mere error, and become an
error apparent on the face of the record? The learned
counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-
cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of
errors could be demarcated. Mr Pathak for the first
respondent contended on the strength of certain
observations of Chagla, C.J. in Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat
Borough Municipality, 1952 SCC OnLine Bom 46, that no
error could be said to be apparent on the face of the
record if it was not self-evident, and if it required an
examination or argument to establish it. This test might
afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of
cases. But there must be cases in which even this test
might break down, because judicial opinions also differ,
and an error that might be considered by one Judge as
self-evident might not be so considered by another. The
fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the
record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there
being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very
nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on
the facts of each case.‖ (Emphasis supplied)
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
60. This Court has carefully examined the judgment referred
above and will now consider, if any ground is made out by the writ
petitioners warranting interference of this Court as against the
impugned order. The undisputed fact remains that the predecessors
of the unofficial respondents are ryots and the land is zeroity. Their
names are recorded in the Settlement Fair Adangal and other
related records. They were in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the property prior to the cut off date 01.07.1945, which is also
evident from the various proceedings filed before this Court and
discussed elaborately by the Revisional Authority in the impugned
order. The Revisional Authority in the impugned order categorically
discussed about the nature of the subject land, possession of the
subject land, records of pre and post abolition, all the above findings
are matter of record and cannot be disputed.
61. After elaborate discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the
writ petitioners could not make out any case that warrants
interference of this Court, more particularly, a Writ of Certiorari
which, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, cannot be issued on
mere asking.
62. In view of the above settled position of law and upon
discussion of the grounds and consideration of the issues framed in
71
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
the writ petitions, the revisional order dated 21.12.2017 passed by
the Revisional Authority does not warrant any interference, as the
writ petitioners did not make out any substantive ground for
issuance of Writ of Certiorari, as such, both the Writ Petitions are
devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed.
63. Accordingly, both the Writ Petitions are dismissed. No order
as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall
stand closed.
__________________________
JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM
31st July, 2026
Note: L.R. copy be marked.
(b/o)
cbs
Whether the order is:
Speaking -- Reasoned √
Reportable √ Non- --
Reportable
72
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM
Writ Petition Nos.5306 and 11889 of 2018
31st July, 2026
cbs
*THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM
+WRIT PETITION Nos. 5306 and 11889 of 2018
73
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W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
WRIT PETITION No.5306 of 2018
%31-07-2026
Between:
Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal
Corporation, rep., by its
Commissioner, Visakhapatnam,
Visakhapatnam District. … PetitionerAND
1. The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep. by its Special Chief Secretary,
Revenue Department Secretariat,
Velagapudi, Guntur, Guntur District,
and others … Respondents<GIST:
>HEAD NOTE:
! Counsel for petitioner : Sri A.S.C.Bose
^ Counsel for respondents 1 to 4 : The Government Pleader for
Revenue
^ Counsel for respondents 5 to 25 : M/s.Pillix Law Firm
? CASES REFERRED :
74
JS,J
W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
1) (2004) 8 SCC 706
2) (2019) 4 SCC 500
3) AIR 1972 AP 1 (FB)
4) (1969) 2 SCC 187
5) (2017) 2 SCC 69
6) 2010 WLR 356
7) (2003) 3 SCC 472
8) AIR 1963 SC 1503
9) (2023) 16 SCC 462
10) (1954) 2 SCC 881
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
WRIT PETITION Nos. 5306 and 11889 of 2018
WRIT PETITION No.5306 of 2018
Between:
Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal
Corporation, rep., by its
Commissioner, Visakhapatnam,
Visakhapatnam District. ... Petitioner
AND
1. The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep. by its Special Chief Secretary,
Revenue Department Secretariat,
Velagapudi, Guntur, Guntur District,
and others ... Respondents
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 31.07.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals?
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to Yes/No
see the fair copy of the Judgment?
75
JS,J
W.P.Nos.5306 & 11889 of 2018
___________________
SUMATHI JAGADAM, J
