Telangana High Court
Smt. Manjula Ireddy vs Bandi Madhu on 23 July, 2026
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4148 of 2025
DATE OF ORDER:23.07.2026
Between:
Manjula Ireddy
.... Petitioner
And
Bandi Madhu
and nine others.
.... Respondent
ORDER:
This Civil Revision Petition is filed challenging the order dated
10.11.2025 passed by respondent No.10, vide Ref.No.D1/396/2024. By
the impugned order, the appeal filed by respondent Nos.1 to 7 was
allowed, declaring them as protected tenants, thereby, entitling them to be
issued ownership rights certificate under Section 38-E of the Telangana
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short ‘the Act, 1950’), and
further, the Tahsildar, Peddapalli was directed to take consequential steps.
2. Heard Sri Harendra Pershad, learned senior counsel, appearing for
Sri A.Naren Rudra, learned counsel-on-record for the petitioner,
Sri V.Ravinder Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for Ms. Sai Ramya
Praneetha, learned counsel-on-record for respondent Nos.1 to 7 and
learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue for respondent Nos.8
and 10.
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3. The present Civil Revision Petition arises out of a dispute
concerning land admeasuring Acs.12-37 guntas situated in Sy.Nos.575
and 632 of Peddapalli Village and Mandal, Peddapalli District.
3.1. The succinct facts of the case, necessary for disposal of the
Revision Petition, as averred in the writ affidavit are narrated as
hereunder. Respondent Nos.1 to 7 claim rights over the subject land as
legal heirs of the original protected tenant and assert entitlement to
ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act, 1950. The petitioner
disputes the claim of protected tenants and relies upon a decree passed in
O.S.No.310 of 1988, mutation proceedings and other revenue records to
substantiate her claim over the subject land; that the dispute between the
vendor of the petitioner and respondent Nos.1 to 7 persists way back from
the year 1986, when the pattadar consented to acquisition of the subject
land for house sites to weaker sections and notification under Section 4(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in 1987; that challenging the said
notification, respondent Nos.1 to 7 herein-protected tenants filed
W.P.No.9940 of 1987, however, during the pendency of the said writ
petition, the vendor of the petitioner, i.e., pattadar, and the protected
tenants entered into a compromise to share the compensation equally for
an extent of Acs.12.20 gts of land and the land owners will receive the
compensation for the remaining area of Ac.0.17 gts, which was recorded
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by this Court while disposing of the writ petition, vide Orders, dated
10.12.1987.
3.2. Thereafter, the parties herein have filed WPNos.15337 of 1988,
14330 of 1991 and 13482 of 1992 before this Court with regard to
acquisition of land, which were disposed of with certain directions, the
particulars of which are not mentioned as subsequent thereto, much water
has flown. Ultimately, against the order dated 16.08.1991 passed in
WPNo.14330 of 1991, directing to pass Award for the entire extent of
Acs.12.37 gts of land, WA.No.1943 of 1999 was filed. The said Writ
Appeal was allowed, restricting the acquisition of land to Acs.2.36 guntas
only. In the said judgment, the Division Bench categorically observed that
the Court is not deciding the rival titles of the parties and granted liberty
to the parties to pursue their remedies in accordance with law. Pursuant to
the said judgment, the Land Acquisition Officer requested the Senior Civil
Judge to decide the rightful owner of Acs.2.36 guntas to receive
compensation.
3.3. During the pendency of the said proceedings, respondent No.8 has
considered the issue relating to grant of ownership certificates under
Section 38-E of the Act, 1950 and issued proceedings dated 20.03.2001,
vide File No.B/2862/1997, thereby granting ownership rights in favour of
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respondent Nos.1 to 7-the protected tenants for the entire extent of
Acs.12.37 gts by cancelling the 13-B Certificate of the petitioner and
pursuant thereto, ownership certificates were issued to respondent Nos.1
to 7 on 13.06.2001; that challenging the said proceedings, the petitioner
filed WPNo.16752 of 2001 and during pendency of the said Writ Petition,
respondent No.8, vide proceedings dated 18.11.2001, recalled the earlier
order dated 20.03.2001, and recognized the protected tenancy rights only
to an extent of Acs.7-36 guntas while, treating the petitioner as owner of
Acs.5-01 guntas. Subsequently, respondent Nos.1 to 7 challenged the
order, dated 18.11.2001 by filing W.P.No.22553 of 2008, which was
allowed by this Court setting aside the order dated 18.11.2001 and
remanded the matter to respondent No.8 for consideration of the matter
afresh and to pass appropriate orders. Pursuant to the said order, the
Revenue Divisional Officer/Land Reforms Tribunal, Peddapalli,
reconsidered the matter in Case No.B2/1035/2023 and by order dated
17.02.2024, rejected the claim of respondent Nos.1 to 7 for grant of
ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act, 1950, as their land holder-
Giridhar Singh was having only Acs.12.37 gts as on 01.01.1973, which is
less than one family holding.
3.4. Questioning the said order, respondent Nos.1 to 7 preferred an
appeal before respondent No.10, under Sections 90 and 92 of the Act,
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1950, who, upon consideration of the material available on record, by
order dated 10.11.2025, set aside the order, dated 17.02.2024 passed by
respondent No.8, and confirmed and restored the order dated 20.03.2001
whereby respondent Nos.1 to 7 were granted ownership certificate under
Section 38-E of the Act, 1950 in respect of the subject land admeasuring
Acs.12.37 gts. Aggrieved by the said order, dated 10.11.2025, the present
Writ Petition is filed.
4. Learned senior counsel for petitioner submitted that the impugned
order is contrary to the provisions of the Act, 1950 and the material
available on record. He further submitted respondent Nos.1 to 7 have
failed to establish that their predecessor was a protected tenant within the
meaning of the Act, 1950; and that the authorities below erred in
recognizing their claim for ownership rights under Section 38-E of the
Act,1950.
4.1. He further submitted that the respondents have taken inconsistent
pleas regarding the source of their protected tenancy rights and have relied
upon documents which do not satisfy the statutory requirements
prescribed under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder; that the
respondents failed to produce the requisite statutory records evidencing
conferment of protected tenancy status and compliance with the
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mandatory procedure for grant of ownership certificates under Section 38-
E of the Act, 1950.
4.2. He further submitted that the proceedings dated 20.03.2001
granting ownership certificates in favour of respondent Nos.1 to 7 to an
extent of Acs.12.37 gts had already been recalled by order dated
18.11.2001 and, therefore, order dated 20.03.2001 ceased to exist in the
eye of law.
4.3. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that W.P.No.22553 of
2008 filed against the order dated 18.11.2001, was disposed of, remanding
the matter for consideration afresh, which does not amount to restoration
of the proceedings dated 20.03.2001. Therefore, respondent No.10 while
exercising appellate jurisdiction, erred in restoring and confirming the
order dated 20.03.2001.
4.4. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the respondents
approached the authorities after an inordinate and unexplained delay and
that their claim for ownership rights under Section 38-E was liable to be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches.
5. He further submitted that respondent No.10 failed to appreciate
the effect of the earlier proceedings, revenue records and other material
relied upon by the petitioner and consequently arrived at erroneous
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findings and therefore, the impugned order warrants interference by this
Court. Hence, prayed to allow the revision petition.
6. In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel for petitioner
placed reliance on the following judgments:-
7. In Raj Kishan Pershad Vs Joint Collector-I1, a Division Bench of
the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, while examining the scheme
and object of the Telangana Area Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1950, emphasized the importance of complying with the statutory
conditions governing conferment of protected tenancy and ownership
rights. The Court observed that the requirement of leaving the prescribed
family holdings with the landholder is intended to strike a balance
between the interests of landholders and tenants and is not intended to
make a prince a pauper and vice versa.
8. In Shahpurji Chenai v. M. Narayana Reddy 2, the erstwhile High
Court of Andhra Pradesh held as hereunder:-
“For a person to be treated as a protected tenant under
Section 37-A, two jurisdictional facts must exist:
(i) the person must have been holding the land as a tenant
on the relevant date; and
(ii) the landholder must have possessed land exceeding
three family holdings.”
1
2018 SCC Online Hyd 493
2
1965 SCC Online AP 143
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9. The Court further elaborated the statutory procedure under the
Hyderabad Protected Tenants Rules, 1956 and observed that the Tribunal
is required to prepare a provisional list in Form-A, invite objections,
adjudicate such objections, finalize the list and thereafter, issue Form-B
certificates to those declared as protected tenants. Mutation entries are
contemplated only after issuance of Form-B certificates.
10. In Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala 3, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, relying upon the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in Taylor
v. Taylor {(1875) 1 Ch D.426} and Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor,
{(1936) 63 IA 372} reiterated the settled principle that Where a power is
given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that
way or not at all.”
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that mandatory statutory
requirements cannot be bypassed and that non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure renders the action invalid.
12. In Islamia Arabic College, Kurnool v. Balaram Singh4, a
Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that
Section 38-E confers a special right upon a protected tenant to acquire
ownership of land in his possession only when the statutory conditions
3
1999 3 SCC 422
4
1997 SCC Online AP 260
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prescribed therein are satisfied. The Court specifically held that if the
landlord holds less than two family holdings, then the protected tenant
is not entitled to the ownership certificate.
(emphasis supplied)
13. In I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards v. Mandal Revenue
Officer 5, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
“The doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel
cannot be invoked to defeat mandatory statutory provisions.
Where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a
particular manner, non-compliance with such mandatory
requirements renders the action invalid. Such invalid action
cannot subsequently be treated as a promise or representation
so as to attract estoppel.
Permitting estoppel to override statutory provisions would
render the law meaningless and would allow authorities to
circumvent legislative mandates.”
14. In Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra v. J.K. Synthetics Ltd 6, the
Rajasthan High Court held that jurisdiction of a Tribunal flows from the
statute and the order of reference and not from pleadings, admissions or
consent of parties. Pleadings may explain an issue but cannot confer
jurisdiction where none exists.
5
1996 6 SCC 634
6
1995 SCC Online Raj 736
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15. In Syed Ghouse Pasha v. State of Karnataka 7, the Karnataka
High Court held that jurisdiction is a pure question of law and does not
depend upon the contentions advanced by parties or their advocates.
Jurisdiction is conferred only by statute.
16. In Bhim Bahadur v. Vikram Singh8, the Uttarakhand High Court
held that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a Court or Tribunal by
pleadings, admissions or consent of parties. The existence of jurisdiction
must be determined in accordance with law.
17. In Rukmini Debi v. Mihir Bala Sarkar 9, the Calcutta High Court,
after reviewing the law relating to estoppel, held that where jurisdiction of
a Court or Tribunal depends upon the existence of particular facts or
position prescribed by statute, representations or admissions by parties
cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court or Tribunal to adjudicate upon the
controversy involved.
18. The Court further held that the Tribunal must independently
determine whether the jurisdictional facts actually exist and there can be
no estoppel against such determination.
7
1990 SCC Online Kar 11
8
2015 SCC Online Utt 1563
9
1997 SCC Online Cal 3
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WPNo.4148 of 2025
19. In State of Gujarat v. Kothari & Associates 10, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that a plea of limitation goes to the root of the matter
and can be raised at any stage of proceedings, including for the first time
before the highest court.
20. In Boddam Narsimha v. Hasan Ali Khan11, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court considered a claim for declaration of protected tenancy
under Section 37-A and grant of ownership rights under Section 38-E
raised for the first time in 1998, despite Section 37-A having come into
force in 1956 and the alleged protected tenant having died in 1975 without
ever asserting such rights. The claimant argued that a statutory right of
protected tenancy is not lost by delay and that no application is
contemplated under Section 37-A. Rejecting the contention, the Supreme
Court noted that no explanation whatsoever had been furnished for the
delay of more than four decades in invoking the provisions of the Act. The
Court upheld the dismissal of the claim on the ground of delay and laches
and affirmed the decision of this Court, holding that stale claims under
Sections 37-A and 38-E cannot be entertained after an inordinate and
unexplained lapse of time.
10
2016 14 SCC 761
11
2007 11 SCC 410
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WPNo.4148 of 2025
21. In V. Ramaswamy v. State of Telangana 12, this Court
categorically held that although the statute may not prescribe a specific
limitation period for seeking relief under Section 38-E(2), such
applications must nevertheless be made within a reasonable time.
Unexplained and inordinate delay may disentitle a claimant from
obtaining relief.
22. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the
predecessors of respondent Nos.1 to 7 were duly recognized as protected
tenants and their names were reflected in the relevant tenancy and revenue
records. He further submitted that respondent No.8, after due
consideration of the material available on record, issued proceedings
dated 20.03.2001 granting ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act,
1950, to respondent Nos.1 to 7 and consequently, ownership certificates
dated 13.06.2001 were validly issued to them.
22.3. He further submitted that the order dated 18.11.2001, re-calling
the earlier order, dated 20.03.2001, was set aside on the ground of lack of
authority and jurisdiction of RDO, and not on merits as the competent
authority had no statutory power of review under the provisions of the
Act. Therefore, there is no illegality or irregularity in the order of District
Collector in restoring the proceedings dated 20.03.2001.
12
2021 SCC Online TS 947
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WPNo.4148 of 2025
22.4. Learned Senior Counsel specifically submitted that, despite
being aware of compromise entered into between the pattadar and the
protected tenants regarding apportionment of compensation, the petitioner
got her name recorded only to an extent of Acs.5-01 guntas, although she
subsequently relied upon a consent decree passed in OS.No.310 of 1988
claiming rights over the entire extent of Acs.12-37 guntas.
22.5. He further submitted that the landowner and the tenants have
already entered into compromise and filed a memo to that effect in
WP.No.9940 of 1987, basing on which, the said Writ Petition was
disposed of and therefore, the landowner is estopped from filing a consent
written statement in OS.No.310 of 1988.
22.6. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the date of
purchase by the petitioner was shown as 24.03.1974 in Form 13-C and
that, as on the said date, the petitioner would have been aged about 14
years only. According to him, the petitioner being a minor at the relevant
point of time, she could not have validly entered into a sale transaction
with the landholders. He further contended that the petitioner was stated
to be unmarried at the time of filing of the suit, whereas in the suit
proceedings her surname was shown as “Ireddy”, which is stated to be the
surname of her husband. On the strength of these factual aspects, learned
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Senior Counsel contended that the consent decree relied upon by the
petitioner is not genuine and is a collusive one.
22.7. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that respondent
No.10, upon a detailed consideration of the entire material available on
record, rightly concluded that respondent Nos.1 to 7 were entitled to
ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act, 1950. He further
submitted that the petitioner, having herself acknowledged the status of
respondent Nos.1 to 7 and their predecessors as tenants in several earlier
proceedings, cannot now be permitted to dispute the same.
22.8. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the contention of
the petitioner that the landholders did not possess more than two standard
holdings and therefore, respondent Nos.1 to 7 were not entitled to be
declared as protected tenants is untenable. He further submitted that the
proceedings dated 20.03.2001 and 18.11.2001 specifically record that the
holdings of the landholders were calculated and that the respondents were
found entitled to the benefits of the Act, 1950. He further submitted that in
the impugned order, respondent No.10 at para-13 has categorically
recorded that a provisional list had been prepared in the year 1975 under
the A.P. (Telangana Area) Protected Tenants (Transfer of Ownership of
Lands Rules, 1973, wherein the holdings of the protected tenants and the
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landholders were duly calculated and hence, the consent decree relied
upon by the petitioner is collusive and void.
22.9. He further submitted that the consent decree obtained by the
petitioner requires registration, since the same confers rights in
immovable property. However, in the present case, the consent decree is
not registered, therefore, the same cannot be implemented.
30. By contending as above, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
respondent Nos.1 to 7 finally submitted that the impugned order does not
suffer from any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error warranting
interference by this Court and hence, the Writ Petition being devoid of
merits is liable to be dismissed.
31. In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel for
respondent Nos.1 to 7 placed reliance on the following judgments:
32. In K. Raghunandan and others v. Ali Husain and others 13, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“A statute must be construed having regard to the purpose and
object thereof. If a right is created by a compromise decree or is
extinguished, it must compulsorily be registered if the
compromise decree comprises immovable property which was not
the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding. Clause (vi) is an
exception to the exception. If the latter part of clause (vi) of sub-
13
2008 13 SCC 102
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WPNo.4148 of 2025section (2) of Section 17 of the Act applies, the first part thereof
shall not apply.??
33. In Khushi Ram and Others v. Nawal Singh and others 14, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-
“The legal position qua clause (vi) can, on the basis of the
aforesaid discussion, be summarised as below: (1)
Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the
compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp duty
and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not
require registration. In a converse situation, it would require
registration. (2) If the compromise decree were to create for
the first time right, title or interest in immovable property of
the value of Rs.100 or upwards in favour of any party to the
suit, the decree or order would require registration. (3) If the
decree were not to attract any of the clauses of sub-section
(1) of Section 17 of the Registration Act, as was the position
in the aforesaid Privy Council and this Court’s cases, it is
apparent that the decree would not require registration.”
34. In State of West Bengal and Others Vs Jai Hind 15, the Hon’ble
Apex Court, at paras 31, 47, 48 and 49 of the judgment, has held that the
power of review is not an inherent power and can be exercised only when
it is expressly conferred by the statute or arises by necessary implication.
It was held that quasi-judicial authorities, being creatures of statute, are
confined to the powers specifically vested in them and, in the absence of a
14
2021 16 SCC 729
15
2026 SCC Online SC 157
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statutory provision, they cannot review or reopen their own orders on
merits. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that recognising such an
implied power of review by executive authorities exercising quasi-judicial
functions would amount to enlarging their jurisdiction and virtually
converting them into civil Courts or judicial tribunals, which would be
contrary to the settled principles governing the exercise of quasi-judicial
powers.
35. In SUPDT of Taxes , Tinsukia and Others v. Thanai Tea
Estate16, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-
“The doctrine of estoppel by conduct means that where one by
words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe in the
existence of certain state of things and induces him to act on
that belief, or to alter his own previous position, the former
is concluded from averring against the latter a different state
of things as existing at that time. The fundamental
requirement as to estoppel by conduct is that the estoppel
must concern an existing state of facts.”
36. In Chagan Lal Keshavlal Mehta Vs Patel Narandas Haribhai 17,
the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-
“The difference between an admission and estoppel is a
marked one. Admissions being declarations against an
interest are good evidence but they are not conclusive and
a party is always at liberty to withdraw admissions by
16
1976 1 SCC
17
1982 1 SCC 223
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WPNo.4148 of 2025proving that they are either mistaken or untrue. But
estoppel creates an absolute bar.
It may be pointed out that estoppel deals with questions
of facts and not of rights. A man is not estopped from
asserting a right which he had said that he will not assert.
It is also a well-known principle that there can be no
estoppel against a statute”.
37. In Raja Gounder and Others v. M. Sengodan and others 18, the
Hon’ble Hon’ble Apex Court observed that, under Section 17 of the
Evidence Act, an admission is a statement, oral or documentary,
suggesting an inference as to a fact in issue or a relevant fact. It held that
an admission is a conscious, deliberate and voluntary acknowledgment of
the existence of certain facts during judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
Such an admission dispenses with the need for the opposite party to prove
the admitted fact and constitutes the best evidence against the maker,
though it is not conclusive and may be explained or withdrawn in
accordance with law. The Court further clarified that Section 17 cannot be
read in isolation and must be construed along with the other provisions
relating to admissions under the Evidence Act.
38. In Kotaiah v. Property Association of the Baptist Churches (pvt
Ltd)19, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
18
2024 12 SCC 350
19
1989 3 SCC 424
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WPNo.4148 of 2025“Firstly, there cannot be any dispute in this case about the
protected tenancy rights of the appellants. The revenue
documents like Pahanipatrika and final record of
agricultural tenancy clearly establish that the appellants
were recognised as protected tenants. Secondly, it was not
the case of the Association that Rev. Rutar Ford Padri and
Vundru Padri first offered the land to the appellants before
they transferred the same to the Association. Therefore, in
the light of the statutory provisions to which we have called
attention, the Association’s title cannot be said to be
legitimate.
39. In B.Bal Reddy v. Teegala Narayana Reddy and Others 20, the
Hon’ble Apex Court held that Section 38-D of the Act, 1950, mandates
that where a landholder intends to alienate land held by a protected tenant,
the land must first be offered to the protected tenant by issuing a written
notice. Only upon the protected tenant declining or failing to exercise the
right of purchase, the land be sold to a third party. Any alienation made in
contravention of Section 38-D is void and has no legal effect.
Consequently, a purchaser under such an invalid transaction acquires no
locus standi or enforceable rights. The Court further reiterated that the
status of a protected tenant continues until it is validly terminated in
accordance with the Act, and mere loss of physical possession does not
extinguish such status. As long as the protected tenancy subsists,
ownership stands transferred by operation of Section 38-E, and an
20
2016 15 SCC 102
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ownership certificate issued under Section 38-E(2), after due enquiry,
constitutes conclusive evidence of the protected tenant’s title.
40. In Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major 21, the Supreme Court held
that, while considering the applicability of Section 17(2)(vi) of the
Registration Act, the Court must examine whether the parties merely
recognised or declared a pre-existing right in the immovable property, or
whether the compromise decree, for the first time, created new right, title
or interest or agreed or suffered to extinguish the same, in immovable
property valued at Rs.100 or more. In the latter case, the decree is
compulsorily registerable. The Court further summarised that a bona fide
compromise decree relating to the subject matter of the suit and
recognising pre-existing rights does not require registration. However,
registration becomes mandatory where the compromise is a device to
evade the registration law or stamp duty, where it creates rights in
immovable property for the first time, or where it deals with property that
was not the subject matter of the suit or proceeding.
41. In Ram Chandra v. Man Singh22, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as
under:
21
1995 5SCC 709
22
1967 2 SCR 77
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WPNo.4148 of 2025“It is now a well-settled principle that, if a decree is passed
against a minor without appointment of a guardian, the decree
is a nullity and is void and not merely voidable.”
42. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions
advanced by the learned senior counsels appearing for both the parties and
perused the entire material available on record vis-Ã -vis the citations
relied upon by the learned counsel for both the parties.
43. The following issues arise for consideration:
(1) Whether respondent Nos.1 to 7 have established their entitlement
to ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Telangana Area
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 in respect of the
subject land?
(2) Whether the District Collector was justified, while exercising
appellate jurisdiction, in setting aside the order dated 17.02.2024
passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer/Land Reforms Tribunal
and restoring the proceedings dated 20.03.2001 in File
No.B/2862/1997 together with the consequential ownership
certificates dated 13.06.2001?
44. Before delving into the merits of the case, this Court deems it
appropriate to deal with and answer the second issue being the foremost
issue and since the same goes to the very root of the matter and pertains to
the legality of the impugned order passed by respondent No.1 in statutory
appeal, in restoring the order dated 20.03.2001 of the Revenue Divisional
Officer.
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WPNo.4148 of 2025
Issue No.2:-
45. A perusal of the material available on record discloses that
respondent Nos.1 to 7 are claiming ownership rights under Section 38-E
of Act, 1950 as the legal heirs of the original protected tenant. Their
names are also reflected in the Protected Tenancy Register, Record of
Agricultural Tenancies and other revenue records. The petitioner disputes
the very entitlement of respondent Nos.1 to 7 to claim ownership rights
under Section 38-E and has questioned the statutory compliance required
under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
46. The material placed on record further reflects that there are serious
disputes with regard to the petitioner’s title, including the recital in Form
13-C showing the date of purchase by the petitioner as 24.03.1974, by
which date, she was aged only 14 years; the description of her surname as
“Ireddy” in the civil suit proceedings, being the surname of her husband,
though it is contended that she was not married at the relevant point of
time; the genuineness of the compromise decree relied upon by her and
non-registration of the same as required under law; the calculation of the
landholders’ holdings; and the preparation of the provisional list under the
Rules, 1973.
47. The record discloses that the proceedings dated 20.03.2001,
whereby ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act, 1950 were
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conferred on Bandi Pullaiah, Bandi Mallaiah and Bandi Chinna Mallaiah,
predecessors of respondent Nos.1 to 7, were specifically challenged
before this Court by the petitioner herein in W.P.No.16752 of 2001.
48. At this juncture, it is apposite to mention that this Court while
registering the suo-motu contempt case-CC.No.1057 of 2001 against
respondent No.8 observed that in WP.No.9940 of 1987, this Court has not
only recorded the compromise, but also directed that compensation be
paid as per the compromise, which shows the shares of respondent Nos.1
to 7 and the vendor of the petitioner herein as Acs.6.27 gts and Acs.6.10
gts respectively. It is thus clear that the Court having examined the
compromise filed by the parties, recorded the same and ultimately, the
terms of compromise entered into by and between the parties culminated
into passing of final order, dated 10.12.1987, in WPNo.9940 of 1987.
49. This Court has taken note of the fact that respondent No.8 in the
order, dated 30.03.2001, observed that the very compromise entered into
by the land holders and protected tenants itself is illegal and become void
under the provisions of Tenancy laws, held that the said observations by
respondent No.8 amounts to blatant contempt of orders passed in
WPNo.9940 of 1987 and accordingly, issued Form-I notice, dated
13.08.2001, to respondent No.8.
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WPNo.4148 of 2025
50. Thus, from the above, it is obvious that this Court having held that
the order dated 20.03.2001 was found to be prima facie contemptuous,
initiated suo-moto contempt proceedings in CC.No.1057 of 2001, vide
order dated 13.08.2001, pursuant to which the Revenue Divisional
Officer, Peddapalli-respondent No.8 recalled the earlier proceedings dated
20.03.2001 by issuing proceedings dated 18.11.2001. In view of such
recalling of order dated 20.03.2001, W.P.No.16752 of 2001 was dismissed
as infructuous. The validity of the said recall proceedings, dated
18.11.2001, was thereafter questioned before this Court in W.P.No.22553
of 2008, and this Court vide orders dated 03.01.2023 disposed of the Writ
Petition, setting aside the recall proceedings dated 18.11.2001 and
remanded the matter to respondent No.8 for fresh consideration after
affording opportunity to all the parties concerned.
51. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the Revenue Divisional
Officer/Land Reforms Tribunal reconsidered the entire matter afresh and
passed a detailed order dated 17.02.2024 in Case No.B2/1035/2023
rejecting the claim of respondent Nos.1 to 7 for issuance of protected
tenancy certificates. Aggrieved by the said order, respondent Nos.1 to 7
preferred an appeal before respondent No.10, who, after examination of
the pleadings, evidence and the statutory requirements governing
conferment of ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act, 1950,
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LNA, J
WPNo.4148 of 2025
proceeded to restore and confirm the proceedings dated 20.03.2001 and
the consequential ownership certificates under Section 38-E of the Act,
1950 dated 13.06.2001 instead of passing an independent order.
52. In the impugned order, respondent No.10, having considered the
documents, written statements, arguments advanced on behalf of the
parties, etc., has observed that respondent No.8 has no inherent power to
review or recall his own order and accordingly, held that the recall order,
dated 18.11.2001, passed by respondent No.2, without jurisdiction and
without notice to the tenant, is a nullity.
53. Here, it is trite to note that this Court in CC.No.1057 of 2001 has
prime facie found the order, dated 20.3.2001, passed by respondent No.8
to be contemptuous in nature, it being utter and blatant violation of orders
passed by this Court in WPNo.9940 of 1987.
54. In such circumstances, respondent No.10, who is an appellate
authority, while entertaining the appeal and considering the same on
merits, ought to have adjudicated the matter afresh, recorded the findings
independently and disposed of the appeal. Instead, respondent No.10
committed error in restoring the order, dated 20.03.2001, which was
already found to be contemptuous by this Court in CC.No.1057 of 2001,
vide orders dated 13.08.2001, and committed a jurisdictional error,
therefore, impugned order cannot be legally sustained.
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WPNo.4148 of 2025
55. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order
dated 10.11.2025 suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity and cannot be
sustained on that ground alone. Since the appellate authority has failed to
apply his mind and has instead proceeded to restore the earlier
proceedings dated 20.03.2001, the matter requires reconsideration.
Issue No.1:-
56. In view of the findings of this Court on issue No.2, this Court does
not deem it appropriate to delve into merits of the case to adjudicate this
issue.
57. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 10.11.2025, passed by
respondent No.10 in Ref.No.D1/396/2024 is hereby set aside and the
matter is remanded to respondent No.10 for fresh consideration of the
appeal preferred by respondent Nos.1 to 7 against the order dated
17.02.2024 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer/Land Reforms
Tribunal. Respondent No.10-District Collector shall afford reasonable
opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned, independently consider
the rival contentions, the material available on record and the statutory
requirements governing Section 38-E of the Act, 1950, and pass a
reasoned order strictly in accordance with law, without being influenced
by the observations contained in the proceedings dated 20.03.2001.
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WPNo.4148 of 2025
58. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the rival claims, and all contentions are left open to be urged
before respondent No.10-District Collector.
59. Subject to the above observations and directions, the Civil
Revision Petition is disposed of.
60. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. No
costs.
___________________________________
LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J
Date:23.07.2026
Dr
