Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mohd Qadir vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 3 August, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:58508
1 WP-20457-2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 3 rd OF AUGUST, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 20457 of 2014
MOHD QADIR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Satyendra Prasad Dubey - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Amit Pandey - Panel Lawyer for the State.
Shri Ved Prakash Tiwari - Advocate for the respondent No.3.
ORDER
At the request of counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally at
motion stage.
2. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been
filed by the petitioner seeking the following reliefs:
7.1 That, it is therefore humbly and most respectfully prayed that
Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct the respondent authority they
should be adopt the procedure of law as they required the land of
petitioner in appropriate manner.
7.2 That, it is therefore humbly and most respectfully prayed that
Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ in the nature of
Mandamus directing the respondents no. 3 to 5, pay compensation
to the petitioner according to law in the interest of justice.
7.3 That, it is therefore humbly and most respectfully prayed that
Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct the respondent no. 3 to 5 to
fix the compensation of petitioners land according to law and
procedure of land Acquisition.
7.4 Any other relief which this Hon’ble High Court deems fit
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KOUSHALENDRA
SHARAN SHUKLA
Signing time: 04-08-2026
13:32:56
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:585082 WP-20457-2014
and proper may also be granted.”
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the facts and grounds
mentioned in the petition, submits that the petitioner is title holder of the land
comprising in survey number 469/1 measuring 0.035 Hectare and survey number
471/1 measuring 0.099 Hectare at village – Padra tahsil – Huzur, district – Rewa.
The land is situated within the limit of Municipal Corporation area. In the year
2005, respondent No.3- Municipal Corporation, Rewa unauthorisedly encroached
upon 13.3×176 square feet i.e. 2340.80 square feet land of the petitioner
comprising in survey number 469/1 and 471/1 and constructed a WBM road. The
petitioner applied for demarcation of land. The demarcation was directed vide
order dated 27.12.2006 of the Tahsildar. The concerned Patwari conducted
demarcation on 08.12.2007. The demarcation report along with panchnama was
produced before the Tahsildar, Tahsil – Huzur, district – Rewa. The Tahsildar vide
order dated 30.01.2008 (Annexure P-6) confirmed the demarcation report. Thus,
encroachment on the land of the petitioner for WBM road by the respondent No.3
is clearly made out. The petitioner had applied for grant of compensation to the
Municipal Corporation, Rewa vide application dated 18.03.2008 (Annexure P-8),
thereafter also filed an application under Section 79-A of the Municipal
Corporation Act, 1956 (Annexure P-9) and sent reminder dated 15.06.2014
(Annexure P-10) but no action is taken by the Commissioner, Municipal
Corporation, Rewa for grant of compensation till date.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the order dated
27.11.2024 passed by a Coordinate Bench in WP No.10144/2014 (Jagdish Prasad
v. State of MP) to contend that the petitioner cannot be deprived of his property
except according to process of law. No acquisition proceeding was undertaken
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KOUSHALENDRA
SHARAN SHUKLA
Signing time: 04-08-2026
13:32:56
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:58508
3 WP-20457-2014
before construction of WBM road on land of the petitioner. The petitioner is
entitled to compensation for the same. Delay cannot be a ground to deprive the
petitioner of compensation in accordance with law. Therefore, it is prayed that the
petition be allowed and the respondents be directed to adequately compensate the
petitioner for construction of the WBM road on his land.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.3 submits that the
petition suffers from inordinate delay and laches. The WBM road was constructed
at the request of local residents for their convenience and safety. The delay of
eight years in claiming compensation is not explained by the petitioner. The
Google Map shows the exact location of the land in question which does not
belong to the petitioner. The petitioner could have filed appropriate proceedings
for grant of compensation. Therefore, the petition is meritless.
6. Heard both the parties and perused the record.
7. The revenue records khasara panchsala of year 2005 (Annexure P-1
and P-2) show that the petitioner was Bhumiswami of land comprised in Khasra
No.469/1 measuring 0.035 hectare and Khasra No. 470/1 measuring 0.099 hectare
situated at village Padra, Tehsil Huzur, District Rewa. The petitioner applied for
demarcation of his land. The Tahsildar directed demarcation vide order dated
27.12.2006 (Annexure P-6). The Patwari conducted demarcation and submitted
report dated 08.12.2007 (Annexure P-7) along with panchnama before the
Tahsildar, Tahsil – Huzur, District- Rewa. The Tahsildar v i d e order dated
30.01.2008 (Annexure P-6) confirmed the demarcation report. Thus,
encroachment on the land comprised in Khasra No.469/1 and Khasra No. 470/1 of
the petitioner by construction of WBM road by the respondent No.3 is apparent
from the material on record. Admittedly, no compensation is paid to the petitioner
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KOUSHALENDRA
SHARAN SHUKLA
Signing time: 04-08-2026
13:32:56
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:58508
4 WP-20457-2014
by respondents till date. The respondent has cited delay as reason to deny
compensation to the petitioner.
8. In case of Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC , reported in (2013) 1 SCC
353, it was observed that-
8. The appellants were deprived of their immovable property in 1964, when Article 31 of
the Constitution was still intact and the right to property was a part of fundamental rights
under Article 19 of the Constitution. It is pertinent to note that even after the right to
property ceased to be a fundamental right, taking possession of or acquiring the property of
a citizen most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can take place
only in accordance with the “law”, as the said word has specifically been used in Article
300-A of the Constitution. Such deprivation can be only by resorting to a procedure
prescribed by a statute. The same cannot be done by way of executive fiat or order or
administration caprice. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp (1)
SCC 596 : AIR 1995 SC 142] , it has been held as follows : (SCC p. 627, para 48)
“48. In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There [is] no deprivation
without [due] sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or
taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no
deprivation.”
9. The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or a statutory right
but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a
fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as
the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment, etc. Now
however, human rights are gaining an even greater multifaceted dimension. The right to
property is considered very much to be a part of such new dimension. (Vide Lachhman
Dass v. Jagat Ram [(2007) 10 SCC 448] , Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab [(2010) 10 SCC
43 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 29] , State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [(2011) 7 SCC
639 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 875 : AIR 2011 SC 1989] , State of Haryana v. Mukesh
Kumar [(2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769 : AIR 2012 SC 559] and Delhi
Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673 :
AIR 2012 SC 573] )
10. In the case at hand, there has been no acquisition. The question that emerges for
consideration is whether, in a democratic body polity, which is supposedly governed by
the rule of law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen of his property, without
adhering to the law. The matter would have been different had the State pleaded that it has
right, title and interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and
interest of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as
grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal.
11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth
a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation
for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational
facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few
authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if
his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the
case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took
over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The
appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must
either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other
permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between
the principle of “eminent domain” and “police power” of the State. Under certain
circumstances, the police power of the State may be used temporarily, to take possession of
property but the present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been
exercised. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which theSignature Not Verified
Signed by: KOUSHALENDRA
SHARAN SHUKLA
Signing time: 04-08-2026
13:32:56
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:585085 WP-20457-2014
State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment,
in exercise of “absolute power” which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or
use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities
have treated the landowner as a “subject” of medieval India, but not as a “citizen” under
our Constitution.
12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the rule of law, cannot
arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution
is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to
decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required
to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances
of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an
absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That
apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the
discretion more so, when no third-party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is
not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the
cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience.
17. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties was a clear violation of Article
21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay
adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such
persons. The non-fulfilment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said
uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities as such
sentiments would be born in them on account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not
permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his
fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the garb of industrial development.
18. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for about half a century. In
such a fact situation, we fail to understand for which class of citizens the Constitution
provides guarantees and rights in this regard and what is the exact percentage of the
citizens of this country, to whom constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded, in
accordance with the law.
22. Be that as it may, ultimately, good sense prevailed, and the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the State came forward with a welcome suggestion stating that in order to
redress the grievances of the appellants, the respondent authorities would notify the land in
dispute under Section 4 of the Act within a period of 4 weeks from today. Section 6
declaration will be issued within a period of one week thereafter. As the appellants have
full notice and information with respect to the proceedings, publication in the newspapers
either of the notification or of the declaration under the Act are dispensed with. Notice
under Section 9 of the Act will be served within a period of 4 weeks after the publication of
Section 6 declaration and award will be made within a period of three months thereafter.
The deemed acquisition proceedings would thus be concluded most expeditiously.
Needless to say, the market value of the land in dispute will be assessed as it prevails on
the date on which the Section 4 notification is published in the Official Gazette. Payment
of compensation/award amount will be made to the claimants/persons interested
immediately thereafter, along with all statutory benefits. The appellants shall be entitled to
pursue the statutory remedies available to them for further enhancement of compensation,
if so desired.
9. In case of Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of H.P. , reported in (2022) 7 SCC
508, the Supreme Court observed as under-
14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be deprived of liberty or
property without due process, or authorisation of law. The recognition of this dates back to
the 1700s to the decision of the King’s Bench
in Entick v. Carrington [Entick v. Carrington , 1765 EWHC (KB) J98 : 95 ER 807] and by
this Court in Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. [Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. , (1955) 1 SCR
408 : AIR 1954 SC 415] Further, in several judgments, this Court has repeatedly held that
rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher
responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within the confines of legality, and
therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this Court has upheld the high
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KOUSHALENDRA
SHARAN SHUKLA
Signing time: 04-08-2026
13:32:56
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:58508
6 WP-20457-2014
threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and
even more so when done by the State. In Bishan Das v. State of Punjab [Bishan
Das v. State of Punjab , (1962) 2 SCR 69 : AIR 1961 SC 1570] this Court rejected the
contention that the petitioners in the case were trespassers and could be removed by an
executive order, and instead concluded that the executive action taken by the State and its
officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. This Court, in another
case State of U.P. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh , (1989) 2 SCC 505 held-
“30. A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-
judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination
of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression “re-entry” in the
lease deed does not authorise extra-judicial methods to resume possession. Under
law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is
juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be
dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that
the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the
contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all
actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a “legal
pedigree”.”
16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-Ã -vis their private property
(embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the
high threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the question remains — can the
State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards
those from whom private property has been expropriated? In these facts and circumstances,
we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds of
equity and fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s actions, or lack thereof, have in
fact compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them to approach
this Court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s
occurred only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the
State continued to only extend the benefit of the Court’s directions to those who
specifically approached the courts. The State’s lackadaisical conduct is discernible from
this action of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands of
those writ petitioners who had approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other
landowners, pursuant to the orders dated 23-4-2007 (in Anakh Singh v. State of H.P. , 2007
SCC OnLine HP 220) and 20-12-2013 (in Onkar Singh v. State, CWP No. 1356 of 2010,
order dated 20-12-2013 (HP) ), respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State
sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the manner
prescribed by law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which conclude either way–as
contended by both sides in the present dispute–however, the specific factual matrix
compels this Court to weigh in favour of the appellant landowners. The State cannot shield
itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be a
“limitation” to doing justice. This Court in a much earlier case — Maharashtra
SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service , (1969) 1 SCR 808, held :
“11. … ‘Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a
technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either
because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is
founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute
of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the
delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as relates to the remedy’.”
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary
manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as required by law, only to those
for which it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all those who are entitled.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KOUSHALENDRA
SHARAN SHUKLA
Signing time: 04-08-2026
13:32:56
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:58508
7 WP-20457-2014
This arbitrary action, which is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article 31 right
(at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly warranted consideration, and intervention by
the High Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This Court, in Manohar –a similar case
where the name of the aggrieved had been deleted from revenue records leading to his
dispossession from the land without payment of compensation held :
“6. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that the
case projected before the court by the appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy
of emanating from any State which professes the least regard to being a welfare
State. When we pointed out to the learned counsel that, at this stage at least, the
State should be gracious enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the
compensation to the respondent, the State has taken an intractable attitude and
persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the
respondent.
7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available to the citizens are
declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19(1)( f) was deleted by the Forty-
fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in the
Constitution, which reads as follows:
‘300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law .–No person shall
be deprived of his property save by authority of law.’
8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the
respondent’s property by the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case was
an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution.”
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn. (MIDC) ,
(2013) 1 SCC 353, while dealing with a similar fact situation, this Court held as follows :
“11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to
put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of
compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues,
claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it
is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a
citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under
Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different
scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land
belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked
repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply
with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode.”
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this Court finds that the contentions raised by
the State, do not inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The State has merely
averred to the appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not placed
any material on record to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was unable to produce
any evidence indicating that the land of the appellants had been taken over or acquired in
the manner known to law, or that they had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to
note that this was the State’s position, and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as
well, in the other writ proceedings.
23. This Court, in Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. , (2020) 2 SCC 569, facing an almost
identical set of facts and circumstances — rejected the contention of “oral” consent to be
baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State :
“12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have
deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed
on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial
Development Corpn. (MIDC), (2013) 1 SCC 353 wherein it was held that the State
must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot
arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar , (2011) 10 SCC 404 held
that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or
statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the
realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment,
etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.”
24. And with regard to the contention of delay and laches, this Court went on to hold :
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KOUSHALENDRA
SHARAN SHUKLA
Signing time: 04-08-2026
13:32:56
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:58508
8 WP-20457-2014
“12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in
moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a
case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial
conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion,
which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances
of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy
claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation
prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial
justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional
court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.
[P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. , (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]
25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their private property without
following due process of law, was violative [ Relying on Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.
Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai , (2005) 7 SCC 627 : 2005 Supp (3) SCR 388; N.
Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy , (2008) 15 SCC 517; Delhi Airtech Services (P)
Ltd. v. State of U.P. , (2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673 : (2011) 12 SCR 191
and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat , 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 : 1994 Supp (1)
SCR 807.] of both their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-A, this
Court allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this Court in Vidya
Devi [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. , (2020) 2 SCC 569 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799] is
squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the present case.
26. In view of the above discussion, in view of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under
Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, the State is hereby directed to treat the subject
lands as a deemed acquisition and appropriately disburse compensation to the appellants in
the same terms as the order of the Reference Court dated 4-10-2005 in Land Ref. Petition
No. 10-LAC/4 of 2004 (and consolidated matters). The respondent State is directed,
consequently to ensure that the appropriate Land Acquisition Collector computes the
compensation, and disburses it to the appellants, within four months from today. The
appellants would also be entitled to consequential benefits of solatium, and interest on all
sums payable under law w.e.f. 16-10-2001 (i.e. date of issuance of notification under
Section 4 of the Act), till the date of the impugned judgment [ Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of
H.P., 2013 SCC OnLine HP 3773] i.e. 12-9-2013.
10. The material on record is examined in the light of above propositions
of law. The petitioner had objected encroachment/ illegal construction of road on
his land by filing an application under Section 32 of the M.P. Land Revenue
Code, which was dismissed by the Tahsildar on irrelevant grounds vide Order
dated 30.08.2005 (Annexure P-5). It reflects that the petitioner did not consent or
acquiesce to construction of road on his land. Further, the petitioner formally
applied to the Collector, Rewa and Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Rewa
for compensation in year 2014. Thus, dealy or laches on part of petitioner cannot
be considered sufficient ground to deny him just compensation. The Google Map
location of the road in question, relied by respondent, cannot supersede the
revenue demarcation proceedings conducted in accordance with Rules and
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KOUSHALENDRA
SHARAN SHUKLA
Signing time: 04-08-2026
13:32:56
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:58508
9 WP-20457-2014
approved by the Tahsildar. In view of the above discussion, in exercise of
supervisory writ jurisdiction, ex debito justitiae, the respondents are directed to
treat the subject lands under encroachment, as deemed acquisition and
appropriately disburse compensation to the petitioner. The respondent no. 3 would
proceed under Section 78 and 79 the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act,
1956 for grant of compensation to the petitioner in accordance with law and
ensure that payment of compensation along with all statutory benefits is made to
the petitioner within Four Months . The Collector, Rewa shall extend necessary
co-operation to the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Rewa in this regard.
11. The petition is, accordingly, allowed.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
ks
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: KOUSHALENDRA
SHARAN SHUKLA
Signing time: 04-08-2026
13:32:56
