Punjab-Haryana High Court
Improvement Trust Ludhiana And Another vs Harjinder Pal Kaur And Ors. on 30 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
IOIN
IOIN-RSA-150-2006 IN
RSA
RSA-150-2006 (O&M)
Reserved on : 01.05.2026
Pronounced on:
on:30.07.2026
IMPROVEMENT TRUST LUDHIANA AND ANOTHER
.... Appellants
Versus
HARJINDER PAL KAUR AND OTHERS
.... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE RAMESH KUMARI
Present : Mr. Gurinder Singh and Mr.Vinish Singla
Singla, Advocates
for the appellants.
Respondents No.1 to 3 proceeded against ex-parte
vide order dated 27.02.2026.
****
RAMESH KUMARI,
KUMARI J.
1. Appellants (defendants
(defendants No.1 & 2 in original suit) has filed the present
regular second appeal against impugned judgment and decree dated
29.07.2005 whereby the judgment
ent of the learned trial Court had been set
aside and suit filed by respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as
plaintiff) had been decreed for permanent injunction.
Facts of the plaintiff’s case
2. The subject matter of the civil suit/appeal in hand is property i.e. house
building of property unit No.B-XIV/46-C/1,
No.B C/1, situated at Rajpura Road,
near Mata Kali Mandir, Haibowal Khurd, bearing khewat-khatuni
khatuni
No.99/107, khasra No.5R//21/2, Hadbast No.158, Haibowal Khurd,
Tehsil and Distt. Ludhiana and bounded as follows:-
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West: Open Plot No.30
North: House in plot No.31
South: Rajpura RoadAs shown red in the site plan attached with the
plaint.
3. The facts of the case pleaded by the plaintiff
plaintiff-Harjinder
Harjinder Pal Kaur before
learned trial Court is that she purchased the suit property along with
defendants No.3 and 4,
4 from Sheela Devi vide sale deed dated 07.03.1989
Ex. P-1
1 for consideration of Rs.50,000/-
Rs.50,000/ and mutation of ownership
rship was
also sanctioned in their favour and their names were incorporated in
jamabandi for the year 1984-85 Ex. P-33 and jamabandi for the year 1989–
90 Ex.P-4
4. The plaintiff along with defendants No.3 and 4 submitted site
plan to Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana (for short
short-Municipal
Municipal
Corporation) for construction of house and payment was made vide
receipt No.35 dated 05.06.1989
0 .06.1989 Ex.P
Ex.P-5.
5. However, the Municipal
Corporation
ration neither rejected nor sanctioned site plan.. After a lapse of
considerable time, the plaintiff considered that site plan has been
accepted. The plaintiff along with defendants No.3 and 4 raised
construction over the suit property in the month of Janua
January, 1990 by
spending Rs.50,000/-.
Rs.50,000/ . Municipal Corporation did not raise any objection.
Thereafter, the plaintiff received
received notice dated 10.07.1990 Ex.P-6
6 issued
by defendants No.1 & 2 i.e. appellants, under Section 195A of The
he Punjab
Municipal Act, 1911 (for short- the Municipal Act) and Section 49 of the
Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (for
(for short
short-the Improvement Act)
directing the plaintiff and defendants No.3 and 4 to demolish the
constructions raised in the plot within 3 days otherwise threatened to
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demolish
ish the construction. The plaintiff further pleaded that defendants
No.1 and 2 had no right or title to issue the impugned notice as neither the
disputed property had been acquired by defendants No.1 and 2 at any time
nor there was any scheme. No notice wass served regarding acquisition of
land. Defendants No.1 and 2 have no jurisdiction to issue notice. There
was no objection from Municipal Corporation regarding the construction
raised over the disputed plot. The plaintiff and defendants No.3 and 4
were not afforded opportunity of being heard before issuing the impugned
notice.. Defendants No.1 and 2 had not published any scheme as provided
under Section 36 of the Improvement Act
Act.. The plaintiff approached
defendants No.1 and 2 to withdraw the impugned notice and not to cause
any damage or demolition but they refused, thereby, necessitating the
filing of the suit.
4. Since defendants No.3 and 4 were profor
proforma
ma defendants, their presence
was dispensed with by the learned trial Court.
Pleadings of the contesting defendants
5. Defendants No.1 and 2 filed written statement and contested the suit by
raising preliminary objections regarding its maintainability and that the
suit is barred under Sections 91 and 98 of the Improvement Act, and
plaintiff have no locus standi to file the suit, her ownership over the
disputed property was also denied. The case of the defendant is that suit
property had been acquired by defendants No.1 and 2 under 256 Acre
Area Scheme vide resolution No.19 dated 29.06.1976 Ex.PW-2/1)
2/1)
(Award No.1 of 1980-81,
1980 dated 12.06.1980 Ex.11), Municipal
Corporation has no right over the suit property. The power
powers of Municipal
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Corporation regarding building control stand vested with defendant No.1
No.1–
Improvement Trust, Ludhiana after area acquired under Development
Scheme by defendant No.1 under Section 40 of the Improvement Act..
Plaintiff had no right to submit alleged site plan w
with Municipal
Corporation, Ludhiana seeking sanction to raise construction over the suit
Corporation,
property. The plaintiff had raised illegal, unauthorized constructions
against rules and regulations of the Improvement Act which is liable to be
demolished in accordance
accordance with the said Act in due course. The impugned
notices served upon the plaintiff were legal and the construction raised by
the plaintiff over the suit property is liable to be demolished as suit land
had already been acquired from the previous owner and even the
compensation had already been got deposited by defendant No.1 with
Land Acquisition Collector, Ludhiana, the plaintiff has no cause of action.
6. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statement of defendants No.1
and 2 and reiterated the pleadings.
Issues framed by learned trial Court
7. Following issues were framed by learned trial Court vide order dated
09.01.1992:
09.01.1992:-
1. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form?
OPD
2. Whether the suit is barred under Section 98 of the Pun
Punjab
jab
Town Improvement Act? OPD.
3. Whether the plaintiff has got the locus standi to file the
present suit? OPD
4. Whether any cause of action has arisen to the plaintiff to
file the suit against the defendants? OPPJYOTI
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5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed
for? OPP
6. Relief.
8. Oral and documentary evidence were led by the parties to the suit before
the learned trial Court. Plaintiff herself stepped into the witness box as
PW1 and also examined Gurmel Singh, Draftsman as PW2, Balwinder
Singh as PW3, Balwinder Singh s/o Piara Si
Singh
ngh as PW4, Avtar Singh,Steno Ludhiana Improvement Trust as PW5
PW5.. Defendants No.1 and 2examined Harbans Lal Kanungo as DW1.
Analysis and decision by learned trial Court
9. Learned trial Court observed that:-
“9.. ….It is admitted that the plaintiff is owner and in possession of
the suit property vide sale deed Ex. P1 which was executed by Smt.
Sheela Devi in favour of the plaintiff after taking the due
consideration. However, it is allegation of the plaintiff tha
thatt before
raising construction they moved application before the Municipal
Corporation authorities, but admittedly the Municipal Corporation
has not sanctioned the site plan. So, the moving of application with
the Municipal Corporation authorities is nothin
nothing
g but to create
evidence is only the in one’s favour since vide notification Ex. PD,
the suit land has been acquired by the Punjab Government for its
development. So, it Improvement Trust which could authorise the
plaintiff raise construction. But undisput
undisputedly
edly the plaintiff sought
any permission from the Imp. Trust before raising the construction.
So, now the plaintiff estopped by her own act and conduct from
saying that defendants from that no. 1 and 2 did not stop them
raising construction and only when tthe
he construction was raised,
notice u/s 195-A
195 A was served upon either they should remove the
construction failing which, it will be removed by the Improvement
Trust. However, nothing has been suggested by the plaintiff eitherJYOTI
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statement that employees of defendants no. 1
and 2 or their representatives ever come to demolish the suit
property forcibly and illegally.”
So far as possession is concerned possession has not been taken by
the Improvement Trust, but it does not mean that the def
defendant–
Trust interest in the same. However, the publication of notice Ex.
PD whereby the suit land has been acquired by the Punjab
Government for its development, the Imp. Trust has become its
owner.
So far as compensation is concerned, the plaintiff can m
move
ove under
the Land Acquisition Act seeking compensation or enhancement of
the award, but she is not entitled to any injunction at all. Because
with the not -action
action the plaintiff is barred from raising
construction. Not only this, the notification or the nnotice u/s 195-A
A
Pb… Town Imp. Act have not been challanged by the plaintiff nor
the same have been got declared illegal by the plaintiff from
competent court of law. So, unless and until the same is declared
null and void, the plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction, rather
the suit in the present form without declaring notification void not
maintainable. Apart from it publication Ex. PD was effected in the
newspaper, so Publication as is notice to th
thee Gen. Public and this
fact was in the notice of the plaintiff that land has been acquired
but this material fact has been concealed by the plaintiff. So,
therefore, in these circumstances, all these issues are decided
against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants No. 1 and 2.
2.”
Findings of the learned First Appellate Court
10. The learned First Appellate Court reversed
reversed the findings of the learned trial
Court on the ground that plaintiff was not required to issue notice before
filing
ng of the suit because it was mere suit for permanent injunction aand
nd
not for declaration, therefore, suit is maintainable. In the original award
Ex.P-11,
11, suit property was not part of acquired land and there is a
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certificate dated 14.02.1991 Ex.P-10
Ex.P 10 proved by PW
PW-5
5 Avtar Singh,
Steno/Clerk
Clerk of Improvement Trust, Ludhiana bby
y stating that suit land had
never been acquired. The correctness of certificate is admitted by PW
PW-5
5
Avtar Singh and supplementary award dated 03.06.1983 Ex.PD passed by
the competent Collector who mentioned that possession of the suit land
will be taken after
after depositing the payment of compensation but said
compensation had never been deposited in the office of Collector or in
any Court and there is no evidence or proof that the possession of the suit
land had ever taken. Notification or notice under Sectio
Section 195A of the
Municipal Act was not required to be challenged because the plaintiff was
not seeking declaration but merely injunction to protect her possession
except in due course of law. So serving of notice under Section 98 of the
Improvement Act was not required. The learned Appellate Court
concluded as under:-
under:
“Admittedly the plaintiff is in possession over the suit land,
so the Improvement Trust in my opinion, has no right to
demolish the construction of the appellant/plaintiff forcibly
and illegally
egally unless the Improvement Trust takes thepossession of the suit land in due course of law from the
plaintiff. So, consequently, the appeal is accepted and the
impugned judgment and decree are set aside. Resultantly, the
suit of the plaintiff is decree
decreed
d for permanent injunctionrestraining the defendant No.1 and 2 from causing any
damage or demolition on any part of the house building of
property unit No.B-XIV-1348/46
1348/46-C/1
C/1 situated at Rajpura
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RSA-150-2006 IN RSA-150-2006 (O&M) -8-Road near Mata Kali Mandir, Haibowal Khurd bearing
Khewat Khatuni
uni No.99/107, Khasra No.5R//21/2, HadbastNo.158 as detailed in the head note of the plaint with costs
costs.”
Substantial question of law in second appeal
11. Upon filing of the regular second appeal,, following substantial questions
of law were framed by this
this Court vide order dated 16.12.2008:
16.12.2008:-
“1. Whether the respondents have any locus standi to file
the present civil suit when the land that they have purchased
had already been acquired by the Appellant Trust much
before the sale deed?
2. Whether the registered sale deed dated 07.03.1989
whereby the respondents purchased the suit property is
illegal and void ab initio as the same property already vests
with the Appellant Trust vide award dated 27.2.1987 made
with respect to the suit land?
3. Whether the acquisition proceeding would be vitiated
by mere non deposit of the compensation amount when the
award has been passed?
4. Whether civil suit is maintainable whereby it has
indirectly challenged the acquisition proceeding in view of
the judgment
ment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court?”
12. I have heard submissions of learned counsel for the appellants and have
perused the oral and documentary evidence with his able assistance.
Submissions of appellant’s counsel
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13. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendants
appellant/defendants No.1 and 2 submitted that
256 acre of land was acquired under Development Scheme of Village
Habowall Khurd vide resolution No.19 dated 29.06.1976 vide main award
dated 12.06.1980 Ex.P-11.
11. On the request of Improvement Trust,
Ludhiana, some more
more land was proposed to be acquired and then
supplementary Award dated 03.06.1983
03.06.1983 Ex.PD was passed and defendant
No.1 became owner of the disputed property for all intents and purposes.
Suit property is part of the land acquired vide supplementary Award dated
03.06.1983
1983 Ex.PD. The disputed property had already been acquired vide
Ex.PD before its purchase by the plaintiff vide sale deed dated 07.03.1989
Ex.P-1.. The construction raised by the plaintiff and defendants No.3 and 4
over the suit property is illegal
illegal because no site plan was sanctioned by
defendant No.1. Defendant No.1 rightly issued notice
notices Ex.P6 to Ex.P8
under Section 195A of the Municipal Act and Section 49 of the
Improvement Act,
Act, directing the plaintiff to demolish the construction
within 3 days. Instead of raising demolition, plaintiff filed suit, however
the plaintiff had not challenged the notices Ex.P6 dated 10.07.1990, Ex.
P7 dated 13.07.1990, Ex.P8 dated 30.07.1990 and the learned Appellate
Court erroneously held that the plaintiff was not required to challenge the
same. The plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands and was
not entitled to discretionary relief of injunction. The suit property vests in
defendant No.1 by virtue of supplementary Award dated 03.06.1983
Ex.PD, and the plaintiff is not owner of suit property and in support of his
contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the observation of this
Court in case titled as Nirnjan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1986
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(FB), P&H, 202, wherein, it is held that once the award under Section 11
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is made, two consequences follows i.e.
1) Acquired land absolutely vests in the Government and 2) such vesting
is free from all encumbrances.
encumbrances. Since the defendant N
No.1
o.1 is the owner of
the suit property, learned First Appellate Court gravely erred in deciding
the issues. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the validity of
acquisition proceedings and the same can be done under the writ
jurisdiction of High Court.
Court. The plaintiff had not served notice under
Section 98 of the Improvement Act before filing of the suit and on this
score also, the suit was liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel,
vehemently prayed for setting aside the findings of the learned First
Appellate Court and all the issues.
Analysis
14.(i) Undisputed facts are that the plaintiff and defendants No.3 and 4
purchased 400 Sq. yards of house building of property unit No.B
No.B-XIV/46–
C/1, situated at Rajpura Road, near Mata Kali Mandir, Haibowal Khu
Khurd,
rd,
bearing khewat-khatuni
khewat No.99/107, khasra No.5R//21/2, Hadbast
No.158, Haibowal Khurd, Tehsil and Distt. Ludhiana vide sale deed dated
07.03.1989 Ex. P-1
P 1 for consideration of Rs.50,000. It has come on record
and also reveals from the recitals of original Award dated 12.06.1980
Ex.11 that khasra No.5R//21/2 was not part of the acquired land. Land
bearing khasra No.5R//21/2 along with other land was acquired vide
supplementary award dated 03.06.1983 Ex.PD to the original award dated
12.06.1980 Ex.P-11.
11. One of the Clause 5 of this Award deals with
possession and it is in unambiguous terms states that ” The possession
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shall be taken after making payment of compensation to the respective
land owners/claimants”. It is undisputed that after purchase, the plaintiff
along with defendants No.3 and 4 had raised construction over the
disputed property as reflected in site plan, proved on record by Gurmel
Singh, Draftsman.
14(ii). Defendant No.1 issued certificate dated
dated 14.02.1991 Ex.P
Ex.P-10
10 proved on
record by PW-5
PW Avtar Singh, Steno/Clerk
Clerk certifying that:-
” Khasra Number 5//21/2 situated in village Haibowal,
tehsil and Distt. Ludhiana, at present had not acquired in
any Scheme of the Ludhiana Improvement Trust, Lu
Ludhiana.
dhiana.
If the building plan of this Plot Khasra No.5//21/2 is
sanctioned accordingly the Improvement Trust have no
objection”.
14(iii) The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff in her affidavit/ statement
specifically
cally stated that constructions was raised in the year 1991. Since
defendant No.1 had no objection to raise construction over the plot
situation in Khasra Number 5//21/2 situated in village Haibowal, tehsil
and Distt. Ludhiana,
Ludhiana, even though the land was acquired by Improvement
Trust, Ludhiana by virtue of Supplementary Award dated 03.06.
03.06.1983
1983
Ex.PD, but since, the construction was without any objection, the right of
the plaintiff is protected and she cannot be dispossessed or constructions
cannot be demolished except in due course of law.
14(iv). The plaintiff had not challenged the notification/ main award dated
12.06.1980 Ex.P-11
Ex.P 11 and Supplementary Award dated 03.06.1983 Ex.PD
by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court. In a suit for permanent
injunction, the
t plaintiff has not challenged
hallenged the legality of notices issued to
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her under Section 195A of the Municipal Act and Section 49 of the
Improvement Act,
Act, for this reason, she was not required to file a suit for
declaration. The plaintiff has not sought decree for declaration for he
herr title
as owner in the suit property and she has filed the suit for permanent
injunction to protect her lawful possession
possession, as plaintiff stepped into the
shoes of original vendor by virtue of execution of sale deed dated
07.03.1989 Ex. P-1
P in her favour and
d in favour of defendants No.3 and 4.
The plaintiff is entitled for protection of possession as defendants No.1
and 2 did not object to her construction as per certificate dated 14.02.1991
Ex.P-10
10 and also because no compensation is paid to her or to her
predecessor
predecessor-in-interest, therefore, as per clause 5 of the original award
dated 12.06.1980 Ex.P-11
Ex.P and Supplementary Award dated 03.06.1983
Ex.PD itself, she is entitled for protection of her possessory right.
Reference can also be made hereto judgment
udgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in
Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR (2020) (SC) 4709. Vidya
Devi had invoked the writ jurisdiction of High Court of Himachal Pradesh
regarding acquisition of her land without compensation. The plea of the
State was
as of adverse possession. Her writ came to be dismissed. Hon’ble
Apex Court reversed the judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court and
held that:–
“10.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the
Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act Act,, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State, and a
Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article
300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot ddispossess
ispossess a citizen of his property
except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The
obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in
Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article. 31 The State of WestJYOTI
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RSA-150-2006 IN RSA-150-2006 (O&M) -13-Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram
Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353. 3 KT
Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1. To forcibly
dispossess a person of his private property, without following due
process of law, would
ould be violative of a human right, as also the
constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution.”
Reliance was placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 627, wherein Hon’ble Apex
2005) 7 SCC 627
Court held that:
“6…..
6….. Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300 of the
Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of “eminent domain”
may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the
same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable
compensation therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied) In N.
Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517 this Court
held that:
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional
right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law.
Article 300 of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of
the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of
Article 300 of the Constitution of India, must be st strictly
rictly construed.”
(emphasis supplied).”
Judgment in
i Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P. &
(2011) 9 SCC 354 was also referred in Vidaya Devi‘s case (supra)
Ors.(2011)
wherein, Hon’ble Apex Court recognizes the right to property as a basic
human right in the following words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political
thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable
safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the
Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist
without the support of property.
“Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion
of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed
which must be conserved if other constit
constitutional
utional values are to flourish is
the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis
supplied)JYOTI
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RSA-150-2006 IN RSA-150-2006 (O&M) -14-Reference was also made to Judgment in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v.
State of Gujarat,
Gujarat (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596. wherein Hon’ble Apex Courtheld as follows
ollows:
“48….In other words, Article 300 only limits the powers of the State
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of
law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law.
Deprivation by any other mode is not acqui
acquisition
sition or taking possession
under Article 3000. In other words, if there is no law, there is no
deprivation.” (emphasis supplied).”
.”
Since no compensation was paid to Vidaya Devi in the year 1967 when
she was dispossessed, Hon’ble Apex Court observed that :-
“10.3.
10.3. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without
following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just
compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of fforcible
orcible
dispossession in 1967.
10.4. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors
had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We
find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily
divesting the Appellant of her property by the State.
10.5. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State
could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction
of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram
Kana Joshi & Ors. V. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353. wherein it
was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a
welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a
status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
Constitution.”
14(v) These judgments expounded the law that the State being welfare State
cannot deprive the citizens to their property except in due process of law.
State cannot take the plea of adverse possession
possession. One of the ingredients
of due process of law is that there cannot be delivery of pos
possession
session in
favour of the State without compensation to the lawful owner or person
who was is in lawful possession as owner through original lawful owner
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14(vi) Reverting to the facts of this case, no compensation had been paid
either to predecessor-in-interest
predecessor interest of the plaintiff or to the plaintiff, after the
land of the plaintiff was acquired vide supplementary award Ex. PD dated
03.06.1983 Onn the other hand vide certificate Ex. P10 dated 14.2.1991
03.06.1983.
had been issued in favour of the
the plaintiff that land be
bearing khasra
No.5/21-2
2 (purchased by her vide sale deed Ex.P1 along with other co
co–
shares on 07.03.1989) had not been acquired in any scheme of the
Ludhiana Improvement Trust, Ludhiana and if the building plan of this
land is sanctioned, Improvement Trust have no objection.
14(vii) Under Clause 5 of supplementary notification Ex. PD, there is clear
stipulation that
” the possession shall be taken after making payment of
compensation to the respective
spective land owners/claimants.”
14(viii) In view of this stipulation, in a suit for permanent injunction, the learned
First Appellate Court committed no error while setting asied the judgment
of learned trial Court and correctly held that “the Improvement Trust has
no right to demolish the construction
construction of the plaintiff forcibly and illegally
unless the Improvement Trust takes the possession of suit land in due
course of law from the plaintiff.”
14(ix) Due process of law only means that the defendants are required to
comply with pre condition of payment of compensation before taking
possession.
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14(x) In view of the above discussion, the
the judgment of learned First Appellate
Court is upheld.
upheld. The substantial question of law framed in this appeal are
decided as under:-
under:
1. The plaintiff has locus standi to
to file the civil suit in spite of thefact that the land they have purchased by the plaintiff vide sale
deed Ex. P1 dated 07.03.1989, had already been acquired by the
Improvement Trust
Tru because the possession had not been takenfrom the predecessor-in-interest
predecessor interest of the plaintiff and nocompensation had been paid to the predecessor
predecessor-in-interest
interest of theplaintiff.
2. Even if for the sake of arguments, it is held that the
Improvement Trust become owner of suit property by virtue of
notification Ex. PD dated 03.06.1983
03.06.1983,, the possession was stillwith the predecessor-in-interest
predecessor interest of the plaintiff at that time andthe vendor delivered possessory rights in favour of
plaintiff/vendee, and for this reason, sale deed Ex. P1 cannot be
declared as illegal and void ab initio .
3. Acquisition proceedings cannot be termed as vitiating by mere
non deposit of compensation amount when the award had been
passed because payment of compensation was pre condition for
tak
taking of possession.
4. Civil suit for permanent injunction regarding suit property is
maintainable because acquisition proceedings has not been
challenged in the civil suit directly or indirectly especially in the
JYOTI
2026.08.04 17:23
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
IOIN-RSA
RSA-150-2006 IN RSA-150-2006 (O&M) -17-
light of the fact that suit was for permanent injunction and was
not for declaratory decree regarding ownership of plaintiff over
the suit property.
16. In view of above discussion, the appeal in hand is dismissed being
without merits.
(RAMESH KUMARI))
30.07.2026 JUDGE
Jyoti-IV
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No.
Whether reportable : Yes/No
JYOTI
2026.08.04 17:23
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
