Commissioner Of Central Excise And … vs M/S. Incredible Unique Buildcon Pvt. … on 18 July, 2026

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    Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur

    Commissioner Of Central Excise And … vs M/S. Incredible Unique Buildcon Pvt. … on 18 July, 2026

            [2026:RJ-JP:26593-DB]
    
                    HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                                BENCH AT JAIPUR
    
                            D.B. Central/excise Appeal No. 1/2023
                                   URN: EXCIA / 1U / 2023
    
             Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, A Block, Surya
             Nagar, Alwar-301001.
                                                                                  ----Appellant
                                                   Versus
             M/s. Incredible Unique Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., 812/G1 15, Samtel
             Zone, Phase III, Bhiwadi, Alwar.
                                                                                ----Respondent
             For Appellant(s)            :     Mr. C.S. Sinha
                                               Mr. Mayank Kanwar
             For Respondent(s)           :     Mr. Sanjay Jhanwar, Sr. Advocate with
                                               Mr. Aditya Sharma
                                               Mr. Wilson Joy
    
    
                          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA
                     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA
                                         Order
             1. Date of conclusion of Arguments      09.07.2026
             2. Date on which the order was reserved                              09.07.2026
             3. Whether the full order or only operative part                        Full
                is pronounced
             4. Date of pronouncement                                             18.07.2026
    REPORTABLE
    
            Per: Maneesh Sharma,J
    

    1. The present appeal has been preferred by the Commissioner

    of Central Excise and Service Tax, Alwar (hereinafter, the

    SPONSORED

    “appellant”) assailing the Final Order No. ST/A/50651/2022-

    CU(DB) dated 26.07.2022 (hereinafter, the “impugned order”),

    passed by the learned Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate

    Tribunal, New Delhi (“CESTAT”), in Service Tax Appeal No.

    50307/2017.

    A) Factual Matrix

    2. Shorn of unnecessary detail, the facts giving rise to the

    present appeal are as follows.

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    2.1. The respondent/assessee is engaged in the business of

    construction and is registered with the Department under the

    categories of “Commercial or Industrial Construction Services”

    (“CICS”) and “Works Contract Services” (“WCS”), as defined under

    the Finance Act, 1994.

    2.2. In the course of an audit of the respondent’s records, the

    Department found that the respondent had discharged its Service

    Tax liability under the CICS head, both before and after

    01.06.2007. It was further observed that, with effect from

    01.06.2007, WCS came to be introduced as a distinct taxable

    service, and that the respondent’s activities,which involved the

    charging of a composite consideration towards both the rendition

    of services and the utilisation of materials therein,were squarely

    covered thereunder.

    2.3. The Audit Team found that the respondent had not opted for

    the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service

    Tax) Rules, 2007, and had instead been discharging Value Added

    Tax to the State of Rajasthan in terms of the Rajasthan VAT Rules.

    On this basis, a shortfall of Rs. 2,54,64,515/- was alleged in the

    tax so paid by the respondent.

    2.4. Consequently, the Department issued a Show Cause Notice

    dated 30.09.2015 under the proviso to Section 73(1) (the “SCN”),

    proposing to reclassify the respondent’s services under the WCS

    head for the period from October 2010 to June 2012, and to

    recover the differential duty, along with with interest under

    Section 75 and penalties under Sections 77 and 78 of the Finance

    Act, 1994.

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    2.5. The respondent filed a reply to the said SCN, refuting the

    allegations therein point wise, and contending, inter alia, that: (a)

    its services were classifiable as Commercial or Industrial

    Construction Services; (b) as a service provider, it had the option

    to discharge tax under either the CICS or the WCS head; (c) the

    computation of Service Tax proposed by the appellant was

    erroneous; (d) the demand so raised was barred by limitation;

    and (e) the penalty proposed was not sustainable in law.

    2.6 By Order-in-Original dated 22.08.2016, the Commissioner of

    Central Excise and Service Tax, Alwar, confirmed the demand of

    Service Tax amounting to Rs. 2,54,64,515/- for the period from

    October 2010 to June 2012, along with recovery of interest and a

    penalty of Rs. 10,000/- upon the respondent.

    B) Proceedings Before the CESTAT

    3. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent preferred an appeal

    before the learned CESTAT. By the impugned order dated

    26.07.2022, the learned CESTAT, while upholding the demand on

    merits, set aside the Order-in-Original on the ground of limitation,

    holding that, in the absence of any proof of intent to evade

    payment of tax, no case of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or

    suppression of facts was made out. Accordingly, the appeal was

    allowed and the Order-in-Original dated 22.08.2016 was set aside

    in limine.

    C)       The Substantial Question of Law
    
    
    
    
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    4. By order dated 10.07.2023, this Court admitted the present

    appeal on the following substantial question of law:

    “Whether the Ld. CESTAT is correct in setting aside the
    demand of service tax and penalties on the assessee by merely
    stating that the elements of fraud, supression or willful
    misstatement with intent to evade taxes is missing in the
    present case without providing cogent reasons for holding the
    same?”

    D) Submissions on Behalf of the Appellant

    5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the

    impugned order is ex facie illegal, arbitrary and mechanical,

    having been passed without due application of mind to the facts

    on record. He submitted, in particular, that:

    (a) the learned CESTAT erred in holding the demand raised
    vide the SCN dated 30.09.2015 to be barred by limitation;

    (b) the scheme of Service Tax is founded upon self-

    assessment, which casts a corresponding duty upon the
    respondent to make an accurate and truthful disclosure;

    (c) upon the introduction of the WCS category with effect
    from 01.06.2007, there existed no ambiguity that services
    involving the supply or deemed supply of goods fell to be
    classified under the WCS head, and yet the respondent
    persisted in classifying them under CICS, thereby
    suppressing material facts and evincing an intent to evade
    payment of tax; and

    (d) although the respondent had voluntarily incorporated WCS
    into its existing Service Tax registration by way of an
    amendment dated 12.10.2010, it nonetheless failed to
    disclose any taxable value under that head, thereby
    demonstrating a wilful and deliberate suppression of facts.

    5.1. In order to buttress his contentions, learned counsel for the

    appellant places reliance upon the judgments passed by the

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    Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of M/s Bhor Industries

    Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai 1 and The

    Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs and Anr. v. M/s

    Reliance Industries Ltd.2

    5.2. Accordingly, order under challenge is prayed to be set aside

    and appeal is prayed to be allowed.

    E) Submissions on Behalf of the Respondent

    6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supported the

    impugned order and submitted that:

    (a) the learned CESTAT rendered its findings after due
    consideration of the submissions by both parties and a
    detailed examination of the evidence on record;

    (b) there was no intention to evade tax by the respondent,
    inasmuch as classification under either taxable head
    attracted the same rate of tax and occasioned no
    difference in the ultimate liability;

    (c) the mere classification of a service under a different
    taxable head does not, of itself, constitute wilful
    suppression of facts;

    (d) the question of classification remained unsettled until the
    pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
    Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs v. Larsen
    & Toubro Ltd.3
    , and, consequently, the invocation of the
    extended period of limitation is unsustainable; and

    (e) the burden of establishing wilful suppression of facts lay
    upon the appellant, which it has failed to discharge.

    6.1. In order to buttress his contentions, learned counsel for the

    respondent places reliance upon the judgments passed by the

    1 2016 (16) SCC 643
    2 2023 AIR (SC) 3219
    3 AIR 2015 SC 3600

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    Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Larsen & Toubro

    (Supra); Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore v.

    Karnataka Agro Chemicals4; O.K Play (India) Ltd. v.

    Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-III, Gurgaon 5; Lipi

    Boilers v. CCE6; Stemcyte India Therapeutics (P) Ltd. v.

    CCE7; Easland Combines, Coimbatore Vs. Collector of

    Central Excise, Coimbatore8; Collector of Central Excise v.

    H.M.M. Limited9; Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company Vs.

    Collector of Central Excise, Bombay10; Densons Pultretaknik

    Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise11; Collector of Central

    Excise, Hyderabad Vs. Chemphar Drugs and Liniments,

    Hyderabad12; Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner of

    Central Excise, Raipur13; CCE v. Bajaj Auto Ltd. 14; Chamundi

    Die Cast Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise,

    Bangalore15; Principal Commissioner of Service Tax v.

    Shree Chanakya Education Society16; Central Excise and

    Service Tax v. Amba Poly Chrome P. Ltd. 17; and CCE v.

    Himadri Speciality Chemical Ltd.18

    6.2. Accordingly, the appeal is prayed to be dismissed.

    4 (2008) 7 SCC 343
    5 (2005) 2 SCC 460
    6 (2025) 152 GSTR 760
    7 (2025) 144 GSTR 662
    8 (2003) 3 SCC 410
    9 1995 Supp (3) SCC 322
    10 1995 Supp (3) SCC 462
    11 (2003) 11 SCC 390
    12 (1989) 2 SCC 127
    13 (2013) 9 SCC 753
    14 (2010) 13 SCC 117
    15 2007 (215) ELT 169 SC
    16 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 14918
    17 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 19036
    18 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 3348

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    F) Analysis and Findings

    7. We have heard learned counsel for the rival parties at length

    and have carefully perused the material on record, including the

    authorities cited at the Bar.

    8. The controversy in the present appeal lies within a narrow

    compass, and is confined to the substantial question of law framed

    hereinabove, namely, whether the learned CESTAT was justified in

    setting aside the Order-in-Original on the finding that the

    elements of fraud, suppression or wilful misstatement, coupled

    with an intent to evade tax, were absent.

    9. A perusal of the impugned order dated 26.07.2022 discloses

    that the learned CESTAT, while allowing the appeal, held as

    follows:

    “17. We are unable to find any proof of intent to evade either
    from the show cause notice or from the impugned order. Mere
    omission or merely classifying its services under an incorrect
    head does not amount to fraud or collusion or willful
    misstatement or suppression of facts. The intention has to be
    proved to invoke extended period of limitation. Supreme Court
    has delivered the judgment in the case of Larsen & Toubro
    dated 20 August 2015, prior to which there was no clear ruling
    that services which involved supply or deemed supply of goods
    could only be classified under WCS. The appellant had been
    classifying its services (which also involved supply/use of
    goods) under the CICS and Revenue never objected to it and,
    therefore, the appellant could have reasonably believed it to be
    the correct head and continued to file returns accordingly and
    paying duty. Once the returns are filed, if Revenue was of the
    opinion that the self-assessment of service tax and the
    classification was not correct, it could have scrutinized the
    returns and issued notices within time. The show cause notice
    was issued on 30 September 2015 for the period covered
    October 2010 to June 2012, which is clearly beyond the normal
    period of limitation. Therefore, although Revenue is correct on
    merits, the demand is time barred and, therefore, cannot
    sustain. For the same reason, the penalties imposed upon the
    appellant under Sections 77 and 78 also cannot be upheld.”

    10. On a careful scrutiny of the record, it also emerges that the

    respondent had, throughout, been filing its returns by classifying

    its services under the CICS head, and that no Show Cause Notice

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    was issued by the appellant within the ordinary period of limitation

    calling upon the respondent to file returns under the WCS head.

    11. It is further evident that, as early as in the year 2013, the

    appellant had itself conducted an audit of the respondent’s

    accounts, in the course of which an objection with respect to the

    classification of the respondent’s services was raised.

    Notwithstanding this, no Show Cause Notice was issued to the

    respondent at that stage. It may therefore reasonably be inferred

    that the appellant was, well within the period of limitation, aware

    of the alleged misclassification and was in a position to issue

    notice accordingly; yet, for reasons best known to it, no such

    notice came to be issued until 30.09.2015, in respect of the period

    from 2010 to 2012.

    12. In this backdrop, and in the light of the explanation

    furnished by the respondent, we are satisfied that the respondent

    entertained a bona fide belief that it was correctly discharging its

    tax liabilities and filing accurate returns. It cannot, in these

    circumstances, be said that the respondent harboured any intent

    to evade payment of tax, for mere inaction, omission, or the

    classification of services under an incorrect head does not, of

    itself, amount to fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or

    suppression of facts, so as to warrant invocation of the extended

    period of limitation by the appellant.

    13. On a further perusal of the material available on record, we

    find that in the absence of any positive act/action taken by the

    respondent, mere inaction/omission or mere classification of its

    services under an incorrect head does not, by itself, amount to

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    fraud or collusion or willful misstatement or suppression of facts,

    and is thus insufficient to invoke the extended period of limitation.

    14. The foregoing conclusion accords with the settled position of

    law. In Chemphar Drugs and Liniments (supra), the Hon’ble

    Supreme Court held:

    “9……..Something positive other than mere inaction or failure
    on the part of the manufacturer or producer or conscious or
    deliberate withholding of information when the manufacturer
    knew otherwise, is required before it is saddled with any
    liability, before the period of six months. Whether in a
    particular set of facts and circumstances there was any fraud
    or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression or
    contravention of any provision of any Act, is a question of fact
    depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular
    case.”

    (Emphasis Supplied)

    14.1. In Easland Combines (Supra), it was held as under:

    “31. It is settled law that for invoking the extended period or
    limitation duty should not have been paid, short levied or short
    paid or erroneously refunded because of either fraud, collusion,
    wilful misstatement, suppression of fact or contravention of
    any provision or rules. This Court has held that these
    ingredients postulate a positive act and, therefore, mere failure
    to pay duty and/or take out a licence which is not due to any
    fraud, collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of fact or
    contravention of any provision is not sufficient to attract the
    extended period of limitation.”

    (Emphasis Supplied)

    14.2. In Lipi Boilers Ltd. (Supra), it has been held as under:

    77. In the context of invoking the extended period of
    limitation Under Section 11A of the Act, 1944, this Court in
    Pahwa Chemicals Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central
    Excise, Delhi
    reported in (2009) 4 SCC 658, observed that
    mere failure does not amount to wilful misdeclaration or wilful
    suppression and that there must be some positive act on the
    part of an Assessee to bring the case within the mischief of
    wilful misdeclaration or wilful suppression, as the case may be.

    This Court in Pahwa Chemicals (supra) observed as follows:

    “6. It is settled law that mere failure to declare does
    not amount to wilful misdeclaration or wilful
    suppression. There must be some positive act on the
    part of the party to establish either wilful
    misdeclaration or wilful suppression. When all facts
    are before the Department and a party in the belief
    that affixing of a label makes no difference does not
    make a declaration, then there would be no wilful
    misdeclaration or wilful suppression. If the
    Department felt that the party was not entitled to
    the benefit of the notification, it was for the

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    Department to immediately take up the contention
    that the benefit of the notification was lost.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    78. The allegation levelled against the Assessee in the present
    matter before us is of wilful suppression with an intention to
    evade central excise duty. Therefore, the following observation
    of this Court in Continental Foundation Joint Venture Holding v.
    CCE
    reported in 2007:INSC:877 is required to be referred to:

    “12. The expression ‘suppression’ has been used in
    the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act accompanied
    by very strong words as ‘fraud’ or ‘collusion’ and,
    therefore, has to be construed strictly. Mere
    omission to give correct information is not
    suppression of facts unless it was deliberate to stop
    (sic evade) the payment of duty. Suppression means
    failure to disclose full information with the intent to
    evade payment of duty. When the facts are known to
    both the parties, omission by one party to do what
    he might have done would not render it suppression.
    When the Revenue invokes the extended period of
    limitation Under Section 11-A the burden is cast
    upon it to prove suppression of fact. An incorrect
    statement cannot be equated with a wilful
    misstatement. The latter implies making of an
    incorrect statement with the knowledge that the
    statement was not correct.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    15. To the same effect, in Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co.

    (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, holding that “suppression of

    facts”, having been deployed in the company of strong words such

    as fraud, collusion and wilful default; therefore the act must be

    deliberate and animated by an intent to evade payment of tax,

    observed:

    “4. ………..But the proviso carves out an exception and
    permits the authority to exercise this power within five years
    from the relevant date in the circumstances mentioned in the
    proviso, one of it being suppression of facts. The meaning of
    the word both in law and even otherwise is well known. In
    normal understanding it is not different that what is explained
    in various dictionaries unless of court the context in which it
    has been used indicates otherwise. A perusal of the proviso
    indicates that it has been used in company of such strong
    words as fraud, collusion or wilful default. In fact it is the
    mildest expression used in the proviso. Yet the surroundings in
    which it has been used it has to be construed strictly. It does
    not mean any omission. The act must be deliberate. In
    taxation, it can have only one meaning that the correct
    information was not disclosed deliberately to escape from
    payment of duty. Where facts are known to both the parties
    the omission by one to do what he might have done and not
    that he must have done, does not render it suppression.”

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    (Emphasis Supplied)

    15.1. A similar view was taken in Collector of Central Excise v.

    H.M.M. Limited (supra):

    “2………The mere non-declaration of the waste/by-product in
    their classification list cannot establish any wilful withholding of
    vital information for the purpose of evasion of excise duty due
    on the said product……………… If the Department proposes to
    invoke the proviso to Section 11A(1), the show cause notice
    must put the assessee to notice which of the various
    commissions or omissions stated in the proviso is committed to
    extend the period from six months to 5 years. Unless the
    assessee is put to notice, the assessee would have no
    opportunity to meet the case of the department. The defaults
    enumerated in the proviso to the said sub-section are more
    than one and if the excise department places reliance on the
    proviso it must be specifically stated in the show cause notice
    which is the allegation against the assessee falling within the
    four corners of the said proviso.”

    16. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts at hand, we

    are of the considered view that the appellant has failed to adduce

    any cogent evidence of a positive act on the part of the

    respondent evincing an intent to evade payment of tax. The mere

    omission, or the classification of services under an incorrect head,

    does not, of itself, constitute fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement

    or suppression of facts. It follows that the appellant was not

    entitled to invoke the extended period of limitation.

    17. In view of the aforesaid, the submission of the appellant

    lacks merit, and as far as the authorities relied upon by learned

    counsel for the appellant are concerned the same are clearly

    distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present

    case.

    G) Conclusion

    18. For the reasons aforesaid, we find that the findings of the

    learned CESTAT are consistent with the record and in conformity

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    with the settled legal position expounded by the Hon’ble Supreme

    Court.

    19. The learned CESTAT has, in our view, correctly held that the

    appellant failed to establish any element of fraud, collusion, wilful

    misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade

    payment of tax. We find no legal infirmity or perversity in the

    impugned order warranting interference by this Court.

    20. In the premises, the merits of the controversy no longer

    survive for consideration. The substantial question of law framed

    is answered in favour of the respondent and against the appellant,

    and the impugned order dated 26.07.2022 is upheld.

    21. Accordingly, the present appeal, being devoid of merit, is

    dismissed, with no order as to costs.

    22. All other pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

                                       (MANEESH SHARMA),J                                                  (ARUN MONGA),J
    
                                       Deepa
    
    
    
    
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