Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Sudhir Chandra Das vs State Of West Bengal And Others on 3 August, 2026
Author: Supratim Bhattacharya
Bench: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, Supratim Bhattacharya
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In the High Court at Calcutta
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
WP.LRT. No. 31 of 2026
Sudhir Chandra Das
-Versus-
State of West Bengal and Others
For the Petitioner : Mr. Probal Mukherjee, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Pinaki Dhole,
Mr. Rabindra Kr. Pathak,
Ms. Srijita Noe, ... Advs.
For the State : Mr. Nilanjan Bhattacharjee,
Sr. Standing Counsel,
Ms. Jayita Dhar Chakraborty, Jr. Govt. Adv.,
Mr. Suman Banerjee, ... Adv.
For Respondent no. 4 : Mr. Sounak Bhattacharya,
Mr. Dilip Kumar Maiti,
Mr. Anirban Saha Ray, … Advs.
Heard on : 07.07.2026, 08.07.2026 & 15.07.2026
Reserved on : 15.07.2026
Judgment on : 03.08.2026
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. The writ petitioner has challenged an order dated March 13, 2025 passed by
the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in OA No. 248 of
2025, directing the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer (BL & LRO), Gazole,
District – Malda to take steps for compliance of the order passed by the
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Appellate Authority on June 10, 2008 in Appeal Case No. 58 of 2000, after
hearing all necessary parties, within a period of two months from the date of
communication of the order in accordance with law.
2. The backdrop of the case is that the Appellate Authority under the West
Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (in short, “the 1955 Act”) passed an order
on June 10, 2008, directing the concerned BL & LRO to rectify the Records
of Rights by incorporating the name of the present respondent no. 4. The
said order not being implemented, OA No. 246 of 2025 (LRTT) was filed by
the respondent no. 4 before the Tribunal, leading to the order impugned in
the present writ petition.
3. The writ petitioner claims to have purchased the disputed property by a
registered deed of conveyance on July 18, 2025 from the heirs and
successors of late Sudhir Ranjan Saha and late Satya Ranjan Saha. After
such purchase, the petitioner approached the BL & LRO, Gazole for
mutating his name, which was refused by the BL & LRO, who dismissed the
mutation case bearing no. MN/2025/0909/19385 on August 5, 2025 on the
ground that a court case was pending. According to the writ petitioner, he
learnt from his vendors, thereafter, about a contempt application having
been filed by respondent no. 4 for non-implementation of the order dated
June 10, 2008. Thereafter, upon obtaining leave from this court, the present
writ petition has been filed by the petitioner against the order of
implementation passed therein.
4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner argues that the
application for implementation of the order dated June 10, 2008 was filed
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only in the year 2025, after a gap of 17 years. It is, thus, contended that the
application was palpably time-barred.
5. In support of such contention, learned senior counsel relies on Section 10(2)
of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (for short,
“the 1997 Act”), which stipulates that every application under sub-section
(1) of Section 10 shall be made within 60 days from the date on which the
impugned order was passed or such action was taken, as the case may be,
or within such further time as may be allowed by the Tribunal for cause
shown to its satisfaction.
6. Sub-section (1) of Section 10, it is argued, is the enabling provision
contemplating a challenge by way of an appeal to any order or action passed
or taken by an Authority or by the State Government under the specified
Acts provided in the 1997 Act. It is argued that the expression “appeal” and
“application” in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 10 have been used
interchangeably, providing remedy to an aggrieved person to seek redressal
of grievance in either form as available under any of the specified statutes. It
is contended that although sub-section (1) of Section 10 enables an
aggrieved person to prefer an appeal, sub-section (2) uses the language
“application”. The dichotomy in the text of the statute, it is contended, is
explicit, which can be resolved by construing the said two expressions to be
alternative in nature.
7. Learned senior counsel next contends that Section 6 of the 1997 Act
provides for the jurisdiction, power and authority to be exercised by the
Tribunal. Under Clause (a) thereof, any order by an Authority under a
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specified Act is amenable to challenge before the Tribunal, whereas under
Clause (b), an application complaining of inaction or culpable negligence of
an Authority under such an Act can be preferred before the Tribunal.
8. Thus, it is contended that the provisions of Section 10 in respect of a
challenge against action of the Authority should be construed also to
include a challenge against inaction. Unless the word “inaction” is read into
“action” of the Authority in the said provision, the very purpose of Section
10 would be frustrated, since, in such a case, it has to be construed that
there cannot be any challenge to an inaction, although the Tribunal is
specifically empowered to take up such challenge under Section 6(b) of the
1997 Act, thus negating the effect of Section 10. It is construed that, thus
read, the limitations stipulated in Section 10(2) should also apply to an
application against an inaction or culpable negligence of the Authority.
9. In support of such contention, learned counsel cites Namit Sharma v. Union
of India, reported at (2013) 1 SCC 745, where it was observed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that courts would be reluctant to declare a law invalid or
ultra vires on account of unconstitutionality, which is one of the last resorts
taken by the courts. Instead, the courts would preferably put into service
the principle of “reading down” or “reading into” the provision to make it
effective, workable and ensure the attainment of the object of the Act.
10. Following such principle, the term “inaction” should be read into Section 10
of the 1997 Act to give effect to its objective.
11. Learned senior counsel further argues that Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act, 1963 stipulates that where any special or local law prescribes for any
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suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such
period means the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections
4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which,
they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
12. Even if it is to be construed that the limitation prescribed under Section
10(2) of the 1997 Act is not applicable to an application challenging inaction
of the Authority, Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies, which stipulates
that any other application for which no period of limitation is provided
elsewhere in the Schedule, the limitation period would be 3 years from when
the right to apply accrues. Hence, in no event could the limitation period for
the alleged inaction in the present case exceed 3 years after June 10, 2008,
when the order was passed in the appeal under Section 54 of the 1955 Act.
13. It is next contended that while passing the impugned order, the Tribunal did
not make any observation regarding satisfaction of service on the heirs of
the respondents in the said appeal by the Appellate Authority, being the DL
& LRO, Malda. Thus, in the absence of any such specific finding that all
parties were served notice, including the heirs of the deceased respondent in
the said appellate proceeding, any order passed for implementation of the
Appellate Authority’s order would not be sustainable in the eye of law.
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14. Moreover, in view of the demise of the original respondent in the appeal at
the relevant juncture, the order of the Appellate Authority dated June 10,
2008 was also a nullity.
15. Since the petitioner has stepped into the shoes of his vendors by purchase,
it is argued that the petitioner is also entitled to prefer the present
challenge.
16. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no. 4 argues that the Tribunal
under the 1997 Act performs dual roles – both as a court of first instance
and as an appellate forum.
17. On a harmonious reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 10 of the
1997 Act, it will be clear that the said provision evidently applies to the
appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal and not to its original jurisdiction.
Therefore, an application under Section 6(b) of the 1997 Act, complaining
about inaction or culpable negligence of an Authority, would come under the
said provision and will not be governed by Section 10.
18. Rule 3 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Rules, 1997
(for short “the 1997 Rules”), it is submitted, contemplates filing of an
application under Section 6 or Section 10. Thus, the legislative intent was to
segregate the applications under Sections 6 and 10 respectively into two
different compartments. Hence, when the applicant approaches the Tribunal
alleging inaction, it will be governed under Section 6 and not under Section
10. Thus, the question of limitation stipulated in Section 10(2) would not
apply to such an application at all.
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19. It is next argued that the object of the 1997 Act is to vest the Tribunal with
the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of matters governed by the 1997
Act. After the promulgation of the 1997 Act, it is argued, the jurisdiction
over those matters which were previously dealt with by the High Court were
transferred to the Tribunal. Learned counsel cites Popat & Kotecha Property
& Anr. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., reported at (2011) 3 Cal LT 431,
for such proposition.
20. In a hypothetical situation where an application was originally filed under
Article 226 before the High Court and was later transferred to the Tribunal
after coming into force of the 1997 Act, such application could not be
objected to on the ground of limitation at the inception, being a
constitutional remedy, and, thus, such challenge cannot be raised
subsequently upon its transfer to the Tribunal. There cannot be two sets of
limitations governing the same application.
21. It is argued that when the words in a statute are clear, plain and
unambiguous, and only one meaning can be inferred, the courts are bound
to give effect to the said meaning irrespective of consequences.
22. Learned counsel relies in this context on Commissioner of Customs (Import),
Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar and Company and Others, reported at (2018) 9 SCC
1. It is submitted that the Legislature, in its wisdom, has omitted to include
inaction and culpable negligence of an Authority in Section 10 of the 1997
Act. Thus, the court is bound to give effect to the natural and ordinary sense
of the said provision, there being no ambiguity.
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23. Learned counsel submits that legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied
by judicial interpretative process. Reliance is placed on Padma Sundara Rao
(dead) and Others v. State of T.N. and Others, reported at (2002) 3 SCC 533,
in the above regard.
24. Learned counsel for respondent no. 4 contends that inaction on the part of
the BL & LRO squarely falls under Section 6 (b) of the 1997 Act and it is the
Tribunal where an application challenging the same has to be filed. Reliance
is placed in this regard on Atikur Hoque & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal &
Ors., reported at (2008) 3 Cal LT 122.
25. Regarding the petitioner’s argument that the order of the Appellate Authority
was a nullity for non-substitution of the heirs of the respondent no. 3 in the
said appeal, it is contended that the said ground is not tenable, since an
application for substitution was filed before the Appellate Authority on the
death of the respondent no. 3 therein, being the vendor of the present
petitioner. The said application was allowed by the Appellate Authority on
December 19, 2007. Thereafter, by an order dated January 22, 2008, the
Appellate Authority directed notices to be served on the substituted heirs
and, in the order dated June 10, 2008, recorded that both the appellant and
the respondents were present. By the previous order dated May 22, 2008,
the Appellate Authority also recorded the presence of the appellants and the
respondents, who attended the hearing and filed haziras, upon which June
10, 2008 was fixed for passing order. It appears from the order dated May
22, 2008, that the learned Advocates for both the parties counter-signed the
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order after perusing the same. The annexures to the affidavit-in-opposition
filed by respondent no. 4 are relied on in support of above submissions.
26. Thus, it is argued that the ‘nullity’ argument is not tenable in the eye of law.
27. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the impugned order is nothing but an
order to implement the Appellate Authority’s decision, which has not been
set aside and has to be implemented.
28. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, this Court proceeds to decide
the instant writ petition as follows:
(i) Limitation
29. The first germane question which arises for consideration is whether the
application for implementation of the order of the Appellate Authority dated
June 10, 2008 was barred by the limitation, as stipulated in sub-section (2)
of Section 10 of the 1997 Act.
30. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 10 of the 1997 Act are quoted
hereinbelow for the purpose of reference:
“10. Application to Tribunal.–(1) Subject to the provisions of
section 6 and other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order
passed by an Authority or any action taken either by an Authority or by the
State Government may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal for the redressal of
his grievance.
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made within
sixty days from the date on which such order was passed or such action
was taken, as the case may be, or within such further time as may be
allowed by the Tribunal for cause shown to its satisfaction, and shall be
made in such form, and shall be accompanied by such fee, as may be
prescribed.
... ... ... ... ... ... ..."
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31. From the above, it is evident that the limitation under sub-section (2)
applies only to appeals/applications preferred under sub-section (1) of
32. Sub-section (1), on the other hand, renders itself “subject to” the provisions
of Section 6 and the other provisions of the 1997 Act.
33. Thus, if Section 6 itself provides the remedy by way of a right to file an
application, Section 10(1) would not be applicable at all.
34. Section 6 of the 1997 Act, which acquires relevance in the context, is set
forth below in its entirety:
“6. Jurisdiction, power and authority of Tribunal.–Subject to the
other provisions of this Act, the Tribunal shall, with effect from such date
as may be appointed by the State Government by notification in this
behalf, exercise jurisdiction, power and authority in relation to–
(a) any order made by an Authority under a specified Act;
(b) an application complaining inaction or culpable negligence of an
Authority under a specified Act;
(c) an appeal against an order of the Mines Tribunal appointed, under
Section 36 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953;
(d) applications relating to matters under any provision of a specified
Act or matters relating to any constitutional validity of any Act
under the provisions of a specified Act;
(e) adjudication of matters, proceedings, cases and appeals which
stand transferred from the High Court and other Authorities to the
Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
35. Different classes of causes of action have been subjected to the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal under the above Section. It is relevant to note that while
some of the clauses of Section 6, apart from stipulating jurisdiction,
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themselves provide the remedy as well, others merely indicate the orders
over which jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribunal.
36. For example, under Clause (a) of Section 6, any order made by an Authority
under the specified Act comes under the jurisdiction, power and authority of
the Tribunal, without the said clause providing any remedy by way of an
application or appeal. Thus, for a challenge to be preferred against any
such order as enumerated in Clause (a) of Section 6, the challenger has to
take resort to Section 10(1) of the 1997 Act, which is the enabling provision
for preferring an appeal, or to any appellate provision, if stipulated in the
concerned specified Act itself.
37. On the other hand, Clause (b) of Section 6 itself provides the jurisdiction as
well as the remedy, by stipulating that the Tribunal exercises jurisdiction in
relation to “an application” complaining of “inaction or culpable negligence”
of an Authority under the specified Acts.
38. Similarly, Clause (c) of Section 6 of the 1997 Act provides for “an appeal”
against an order of the Mines Tribunal appointed under Section 36 of the
West Bengal Estates Acquisitions Act, 1953 and Clause (d) provides for
applications, relating to matters under any provision of a specified Act or
matters relating to the constitutional validity of any Act under the provisions
of a specified Act.
39. Clause (e) of Section 6, on the other hand, contemplates a separate
paradigm altogether, being not the source provision of challenge but merely
an enabling provision conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal to adjudicate
matters, proceedings, cases and appeals which had previously been filed
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before the High Court and other Authorities and are transferred to the
Tribunal pursuant to the 1997 Act. Hence, Clause (e) is fundamentally
different in character from the other Clauses of Section 6 and need not
bother us in the present context.
40. Coming back to the other Clauses, specific remedies have been provided in
Clauses (b), (c) and (d) of Section 6 of the 1997 Act, either by way of appeal
or application, with regard to the subject-matters covered thereby, whereas
no such remedy has been provided in Clause (a).
41. The necessary corollary would be that for resorting to a challenge under
Clauses (b), (c) and (d), the said Clauses themselves are self-sufficient,
providing jurisdiction as well as remedy, whereas for a challenge to be
preferred under Clause (a) of Section 6, although the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal has been enumerated in the said Clause, the remedy has been
provided under the enabling provision of Section 10(1), which provides for
an appeal against such an order. The word “action” of Authorities, as used
in Section 10, has to be taken in the generic sense, including any positive
act of any such Authority under the specified Acts which is amenable to
challenge under the specified Acts themselves.
42. Viewing from such perspective, an original application complaining of
inaction or culpable negligence on the part of an Authority under any
specified Act is preferred directly under Section 6(b) and not under Section
10(1) of the 1997 Act, thus not being governed by the limitations stipulated
in Section 10(2), which refers only to challenges under Section 10(1).
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43. From another perspective, there is a fundamental difference between
Clauses (a) and (c) of Section 6 on the one hand and Clauses (b) and (d)
thereof on the other. Whereas the first category contemplates a challenge in
the nature of an appeal against an order passed or action taken by an
original forum, the second envisages original applications before the
Tribunal, either ventilating grievance regarding some inaction or culpable
negligence or assailing the vires of an Act.
44. The challenge under sub-section (b) of Section 6 against an inaction or a
culpable negligence of an Authority in omitting to do its duty is an original
application, initiated for the first time before the Tribunal, and not a
challenge against any order or action of any Authority as such. As opposed
to a positive order or action contemplated under Section 10(1) of the 1997
Act, an inaction or negligence operates in the negative sense, Section 6(b)
providing for a recourse to the Tribunal for passing a positive direction to
neutralise/negate such inaction or negligence. Thus, being in the nature of
an original application, akin to the previous class of writ petitions filed for
inaction of Authorities before the High Court before the promulgation of the
1997 Act, the same cannot be subjected to the rigours and limitation
associated with an appeal.
45. Having held that the limitation under Section 10(2) is not attracted to an
application complaining of inaction or culpable negligence under Section
6(b) of the 1997 Act, the next question which arises is whether the residuary
provision of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is
attracted.
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46. The said Article provides for a limitation of three years from the date when
the right to apply accrues in respect of applications for which no period of
limitation is prescribed elsewhere in the concerned Division (pertaining to
applications) of the Schedule of the Limitation Act. However, it is well-
settled that the said provision can only be attracted in case the accrual of
the cause of action is static, bound to a particular point of time. As opposed
thereto, in case of an inaction or negligence on the part of the Authority
under any specified Act within the contemplation of the 1997 Act, the
nature of the cause of action is fluid and continuing. If an order is passed
by the Appellate Authority directing the first Authority to carry out some act,
it is the bounden duty of the first Authority to do so, until and unless the
Appellate order is stayed or set aside by some competent forum.
47. Such a situation should be looked at from the prism of the Authority, and
not from the aggrieved party. Unlike an order or positive action of an
Authority, where the onus is on the aggrieved party to prefer a challenge, in
case of an inaction/negligence on the part of the Authority by non-
compliance of an appellate direction or otherwise, the duty is cast on the
Authority to do such act unless the statutory mandate or the order of a
superior forum directing such act to be done is set aside or annulled. In
such a case, there is no necessity for the party aggrieved by such inaction to
set the course of justice in motion but the duty of the Authority is
temporally co-extensive with the direction on it or the statutory mandate
requiring to do such act.
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48. Hence, the concept of limitation is not strictly applicable in case of an
inaction.
49. Again, the Legislature, in its wisdom, specifically segregated challenges (by
way of appeal/application) under Section 10(1), subjecting it to limitation
under Section 10(2), and original applications under Clauses (b) and (d) of
Section 6 of 1997 Act. Hence, under the scheme of the 1997 Act, an
application under Section 6(b), complaining of inaction or culpable
negligence of an Authority, is not amenable to any limitation period and is
co-extensive with the inaction or culpable negligence complained of. Holding
to the contrary would be thwarting the legislative intent behind the eco-
system between Sections 6 and 10 of the 1997 Act.
50. Thus, returning to the case at hand, the original application seeking
inaction and/or non-implementation of the order dated June 10, 2008
passed by the Appellate Authority cannot be held to be barred by limitation.
51. As to the decisions relied on by the parties, in Atikur Hoque (supra)1, a
learned Single Judge of this Court merely observed that the remedy against
an alleged inaction of an Authority under the specified Acts is to file an
application before the Tribunal. Such proposition, thus, corroborates the
above finding that such an application comes within the ambit of Section 6,
and not Section 10, of the 1997 Act. However, the Larger Bench judgment
of this Court in Popat (supra)2 is not directly relevant in the present context.
The Larger Bench merely recognized that the object of the 1997 Act is to vest
1
Atikur Hoque & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., reported at (2008) 3 Cal LT
122
2
Popat & Kotecha Property & Anr. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., reported at
(2011) 3 Cal LT 431
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the Tribunal with the jurisdiction over those matters which were previously
dealt with by the High Courts. The said observation was made in a different
context, while examining whether administrative members, in order to man
the Tribunal, must have experience to deal with the specified Acts.
52. In Commissioner of Customs (Import) (supra)3, it was held that when the
words in a statute are clear, plain and unambiguous and only one meaning
can be inferred, the Courts are bound to give effect to the said meaning
irrespective of consequences, which lends support to the observations
rendered by us above, to the effect that the scheme contemplated under
Sections 6 and 10 of the 1997 Act has to be read in its statutory backdrop.
Thus, the principle laid down in Namit Sharma (supra)4 is not applicable,
since no “reading down” or reading into” the relevant provisions is required
at all, as we do not find either Section 6 or Section 10 of the 1997 Act to be
ambiguous, ineffective, unworkable or unconstitutional in the first place.
53. In Padma Sundara Rao (dead) (supra)5, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and
unambiguous, to which legal proposition there cannot be any quarrel.
(ii) Whether the impugned order of the Tribunal is otherwise
sustainable
54. Certain aspects of the matter have to be noted in this context.
3
Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar and Company and
Others, reported at (2018) 9 SCC 1
4
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, reported at (2013) 1 SCC 745
5
Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and Others v. State of T.N. and Others, reported at
(2002) 3 SCC 533
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55. First, the writ petitioner claims through his vendors, the heirs of the original
owners, who were parties to the appeal in which the parent order dated
June 10, 2008 was passed.
56. As explicit from the annexures to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by
respondent no. 4, substitution was duly effected on the demise of one of the
respondents therein. Thus, it cannot be said that the said order was a
nullity.
57. Moreover, since the petitioner claims through his vendors, whose
predecessors-in-interest were parties to the appeal, the petitioner steps into
the shoes of his vendors and is, thus, bound by the said order of the
Appellate Authority under Section 54 of the 1955 Act. It is nobody’s case
that any challenge has been preferred either to the parent appellate order of
the DL & LRO dated June 10, 2008 or that any substantive and
independent rights have been created in favour of third parties in the
interregnum. Hence, the order of the Appellate Authority which is now
sought to be implemented has attained finality and till it is implemented, the
cause of action challenging such inaction on the part of the concerned BL &
LRO in not implementing the order remains alive.
58. The argument of the petitioner that substantive rights might have accrued
in the meantime cannot be accepted, since admittedly the petitioner has
purchased from the heirs of the respondents in the appeal in which the
parent order dated June 10, 2008 was passed. Tracing the chain of title, the
writ petitioner claims through, and has ultimately stepped into the shoes of,
the respondents in the appeal Thus, he cannot claim an independent or
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better title but is bound by order of the Appellate Authority. Thus, there is
no applecart of any third party to be upset if the said order is implemented
now, irrespective of the time-lapse in between.
59. The arguments of the appellant on the merits of the order dated June 10,
2008 cannot be accepted at this belated stage, since the said order has
attained finality in the absence of any challenge thereto.
60. Lastly, we must also take note of the fact that the learned Tribunal, in the
impugned order, has not directed blind implementation of the order dated
June 10, 2008 passed in Appeal Case No. 58 of 2000, but has also left open
an opportunity of hearing to all necessary parties. In our opinion, such
component of the order is squarely in consonance with the principles of
natural justice and leaves it open for any just cause to be ventilated at the
time of implementation, despite the ambit of such “cause” being very limited.
61. Hence, in view of the aforesaid findings, we are of the opinion that the
impugned order of the learned Tribunal does not suffer from any illegality or
jurisdictional error.
CONCLUSION
62. Accordingly, WP.LRT. No. 31 of 2026 is dismissed on contest, thereby
affirming the order dated March 13, 2025 passed by the Third Bench of the
West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in OA No. 246 of 2025
(LRTT).
63. There will be no order as to costs.
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64. Urgent certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon
compliance of all formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
