Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home, … vs Sukhram Rawat And Another on 24 July, 2026
Bench: Abdul Moin, Pramod Kumar Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:50588-DB HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW APPLICATION U/s 378 No. - 210 of 2023 State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home, Lucknow ..Applicant(s) Versus Sukhram Rawat and another ..Opposite Party(s) Counsel for Applicant(s) : G.A., Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Vivek Kumar Singh, Priya Singh, Trivendra Pratap Singh Court No. - 11 HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.
HON’BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
(Dictated by Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.)
Re: Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal)
1. Heard learned AGA appearing for the appellant-State of UP and perused the record.
2. The present government appeal has been preferred by the State against the judgment and order dated 17.07.2023 passed by Special Judge POCSO Act/Additional District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow in Session Trial No. 172 of 2015, arising out of Case Crime No. 423 of 2014, under Sections 363, 366, 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as I.P.C.) and Section POCSO Act, Police Station Mohanlalganj, District Lucknow.
3. By the impugned judgment dated 17.07.2023 passed in Session Trial No. 172 of 2015, the accused Sukhram Rawat was acquitted of the charges levelled against him.
4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order of acquittal, the State has filed this appeal along with application under Section 378(3) of Cr.P.C. for grant of leave to appeal against the said judgment.
5. According to the prosecution narrative, a complaint was lodged at the police station by the complainant Bajrangi stating that the incident occurred on 09.10.2014, at around 11:00 PM at night. The complainants daughter, victim, was staying at home with them until 11:00 PM. After 11.00 P.M. the complainant and his wife went to sleep. Following that, the complainants daughter-victim moved somewhere. When the complainant woke up in the morning, he found his daughter missing at home. The complainant traced his daughter among all relatives, but no whereabouts could be found. Complainant expressing confidence that his daughter went with Sukhram son of Kallu, who belongs to the same village, because Sukhram used to visit the complainant’s home daily, lodged FIR against accused. The age of the girls was narrated 16 years.
6. On the basis of the written complaint by the complainant, the case against the accused Sukhram Rawat was registered under Sections 363, 366, 376, 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3/4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act.
7. After registering Crime Case No. 423/14 against the accused Sukhram Rawat under Sections 363, 366, 376, 506 IPC and Sections 3/4 POCSO Act, the Investigating Officer (I.O.) commenced the investigation as per rules. During the course of the investigation, the I.O. inspected the crime scene and prepared a site plan. The Investigating Officer got the victims statement recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. on 09-12-2014. After reviewing the victim’s medical examination report, the I.O. made it a part of the case diary. During the investigation, upon collecting all relevant evidence and recording the statements of witnesses, and finding sufficient evidence against the accused in the present case, the I.O. submitted the charge-sheet (Exhibit K-4) to the court for trial under Sections 363, 366, 376, 506 IPC and Sections 3/4 POCSO Act.
8. After compliance of mandatory provision of Section 207 of Code of Criminal Procedure (herein after referred to as CrPC), the said case was committed to the Court of Session Judge from where it is made over to the Special Judge POCSO Act/Additional District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow for trial, who framed the charges against the accused Sukhram Rawat under Section 363, 366, 376 and 506 of I.P.C. and Section POCSO Act for which the accused persons denied and claimed to be tried.
9. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has adduced ocular evidence of informant PW-1 Bajrangi, victim PW-2, Smt Ram Dulari PW-3, Santosh Kumar PW-4, Dr. Archana Jain PW-5, Ajay Pratap Verma PW-6, S.I. Naushan Ahmad PW-7.
10. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material available on record, the learned trial court acquitted acccused Sukhram Rawat for the charge levelled against him.
11. Judgment of acquittal was passed on the ground that prosecution version is not innocment. Since the victim was major at the time of incident and after due consultation, FIR had been had been lodged. On the scrutiny of the statement of the witness it reveals that she herself left her parental house on her own accord and went with the accused and it also reflects from her evidence that she on her own free will established physical relationship with the accused and she was a consensual party. It is further observed that the victim herself proposed to the accused marry with her and she on her own violation went with the accused in several places, but nowhere she made any alarm to attract the attention of the Public. She did not resist at any place. Further observed that mother of the victim is not an eye witness in respect to the incident. The victim herself left her house, as mother was sleeping at that time.
12. Learned trial court also indicated that PW5 Dr. Archana Jain did not find any mark of injury on the private part of the victim at the time of alleged incident. Learned trial court further found that there was material contradiction and shifting of stand in the statement of victim, her statement was not wroth belief. Under such circumstances, the trial Court found that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the accused persons were given benefit of doubt and judgment of acquittal was passed.
13. Challenging to this impugned judgment. learned AGA submits that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence on record. He further submits that the prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to prove its case but learned trial court without considering the entire facts, evidences and circumstances passed the Impugned judgment and disbelieved the victim’s statement, which is not consonance with the law. He further argued that all the witnesses of fact are intact and testimony of the victim is corroborated with the medical evidence. Despite of the fact learned trial Court has given undue weightage to the defence evidence and has wrongly ignored the prosecution evidence. He further submits that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court is not one of the possible view. Submission, therefore, is that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court requires serious consideration and reversal and the accused persons herein are liable to be convicted.
14. We have considered the submissions and have perused the record.
15. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of law on the appeal against acquittal.
16. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790, in paragraph 10, the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that “the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, especially when the prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and infirmities”
17. In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words:
“The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the view formed by the trial court was a ”possible view’. The judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete misreading of the material evidence which has led to miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with. This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High Court of its powers to re-appreciate the evidence, including in an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding of fact.”
18. In a judgment of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, the law on the issue involved has been considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as under:
“10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:-
“12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more, the probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).
13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under:
“…the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.”
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).
15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:
“(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that an “order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.”
18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances includes:
i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;
iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”
11. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it is wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal.
12. The aforesaid judgments were taken note of with approval by Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166, Nagabhushan vs. State of Karnataka (2021) 5 SCC 222, and Babu (supra) in Achhar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 543.”
19. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471.
20. On perusal of material available on record, we find that the trial court has thoroughly marshaled the facts and analyze the testimony of the witnesses and specifically discussed that victim was major at the time of alleged incident. There is a delay in lodging of the FIR, no plausible explanation has been offered. On the statement of the victim PW2 has stated that she herself left her parental house and voluntarily went with the accused and established physical relationship with him, thus relationship between them was consensual. We also found find that victim has admitted that she moved many places along with accused, but nowhere she attracted the attention of public by way of raising alarm or raising resistance. PW3-Smt Ramdulari, who is the mother of victim has also stated that when she woke up she did not find her victim daughter on the bed, thus she was not an eyewitness and on the basis of information given by others, she had lodged the FIR against the accused. Dr Archana Jain- PW5 who had medically examined victim, had stated that no marks of injury was found on the private parts of the victim. We further find that by cross examination to the prosecution witnesses and by adducing defence evidence accused has created a rational doubt in the prosecution story, which could not be resolved by prosecution in way of adducing clinching, convincing cogent evidence. On close scrutiny, we also find that there is material discrepancy in the statement of the victim with regard to commission of rape and she is not a sterling witness on this point. In such view of the matter, we, therefore, find that the trial Court has taken possible view of the matter on appreciation of entire evidence on record, which cannot be substituted by this Court taking a different view as per the law discussed above.
21. Accordingly, it is not a case worth granting leave to appeal. The application for granting leave to appeal is rejected.
Re: Government Appeal
1. Consequently, since the Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal) has been rejected by order of date, the present government appeal is also dismissed.
2. Let the record of trial Court be sent back to the Court concerned along with copy of judgment and order for information.
(Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.) (Abdul Moin,J.)
July 24, 2026
Arvind
