Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Madan Lal vs Ut Of J&K And Others on 30 July, 2026
Author: Rajnesh Oswal
Bench: Rajnesh Oswal
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU &KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
...
HCP No. 163/2025
Reserved on: 23.07.2026
Pronounced on: 30.07.2026
Uploaded on: 30.07.2026
Whether the operative part or full
Judgment is pronounced: Full
Madan Lal
.......Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. Akarshan Magotra, Advocate
Vs.
UT of J&K and others
.....Respondent(s)
ThroughMr. Sumeet Bhatia, GA
CORAM: HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. Through the medium of the present petition, the petitioner has challenged
the Order No. 11-PSA-2025 dated 11.09.2025 (hereinafter referred to as
“the detention order”) passed by respondent No. 5-the District Magistrate,
Udhampur (hereinafter referred to as “the detaining authority”), whereby
the petitioner has been detained under the provisions of the Jammu and
Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, on the ground of his activities
prejudicial to the maintenance of public peace and order.
2. The petitioner has assailed the detention order on the following grounds:
(i) That in FIR No. 71/1989 registered at Police Station, Chenani
under Sections 382, 332 and 148 RPC; FIR No. 107/1989
registered at Police Station, Chenani under Sections 341, 323, 294,
354 and 34 RPC; FIR No. 116/1998 registered at Police Station,
Chenani under Section 376 RPC; and FIR No. 130/2013 registered
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344at Police Station, Kud under Sections 294, 509 and 34 RPC, the
petitioner has been acquitted by the learned trial courts. In FIR No.
36/2005 registered at Police Station, Kud under Sections 341 and
323 RPC, the matter was compromised. In FIR No. 17/2017
registered at Police Station, Kud under Sections 353, 458, 336, 341
and 506 RPC; FIR No. 37/2018 registered at Police Station, Kud
under Sections 452, 504, 506, 323 and 34 RPC; FIR No. 29/2023
registered at Police Station, Kud under Sections 341 and 323 IPC;
FIR No. 30/2024 registered at Police Station, Kud under Sections
341, 323, 382, 511 and 147 RPC; and FIR No. 07/2025 registered
at Police Station, Kud under Sections 191(2), 304, 125, 351 and
352 of the BNS, the charge-sheets have been filed and the cases are
pending trial. It is contended that the allegations forming the
subject matter of the aforesaid FIRs pertain to isolated personal
disputes having no nexus with the maintenance of public order. As
such, the impugned order of detention is unsustainable in law.
(ii) That the petitioner was not furnished the grounds of detention in a
language understood by him, i.e. Hindi/Dogri. It is further
contended that the detaining authority failed to arrive at the
requisite subjective satisfaction before passing the impugned order
of detention.
(iii) That the detaining authority failed to forward the petitioner’s
representation to the Advisory Board within the prescribed time. It
is submitted that the petitioner signed the representation dated
28.10.2025 at Central Jail, Kot Bhalwal, which was attested by the
Assistant Superintendent, Central Jail, Kot Bhalwal on 30.10.2025.
The representation was received in the office of the detaining
authority on 04.11.2025 but was forwarded only on 10.11.2025.
According to the petitioner, had the respondents acted with due
promptitude and followed the prescribed procedure, the
representation would have reached the Advisory Board before the
confirmation of the detention. Thus, it is contended that the
confirmation order dated 06.11.2025 is also vitiated in law.
HCP No. 163/2025 Page 2 of 11
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344
(iv) That the petitioner has been falsely implicated in FIR No. 07/2025
and that, thereafter, no further incident has occurred or been
reported against him which could justify the passing of the
impugned order of detention.
(v) That the impugned order of detention has been passed with the sole
object of circumventing the ordinary criminal law and depriving the
petitioner of his legal remedies by confining him within the four
walls of the jail, thereby preventing him from effectively defending
himself in the pending criminal proceedings.
3. Counter-affidavit has been filed by respondent No. 5, wherein it is stated
that the petitioner is a habitual criminal, against whom as many as ten
FIRs have been registered. It is averred that, in order to prevent the
petitioner from indulging in further criminal activities, his detention under
the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 became
imperative, and accordingly, he was detained in terms of the impugned
order of detention. It is further stated that a copy of the detention order,
alongwith the notice of detention, grounds of detention, dossier and all
other material relied upon by the detaining authority, was duly furnished
to the detenue on 04.10.2025 through the Executing Officer, PSI, Syed
Umar Shah. The contents of the detention order and the grounds of
detention were read over and explained to the detenue in Hindi/Dogri
languages understood by him, and, in token of having understood the
same, the detenue acknowledged their receipt by affixing his signatures
thereon. It is also stated that the detenue was informed of his right to
make a representation against the order of detention to the detaining
authority as well as to the Government. The specific stand taken by
respondent No. 5 is that all the constitutional and procedural safeguards
HCP No. 163/2025 Page 3 of 11
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344
envisaged under the Constitution and the Jammu and Kashmir Public
Safety Act, 1978 were strictly complied with, both at the time of passing
and executing the impugned order of detention.
4. Mr. Akarshan Magotra, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
the last alleged activity attributed to the petitioner dates back to February
2025, when FIR No. 07/2025 was registered at Police Station, Kud. Since
then, the petitioner has not engaged in any conduct justifying preventive
detention under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. In
support, learned counsel relied upon the decision of a Coordinate Bench
of this Court in Abdul Karim v. Union Territory of J&K & Ors.(HCP
No. 132/2025, decided on 06.06.2026), contending that the DDR entries
relied upon by the respondents could not carry identical serial numbers, as
DDRs are legally maintained in a running numerical sequence.
5. Per contra, Mr. Sumeet Bhatia, learned Government Advocate, submitted
that the petitioner is a habitual offender with a history of criminal
involvement, leaving the Detaining Authority with no alternative but to
issue the impugned detention order. He further contended that all
procedural and constitutional safeguards under the Jammu and Kashmir
Public Safety Act, 1978 and the Constitution of India were meticulously
followed while passing and executing the detention order.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, including the
detention record.
7. So far as the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is
concerned, it is pertinent to note that Daily Diary Reports (DDRs) are
maintained on a daily basis, wherein serial numbering recommences from
HCP No. 163/2025 Page 4 of 11
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344
No. 01 for each date, rather than running in an uninterrupted, continuous
sequence across days. Consequently, while the dates of entries may differ,
their corresponding serial numbers may coincide. Therefore, the reliance
placed by the petitioner on the decision in Abdul Karim v. Union
Territory of J&K & Ors. (supra) is misplaced and does not advance his
case, nor does it afford a valid ground to quash the impugned detention
order. The principles laid down by the Coordinate Bench in the cited
judgment apply strictly to FIRs, which follow a continuous annual serial
sequence, and have no application to DDR entries, which are reset daily.
8. However, the record demonstrates that the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Udhampur, by way of a dossier dated 07.08.2025, proposed the
petitioner’s preventive detention under the Jammu and Kashmir Public
Safety Act, 1978 to respondent No. 5. Acting upon the said dossier, the
Detaining Authority formulated the grounds of detention and passed the
impugned order. Perusal of the grounds of detention reflects that ten FIRs
registered against the petitioner were taken into account. Crucially, both
the dossier and the grounds of detention establish that the Detaining
Authority was fully cognizant that the petitioner stood acquitted in four
cases, that one case had culminated in a compromise, and that trial was
pending in the remaining five FIRs.
9. In FIR No. 07/2025, the allegations against the petitioner are that on
17.02.2025 at about 1930 hrs, one Shamim Ahmad appeared at Police
Station, Kud and submitted a written application in Urdu. In the said
application, he alleged that he was awarded the contract for the
construction of pillars from Karlah to Latti and on 15.02.2025, at about
HCP No. 163/2025 Page 5 of 11
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344
5:30 p.m., while labourers were engaged in the construction of pillars at
Gali, six unknown individuals suddenly arrived at the site, abused the
labourers and, when questioned, started demolishing the constructed
pillars. They also allegedly snatched the tools being used for the
construction work. During investigation, one of the alleged assailants was
identified as Mohan Lal. On the basis of the said complaint, FIR No.
07/2025 came to be registered at Police Station, Kud under Sections
191(2), 304, 125, 352 and 351 of the BNS.
10. In the opinion of this Court, the allegations in the aforementioned FIR fail
to fall within the purview of activities adversely affecting public order in
terms of Section 8 (3) (b) of the Act. The alleged conduct, at most,
amounts to a breach of law and order. Consequently, the petitioner could
not have been lawfully detained under the Act. The other FIRs are stale
and remote, and therefore cannot form a valid basis for upholding the
detention order.
11. In “Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana“, (2021) 9 SCC 415, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:
“13. As is well-known, the expressions “law and order”, “public
order”, and “security of State” are different from one another.
In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, the question before this
Court arose under a preventive detention order made under Rule 30
of the Defence of India Rules, which permits apprehension and
detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. This Court set out the distinction
between a mere law and order disturbance and a public order
disturbance as follows:
“42. The Defence of India Act and the Rules speak of the
conditions under which preventive detention under the Act can
be ordered. In its long title and the preamble the Defence of
India Act speaks of the necessity to provide for special
measures to ensure public safety and interest, the defence ofHCP No. 163/2025 Page 6 of 11
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344India and civil defence. The expression “public safety” and
interest between them indicate the range of action for
maintaining security, peace and tranquillity of India whereas the
expressions “defence of India” and “civil defence” connote
defence of India and its people against aggression from outside
and action of persons within the country. These generic terms
were used because the Act seeks to provide for a congeries of
action of which preventive detention is just a small part. In
conferring power to make rules, Section 3 of the Defence of
India Act enlarges upon the terms of the preamble by
specification of details. It speaks of defence of India and civil
defence and public safety without change but it expands the idea
of public interest into maintenance of public order, the efficient
conduct of military operations and maintaining of supplies and
services essential to the life of the community. Then it mentions
by way of illustration in clause (15) of the same section the
power of apprehension and detention in custody of any person
whom the authority empowered by the rules to apprehend or
detain (the authority empowered to detain not being lower in
rank than that of a District Magistrate), suspects, on grounds
appearing to that authority to be reasonable–
(a) of being of hostile origin; or
(b) of having acted, acting or being about to act or being likely
to act in a manner prejudicial to–
(i) the defence of India and civil defence;
(ii) the security of the State;
(iii) the public safety or interest;
(iv) the maintenance of public order;
(v) India’s relations with foreign States;
(vi) the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part or area
of India; or
(vii) the efficient conduct of military operations.
It will thus appear that security of the State, public safety or
interest, maintenance of public order and the maintenance of
peaceful conditions in any part or area of India may be viewed
separately even though strictly one clause may have an effect or
bearing on another. Then follows Rule 30, which repeats the
above conditions and permits detention of any person with a
view to preventing him from acting in any of the above ways.
The argument of Dr Lohia that the conditions are to be
cumulatively applied is clearly untenable. It is not necessary to
analyse Rule 30 which we quoted earlier and which follows the
scheme of Section 3(15). The question is whether by taking
power to prevent Dr Lohia from acting to the prejudice of “law
HCP No. 163/2025 Page 7 of 11
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344
and order” as against “public order” the District Magistrate went
outside his powers.
***
51. We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the
Defence of India Rules which permits apprehension and
detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a
person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended
result. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance
of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum
which includes at one end small disturbances and at the
other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the
expression “public order” take in every kind of disorders or
only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish
“public order” from “law and order” because the latter
undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed,
must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does
not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel
and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can
be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order
but cannot be detained on the ground that they were
disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were
of rival communities and one of them tried to raise
communal passions. The problem is still one of law and
order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder.
Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law
always affects order but before if can be said to affect public
order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A
mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is
thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence
of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public
order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under
Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in
aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary
circumstances.
52. It will thus appear that just as “public order” in the rulings
of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of
less gravity than those affecting “security of State”, “law and
order” also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those
affecting “public order”. One has to imagine three concentric
circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which
is the next circle representing public order and the smallest
circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an
act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act
HCP No. 163/2025 Page 8 of 11
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344
may affect public order but not security of the State. By using
the expression “maintenance of law and order” the District
Magistrate was widening his own field of action and was adding
a clause to the Defence of India Rules.”
14. There can be no doubt that for “public order” to be
disturbed, there must in turn be public disorder. Mere
contravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminal
breach of trust certainly affects “law and order” but before it
can be said to affect “public order”, it must affect the
community or the public at large.”
(emphasis added)
12. Furthermore, the record does not disclose that, subsequent to the aforesaid
incident, the petitioner indulged in any further criminal activity prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order. Reference has also been made to
preventive proceedings under Section 129 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) dated 09.06.2025, as well as Daily Diary
Report (DDR) Entries No. 13 dated 19.05.2025, No. 09 dated 16.06.2025,
No. 04 dated 26.06.2025, No. 11 dated 01.07.2025, and No. 16 dated
11.07.2025, recorded at Police Station, Kud. Insofar as the preventive
measures under Section 129 BNSS are concerned, the record attributes no
fresh illegal activity to the petitioner. It merely reveals that the petitioner
was produced before the Executive Magistrate 1st Class, Chenani, on
09.06.2025. The initiation of said proceedings, by itself, does not disclose
any overt act or subsequent conduct on the part of the petitioner
warranting his preventive detention.
13. So far as the other DDR entries for the year 2025 are concerned, including
Entry No. 13 dated 19.05.2025, there is merely a general reference,
without any specificity, alleging that the petitioner, Madan Lal, along with
his sons, is involved in criminal activities prejudicial to the peace and
tranquillity of the area, such as damaging forest land and creating an
HCP No. 163/2025 Page 9 of 11
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344
atmosphere of fear among local residents. However, even these DDR
entries fail to disclose any specific incident or fresh illegal activity
directly attributable to the petitioner.
14. Thus, it is evident that, after the registration of FIR No. 07/2025 at Police
Station, Kud under Sections 191(2), 304, 125, 351 and 352 of the BNS in
February, 2025, no further illegal activities have been attributed to the
petitioner. Had respondent No. 5 been genuinely satisfied that the
activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order, the detention order would have been passed forthwith upon the
registration of the aforesaid FIR on 17.02.2025, rather than after an
unexplained delay. Instead, the impugned order of detention came to be
issued only on 11.09.2025. There is, therefore, an unexplained delay of
nearly seven months between the last alleged prejudicial activity
attributed to the petitioner and the passing of the impugned order of
detention. In the absence of any material indicating the petitioner’s
involvement in any intervening prejudicial activity, such unexplained
delay snaps the live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial
activities and the purpose sought to be achieved by issuing the order of
preventive detention.
15. It would be apt to take note of the judgment of the Apex Court in case
titled, „Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik vs. State of Maharashtra‟ reported
in (2012) 8 SCC 233. The relevant paragraph Nos. 27 and 28 read as
under:-
“27) As regards the second contention, as rightly pointed out by
learned counsel for the appellant, the delay in passing the detention
order, namely, after 15 months vitiates the detention itself. TheHCP No. 163/2025 Page 10 of 11
2026:JKLHC-JMU:2344question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating
to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the
order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and
the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case. Though there is no hard and fast rule
and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf,
however, when there is undue and long delay between the
prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, it is
incumbent on the part of the court to scrutinize whether the
Detaining Authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and
afforded a reasonable and acceptable explanation as to why such a
delay has occasioned.
28) It is also the duty of the court to investigate whether casual
connection has been broken in the circumstance of each case. We
are satisfied that in the absence of proper explanation for a period
of 15 months in issuing the order of detention, the same has to be
set aside. Since, we are in agreement with the contentions relating
to delay in passing the Detention Order and serving the same on
detenue, there is no need to go into the factual details.”
16. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the considered
opinion that on this ground as well, the detention of the petitioner cannot
be sustained.
17. Thus, the present petition is allowed and order No. 11-PSA of 2025 dated
11.09.2025, passed by respondent No. 5-the District Magistrate,
Udhampur, is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to release the
petitioner forthwith from preventive custody, provided he is not required
in connection with any other case.
18. The detention record, as produced, be returned to the learned GA.
(Rajnesh Oswal)
Judge
Jammu
30.07.2026
Karam Chand
Whether approved for reporting: Yes/No
HCP No. 163/2025 Page 11 of 11
