Jharkhand High Court
Mahadeo Oraon vs The State Of Jharkhand on 31 July, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cont. Case (Civil) No.1010 of 2025
-----
Mahadeo Oraon, son of Late Bhukhla Oraon, resident of
Madhukam, Ratu Road, Ranchi, P.O. Hehal, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar,
District Ranchi.
.......... Petitioner.
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Ghanshyam Kumar, son of not known to the petitioner, at
present working and posted as Circle Officer, Hehal, Hehal
Anchal, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. Hehal, District Ranchi.
3. Santosh Kumar Chaudhary, son of Sri Govind Chaudhary
4. Savitri Devi, wife of Mahesh Kumar Saw
5. Narayan Saw, son of Late Ramdhani Saw
6. Prem Kumar Sao, son of Late Ram Jatan Saw
7. Manju Devi, wife of Gyani Saw
8. Mohan Lal Sahu, son of Late Moti Lal Sahu
9. Kaushal Ambike, son of Late Suresh Lal Sahu
10. Archana Devi, wife of Mahesh Prasad Sahu
11. Ram Lakhan Yadav, son of Late Ram Sagar Yadav
12. Sanjay Kumar Sahu, son of Rameshwar Sahu
13. Gudiya Devi, wife of Ajay Sahu
14. Rounak Kumar, son of Late Anil Sao
.......... Opposite Parties.
-----
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
-----
For the Petitioner : Mr. Atul Rai, Advocate
For the State : Md. Shahabuddin, SC-VII
For O.P. Nos.3 to 14: Mr. Sachin Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Gaurav Raj, Advocate
-----
CAV on 24.07.2026 Pronounced on 31.07.2026
Rajesh Shankar, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials placed on record.
2. The present contempt case has been filed alleging willful,
deliberate and intentional violation of the order/judgment dated
22.10.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.5461 of 2024.
3. Brief background of the case is that the petitioner filed writ
petition being W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024 for issuance of
1
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
direction upon the Circle Officer, Hehal Anchal, Ranchi (opposite
party no.2 herein) to dispose of the petitioner’s representation
seeking restoration of possession over the land appertaining to
R.S. Plot No.319, Khata No.179 measuring an area of 45 decimals
situated at village-Madhukam, P.S.-Sukhdeo Nagar, District-
Ranchi (hereinafter referred to the said land) which had been
restored under Section 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act,
1908 vide order dated 13th December, 1996 passed in S.A.R.
Case No.169 of 1993-94 and the said order was upheld up to the
High Court.
4. In the said writ petition, the following facts were averred by the
petitioner:-
(i) The petitioner preferred an application under Section
71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 seeking
restoration of the said land in his favour which was
registered as S.A.R. Case No.169 of 1993-94 and the
Special Officer, S.A.R. Court, Ranchi vide order dated
13.12.1996 allowed the restoration of the said land in
favour of the petitioner.
(ii) Aggrieved with the said order, Shanti Devi & others
preferred S.A.R. Appeal No.570 R15/1997 under the
provisions of Section 48(4) of the C.N.T. Act which was
dismissed vide order dated 15.07.1998 passed by the
Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.
(iii) Thereafter, S.A.R. Revision No.120 of 1998 was filed by
Shanti Devi & others before the Commissioner, South
2
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi who allowed the said
revision in favour of the said persons vide order dated
18.05.1999.
(iv) Aggrieved with the said order, the petitioner preferred
a writ petition before this Court being C.W.J.C. No.2383
of 1999(R) which was allowed vide order dated
01.05.2009 quashing the order dated 18th May,
1999 passed by the revisional authority i.e. the
Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi.
(v) Thereafter, Shanti Devi & others preferred
L.P.A. No.341 of 2009 and Mohan Sao & others
preferred L.P.A. No.342 of 2009. Both the said L.P.As.
were dismissed for default by a Division Bench of this
Court vide order dated 11.04.2017. Subsequently,
C.M.P. No.-201 of 2017 was filed by Shanti Devi &
others seeking restoration of the said L.P.As., however,
the same was also dismissed for default vide
order dated 5.12.2018.
(vi) The aforesaid sequence of litigation suggests that the
order of restoration passed by the SAR Court, Ranchi
on 13.12.1996 in SAR Case No.169 of 1993-94 has
become final up to this Court. The petitioner has not
yet received any notice in connection with the present
case from the Supreme Court of India and as such he
has the reasons to believe that the aforesaid persons
i.e. Shanti Devi & others and Mohan Sao & others have
3
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
not challenged the order passed by the learned Division
Bench of this Court dismissing the aforesaid L.P.A.s and
C.M.P. for default.
5. In course of argument in the said writ proceeding, the learned
counsel for the State concurred the submission made on behalf
of the petitioner. The Court having observed the aforesaid facts,
disposed of the writ petition directing the opposite party no.2 to
take up the present matter, issue notices to the concerned
persons i.e. Shanti Devi & others and Mohan Sao & others who
were said to be in possession of the land in question. The
opposite party no.2 was further directed to verify the fact that
the orders passed in C.W.J.C. No.2383 of 1999(R), L.P.A. No.341
of 2009 with L.P.A. No.342 of 2009 and C.M.P. No.201 of 2017
had not been set aside till that date and thereafter to handover
the possession of the land to the petitioner in accordance with
law preferably within 12 weeks from the date of
receipt/production of a copy of the said order.
6. The present contempt case was earlier taken up for consideration
by this Court on 22.08.2025 and on the said date, the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.2 stated
that an interlocutory application was filed seeking extension of
time to comply the order dated 22.10.2024 passed in W.P.(C)
No.5461 of 2024. However, no such interlocutory application was
found on record and the case was adjourned for the next week.
On 16.01.2026, the opposite party no.2 by pressing I.A.
No.11663 of 2025 sought more time to comply the order dated
4
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
22.10.2024 and to file compliance affidavit, which was allowed
by this Court, granting four weeks’ further time.
7. In the meantime, I.A No. 2413 of 2026 dated 11.02.2026 was
filed by 12 applicants seeking intervention in the present case
stating that they were residing over R.S. Plot No.319, Khata
No.179, measuring an area of 45 decimals situated at village
Madhukam, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, District Ranchi, which is the
subject land in the present contempt case. They also averred that
altogether 11 settlement agreements were executed between
them and the petitioner from 19.12.2019 to 31.12.2020 whereby
they were permitted by the petitioner to remain in possession of
the land in lieu of payments of about Rs.1.08 crore made by them
on different dates. They further claimed that the said material
facts were suppressed by the petitioner in the writ petition and
thus obtained the order dated 22.10.2024 from this court by
playing fraud.
8. This court vide order dated 13.02.2026 directed the opposite
party no. 2 to file a show cause affidavit specifically stating as to
whether in compliance of the order dated 22.10.2024, the
applicants were issued notice(s) and if so, whether they were
given opportunity to produce documents in support of the facts
that they had paid considerable amount by way of settlement to
the petitioner and as to whether any such order was passed by
him before taking steps for evicting the applicants from the said
land. By the said order, this court also directed the opposite party
5
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
no.2 to stay his hands from taking any coercive steps against the
applicants (intervenors) with respect to the said land.
9. On 08.05.2026, when the matter came up for further
consideration, this court observed that the petitioner while filing
W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024 and the present contempt petition did
not even whisper about the fact regarding execution of 11
settlement agreements and receipt of Rs.1.08 crores by him paid
at the instance of the opposite parties/intervenors. Under the said
circumstance, this court was of the prima facie view that the
petitioner had suppressed the material facts and had tried to
mislead the Court amounting to perjury.
10. Having observed so, this court directed for issuance of show
cause notice to the petitioner calling upon him as to why an
appropriate order under suitable provisions of law be not passed
against him.
11. Pursuant to the directions issued by this court on 08.05.2026, the
petitioner filed show cause affidavit dated 17.06.2026 stating that
the subject matter of controversy between the parties started in
the year 1993 and attained finality in the year 2018 through
adjudication at different forums up to the Division Bench of this
Court. The writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024 was filed
for the sole and limited purpose of securing compliance of the
order dated 13.12.1996 passed in SAR Case No.169 of 1993-94
by the opposite party no.2, as the said order was upheld up to
the High Court. The Petitioner genuinely believed that the private
agreements, being matters of a disputed and collateral nature,
6
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
had no bearing on an innocuous prayer made in the writ petition
and such facts were not required to be pleaded. As per his
understanding, only those facts having a direct bearing on the
writ petition were required to be incorporated and the
agreements were not among those.
12. It is further stated that documents relied upon by the opposite
party nos.3 to 14 are the Agreements to Sale which do not
transfer any title or possession in law. Moreover, the Agreements
to Sale contained a specific condition that in the event of
dishonour of cheques issued by them, the agreements would
stand terminated. Some of the cheques issued by the opposite
party nos.3 to 14 were in fact dishonoured, and consequently
the Agreements to Sale could not have been given effect to. The
Petitioner therefore did not consider these incomplete and
terminated agreements with material breach to be germane to,
or having a bearing upon, the prayer for restoration of land made
in the writ petition as well as the contempt proceeding.
13. It is further stated that the land of the petitioner is governed by
the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and the Agreements to Sale
were executed in direct contravention of Sections 46 and 48 of
the CNT Act, 1908 read with Section 23 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872, which prohibit transfer of Scheduled Tribe land without
the required statutory sanction. A contract made in contravention
of a statutory prohibition was otherwise void under Section 23 of
the Contract Act. The petitioner being a member of scheduled
tribes was aware of the fact that no private agreement
7
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
could lawfully override the statutory protection provided to his
land, and that any agreement to the contrary was a nullity. He
therefore did not consider it necessary or meaningful to disclose
about execution of the agreements which were void ab initio and
could not have conferred any right upon the opposite party nos.3
to 14 as a matter of law.
14. It is also averred that the petitioner had been engaged in
prolonged litigation since the year 1993 and trying hard to get
the said land restored in his favour, however, in that process, he
was facing great difficulty. In this state of helplessness and
vulnerability, he was coerced and pressurized by the
intervenors/opposite party nos.3 to 14 to execute agreements to
sale at half of the market rate, payable in three annual
installments. In fact, the petitioner did not sign those agreements
with free will or with a full and informed appreciation regarding
their legal consequences. Even otherwise, an agreement
executed under coercion is voidable under the Indian Contract
Act, 1872.
15. It is also pleaded in the show cause affidavit that the present
contempt case was filed against the State of Jharkhand and the
Circle Officer, Hehal, Ranchi (Opposite Party No. 2) arraying them
as opposite parties alleging wilful and deliberate violation of the
order dated 22.10.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.5461 of 2024 by
not delivering possession of the said land to the Petitioner. The
Petitioner’s dispute with the opposite party nos.3 to 14 regarding
execution of the agreements was a separate, collateral matter
8
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
which had no relevance with the specific prayer for enforcement
of the order passed in the aforesaid writ petition.
16. It is further stated that the petitioner filed the instant contempt
case anticipating that in compliance of the order dated
22.10.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024, the opposite
party no.2 would issue notices to the intervenors (i.e. opposite
party nos.3 to 14), who would then have a full and fair
opportunity to appear, place all the documents including the
agreements in question before the opposite party no.2 and
raise their contentions in defence. As such, the petitioner did
not consider it necessary to disclose the fact regarding execution
of said agreements in the contempt case. Though the opposite
party nos.3 to 14 accepted the notices issued by the opposite
party no.2, but failed to place the said agreements before him.
They also did not furnish any satisfactory explanation regarding
their continued possession over the said land. It was a serious
omission on the part of opposite party nos.3 to 14 in not raising
the issue of execution of the agreements in question before the
opposite party no.2 despite having received the notices and the
opportunity provided for that purpose. Thus, the
petitioner cannot be penalised for such failure of the said
opposite parties.
17. It is also stated that after the opposite party nos.3 to 14 filed I.A.
No. 2413 of 2026 on 11.02.2026 raising the issue pertaining to
existence of the agreements, the petitioner did not deny the said
fact, rather in his rejoinder affidavit dated 05.05.2026, he
9
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
acknowledged the execution of the agreements and explained the
entire surrounding circumstances before this Court, including the
fact of coercion, dishonoured cheques etc. of the opposite party
nos.3 to 14 and the invalidity of the agreements. These facts
clearly suggest bonafide of the petitioner.
18. The petitioner has further stated in the show cause affidavit that
the charge of perjury is not attracted in the present case. Under
section 227 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, perjury is the offence
of deliberately making false statement or producing false
evidence on oath or affirmation about which the maker either
knows to be false at the time of making/producing it or does not
believe it to be true. The petitioner had not made any false
statement on affidavit and the allegation against him is solely
premised on his omission of not having explicitly disclosed the
fact of execution of the settlement agreements. An omission,
however, cannot be treated as perjury.
19. The learned counsel for the petitioner by putting reliance to the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the cases
of M/s S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of
Bihar & Others, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 166; Arunima
Baruah Vs. Union of India & Others, reported in (2007) 6
SCC 120; and Government of NCT of Delhi & Another Vs.
BSK Realtors LLP & Another, reported in (2024) 7 SCC
370; submits that there are three essential requirements for
denying relief to the petitioner on the ground of suppression of
facts; (i) the facts must be material, (ii) withholding of the same
10
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
must be deliberate and (iii) even if the court finds some element
of suppression or non-disclosure of facts, it must ask itself
whether the relief would still be denied.
20. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties 3 to
14 submits that altogether 11 settlement agreements were
executed between the petitioner and the opposite parties 3 to 14
whereby they were allowed to remain in possession of the said
land and in lieu thereof a payment of about Rs. 1.08 Crores was
made to the petitioner by way of cheques. It is further submitted
that the said material fact was not averred in the writ petition and
as such the petitioner obtained the order dated 22.10.2024 by
playing fraud on the Court. Moreover, though few cheques given
to the petitioner got dishonoured, however, the opposite party
nos.3 to 14 handed over other cheques in lieu thereof to the
petitioner which were duly honoured by the Bank and the amount
was also transferred to his bank account.
21. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel for
opposite parties 3 to 14 puts reliance on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of M.P.
Vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Another, reported in
(2011)7 SCC 639.
22. It appears from the materials placed on record by the opposite
party nos.3 to 14 that after dismissal of C.M.P. No. 201 of 2017,
the petitioner entered into settlement agreements with the
opposite party nos. 3 to 14 and conveyed right, title, interest and
possession of the land occupied by them. As per the terms and
11
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
conditions of the said settlement agreements, the petitioner
received consideration of the said transaction by way of different
cheques.
23. The facts regarding execution of the said settlement agreements
and receipt of cheques from the opposite party nos. 3 to 14 has
not been denied by the petitioner, though he has claimed that
the said agreements had no bearing with the subject matter of
the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024 and as such the
fact of execution of the settlement agreements with the opposite
party nos.3 to 14 was not disclosed in the writ petition.
24. I do not find any substance in the said argument of the learned
counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition being W.P.(C) No.
5461 of 2024 was filed by the petitioner seeking restoration of
possession of the land in question in terms with the order dated
13.12.1996 passed in S.A.R Case No. 169 of 1993-94 under
section 71-A of the Act, 1908, which was upheld up to the High
Court. However, even prior to filing of the said writ petition, the
petitioner by way of settlement agreements, had himself
conveyed possession of the said land to the opposite parties and
had also received consideration for the same. Hence, the factum
of execution of settlement agreements was certainly a material
fact and the same was required to be disclosed by the petitioner
in the said writ petition. The petitioner has claimed that some of
the cheques given by the opposite party nos.3 to 14 have been
dishonoured and as such the said agreements have rendered null
and void. Though the opposite party nos.3 to 14 have explained
12
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
this fact as mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, yet even if the
said claim of the petitioner is treated to be true, then also, the
petitioner was required to disclose the said fact in the writ
petition, which he did not do. The petitioner had also not arrayed
the opposite party nos.3 to 14 as respondents in W.P.(C) No.5461
of 2024 and obtained the order dated 22.10.2024 from this court
by suppressing the material facts.
25. In the case of Moti Lal Songara Vs. Prem Prakash @ Pappu
and Another, reported in (2013)9 SCC 199, the respondents
had obtained the order of discharge from the High Court by
concealing the fact of framing of charge by the trial court. It was
thus held that anyone who takes recourse to the method of
suppression in a court of law, is, in actuality, playing fraud with
the court and the maxim supressio veri, expressio falsi, i.e.,
suppression of the truth is equivalent to the expression of
falsehood, gets attracted. It was further held that as the order
had been obtained by practising fraud and suppressing material
fact before a court of law to gain advantage, the said order cannot
be allowed to stand.
26. In the case of Vishnu Vardhan alias Vishnu Pradhan vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1501, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
under:-
“50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression of
even a single material fact can be fatal before writ courts. In this
context, one may usefully refer to the decision of this Court
in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar where the
law has succinctly been stated as follows:
13
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a
litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief.
This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to
deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by
deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material
one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would
have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a
matter which was material for the consideration of the
court, whatever view the court may have taken …
(emphasis ours)”
27. In Vishnu Vardhan (Supra.) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has cited
various earlier judicial pronouncements and held that the Courts
have consistently nullified orders obtained through fraudulent
means. Key excerpts from some of these decisions read thus:-
“a. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and
others, reported in (2000)3 SCC 581, this Court reiterated that
fraud unravels everything:
3. “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus
nunquam cohabitant) is a pristine maxim which has
never lost its temper over all these centuries. Lord
Denning observed in a language without equivocation
that “no judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can
be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for,
fraud unravels everything” (Lazarus Estates
Ltd. v. Beasley, [[1956] 1 Q.B. 702 : [1956] 1 All ER 341
: [1956] 2 WLR 502 (CA)]).
b. In Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. Shaw Bros., reported in (1992)1
SCC 534, it was held:
20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn
proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is
a concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi
likens a fraudster to Milton’s sorcerer, Comus, who
exulted in his ability to, ‘wing me into the easy-hearted
man and trap him into snares’. It has been defined as an
act of trickery or deceit. In Webster’s Third New
14
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)International Dictionary fraud in equity has been defined
as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one
person obtains an advantage against conscience over
another or which equity or public policy forbids as being
prejudicial to another. In Black’s Legal Dictionary, fraud
is defined as an intentional perversion of truth for the
purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part
with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender
a legal right; a false representation of a matter of fact
whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury……..
c. In A.V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Govt. of A.P. and others,
reported in (2007)4 SCC 221, this Court held:
21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any
judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said
to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries,
Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:
“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.”
22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment,
decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court,
tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of
the law. Such a judgment, decree or order–by the first
court or by the final court–has to be treated as nullity by
every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in
any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even
in collateral proceedings.
23. ***
24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith’s Leading Cases,
13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of fraud, de
Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res
judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be
impeachable from without. In other words, though it is
not permissible to show that the court was “mistaken”, it
might be shown that it was “misled”. There is an essential
15
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear
implication of the distinction is that an action to set aside
a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has
been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the
decision was one which should not have been rendered,
but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or
tricked into giving the judgment.
25. It has been said: fraud and justice never dwell
together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and
deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini
patrocinari debent).
d. The judgment by Denning, L.J. in Lazarus Estates
Ltd. (supra), which has since been quoted with approval by this
Court in a catena of decisions including Nidhi Kaim (supra),
asserted intolerance for fraud in legal proceedings in the
following words:
No court … will allow a person to keep an advantage
which he has obtained by fraud. […] Fraud unravels
everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless
it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved,
it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions
whatsoever….”
28. In the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan (Supra.), as has
been relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite parties
3 to 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that whenever the
court comes to a conclusion that the process of the court is being
abused, the court would be justified in refusing to proceed further
with the matter. This rule has evolved out of the need of the
courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of the court by
deceiving it. However, the concealed fact must be a material one
in the sense that had it not been suppressed, it would have an
effect on the merit of the case/order. It has further been held
16
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)that a person who suppresses the material facts from the court is
guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi i.e. suppression or
failure to disclose what a party is bound to disclose, which may
amount to fraud.
29. Thus, it is no more res-integra that suppression of even a single
material fact can be fatal before the Courts muchless the writ
Courts and the same would amount to fraud on the Courts. A
judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court,
tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law.
Such a judgment, decree or order has to be treated as nullity by
every court. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in
appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.
30. In the case in hand, the petitioner neither arrayed the opposite
party nos.3 to 14 as respondents before the writ Court nor
disclosed the material fact about execution of the settlement
agreements and receipt of consideration by him paid at the
instance of the opposite party nos. 3 to 14 to settle the dispute.
Undoubtedly, the said suppression of fact was deliberate. Thus,
this Court is of the view that the petitioner had obtained the order
dated 22.10.2024 by playing fraud on this court and as such the
said order is a nullity in the eye of law and has no legal effect.
31. The other limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the settlement agreements were executed by
the petitioner under pressure and coercion and as such the same
are nonest having no legal force. The said argument of the
learned counsel for the petitioner is nothing but a face saving
17
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
device and far from the truth. Curiously enough, the petitioner
neither initiated any legal proceeding against the opposite party
nos.3 to 14 in that regard nor the said fact was even averred in
the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024.
32. Since the order dated 22.10.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 5461 of
2024 has itself been declared as nullity in the eye of law, there is
no question of proceeding further with the present contempt case
filed by the petitioner alleging wilful disobedience of the order
dated 22.10.2014. The principle “when infrastructure collapses,
superstructure is bound to collapse” is also applicable in the
present case. It is well settled that a litigant, who attempts to
pollute the stream of justice or touches the pure fountain of
justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief.
33. It needs to be mentioned here that the petitioner has played
fraud with the Court by suppressing the material facts which were
vital for the adjudication of the writ petition as those facts were
the development subsequent to passing of the order of
restoration of land in S.A.R Case No. 169 of 1993-94. Had those
facts been disclosed in the writ petition, this Court might not have
passed the order dated 22.10.2024 in absence of the opposite
party nos. 3 to 14. The suppression of the said material facts has
certainly caused great prejudice to the opposite party nos. 3 to
14.
34. This Court also takes note of a dangerous trend of few
unscrupulous litigants misrepresenting the Courts by suppressing
18
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
the material facts just to obtain favourable orders from the
Courts.
35. In the case of Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma,
reported in (1995) 1 SCC 421, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that anyone who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course
of judicial proceedings; or if anything is done with oblique motive,
the same interferes with the administration of justice. Such
persons are required to be properly dealt with, not only to punish
them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging
in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of
administration of justice.
36. In the case of Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has aptly observed that the truth constituted an integral
part of the justice- delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-
Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell the
truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However,
post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value
system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the
quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved
in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,
misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court
proceedings.
37. In the present case, by filing show cause affidavit dated
17.06.2026, the petitioner, on the one hand seeks apology from
this court for inconvenience caused to it due to non-disclosure of
19
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
the fact regarding execution of the settlement agreements
between him and the opposite party nos. 3 to 14, however on the
other hand, he tries to justify his conduct by stating that the said
fact was not a material one for disposal of the writ petition being
W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024. Thus, the said show cause affidavit
also suffers from lack of bonafide.
38. So far as the conduct of the opposite party no.2 is concerned,
this court is of the view that in purported compliance of the order
of this court dated 22.10.2024, he exceeded his jurisdiction by
taking steps to demolish the structures standing over the said
land. This court had not directed the opposite party no.2 to
demolish the structures, he was rather directed to issue notices
to the opposite party nos. 3 to 14 and to hand over possession of
the said land to the petitioner, if the orders of different
forums/Courts were found intact. If the opposite party no.2 had
found that certain structures were erected over the land in
question, he was required to seek appropriate clarification of the
order of this court before taking such a drastic step of
demolishing the same. Unfortunately, the opposite party no.2
proceeded to demolish the structure standing over the said land.
The said approach and conduct of the opposite party no.2
deserve to be highly deprecated by this court. He is thus warned
to be careful in future while executing any order of the court of
law.
39. Considering the conduct of the petitioner, as discussed
hereinabove, he deserves to be imposed an exemplary cost.
20
Neutral Citation No. (2026:JHHC:22664)
Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to pay cost of Rs.1,00,000/-
(rupees one lakh) to each of the opposite party nos.3 to 14 i.e.
Rs.12.00 Lakh (rupees twelve lakh) in total within four weeks
from the date of this order. Both the parties are, however, at
liberty to take appropriate recourse as available under law with
respect to right, title and interest over the said land.
40. The contempt petition is disposed of in above terms.
41. All pending I.As, if any, are also disposed of.
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
31 July, 2026
st
Sanjay/AFR
Uploaded on 31.07.2026
21
