Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
M Govinda Raju vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 28 July, 2026
APHC010371952026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
TUESDAY, THE 28th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos: 6019/2026, 6020/2026, 6021/2026 & 6024/2026
Crl.P.No.6019/2026:
Between:
1. M GOVINDA RAJU, , S/O PARASU RAMAIAH,AGED ABOUT 61
YEARS, OCC PANEL VALUER,FLAT NO.401, 4TH FLOOR, D.NO.2-1-
16/1, SVR PLAZA,J.P. ROAD, BHIMAVARAM, WEST GODAVARI
DISTRICT - 534202.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, ,rep. by its Public
Prosecutor,High court of A.P., Amaravati - 522020.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. BILAAL AHMED SYED
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Crl.P.No.6020/2026:
Between:
1. M GOVINDA RAJU, S/O PARASU RAMAIAH,AGED ABOUT 61
YEARS, OCC PANEL VALUER,FLAT NO.401, 4TH FLOOR, D.NO.2-1-
16/1, SVR PLAZA,J.P. ROAD, BHIMAVARAM, WEST GODAVARI
DISTRICT - 534202.
2
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, ,rep. by its Public
Prosecutor,High Court of A.P., Amaravati - 522020.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. BILAAL AHMED SYED
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Crl.P.No.6021/2026:
Between:
1. M GOVINDA RAJU, , S/O PARASU RAMAIAH,AGED ABOUT 61
YEARS, OCC PANEL VALUER,FLAT NO.401, 4TH FLOOR, D.NO.2-1-
16/1, SVR PLAZA,J.P. ROAD, BHIMAVARAM, WEST GODAVARI
DISTRICT - 534202
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, ,rep. by its Public
Prosecutor,High Court of A.P., Amaravati - 522020.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. BILAAL AHMED SYED
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Crl.P.No.6024/2026:
Between:
1. M GOVINDA RAJU, , S/O PARASU RAMAIAH,AGED ABOUT 61
YEARS, OCC PANEL VALUER,FLAT NO.401, 4TH FLOOR, D.NO.2-1-
3
16/1, SVR PLAZA,J.P. ROAD, E HIMAVARAM, WEST GODAVARI
DISTRICT - 534202.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, ,rep. by its Fublic
Prosecutor,High Court of A.P., Amaravati - 522020.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. BILAAL AHMED SYED
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
COMMON ORDER:
These four Criminal Petitions are heard together and are being
disposed of by this common order, as the Petitioner is common in all petitions,
though the crimes registered against him are different.
2. The Criminal Petition No.6019 of 2026 has been filed under Section 482
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’) by
the Petitioner/Accused No.5 for granting of pre-arrest bail in connection with
Crime No.39 of 2022 on the file of CID Police Station, Mangalagiri, Guntur
District, registered for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 420,
403, 409 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the
I.P.C.,’) and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity,
‘the P.C Act‘).
4
3. The Criminal Petition No.6020 of 2026 has been filed under Section 482
of ‘the BNSS’ by the Petitioner/Accused No.8 for granting of pre-arrest bail in
connection with Crime No.43 of 2022 on the file of CID Police Station,
Mangalagiri, Guntur District, registered for the alleged offences punishable
under Sections 420, 403, 409 read with 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Section
13(2) of ‘the P.C Act‘.
4. The Criminal Petition No.6021 of 2026 has been filed under Section 482
of ‘the BNSS’ by the Petitioner/Accused No.6 for granting of pre-arrest bail in
connection with Crime No.25 of 2022 on the file of CID Police Station,
Mangalagiri, Guntur District, registered for the alleged offences punishable
under Sections 420, 403, 409 read with 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Section
13(2) of ‘the P.C Act‘.
5. The Criminal Petition No.6024 of 2026 has been filed under Section 482
of ‘the BNSS’ by the Petitioner/Accused No.8 for granting of pre-arrest bail in
connection with Crime No.34 of 2022 on the file of CID Police Station,
Mangalagiri, Guntur District, registered for the alleged offences punishable
under Sections 420, 403, 409 read with 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Section
13(2) of ‘the P.C Act‘.
6. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant
Public Prosecutor. Perused the record.
7. Sri Bilaal Ahmed Syed, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that
the Petitioner has been falsely implicated merely on account of his
empanelment as a panel valuer with the State Bank of India, the only
allegation against him being the submission of valuation reports dated
5
04.12.2017, 20.02.2018, 30.04.2018 and 30.01.2019. Except for this solitary
act, there is no material to suggest his involvement in sanction, disbursement,
diversion or utilization of loan proceeds, which allegations are directed
exclusively against the borrower and bank officials. The FIR is bereft of
foundational facts, and the imputation that one property was treated as two or
that photographs were incorrect is a bald assertion incapable of constituting
offences under Sections 420, 409 or 120‑B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ absent dishonest
intention or entrustment of property. The Petitioner, a senior citizen aged 61
years under medical supervision for cataract surgery, has deep roots in
society, unblemished antecedents, and undertakes to cooperate fully with the
investigation. Hence, it is urged that this Court may be pleased to enlarge the
Petitioner on anticipatory bail in the event of arrest.
8. Per contra, Mr. K.Sandeep, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor
vehemently opposed anticipatory bail, contending that without approaching
the learned Sessions Judge of first instance, the Petitioner filed Criminal
Petitions directly before this Court, such procedure is contrary to the order of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohd. Rasal C. v. State of Kerala1 and it is urged
to dismiss the Criminal Petition.
9. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by
the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor. I have perused the entire records.
1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2728
6
10. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the
learned Counsels for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor, now the point for consideration is:
“Whether the Petitioner is entitled for grant of pre-arrest bail?”
11. The de-facto complainant alleged that the Petitioner has committed
offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating. The Hon’ble Apex Court in
Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P.,2 at paragraph Nos.44 & 49
held as under:
“44. At the most, the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate could
have issued process for the offence punishable under Section 420IPC i.e.
cheating but in any circumstances no case of criminal breach of trust is
made out. The reason being that indisputably there is no entrustment of
any property in the case at hand. It is not even the case of the complainant
that any property was lawfully entrusted to the appellants and that the same
has been dishonestly misappropriated. The case of the complainant is plain
and simple. He says that the price of the goods sold by him has not been
paid. Once there is a sale, Section 406IPC goes out of picture. According to
the complainant, the invoices raised by him were not cleared. No case
worth the name of cheating is also made out.
49. From the aforesaid, there is no manner of any doubt whatsoever that in
case of sale of goods, the property passes to the purchaser from the seller
when the goods are delivered. Once the property in the goods passes to
the purchaser, it cannot be said that the purchaser was entrusted with the
property of the seller. Without entrustment of property, there cannot be any
criminal breach of trust. Thus, prosecution of cases on charge of criminal
breach of trust, for failure to pay the consideration amount in case of sale of
goods is flawed to the core. There can be civil remedy for the non-payment
of the consideration amount, but no criminal case will be maintainable for it.
[See : Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P. [Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P.,
(2024) 12 SCC 483 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171] and Mideast Integrated
Steels Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand [Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd. v. State of
Jharkhand, 2023 SCC OnLineJhar 301″
12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Arshad Neyaz Khan v. State of
Jharkhand3, at paragraph No.21 held as under:
“21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it is the case of the
complainant/respondent No. 2 that the offence of criminal breach of trust as
defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is
committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the
accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined in Section
2
(2024) 10 SCC 690
3
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2058
7415, punishable under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club
(1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 690 observed that
there is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For
cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false or
misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust,
mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of
trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly
misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender
fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a
property. In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.
Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are
independent and distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously
in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.”
13. Section 406 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ deals with criminal breach of trust, which
presupposes lawful entrustment of property followed by dishonest
misappropriation or conversion. In contrast, Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’
addresses cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, which
requires deception at the inception of the transaction. Thus, while Section 406
of ‘the I.P.C.,’ arises from a breach of an existing fiduciary relationship, Section
420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is predicated upon fraudulent inducement at the very outset.
The two offences, therefore, operate in distinct spheres.
14. As seen from the record, Petitioner had not approached the learned
Sessions Judge concerned at the first instance for grant of pre-arrest bail.
Filing of anticipatory bail without approaching the learned Sessions Judge
concerned is contrary to the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohammed
Rasal.C supra wherein at paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9 it was held as follows:
“7. The Sessions Judge exercises powers under Section 438 Cr.P.C
in relation to all cases registered with the police stations in the
particular District. This area-wise distribution of work would make it
much more convenient and facilitate expeditious disposal, if the
application for pre-arrest bail is first filed before the Sessions Court
which would have a direct and first-hand assistance of the concerned
Public Prosecutor appointed for that particular District. The Sessions
Court would also have an immediate access to the Case Diary
thereby facilitating a better appreciation of facts of the case.
8. We further feel that if the practice of entertaining the applications
for pre-arrest bail directly in the High Court is encouraged, and the
8parties concerned are not relegated to first approach the Sessions
Court concerned, the High Court would be flooded with a spate of
pre-arrest bail applications thereby creating a chaotic situation. We
say so, because if the parties are required to approach the Sessions
Court concerned for seeking remedy of prearrest bail, there is a
strong probability that significant number of applications would be
allowed at that level only thereby acting as a filtration process before
the process reaches the High Court.
9. It is trite that in most of the States, there is a consistent practice
requiring the litigant concerned to first approach the Sessions Court
for seeking relief of pre-arrest bail and only in the event of denial of
such relief, the litigant would be granted access to approach the High
Court for seeking such relief. This is, of course, subject to just
exceptions and the High Court, for reasons to be recorded, may
entertain an application for pre-arrest bail directly in special/
extraordinary circumstances.”
15. In Jagdeo Prasad v. State of Bihar4, the Hon’ble Apex Court held at
para No. 6 as under:
“6. However, before parting, we do wish to express our sincere
concern with the haste at which the High Court has dealt with this
matter. While the scheme of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) provides concurrent
jurisdiction to the High Court and Sessions Court for entertaining
applications for anticipatory bail, this Court has time and again
observed that High Court should always encourage exhausting an
alternative/concurrent remedy before directly interfering itself. This
approach balances the interests of all the stakeholders, first by giving
the aggrieved party a round of challenge before the High Court.
Second, this approach provides the High Court an opportunity to
assess the judicial perspective so applied by the Sessions Court, in
concurrent jurisdiction, instead of independently applying its mind
from the first go. Further, the High Court fails to record any reason for
directly granting anticipatory bail without impleading the appellant-
complainant as a party.”
16. Albeit, this Court has got concurrent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
‘the BNSS’, such discretionary relief would only be granted, when the
Petitioner establish a special or extra ordinary circumstance. As seen from the
averments, the Petitioner neither established a special circumstances nor
extra-ordinary circumstance.
17. As seen from the record, the alleged offences levelled against the
Petitioner are punishable with imprisonment for less than seven (07) years.
4
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2108
9
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of
Telangana 5 has held as follows:
“We also take notice of the fact that the petition before the High Court
was to quash the FIR. In a petition where quashing of the FIR is
prayed for, the High Court should not have passed an order directing
the Investigating Officer to comply with Section 41-A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, because it indirectly amounts to granting a
relief which the High Court could have considered only if a prima facie
case for quashing of the FIR is made out.”
19. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Satender Kumar Antil v.
Central Bureau of Investigation6, wherein at paragraph No.33, it is held as
under:
“33. On the basis of the interpretation given by us, we conclude
as follows:
a. An arrest by a police officer is a mere statutory discretion
which facilitates him to conduct proper investigation, in the form
of collection of evidence and, therefore, shall not be termed as
mandatory.
b. Consequently, the police officer shall ask himself the question
as to whether an arrest is a necessity or not, before undertaking
the said exercise.
c. For effecting an arrest, qua an offence punishable with
imprisonment up to 7 years, the mandate of Section 35(1)(b)(i) of
the BNSS, 2023 along with any one of the conditions mentioned
in Section 35(1)(b)(ii) of the BNSS, 2023 must be in existence.
d. A notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, 2023 to an accused
or any individual concerned, qua offences punishable with
imprisonment up to 7 years, is the rule.
e. Even if the circumstances warranting an arrest of a person are
available in terms of the conditions mentioned under Section
35(1)(b) of the BNSS, 2023, the arrest shall not be undertaken,
unless it absolutely warranted.
f. Power of arrest under Section 35(6) read with Section 35(1)(b)
of the BNSS, 2023, pursuant to a notice issued under Section
35(3) of the BNSS, 2023 is not a matter of routine, but an
exception, and the police officer is expected to be circumspect
and slow in exercising the said power.”
20. Furthermore, in this regard, it is apposite to mention the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar7, wherein detailed guidelines were
5
2026 SCC Online SC 923
6
Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5191 of 2021, dated 15.01.2026
10
issued at Para Nos.11 and 12, for arresting a person, which are being
reproduced herein below:-
“11. Our endeavor in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do
not arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorize
detention casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we have
observed above, we give the following direction:
a).All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to
automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is
registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest
under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.’);
b) All police officers be provided with a check list containing
specified sub- clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);
c) The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish
the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while
forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further
detention;
d) The Magistrate while authorizing detention of the accused shall
peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid
and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize
detention;
e) The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the
Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the
case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the
Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded
in writing;
f) Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A of Cr.P.C be
served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of
the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of
the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
g) Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from
rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action,
he shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be
instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
h) Authorizing detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by
the judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental
action by the appropriate High Court.
12. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply
to the cases under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. or Section 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where
offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less
than seven years or which may extend to seven years; whether with
or without fine.”
21. The similar view is also reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Md.Asfak Alam supra, which also reiterated the guidelines laid down in the
case of Arnesh Kumar.
7
(2014) 8 SCC 273
11
22. In the light of the law laid down in the case of Satender Kumar Antil,
Arnesh Kumar and Md. Asfak Alam, the Investigating Officer is under legal
obligation to proceed in accordance with law, but he shall follow the procedure
prescribed under Sections 41 and 41(A) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ (now Sections 35 and
35(3) of ‘the B.N.S.S.,’ 2023). The Petitioner is obliged to render his fullest
cooperation in the ongoing investigation.
23. In the result, the Criminal Petitions are disposed of directing the
Investigating Officer to comply with Section 35(3) of ‘the BNSS’/41-A of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ and to strictly follow the directions issued in the cases of Satender
Kumar Antil, Arnesh Kumar and MD.Asfak Alam. If it is noticed in the
course of investigation that the Petitioner has committed any offence which is
punishable with imprisonment beyond seven years, the investigating officer is
at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.
As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.
_________________________
DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Date: 28.07.2026
PRA
12
75
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
Crl.P.Nos: 6019, 6020, 6021 & 6024 of 2026
Date: 28.07.2026
PRA
