Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Priya Rally vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 31 July, 2026
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
ON THE 31st OF JULY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 29234 of 2026
SMT. PRIYA RALLY
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri M.P.S. Raghuwanshi - Senior Advocate alongwith Shri Vineet -
Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Sohit Mishra - GA for the respondents/State.
ORDER
The instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has
been preferred assailing the order dated 16.12.2025 passed by the
Collector/District Magistrate, Gwalior, whereby the firearm licence bearing
No.746/2021 of the petitioner was suspended till the decision of the criminal
case registered against her.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the
impugned order has been passed in complete disregard of the provisions
contained under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959. It is submitted that the
licensing authority is empowered to suspend an arms licence only when any
of the contingencies mentioned under the said provision exist. According to
learned counsel, the only ground which could have been invoked in the
present case is Section 17(3)(b) of the Arms Act, 1959, namely, that such
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suspension is necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety.
3. It is contended that the District Magistrate has not recorded any
finding regarding the existence of any threat to public peace or public safety.
The order has been passed only on account of registration of an FIR against
the petitioner and there is no allegation that the licensed firearm was ever
used, displayed or misused by the petitioner in connection with the alleged
offence. It is further submitted that the dispute involved in the criminal case
is essentially arising out of business transactions and this Court, while
considering the application for anticipatory bail, has already noticed the civil
nature of the dispute.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the order
impugned is also contrary to the settled legal position that mere registration
or pendency of a criminal case cannot be a ground for suspension of an arms
licence unless the licensing authority records a satisfaction that continuance
of such licence is detrimental to public peace or public safety. In support of
his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgments of
this Court in the cases of Abdul Saleem Vs. State of M.P. and Others
reported in 2019 (3) MPLJ 332 and Gajendra Singh Vs. State of M.P. and
Others reported in 2020 (2) MPLJ 441 .
5. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposed the prayer and
submitted that considering the registration of the criminal case against the
petitioner, the District Magistrate was justified in suspending the arms
licence and no interference is called for.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
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available on record.
7. In the matter of Abdul Saleem (supra), while considering the scope
of Section 17 of the Arms Act, 1959, this Court had held in paragraphs 17 to
23 as under:-
17. A Full Bench (consists of three Judges) of Allahabad High Court in the case of Changga
Prasad Sahu vs. State of U. P. (supra) in the context of applicability of the provision of section 17
of the Act with respect to recording satisfaction and to explain the object of enquiry has held as
under:–
15. The object of the enquiry that a licensing authority may, while proceeding to consider
the question as to whether or not an arms licence should be revoked or suspended, like to
make, clearly is to enable the licensing authority to come to a conclusion as to whether or
not the facts stated in clauses (a) to (e) of section 17(3) exist and as already explained it is
not obliged to before considering that a case for revocation/ suspension of licence has
been made out, associate the licensee in such enquiry. In this view of the matter it can
safely be taken that where a licensing authority embarks upon such an enquiry it is, till
then, not convinced about existence of the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of
section 17(3) of the Act. So long as it is not so convinced no case to make an order either
revoking or suspending an arms licence as contemplated by the section will be made out.
18. The said case of Changga Prasad Sahu vs. State of U. P. (supra) has been reconsidered by
Five Judges’ Bench of Allahabad High Court in Rana Pratap Singh vs. State of U. P., reported in
1996 All LJ 301 :–
19. The scheme of the Act i.e. section 17 itself contemplated suspension or revocation on
two independent counts; when challenge is made to suspension directed by the licensing
authority; the ground for suspension is to be scrutinised to find out as to whether it falls
under the scheme of section 17(3) or not. The action of suspension if found justified and
in accordance with the provisions of section 17(3) its affect and validity shall not be
denuded only because the licensing authority wants to give an opportunity before
cancelling the licence. As laid down by all the Full Benches the revocation order can be
made if satisfaction is recorded under section 17(3) without giving an opportunity to the
licensee.However, five Judge Full Bench in Kailash vs. State of U. P. case AIR 1985 All
291 (supra) has observed that finality to such revocation be not attached unless the
licensee is given an opportunity to represent against such revocation. Although power is
given to revoke a licence on being satisfied with the grounds under section 17(3) but in a
case where licensing authority wanted to give an opportunity before passing the
revocation order, the said action cannot denude the jurisdiction and power of the licensing
authority to suspend the licence. Each case has to be examined from the orders passed by
the licensing authority to test it whether the suspension has been ordered without forming
requisite opinion or the authority has not formed opinion and wanted to enquire before
forming opinion, as noted above, if the authority has not formed a definite opinion and is
in process of enquiry to come to a definite conclusion suspension cannot be ordered.
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However, if the opinion is recorded and there is already material, suspension of arm
licence cannot be faulted with.
19. In the case of Ganesh Chandra Bhatt vs. District Magistrate, Almora (supra), the Allahabad
High Court has considered the issue of grant of licence in the context of provision of section 14
of the Act. However, the said case can only be relevant in the context of meaning of the phrase
“public peace and public safety” otherwise the power of grant of licence and its revocation are in
contradistinction to each other.
20. In the case of Ajay Jayawant Bhosale vs. Commissioner of Police, Pune City, Pune and others
(supra), the Division Bench of Bombay High Court has considered the question of cancellation of
arm licence and held as under:–
12. The question, therefore, arises as to whether there was sufficient material placed
before the Commissioner of Police for arriving at subjective satisfaction that continuation
of licence or renewal would be endangering public peace or public safety. It seems that
the show-cause notice was issued by the Commissioner, Pune consequent to filing of
application by the petitioner to the Home Department of the State Government for getting
all India arms licence. Nevertheless at any stage the licensing authority after getting
subjectively satisfied and on the basis of material placed before it could revoke licence
under section 17 of the Act but whether there was sufficient material with the licensing
authority to pass order of revocation.
13. The right to life and liberty are guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Arms licence is granted for personal safety and security after due enquiry by the
authorities in accordance with provisions contained in the Arms Act, 1959. The provisions
of Arms Act with regard to suspension or cancellation of Arms licence cannot be invoked
lightly in an arbitrary manner. The provisions of the Arms Act particularly section 13 to
17 indicate that once a licence is granted under the Act, the same shall be renewed from
time to time unless there exist a ground of refusal as enumerated under section 14 of the
Act. Protection to life, property of citizen is responsibility of the State. It is only when
person apprehends that machinery of State would not come to his help for protection,
he/she applies for licence under the Act. The provisions of section 17-A of the Arms Act
indicate that arms licence can be cancelled or suspended if the licensing authority finds it
necessary for the security of public peace or public safety. Merely because a criminal case
is pending, the provisions of section 17 of the Arms Act would not be attracted. Such
provisions would be attracted in case the licensing authority finds that continuance of
licence is detrimental to public peace or public security and safety. But the authority
concerned will have to record a finding that how and under what circumstances and in
what manner possession of arms licence could be contrary to the provisions of section 17-
B of the Arms Act. Each case is required to be considered on its own merits.
14. Nothing was placed before us by the respondents to indicate that the petitioner had
misused the licenced weapon at any point of time in past. The order of revocation of
license refers to two criminal cases registered against the petitioner. In the facts we find
that mere registration of criminal case/cases could not be a ground to revoke the license.
The order shall indicate clearly that continuance of licence would be against public peace,
safety and security.
15. Learned Counsel appearing for petitioner submits that in fact petitioner and his driver
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were attacked in the year 2009 regarding which he had filed a complaint. Considering the
business activities, political and social work of the petitioner, it was submitted that to
protect petitioner’s life and property, arms licence was applied for and it was granted. The
petitioner still requires the same. The licensing authority has not given any opinion as to
whether the petitioner requires licence to protect his life and property. The subjective
satisfaction of the authority, therefore, plays a vital role while assessing merits of a case
before passing orders under the provisions of section 13, 14 or 17(b). Each case needs to
be assessed, tested on its own merits. Therefore, it is imperative that before arriving at a
conclusion of invoking powers under the provisions of section 17(b), the licensing
authority ought to have considered the entire material, threat perception of the licence and
pass appropriate orders.
21. This Court in the case of Badshah alias Taj Mohammad vs. State of M.P. and another,
reported in 2007(4) M.P.L.J. 527 has an occasion to consider altogether similar issue as involved
in the present case wherein the Court relying upon some of the judgments of the Allahabad High
Court observed as under :–
From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that there is no finding in the aforesaid criminal
cases that the firearm owned by the petitioner under valid licence was ever used or
misused by the petitioner. No threat is stated to have been extended by the petitioner on
the strength of the said firearm. There is no specific provision in Arms Act or elsewhere
that no licence is to be issued when criminal cases are pending against the applicant.
There is further no material on record to infer that the petitioner has caused obstruction to
public safety. This being so, the revocation of the petitioner’s licence on the ground of
public safety is not sustainable in law.
On perusal of the order dated 8-1-2001 contained in Annexure P/3 it may be seen that
certain criminal cases were pending at that time against the petitioner. This position was
entirely changed at the time of passing of the impugned orders contained in Annexures
P/1 and P/2 in the year 2005 because firstly, no criminal case was pending against the
petitioner, secondly, cases under sections 107, 110, 116(3) of Criminal Procedure Code
came to an end on account of expiry of six months. Only in one criminal case namely
Criminal Case No. 285/92, a fine was imposed on the petitioner. Remaining criminal
cases stood terminated in his favour on account of acquittal or compromise. From perusal
of the record of criminal cases, it is ample clear that the firearm was not found to have
been used or misused. Even in the order of District Magistrate, Narsinghpur, there is no
mention that the licensed weapon was used or misused. Mere apprehension of the District
Magistrate that the licensed firearm may be misused by the petitioner has no foundation
and does not provide a ground for revoking the licence of the firearm. Moreover, it is
quite clear that the licensing authority did not take into consideration the effect of
termination of criminal cases while passing the impugned order.
In view of this, the earlier order dated 8-1-2001 cannot form a basis for passing the
impugned orders in the year 2005 when admittedly, the criminal cases against the
petitioner were not pending. Thus, on the date of impugned orders the grounds assigned
for cancellation of licence earlier on 8-1-2001 were non-existent and the impugned orders
are, therefore, found to be unsustainable in law.
Considering the case in hand on the aforesaid parameters, it may be seen that there is
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absolutely no material on record to establish that the petitioner used or misused the
firearm and that possession of firearm poses a threat to the security of the public peace
and public safety. In this view of the matter, the impugned orders contained in Annexures
P/1 and P/2 are clearly unsustainable in law and the same are hereby set aside.
Respondent No. 2 is hereby directed to consider the application of the petitioner afresh in
accordance with law keeping in view the aforesaid observations within a period of one
month from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
22. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sunderlal Bhardwaj vs. State (supra) has dealt
with the issue regarding cancellation of arm licence for the security of public peace or public
safety. In the said case, the Court while considering the issue of cancellation of arm licence
interpreted the words “for the security of public peace” in the context of section 17(3)(b) of the
Act and observed that expression “security of public peace” means maintenance of public
tranquility and order. The Court referring the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Romesh
Thappar vs. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1950 SC 124 observed that public safety ordinarily
means security of public or their freedom from danger.
23. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar vs. Delhi Administration and others,
reported in (1982) 2 SCC 403 has an occasion to consider the issue affecting “public order” vis-Ã -
vis “law and order”. As discussed, “public order” would include the public peace and public
safety. However, the observations of Hon’ble the Apex Court in the said case, in the context of
this case are relevant, therefore, they are reproduced as under :–
“12. The most crucial question on which the decision must turn is whether the activities
of the detenu fall within the domain of ‘public order’ or ‘law and order’
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13. The true distinction between the areas of ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ lies not in
the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The
distinction between the two concepts of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is a fine one but
this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed
in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it
might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order,
while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant
of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of
the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That test is
clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the present case.”
8. In another matter of Gajendra Singh (supra) while discussing
provision of Section 17 of the Arms Act in paragraph 17, this Court had held
as under:-
”17. As far as the discretion of the licencing authority in regard to maintenance of public peace or
public safety is concerned, there should have been some elements of discussion as to conduct of
the petitioner which would have thrown light to his conduct being dangerous to the security of the
public peace or for public safety. Even there is no such discussion that after obtaining the licence,Signature Not Verified
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petitioner’s conduct has been such so to cause threat to security of the public peace or public
safety. In view of such fact, it can be conveniently inferred that the impugned order passed by the
Collector is cryptic and is devoid of any reasons and, therefore, on the touch stone of
reasonableness it cannot be sustained. In fact, it is in clear violation of the provisions of the Act so
also it violates the provisions of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Even the
Commissioner has failed to appreciate these facts in the appeal as the Commissioner has acted as
a post office while deciding the appeal. There is lack of application of mind while deciding the
appeal and, therefore, even appellate order cannot be sustained.”
9. In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it is clear
that only such acts which have the tendency to disturb public peace or
endanger public safety would fall within the ambit of Section 17(3)(b) of the
Arms Act, 1959. Mere involvement of a licence holder in a criminal case, by
itself, would not confer jurisdiction upon the licensing authority to suspend
the arms licence unless the authority records a specific satisfaction that
continuance of such licence is prejudicial to public peace or public safety.
10. In the present case, the impugned order dated 16.12.2025 indicates
that the District Magistrate has proceeded primarily on the basis of
registration of the criminal case against the petitioner. However, there is no
discussion regarding the conduct of the petitioner demonstrating that she
poses any threat to public peace or public safety. There is also no finding that
the licensed firearm was used or misused in connection with the alleged
offence.
11. The allegations contained in the FIR, as reflected from the material
placed on record, relate to a dispute arising out of business transactions.
There is no material available to show that possession of the licensed firearm
by the petitioner has any nexus with disturbance of public peace or public
safety. The satisfaction required under Section 17(3)(b) of the Arms Act has
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to be based on objective material and cannot rest merely on apprehension or
conjecture.
12. The impugned order further reflects that the arms licence has been
suspended “till the decision of the criminal case “. Such an order amounts to
suspension for an indefinite period, whereas Section 17(3) of the Arms Act
contemplates suspension for such period as may be considered appropriate
by the licensing authority upon satisfaction of the statutory requirements.
The order, therefore, also suffers from the vice of being disproportionate.
13. Though under Section 18 of the Arms Act, there is a provision of
appeal against the order impugned herein, but since the very order passed by
the Collector is in total derogation of provision of Section 17 of the Arms
Act and appears to have been passed in the absence of the present petitioner
without giving her any opportunity of hearing, can be said to be against the
principle of natural justice thus, this Court deems it fit to entertain the present
petition.
14. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
impugned order dated 16.12.2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Gwalior,
cannot be sustained in law. Consequently, the instant petition is allowed. The
impugned order dated 16.12.2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Gwalior,
is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to restore the arms licence
of the petitioner and take necessary steps for return of the licensed firearm
and ammunition to the petitioner, subject to compliance of all statutory
formalities.
15. It is, however, made clear that this Court has not expressed any
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opinion on the merits of the case.
16. With the aforesaid directions, the petition stands allowed.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
neetu
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