Delhi High Court
Shivani Sobti vs Kuldip Sobti on 23 July, 2026
Author: Subramonium Prasad
Bench: Subramonium Prasad
$~75
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 23rd JULY, 2026
+ CS(OS) 635/2023, I.A. 20154/2023, I.A. 20155/2023, I.A.
21531/2023, I.A. 3175/2024, I.A. 13892/2025, I.A. 23171/2025, I.A.
30975/2025, I.A. 32253/2025, I.A. 32394/2025
SHIVANI SOBTI .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Neeraj Jain and Mr. Rishi Raj
Sharma, Advocates for Plaintiff
versus
KULDIP SOBTI .....Defendant
Through: Mr.Sunil Dalal Sr.Adv, Ms Dipika
Prasad, Mr Ankit Rana, Mr Bharat
Khurana, Advs.
Mr. Rajshekher Rao Sr. Adv, Adv
Naveen Shrama, Adv Aashna
Chawla, Adv Aman Jwala on behalf
of the Applicant.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
1. The present Suit has been filed by the Plaintiff seeking a decree of
permanent injunction against the Defendant in respect of property bearing
Municipal No. XVI/2105, Block-G, Desh Bandhu Gupta Road, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “Suit Property”).
2. The case of the plaintiff, as stated in the plaint, is that she is the owner
of the first floor, second floor and third floor of the Suit Property by virtue
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of two registered Gift Deeds dated 04.02.2000, executed by the Defendant
and a Will dated 08.04.2022. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant has
no right to interfere with her peaceful use, occupation and possession of the
aforesaid portions of the property or to obstruct her enjoyment of the
easementary rights appurtenant thereto. The plaintiff asserts that disputes
arose between the parties in relation to the use and enjoyment of the terrace
and common portions of the Property. It is stated that the Defendant has
been interfering with the Plaintiff’s peaceful possession and has been
obstructing her ingress and egress, besides creating hindrance in the
enjoyment of the common areas, water tanks and solar panels installed on
the terrace of the third floor. Apprehending further interference at the hands
of the Defendant, the Plaintiff has filed the present Suit. Along with the Suit,
the Plaintiff also filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
CPC praying for an interim order restraining the Defendant from interfering
with her peaceful use, occupation and possession of the suit property and
from creating any third-party rights or otherwise altering the existing state of
affairs of the Suit Property pending adjudication of the Suit.
3. The matter was taken up for hearing on 12.10.2023 when this Court
issues summons in the Suit and considering the urgency projected by the
plaintiff directed the parties to maintain status quo as regards title and
possession of the suit property till the next date of hearing. Relevant portion
of the said Order reads as under:
“I.A. 20154/2023 (under Order 39 R 1 & 2 CPC)
Present application has been filed under Order
39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC with the following prayer:
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a) Restrain the Defendant, his legal heirs, his
agents, representatives and servants from
interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful use,
occupation and possession of the suit property
i.e. the First, Second & Third Floors of the
property hearing Municipal No. XVI / 2105,
Block-G, Desh Bandhu Gupta Road, Karol
Bagh, New Delhi, and/or;
b) Restrain the Defendant, his legal heirs, his
agents, representatives and servants from
raising loans, advances from third parties and
selling, transferring, creating any third party
interests, encumbrances, charges, lien on the
suit property i.e. the First, Second & Third
Floors of the property hearing Municipal No.
XVI / 2105, Block-G, Desh Bandhu Gupta
Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi and/or;
c) Restrain the Defendant, his legal heirs, his
agents, representatives and servants from
creating any hindrance in the ingress and
egress of the plaintiff in the suit property, and /
or;
d) Restrain the Defendant, his legal heirs, his
agents, representatives and servants from
creating any hindrance in the plaintiffs
easementary rights including access to and use
of the common areas as well as the water tanks
and solar panel installed on the terrace of the
3rd Floor of the suit property, and /or;
e) Ex-parte orders in terms of prayers (a) to (d)
may kindly he passed against the defendant,
and/or; f Any other or further orders as this
Hon’hle Court deems fit in the facts and
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On a prima facie consideration of facts and materials
placed on record, this Court is of the opinion that the
plaintiff has made out a case for ex parte ad-interim
orders. The balance of convenience lies in favour of
the plaintiff, and there is likelihood of irreparable
injury being caused to the plaintiff.
Issue notice to the respondent through all
permissible modes, returnable before the Joint
Registrar on 02.11.2023 for completion of pleadings.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a
local commissioner be appointed to ascertain the
possession of the property in question.
In view of the request made, Ms. Nikita Kaushik
(M.No.9810510044) is appointed as a Local
Commissioner. Fee of the Local Commissioner is fixed
at Rs.50,000/- to be paid by the plaintiff.
Report of the Local Commissioner shall be
submitted within one week.
The parties are directed to maintain status quo
as to title and possession of the suit property till the
next date of hearing.
Reply to the application be filed within four
weeks. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed within three
weeks thereafter.
Provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 3 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 be complied with within one
week.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
4. The said interim order continued to remain in operation from time to
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time and admittedly was never vacated.
5. Written Statement was filed by the Defendant. While admitting the
execution of the Gift Deeds dated 04.02.2000 and the Will dated
08.04.2022, the Defendant disputed the Plaintiff’s claim in relation to the
open terrace portion on the third floor. According to the Defendant, although
the Plaintiff was the owner of the built-up portions of the first, second and
third floors, the terrace and roof rights continued to vest in the Defendant.
The controversy between the parties, therefore, narrowed down to the
interpretation of the Gift Deeds and the nature and extent of the rights
transferred thereunder.
6. Material on record indicates that while the interim order dated
12.10.2023, directing maintenance of status quo remained in force, the
Plaintiff executed a registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.2025 in favour of M/s
Easy Builders Private Limited, whereby the Plaintiff transferred her entire
right, title and interest in the first floor, second floor and third floor of the
Suit Property in favour of the said purchaser for valuable consideration. The
execution of the said Sale Deed is not in dispute.
7. According to the Defendant, the execution of the Sale Deed during the
operation of the order dated 12.10.2023 amounted to a deliberate and
conscious violation of the direction issued by this Court requiring the parties
to maintain status quo as regards title and possession of the suit property. On
the aforesaid premise, the Defendant filed I.A. No.13892/2025 under Order
XXXIX Rule 2A CPC read with Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 and Article 215 of the Constitution of India alleging wilful
disobedience of the order dated 12.10.2023 by the Plaintiff. In the said
Application, the Defendant asserted that despite being fully aware of the
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subsisting order of status quo, the Plaintiff had proceeded to alienate the suit
property in favour of a third party, thereby frustrating the very purpose of
the interim order passed by this Court.
8. On 09.07.2026 learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff made an
oral application in Court that the Plaintiff wants to withdraw the present
Suit. The said application was strongly opposed by the learned Counsel for
the Defendant stating that withdrawal cannot be permitted as the Plaintiff
has violated the status quo order passed by this Court and has created third
party rights in the Suit Property and therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be
permitted to withdraw the Suit and wash her hands away.
9. Substantial arguments have been heard on the question as to whether
the Plaintiff must be allowed to withdraw the Suit unconditionally or not in
light of the fact that the Plaintiff has violated the Order dated 12.10.2023,
passed by this Court, directing the parties to maintain status quo with regard
to the title and possession of the Suit Property.
10. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff contends that the Plaintiff is giving
an unconditional apology. Learned Counsel for the Defendant contends that
in view of the fact that status quo order has been violated, the sale deed has
to be held to be void ab initio whereas the learned Counsel appearing for the
Builder/Purchaser states that the Builder/Purchaser being a bona fide
purchaser cannot be left high and dry as the Builder/Purchaser purchased the
Suit Property without knowing the dispute. Learned Counsel for the
Builder/Purchaser also state that the Builder/Purchaser has put in good
money in purchasing the property.
11. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on
record.
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12. The fact that the Plaintiff has filed its reply to I.A. No.13892/2025. A
perusal of the reply shows that the Plaintiff accepts that the Order of status
quo has been violated. Though she has tendered an apology, but the same is
qualified by justification for the sale of the property. The question which has
to be considered is as to whether the apology given by the Plaintiff is
unconditional or not. In the opinion of this Court, a reading of the affidavit
filed in reply to I.A. No.13892/2025 shows that the apology given by the
Plaintiff is not an unconditional apology. It is only an apology in the
alternative. A Full Bench of this Court in Surat Singh v. Des Raj etc., 1967
SCC OnLine Del 169, while stating as to what should be the nature of the
apology of a Contemnor, has held as under:
“6. Before dealing with the case on the merits, we
consider it proper once again to repeat what is
axiomat and is, without doubt, well-known. An apology
by a contemner, in order to be a mitigation factor,
must, another things, be outpouring of a penitent heart
moved by a genuine feeling of remorse and it must
never be an apology or a convenient device to escape
punishment. There cannot be both justification and
apology, for they are incompatible. An apology is not
a weapon to purge the guilt, it is merely meant to
serve as an evidence of real contrition. Those who
drafted affidavits on behalf of both the contemners
before us seem to be labouring under wholly erroneous
and unfounded impression that the stage apology
comes only after the Court holds them guilty of
contempt. This is a complete misconception of the real
legal position and has been repeatedly pointed out in a
long series of cases the latest one being a Bench
decision of this Court in R.K. Gupta v. Delhi
Administration, Cr. O. 36 of 1967 decided on 13-9-
1967(1).” (emphasis supplied)
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13. Similarly, a Division Bench of this Court in H. Syama Sundara Rao
v. Union of India and others, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 1392, while dealing
with the issue of apology in contempt proceedings, has observed as under:-
“23. We may now deal with the question of apology, In
the course of arguments, the petitioner did apologize
to the advocate for the respondents. However,
immediately thereafter, the petitioner pressed his
arguments in reply to the notice to show cause and
stated that he had in fact not committed any
contempt. Even in the written submissions handed over
by the petitioner in the course of arguments on 2nd
November, 2006, the petitioner starts by saying “he
has not committed any contempt and in fact it is the
advocate for the respondents who has committed
professional misconduct, criminal contempt and fraud
on judiciary.” Thereafter, the petitioner has reiterated
all the averments that he made against the advocate in
the notices served upon the advocate as also in the
earlier reply to the notice to show cause issued by us.
The petitioner was informed by the Court that if he
thought it proper he may tender an unconditional
apology and that he could not add any riders or
stipulations to his apology. The petitioner thereafter
continued to address us on the contempt and sought
to justify his acts. Therefore, the question of dropping
the proceedings was ruled out.
24. The conduct of the petitioner shows that the
apology tendered by him was only paying a lip service
and was a mere device adopted to escape the
punishment of his conduct. He is not feeling
repentant or remorseful for his conduct. In any case,
such an apology which has been tendered by the
petitioner in one breath while in other breath, it is
coupled with fresh allegations against the counsel for
the respondents, cannot be accepted or taken note of.
It is beyond any cavil that, an apology by a contemnerSignature Not Verified
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does not entitle him to an order of discharge and it
merely mitigates the offence in certain circumstances
and indeed, the Court has to consider the matter only
from the point of view of administration of justice. A
Full Bench of this Court in the case of State v. Bhavani
Singh reported as ILR (1968) Delhi 1 observed as
below:
“………In order to be a mitigating factor, the apology
must be tendered at the earliest opportunity and it must
be outpouring of a penitent heart moved by a genuine
feeling of remorse and overcome by a sense of one’s
guilt. It should not be merely an apology for an
apology or a convenient device to escape punishment.
Belated apology as an afterthought thus serves no
purpose. It must be indicative of repentant regret and
contrition tendered at the earliest opportunity,
exhibiting realisation of wrong having been done by
the contemner and it must be free and frank
expressions of his feelings.”
25. Same is the opinion expressed by the; Supreme
Court in the cases of Shri C.K. Daphtary Sr. Advocate
v. Shri O.P. Gupta reported as (1971) 1 SCC 626 : AIR
1971 SC 1132 : (1971 Cri LJ 844) and National Textile
Workers‟ Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan reported as
(1983) 3 SCC 105 : AIR 1983 SC 759 : (1983 Cri LJ
1102).
26. In AIR 1940 Nag 407Sub-judge First Class
Hoshangabad v. Jawaharlal Ramchand. it was held
that:
“An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to
purged the guilty of their offences. It is not an
additional insult to be hurled at the heads of those who
have been wronged. It is “intended to be evidence of
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done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to
make such reparation as lies in the wrong doer’s
power. Only then is it of any avail in a court of
justice……. Apology must, in order to dilute the gravity
of the offence, be voluntary, unconditional and
indicative of the remorse and contrition and it must be
tendered at the earliest opportunity.”
27. In AIR 1955 SC 19 : (1955 Cri LJ 133) M. Shareef
v. Hon’ble Judges of Nagpur Court, it was observed as
below:
“There cannot be both justification and an apology.
The two things are incompatible.”
28. Where the stand taken by the contemner in the
show cause petition was that if the Court considered
that contempt had been committed then he tendered an
un qualified apology and the proceeding was hotly
contested, the apology offered by counsel was held to
have been robbed of all grace and the show of regret
was held to be un worthy of consideration, and a
Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the matter
of Bholanath Chaudhary reported in AIR 1961 Pat 1 :
(1961 (1) Cri LJ 134) noted that:
“The question as to whether the Court should or
should not accept the apology would depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case and a Court can
refuse to accept an apology if it is not believed to be
genuine and even if it is accepted, it can commit the
offender to prison or otherwise punish him.”
29. In a recent judgment delivered by a Division Bench
of this Court on 19th October, 2006 in the case, Court
on its own motion v. Mr. Gulshan Bajwa, (Cri. Cont.
Case Nos. 16 and 17/2006) in relation to the law of
tendering and accepting an apology, it has been
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observed as below:
“It is a settled principle of law that an apology besides
being expressed in words literally should be bona fide
and a real repentance of the offending acts. Normally,
offer of an apology should be right at the initial stages
besides being bona fide and upon complete realisation
of the mistakes done, should also be unequivocal
declaration of genuine concern for due course of
administration of justice and upholding of the dignity.
If any of these ingredients are missing, the apology
may not be accepted by the Court as it lacks real intent
of bona fide.”
30. To the same effect are the Judgments of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Jaikwal v. State of U.P.
reported as (1984) 3 SCC 405 : AIR 1984 SC 1374 :
(1984 Cri LJ 909) and M.V. Shareef v. The Hon’ble
Judges of the High Court of Nagpur reported as AIR
1995 SC 19.” (emphasis supplied)
14. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments would show that justification
and apology cannot go in hand and they are incompatible. An apology is the
acceptance of guilt and the person who apologizes for the mistake actually
prays for apology of contempt by expressing sincere regard for atonement of
that guilt.
15. This Court is aware that the power to punish for contempt is a special
power and needs to be exercised with care and caution, and it should be used
sparingly by the Courts. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the
question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of
the court and whether the conduct of the party who is alleged to have
committed such disobedience is contumacious or not. [Refer to:- Jhareswar
Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352].
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16. The Supreme Court in Re: Vinay Chandra, (1995) 2 SCC 584, had
delineated the purpose of the law of contempt in building confidence in the
judicial process. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment has been
reproduced as follows:
“39. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic
society. The Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of
law. Hence judiciary is not only the third pillar, but the
central pillar of the democratic State. In a democracy
like ours, where there is a written Constitution which is
above all individuals and institutions and where the
power of judicial review is vested in the superior
courts, the judiciary has a special and additional duty
to perform, viz., to oversee that all individuals and
institutions including the executive and the legislature
act within the framework of not only the law but also
the fundamental law of the land. This duty is apart
from the function of adjudicating the disputes between
the parties which is essential to peaceful and orderly
development of the society. If the judiciary is to
perform its duties and functions effectively and remain
true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted
to it, the dignity and authority of the courts have to be
respected and protected at all costs. Otherwise, the
very cornerstone of our constitutional scheme will give
way and with it will disappear the rule of law and the
civilized life in the society. It is for this purpose that the
courts are entrusted with the extraordinary power of
punishing those who indulge in acts whether inside or
outside the courts, which tend to undermine their
authority and bring them in disrepute and disrespect
by scandalising them and obstructing them from
discharging their duties without fear or favour. When
the court exercises this power, it does not do so to
vindicate the dignity and honour of the individual
judge who is personally attacked or scandalised, but to
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of justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust
and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver
fearless and impartial justice. When the foundation
itself is shaken by acts which tend to create disaffection
and disrespect for the authority of the court by creating
distrust in its working, the edifice of the judicial system
gets eroded.”
17. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and
dignity of the courts of law, since the respect and authority commanded by
the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the
democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is
undermined.
18. As stated hereinabove, the apology cannot be accepted as the a Reply
has been filed subsequent to the filing of the unconditional apology
justifying the actions. Further, the plea that contempt is not made out and
the apology is only in the alternative cannot be accepted.
19. However, considering the fact that the Plaintiff is a lady of
considerable age, this Court is not inclined to send the Plaintiff to prison.
Though Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC does not provide for imposing any
other penalty other than three months’ imprisonment for violation of the
Orders of the Court, the provisions under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
are also attracted in the present case as the Plaintiff has willfully disobeyed
the Orders of this Court. In light of the above, this Court is inclined to
impose a fine of Rs.2,000/- on the Plaintiff for contempt of Court under
Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
20. The Suit Property has been sold to the Buyer/Purchaser in violation
of the status quo order passed by this Court. Learned Counsel for the
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Buyer/Purchaser places reliance on Section 52 of the Transfer of Property
Act to state that sale of the Suit Property is bona fide in nature. The question
as to whether a sale under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would
save such transaction has been dealt with by the Apex Court in Balwantbhai
Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai, (2023) 17 SCC 545, wherein the
Apex Court has held as under:
“80. We now proceed to answer the third question
formulated by us as regards the power of the contempt
court to declare any contemptuous transaction non est
or void.
81. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in SBI v. Vijay
Mallya [SBI v. Vijay Mallya, (2024) 12 SCC 85 : 2022
SCC OnLine SC 826] , in clear terms said that apart
from punishing the contemnor for his contumacious
conduct, the majesty of law may demand that
appropriate directions be issued by the Court so that
any advantage secured as a result of such
contumacious conduct is completely nullified. The
approach may require the Court to issue directions
either for reversal of the transactions in question by
declaring said transactions to be void or passing
appropriate directions to the authorities concerned to
see that the contumacious conduct on the part of the
contemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage
of the contemnor or anyone claiming under him.
82. It would be pertinent, in this context, to refer to the
decision of the Chancery Division in Clarke v.
Chadburn [Clarke v. Chadburn, (1985) 1 WLR 78] ,
wherein it was held that an act done in wilful
disobedience of an injunction or court order is not only
a contempt of court, but also an illegal and invalid act
which could not, therefore, effect any change in the
rights and liabilities of others. Similar view wasSignature Not Verified
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expressed by this Court in Satyabrata Biswas v. Kalyan
Kumar Kisku [Satyabrata Biswas v. Kalyan Kumar
Kisku, (1994) 2 SCC 266] , wherein the contempt
jurisdiction was invoked by the respondents against the
appellants, and during the contempt proceedings, it
transpired that a sub-tenancy was created while the
status quo order was in operation. This Court held that
creation of sub-tenancy was in violation of the status
quo order and parties were relegated to the position as
existed on the date of the status quo order. This Court,
inter alia, observed thus : (Satyabrata Biswas case
[Satyabrata Biswas v. Kalyan Kumar Kisku, (1994) 2
SCC 266] , SCC p. 276, para 23)“23. … Such an order cannot be circumvented by
parties with impunity and expect the court to
confer its blessings. It does not matter that to the
contempt proceedings Somani Builders was not a
party. It cannot gain an advantage in derogation
of the rights of the parties, who were litigating
originally. If the right of sub-tenancy is
recognised, how is status quo as of 15-9-1988
maintained? Hence, the grant of sub-lease is
contrary to the order of status quo. Any act done
in the teeth of the order of status quo is clearly
illegal. All actions including the grant of sub-
lease are clearly illegal.” (emphasis supplied)
83. We are aware of the two decisions of this Court
one in Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders &
Investors (P) Ltd. [Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v.
Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC
397 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] and T. Ravi [T. Ravi v. B.
Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342 : (2017) 3 SCC
(Civ) 666] . In both these decisions, the view taken is
that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(for short “the 1882 Act”) does not render transfers
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render such transfers subservient to the rights as may
be eventually determined by the court.
84. In Thomson Press [Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v.
Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC
397 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] , T.S. Thakur, J. in his
separate judgment while supplementing the judgment
authored by M.Y. Eqbal, J., observed as under : (SCC
p. 424, para 53)
“53. There is, therefore, little room for any doubt
that the transfer of the suit property pendente lite
is not void ab initio and that the purchaser of any
such property takes the bargain subject to the
rights of the plaintiff in the pending suit. Although
the above decisions do not deal with a fact
situation where the sale deed is executed in
breach of an injunction issued by a competent
court, we do not see any reason why the breach of
any such injunction should render the transfer
whether by way of an absolute sale or otherwise
ineffective. The party committing the breach may
doubtless incur the liability to be punished for the
breach committed by it but the sale by itself may
remain valid as between the parties to the
transaction subject only to any directions which
the competent court may issue in the suit against
the vendor.” (emphasis supplied)
85.Thomson Press [Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v.
Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC
397 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] referred to above has been
relied upon in T. Ravi [T. Ravi v. B. Chinna
Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ)
666] for the proposition that the effect of Section 52 of
the 1882 Act is not to render transfers effected during
the pendency of a suit by a party to the suit void; the
transfer remains valid subject, of course, to the result
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of the suit. The pendente lite purchaser would be
entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and
obligations of his vendor as may be eventually
determined by the Court.
86. This Court in DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (P)
Ltd. [DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (1996)
4 SCC 622] , held that the legal consequences of what
has been done in breach of or in violation of the order
of stay or injunction should be undone and the parties
could be put back to the same position as they stood
immediately prior to such order of stay or injunction to
not let the defaulting party enjoy any undue advantage.
This Court while relying upon cases decided by
various High Courts held as under : (SCC pp. 635-37,
paras 18-21)
“The contemnor should not be allowed to enjoy or
retain the fruits of his contempt
***
18. The above principle has been applied even in
the case of violation of orders of injunction issued
by civil courts. In Clarke v. Chadburn [Clarke v.
Chadburn, (1985) 1 WLR 78] Sir Robert Megarry
V-C observed : (WLR pp. 80-81)
„I need not cite authority for the proposition
that it is of high importance that orders of
the court should be obeyed. Wilful
disobedience to an order of the court is
punishable as a contempt of court, and I feel
no doubt that such disobedience may
properly be described as being illegal. If by
such disobedience the persons enjoined
claim that they have validly effected some
change in the rights and liabilities of others,
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I cannot see why it should be said that
although they are liable to penalties for
contempt of court for doing what they did,
nevertheless those acts were validly done. Of
course, if an act is done, it is not undone
merely by pointing out that it was done in
breach of the law. If a meeting is held in
breach of an injunction, it cannot be said
that the meeting has not been held. But the
legal consequences of what has been done in
breach of the law may plainly be very much
affected by the illegality. It seems to me on
principle that those who defy a prohibition
ought not to be able to claim that the fruits of
their defiance are good, and not tainted by
the illegality that produced them.‟
19. To the same effect are the decisions of the
Madras and Calcutta High Courts in Century
Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah [Century Flour
Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah, 1975 SCC OnLine Mad
73 : AIR 1975 Mad 270] and Sujit Pal v. Prabir
Kumar Sun [Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun, 1985
SCC OnLine Cal 146 : AIR 1986 Cal 220 : (1985-
86) 90 CWN 342] . In Century Flour Mills Ltd. v.
S. Suppiah [Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S.
Suppiah, 1975 SCC OnLine Mad 73 : AIR 1975
Mad 270] it was held by a Full Bench of the
Madras High Court that where an act is done in
violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the
duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong
right and not allow the perpetuation of the
wrongdoing. The inherent power of the court, it
was held, is not only available in such a case, but
it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the
interest of justice. That was a case where a
meeting was held contrary to an order of
injunction. The Court refused to recognise that
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the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put
back the parties in the same position as they stood
immediately prior to the service of the interim
order.
20. In Sujit Pal [Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun,
1985 SCC OnLine Cal 146 : AIR 1986 Cal 220 :
(1985-86) 90 CWN 342] a Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court has taken the same view.
There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the
plaintiff in violation of the order of injunction and
took possession of the property. The Court
directed the restoration of possession to the
plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court
observed that no technicality can prevent the
court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent
powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of
Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such
mandatory direction is given for restoration of
possession to the aggrieved party. This was
necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of
process of law.
21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to
be applied and given effect to by this Court, if
necessary, by overruling any procedural or other
technical objections. Article 129 is a
constitutional power and when exercised in
tandem with Article 142, all such objections
should give way. The court must ensure full
justice between the parties before it.” (emphasis
supplied)
87. This Court in Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v.
Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd. [Vidur Impex & Traders (P)
Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] , while deciding on a similar
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conducted in teeth of the injunction passed by the Delhi
High Court did not have any legal basis. This Court
held as under : (SCC p. 414, para 42)“42. … At the cost of repetition, we consider it
necessary to mention that Respondent 1 had filed
suit for specific performance of agreement dated
13-9-1988 executed by Respondent 2. The
appellants and Bhagwati Developers are total
strangers to that agreement. They came into the
picture only when Respondent 2 entered into a
clandestine transaction with the appellants for
sale of the suit property and executed the
agreements for sale, which were followed by
registered sale deeds and the appellants executed
agreement for sale in favour of Bhagwati
Developers. These transactions were in clear
violation of the order of injunction passed by the
Delhi High Court which had restrained
Respondent 2 from alienating the suit property or
creating third-party interest. To put it differently,
the agreements for sale and the sale deeds
executed by Respondent 2 in favour of the
appellants did not have any legal sanctity. The
status of the agreement for sale executed by the
appellants in favour of Bhagwati Developers was
no different. These transactions did not confer any
right upon the appellants or Bhagwati
Developers. Therefore, their presence is not at all
necessary for adjudication of the question
whether Respondents 1 and 2 had entered into a
binding agreement and whether Respondent 1 is
entitled to a decree of specific performance of the
said agreement.” (emphasis supplied)
88. The decision of Vidur Impex [Vidur Impex &
Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8
SCC 384 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] was relied upon by
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this Court in Jehal Tanti v. Nageshwar Singh [Jehal
Tanti v. Nageshwar Singh, (2013) 14 SCC 689 : (2014)
3 SCC (Civ) 512 : AIR 2013 SC 2235] , wherein it was
held that : (Jehal Tanti case [Jehal Tanti v. Nageshwar
Singh, (2013) 14 SCC 689 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 512 :
AIR 2013 SC 2235] , SCC p. 695, para 13)
“13. We may also notice Section 23 of the
Contract Act, 1872, which lays down that:
„23. What considerations and objects are
lawful, and what not.–The consideration or
object of an agreement is lawful, unless–
it is forbidden by law; or
is of such a nature that, if permitted, it
would defeat the provisions of any law; oris fraudulent; or involves or implies injury
to the person or property of another; or
the court regards it as immoral, or
opposed to public policy.‟In each of these cases, the consideration
or object of an agreement is unlawful and
every agreement executed with such an
object or consideration which is unlawful
is void. Since the sale deed was executed
in favour of Respondent 1 in the teeth of
the order of injunction passed by the trial
court, the same appears to be unlawful.”
(emphasis supplied)
89. Thus, although Section 52 of the 1882 Act does not
render a transfer pendente lite void yet the court while
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in question by declaring the said transactions to be
void or proceed to pass appropriate directions to the
authorities concerned to ensure that the contumacious
conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue
to enure to the advantage of the contemnor or anyone
claiming under him.”
21. A perusal of the abovementioned judgment shows that the transaction
between the Builder and the Plaintiff is bad and the protection under Section
52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not available in such transactions. In
fact, the Apex Court in Chander Bhan v. Mukhtiar Singh, (2024) 13 SCC
122, goes to the extent that even notice is not required to such purchasers.
22. In view of the above, the transaction is bad. It is open for the
Builder/Purchaser to take steps in accordance with law.
23. The issue as to whether the sale is bona fide or not, etc. are not
adjudicated in this Suit.
24. The Plaintiff who is present in Court today states that she wants to
withdraw the Suit unconditionally. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff has
identified the Plaintiff, and he also seeks permission to withdraw the Suit
unconditionally.
25. Statement is taken on record.
26. The Suit is disposed of as withdrawn, along with the pending
applications, if any.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
JULY 23, 2026
Rahul/VG
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