Chattisgarh High Court
Hariram vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 27 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
CGHC010281862015 2026:CGHC:31932-DB
Digitally
signed by
ANURADHA
NAFR
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI Date:
2026.07.29
09:49:39
+0530 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1185 of 2015
Hariram S/o Chhabilal Sahu Aged About 78 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, Police Station Gunderdehi, District Balod Chhattisgarh.
--- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station
Gunderdehi, District Balod Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent
CRA No. 1198 of 2015
1 - Dhananjay S/o Biselal Sahu Aged About 35 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, P.S. Gunderdehi, District Balod, Chhattisgarh
2 - Pawan Kumar S/o Biselal Sahu Aged About 34 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, P.S. Gunderdehi, District Balod, Chhattisgarh
3 - Deolal S/o Ramesh Sahu Aged About 20 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, P.S. Gunderdehi, District Balod, Chhattisgarh
4 - Romlal S/o Dhanesh Sahu Aged About 45 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, P.S. Gunderdehi, District Balod, Chhattisgarh
5 - Domar S/o Premlal Sahu Aged About 38 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, P.S. Gunderdehi, District Balod, Chhattisgarh
6 - Dalsingh S/o Romlal Sahu Aged About 24 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, P.S. Gunderdehi, District Balod, Chhattisgarh , District :
Balod, Chhattisgarh
7 - Daleshwar S/o Khamhanlal Sahu Aged About 21 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, P.S. Gunderdehi, District Balod, Chhattisgarh
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8 - Devendra Kumar S/o Romlal Sahu Aged About 21 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, P.S. Gunderdehi, District Balod, Chhattisgarh
---Appellants
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer Police Station
Gunderdehi, District Balod Chhattisgarh , Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent
CRA No. 1398 of 2015
1 - Ghondul Ram S/o Laduram Mahto, Aged About 60 Years R/o
Kalangpur, Police Station - Ranchirai, Distt. Balod Chhattisgarh
2 - Shatruhan Lal S/o Laduram Mahto, Aged About 65 Years R/o
Kalangur, Police Station - Ranchirai, Distt. Balod Chhattisgarh
3 - Jhaggar Singh (Died And Abated) As Per Honble Court Order Dated
27-01-2026
---Appellants
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station -
Gunderdehi, Distt. Balod Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent
CRA No. 1428 of 2015
1 - Lokesh Kumar S/o Ramadhin Sahu, Aged About 39 Years R/o
Village- Kalang Pur, P.S.- Ranchirai, Distt.- Balod, Chhattisgarh
2 - Gendu Ram S/o Kali Ram Sahu, Aged About 45 Years R/o Char
Bhatha, P.S.- Gunderdahi, Distt.- Balod, Chhattisgarh
---Appellants
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Arkshi Kendra, Gunderdahi, Distt.-
Balod, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent
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CRA No. 1196 of 2015
1 - Smt. Kamin Bai W/o Bemun Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, Police Station Gunderdehi, District Balod Chhattisgarh.
2 - Smt. Nirmala Bai W/o Romlal Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o Village
Charbhata, Police Station Gunderdehi, District Balod Chhattisgarh.
---Appellants
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station
Guderdehi, District Balod Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellants : Mr. Praveen Dhurandhar, Advocate
(In CRA Nos.1185/2015,
1196/2015 & 1198/2015)
For Appellant : Ms. Smita Jha, Advocate
(In CRA No.1398/2015)
For Appellants : Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate
(In CRA No.1428/2015)
For Respondent/State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate
General
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
27.07.2026
1. Since all the above criminal appeals arise out of the common
judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the
learned Sessions Judge in Sessions Trial No. 84/2014, involve
common questions of fact and law, and arise from the same
4
incident, they were heard analogously and are being disposed of
by this common judgment.
2. The present batch of criminal appeals has been preferred under
Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for
short, "CrPC"), namely, Criminal Appeal No.1185 of 2015 filed by
appellant Hariram; Criminal Appeal No.1196 of 2015 filed by
appellants Smt. Kamin Bai and Smt. Nirmala Bai; Criminal
Appeal No.1198 of 2015 filed by appellants Dhananjay, Pawan
Kumar, Deolal, Romlal, Domar, Dalsingh, Daleshwar and
Devendra Kumar; Criminal Appeal No.1398 of 2015 filed by
appellants Ghondul Ram, Shatruhan Lal and Jhaggar Singh;
and Criminal Appeal No.1428 of 2015 filed by appellants Lokesh
Kumar and Gendu Ram, calling in question the legality,
correctness and validity of the common judgment of conviction
and order of sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge,
Balod, District Balod, Chhattisgarh, in Sessions Trial No.84/2014,
whereby the appellants, namely Hariram, Smt. Kamin Bai, Smt.
Nirmala Bai, Dhananjay, Pawan Kumar, Deolal, Romlal,
Domar, Dalsingh, Daleshwar Devendra Kumar, Ghondul Ram,
Shatruhan Lal, Jhaggar Singh, Lokesh Kumar and Gendu
Ram, have been convicted for the offences punishable under
Sections 147, 452, 427 read with Section 149, 435 read with
Section 149, 302 read with Section 149, 307 read with Section
149 and two counts under Section 323 read with Section 149
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced as under :-
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Default
Conviction Sentence Fine
Sentence
--
Section 147 IPC RI for 1 year Nil RI for 3 Section 452 IPC RI for 3 years ₹1,000/- months Section 427 read with -- Section 149 IPC RI for 1 year Nil Section 435 read with RI for 6 Section 149 IPC RI for 3 years ₹2,000/- months Section 302 read with Imprisonment for RI for 6 Section 149 IPC ₹2,000/- Life months Section 307 read with RI for 3 Section 149 IPC RI for 7 years ₹1,000/- months Section 323 read with Section 149 IPC (Count-I) RI for 6 months Nil -- Section 323 read with Section 149 IPC (Count- RI for 6 months Nil -- II)
All the substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
3. It is an admitted position emerging from the record that as many
as twenty-four persons were sent up for trial. Upon appreciation
of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the
prosecution and the defence, the learned trial Court acquitted
eight accused persons, namely, Parmanand, Chhabilal alias
Chhaganlal, Yadram, Ramsahayak, Kaliram, Ashok Kumar,
Kunjlal and Bhushan, holding that the prosecution had failed to
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establish their complicity beyond reasonable doubt. However, the
remaining sixteen accused persons, namely, Ghondul Ram,
Dhananjay, Shatruhan Lal, Pawan Kumar, Lokesh Kumar,
Jhaggar Singh, Deolal, Romlal, Domar, Gendu Ram, Dalsingh,
Daleshwar, Devendra Kumar, Hariram, Smt. Kamin Bai and Smt.
Nirmala Bai, were found guilty and convicted for the aforesaid
offences. It is against their conviction and sentence that the
present five criminal appeals have been preferred before this
Court.
4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the incident in question
arose out of a long-standing dispute between the parties, who
were residents of neighbouring villages Charbhatha and
Kalangpur. According to the prosecution, prior animosity existed
between the complainant party and certain members of the
accused side on account of earlier village disputes. It is alleged
that on the night of the incident, a meeting was convened in the
village. While the defence asserted that the meeting was
organized in connection with an Akhand Ramayan programme,
the prosecution alleged that the accused persons had assembled
with the common object of assaulting the complainant party. The
prosecution version is principally based on the testimony of the
injured eyewitnesses, namely, PW-1 Satyavan Sahu, PW-2
Parma Bai, and PW-3 Dharmendra Kumar Sahu, as well as the
independent witnesses PW-4 Smt. Gayatri Bai and PW-9
Hemnarayan Sahu.
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5. According to the prosecution, the accused persons, armed with
lathis and other weapons, formed an unlawful assembly and
proceeded to the house of the complainant party, where the
family members were called out and assaulted. During the course
of the incident, deceased Basant was chased towards the
agricultural field of Mayaram Sahu, where he sustained fatal
injuries. PW-1 Satyavan Sahu, PW-2 Parma Bai, and PW-3
Dharmendra Kumar Sahu also sustained injuries during the
occurrence. Thereafter, some members of the unlawful assembly
trespassed into the complainant’s house, caused damage to
household articles and set the complainant’s motorcycle on fire.
Thus, according to the prosecution, the occurrence comprised
three distinct stages, namely, the initial gathering and calling out
of the complainant party, the assault resulting in the death of
Basant in the agricultural field, and the subsequent acts of house
trespass, mischief and arson.
6. On the following morning, PW-1 Satyavan Sahu lodged the First
Information Report (Ex.P/3). During investigation, PW-13 B.L.
Soni, the Investigating Officer, prepared the necessary
investigation documents, conducted the inquest, seized the
incriminating articles, arranged for the medical examination of the
injured witnesses and post-mortem examination of the deceased,
recorded the statements of witnesses under Section 161 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and, upon completion of
investigation, filed the charge-sheet against twenty-four accused
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persons for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 452,
427, 435, 302, 307 and 323 read with Section 149 of the Indian
Penal Code. Ex.P/3 has been referred to by the learned trial
Court while appreciating the evidence.
7. The accused denied the allegations and pleaded false
implication. Their principal defence was that the meeting had
been convened only for an Akhand Ramayan programme and
that they had been falsely implicated due to previous enmity.
They further contended that several names had been introduced
subsequently, material omissions and contradictions existed
between Ex.P/3, the police statements and the depositions before
the Court, and some of the accused also pleaded alibi.
8. In support of its case, the prosecution examined PW-1 Satyavan
Sahu, PW-2 Parma Bai, PW-3 Dharmendra Kumar Sahu, PW-4
Smt. Gayatri Bai, PW-5 Gorelal Jangde, PW-6 Temuram Sahu,
PW-7 Rikesh Kumar, PW-8 Dr. A.K. Sahu, PW-9 Hemnarayan
Sahu, PW-10 Dr. C.B. Prasad, PW-11 Girdharilal Yadav, PW-12
Tikendra Sahu, and PW-13 B.L. Soni (Investigating Officer),
besides relying upon the documentary evidence brought on
record. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence,
the learned Sessions Judge acquitted eight accused persons by
extending them the benefit of doubt, but held that the prosecution
had proved beyond reasonable doubt the active participation of
the remaining sixteen accused persons in the unlawful assembly
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and the commission of the offences in question. Accordingly, the
present appellants were convicted under Sections 147, 452,
427/149, 435/149, 302/149, 307/149 and two counts under
Section 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
accordingly.
9. During the course of trial, all the accused persons were examined
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. They
denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against
them in the prosecution evidence, pleaded innocence and
asserted that they had been falsely implicated due to previous
enmity. Their principal defence was that no unlawful assembly
had been formed with the object alleged by the prosecution and
that the meeting convened on the date of the incident was in
connection with an Akhand Ramayan programme. Certain
accused also raised the plea of alibi. In defence, one witness was
examined, and documentary evidence was also brought on
record in support of the defence. Upon completion of the
evidence, the learned trial Court proceeded to appreciate the oral
and documentary evidence adduced by both the prosecution and
the defence for determining the culpability of the accused
persons.
10. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence available on record, the learned Sessions Judge, by the
impugned common judgment of conviction and order of sentence
10
dated 09.09.2015 passed in Sessions Trial No.84/2014, held that
the prosecution had failed to prove the charges against eight
accused persons beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly
acquitted them of all the charges. However, the learned trial Court
found the present appellants, along with the other convicted
accused, guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 147,
452, 427 read with Section 149, 435 read with Section 149, 302
read with Section 149, 307 read with Section 149 and two counts
under Section 323 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal
Code, and sentenced them as detailed in the preceding
paragraphs of this judgment. Aggrieved by the said common
judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the present
appellants have preferred these criminal appeals before this
Court.
11. Mr. Praveen Dhurandhar, learned counsel appearing for the
appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos.1185 of 2015, 1196 of 2015
and 1398 of 2015, Ms. Smita Jha, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.1198 of 2015, and Mr. Vivek
Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Criminal
Appeal No.1428 of 2015, jointly contend that the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence suffers from patent
illegality and perversity and is liable to be set aside. They contend
that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the oral and
documentary evidence in its proper perspective and has recorded
the conviction on the basis of conjectures and surmises.
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12. Learned counsel contend that the prosecution witnesses have
made material improvements, omissions and contradictions on
vital aspects of the prosecution case, which strike at the very root
of the prosecution story. They further contend that the testimonies
of PW-1 Satyavan Sahu, PW-2 Parma Bai, PW-3 Dharmendra
Kumar Sahu, PW-4 Smt. Gayatri Bai and PW-9 Hemnarayan
Sahu do not inspire confidence and fail to establish the individual
role attributed to each of the appellants beyond reasonable
doubt.
13. Learned counsel further contend that the FIR (Ex.P/3) does not
contain the names of several appellants and that many of them
are introduced subsequently during investigation and trial.
According to them, such subsequent implication constitutes a
material improvement which renders the prosecution case
doubtful. They further contend that the prosecution fails to
establish the source of light at the place of occurrence and,
therefore, identification of the appellants during the alleged night
incident becomes highly doubtful.
14. Learned counsel further contend that the prosecution itself
alleges that the occurrence takes place in three different stages
and at different places. However, the prosecution fails to establish
the presence and participation of each appellant at every stage of
the occurrence. They argue that omnibus allegations have been
levelled against a large number of accused persons without
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assigning any specific overt act to each appellant and, therefore,
the learned trial Court has erred in invoking the provisions of
Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
15. Learned counsel further contend that the defence version that the
meeting is convened for an Akhand Ramayan programme has
not been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court. They
also contend that the plea of alibi taken by some of the appellants
and the defence evidence adduced in support thereof have not
been considered in their proper perspective.
16. Lastly, learned counsel contend that the prosecution fails to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants constitute an
unlawful assembly having the common object of committing the
alleged offences. They submit that the prosecution evidence falls
short of the standard required for recording a conviction under
Sections 302/149 and other allied provisions of the Indian Penal
Code. They, therefore, pray that the impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence be set aside, the appellants be
acquitted of all the charges by extending them the benefit of
doubt, and all the appeals be allowed.
17. Per contra, Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate
General, appearing for the State/respondent, vehemently
opposes the submissions advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the appellants and contends that the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the
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learned trial Court is well reasoned, based upon proper
appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence
available on record, and does not suffer from any illegality,
perversity or infirmity warranting interference by this Court in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
18. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the
prosecution has successfully established its case beyond all
reasonable doubt by leading cogent, convincing and reliable
evidence. He contends that the testimonies of PW-1 Satyavan
Sahu, PW-2 Parma Bai and PW-3 Dharmendra Kumar Sahu, who
are injured eyewitnesses, inspire complete confidence and stand
on a higher pedestal than that of ordinary witnesses. Their
presence at the place of occurrence cannot be doubted as they
themselves sustained injuries during the incident. Their evidence
receives substantial corroboration from the testimonies of the
independent witnesses PW-4 Smt. Gayatri Bai and PW-9
Hemnarayan Sahu, the medical evidence adduced by PW-8 Dr.
A.K. Sahu and PW-10 Dr. C.B. Prasad, as well as the evidence of
the Investigating Officer PW-13 B.L. Soni. According to him, the
evidence of these witnesses forms a complete and unbroken
chain pointing towards the guilt of the appellants.
19. Learned Additional Advocate General further contends that the
evidence of the injured eyewitnesses cannot be discarded merely
because they are related to the deceased. It is submitted that
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relationship with the deceased is not a ground to discard
otherwise trustworthy evidence. On the contrary, the injured
witnesses are natural witnesses to the occurrence and there is no
reason for them to falsely implicate the real culprits while allowing
the actual assailants to escape. Their testimonies remain
consistent on all material particulars regarding the genesis of the
occurrence, the manner in which the incident took place, and the
participation of the appellants in the unlawful assembly.
20. Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the
prosecution has been able to establish that the appellants
constituted an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons
and acted in furtherance of their common object. He contends
that the occurrence was not an isolated assault by one or two
individuals but was the result of a concerted attack by a large
group of persons who initially assembled together, called the
complainant party out of their house, chased the deceased and
the injured persons, assaulted them mercilessly, trespassed into
their house, committed mischief and set the motorcycle on fire.
Such concerted acts unmistakably establish the existence of a
common object attracting the provisions of Section 149 of the
Indian Penal Code.
21. Learned Additional Advocate General also contends that the
prosecution case cannot be discarded merely because every
witness has not assigned a specific overt act to each of the
15
appellants. According to him, where an offence is committed by
members of an unlawful assembly sharing a common object, it is
neither possible nor necessary for every eyewitness to describe
the individual role of each accused with mathematical precision.
Once the participation of the appellants as members of the
unlawful assembly is established, every member becomes
vicariously liable for the acts committed in prosecution of the
common object under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
22. Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the
alleged contradictions, omissions and discrepancies pointed out
by the appellants are trivial and insignificant and relate only to
minor details, which are natural in the testimony of witnesses who
depose after a considerable lapse of time. According to him, such
minor inconsistencies rather lend assurance to the truthfulness of
the prosecution witnesses and do not affect the substratum of the
prosecution case. The learned trial Court has meticulously
examined every contradiction and has rightly held that none of
them goes to the root of the prosecution case.
23. Learned Additional Advocate General further contends that the
contention regarding delay in lodging the First Information Report
is wholly misconceived. He submits that the incident occurred
during the night and immediately thereafter the injured witnesses
were under constant fear owing to the presence of a large
number of assailants in the village. The First Information Report
16
(Ex.P/3) was lodged on the very next morning after the
complainant party discovered the dead body of Basant in the
agricultural field. The delay, if any, stands fully explained by the
surrounding circumstances and does not cast any doubt upon the
authenticity of the prosecution case.
24. Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the
plea regarding absence of source of light or mistaken identity has
rightly been rejected by the learned trial Court. He contends that
the appellants and the prosecution witnesses belong to
neighbouring villages and were well acquainted with each other
even prior to the incident. Their identification was, therefore, not
dependent upon fleeting observation but was based upon
previous acquaintance. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses
have consistently identified the appellants during trial and their
evidence remains unshaken during cross-examination.
25. Learned Additional Advocate General also contends that the
learned trial Court has adopted a fair and balanced approach
while appreciating the evidence. He points out that out of twenty-
four accused persons sent up for trial, the learned trial Court has
acquitted eight accused by extending them the benefit of doubt
wherever the evidence was found insufficient. This itself
demonstrates that the learned trial Court has not convicted the
appellants mechanically but has carefully scrutinized the
evidence qua each accused individually before recording the
17
finding of guilt. Therefore, the conviction of the present appellants
is founded upon legally admissible and reliable evidence and
cannot be faulted merely because some co-accused have been
acquitted.
26. Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the
medical evidence completely corroborates the ocular version of
the prosecution witnesses with regard to the injuries sustained by
the deceased as well as the injured eyewitnesses. The medical
findings are wholly consistent with the prosecution version
regarding the manner of assault and completely rule out the
defence theory of false implication.
27. Lastly, learned Additional Advocate General contends that the
learned trial Court has assigned cogent, convincing and legally
sustainable reasons while recording the conviction of the
appellants. The findings recorded are based upon proper
appreciation of the entire evidence and do not suffer from
perversity, misreading of evidence or any manifest illegality. He,
therefore, prays that all the criminal appeals, being devoid of
substance, deserve to be dismissed and the impugned judgment
of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned
Sessions Judge be affirmed in toto.
28. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at
considerable length and have also carefully gone through the
entire record of the case with due circumspection.
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29. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and upon
careful perusal of the entire oral and documentary evidence
available on record, the following questions arise for
consideration in the present batch of criminal appeals:
(i) Whether the prosecution has been able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the present appellants, along
with other accused persons, constituted an unlawful
assembly having the common object of committing the
offences punishable under Sections 147, 452, 427 read
with Section 149, 435 read with Section 149, 302 read with
Section 149, 307 read with Section 149 and 323 read with
Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, and that they
actively participated in the incident resulting in the death of
Basant and causing injuries to the prosecution witnesses?
(ii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present
case, particularly in view of the evidence of the injured and
independent eyewitnesses, the existence of a large mob
comprising about 600-700 persons, the omnibus
allegations against a large number of accused, the acquittal
of eight out of twenty-four accused persons by the learned
trial Court on the same set of evidence, and the omissions
and contradictions appearing in the prosecution evidence,
the conviction and sentence recorded against the present
appellants can be sustained in law, or whether they are
entitled to the benefit of doubt?
Re: Point for Consideration No. (i)
30. The first question which falls for consideration is whether the
prosecution has been able to establish, beyond reasonable
doubt, that the present appellants, along with the other accused
19
persons, constituted an unlawful assembly sharing the common
object of committing the offences punishable under Sections 147,
452, 427 read with Section 149, 435 read with Section 149, 302
read with Section 149, 307 read with Section 149 and 323 read
with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, and that each of the
appellants was a member of such unlawful assembly and actively
participated in the commission of the offences alleged. The
answer to this question necessarily depends upon the reliability of
the ocular evidence, its consistency with the documentary and
medical evidence, and whether the prosecution has been able to
establish the identity and participation of each appellant beyond
all reasonable doubt. It is a settled principle of criminal
jurisprudence that mere presence in a crowd or at the place of
occurrence does not by itself attract the rigours of Section 149
IPC unless the prosecution further proves that the accused
shared the common object of the unlawful assembly.
31. The prosecution case principally rests upon the testimonies of
PW-1 Satyavan Sahu, PW-2 Paramabai and PW-3 Dharmendra
Kumar Sahu, all of whom are closely related to the deceased
Basant Sahu. Their evidence discloses that on the intervening
night of 7th and 8th August, 2014, several villagers came to their
residence and compelled them to attend a village meeting
(Kalamanch), where Basant was questioned regarding the
alleged assault upon village watchman Ghondul. According to
these witnesses, when Basant denied the allegation, he was
20
assaulted by several persons and was thereafter taken towards
the field of Mayaram, where his dead body was subsequently
found. While these witnesses have generally supported the
prosecution version regarding the occurrence, a careful scrutiny
of their depositions reveals material inconsistencies regarding the
identity of the assailants, the specific overt acts attributed to
individual accused, and the sequence of events after the alleged
assault commenced. Significantly, PW-1 himself admits that
immediately after the assault began he fled from the place out of
fear and, therefore, did not witness the subsequent incident which
allegedly occurred in Mayaram’s field where the deceased
ultimately succumbed to injuries. Consequently, his testimony
regarding the actual assault resulting in death is not based upon
direct observation.
32. Equally significant is the fact that PW-2 Paramabai and PW-3
Dharmendra Kumar Sahu have also admitted that an
exceptionally large number of villagers had assembled at the
meeting. PW-1 estimates the gathering to consist of about 200 to
250 persons, whereas PW-2 speaks of nearly 500 to 700
persons, and PW-3 also admits the presence of several hundred
villagers comprising men, women and children. Independent
witness PW-4 Gayatri Bai likewise deposes that about 200 to 300
villagers were present. Thus, the prosecution evidence itself
establishes that the occurrence took place in the midst of an
enormous crowd. In such circumstances, the possibility of
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confusion in identifying individual participants cannot be lightly
brushed aside. More importantly, despite such a large gathering,
the prosecution has chosen to implicate only twenty-four persons,
while numerous other villagers admittedly remained present
throughout the incident. The record is conspicuously silent as to
the basis upon which these particular individuals alone were
singled out. Such omission assumes considerable importance
while evaluating the reliability of the ocular version.
33. A further circumstance creating serious doubt is the inconsistency
regarding the number of persons who actually participated in the
assault. PW-1 admits in paragraph 31 of his cross-examination
that while lodging the First Information Report (Ex. P/3), he could
disclose the names only of those persons standing in front and
could not identify the persons standing behind. He further admits
that the police informed him that sufficient names had already
been recorded and that all participants were not named in the
FIR. This admission substantially weakens the prosecution case
because the FIR itself ceases to represent a complete account of
the alleged assailants. Moreover, PW-1 candidly admits that the
names of accused Kaminabai and Nirmalabai were not
mentioned in the FIR though they were later introduced during
investigation. Such material improvements strike at the root of the
prosecution case, particularly when the prosecution seeks to
invoke constructive liability under Section 149 IPC against every
accused.
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34. The evidence further reveals that the deceased and his family
admittedly had previous enmity with several accused persons.
PW-1 acknowledges that Basant had earlier lodged complaints
against some accused for illegally cutting Government trees and
that disputes had existed between them. PW-2 also admits that
her husband had repeatedly lodged reports against certain
accused persons. Previous enmity is undoubtedly a double-
edged weapon. While it may provide motive for commission of an
offence, it equally furnishes a motive for false implication. In a
case involving a large unlawful assembly, where identification
itself is doubtful and independent corroboration is deficient, the
existence of prior hostility assumes greater significance. It
therefore became incumbent upon the prosecution to produce
clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence identifying the specific
role of each appellant. Such standard of proof is conspicuously
absent.
35. The evidence of the so-called independent witnesses also fails to
remove these doubts. PW-4 Gayatri Bai, though supporting the
prosecution to a limited extent, specifically admits in her cross-
examination that accused Shatrughan, Ghondul, Jhaggar Singh,
Chhabilal, Paramanand and Lokesh did not assault the
complainant party and had left the meeting after the altercation
commenced. Similarly, PW-9 Hemnarayan admits that after the
dispute started, several accused persons belonging to Village
Kalangpur had left the place and did not participate in the
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subsequent assault. These admissions assume great significance
because the Trial Court itself acquitted eight accused persons on
appreciation of substantially the same evidence. Once the Court
found that the evidence was insufficient to establish participation
of eight accused despite their presence in the FIR and evidence,
the same degree of scrutiny was required while examining the
case against the present appellants. Unfortunately, the Trial Court
failed to explain why evidence considered unreliable qua eight
accused suddenly became reliable against the remaining
appellants, although all were alleged to be members of the same
unlawful assembly and were sought to be convicted on
substantially identical evidence.
36. The medical evidence led through PW-10 Dr. C.B. Prasad
establishes that deceased Basant sustained multiple incised
wounds on the scalp, fracture of the sternum and a piercing injury
to the lung resulting in haemorrhagic shock, as reflected in the
post-mortem report (Ex. P/18). The doctor categorically opined
that injuries Nos.1 to 4 were incised wounds caused by a sharp-
edged weapon and specifically admitted during cross-
examination that such injuries could not ordinarily be caused by
lathis or sticks. However, the ocular evidence of prosecution
witnesses predominantly attributes assault by lathis, fists and
kicks. The prosecution has not satisfactorily reconciled this
apparent inconsistency between the ocular and medical
evidence. The discrepancy assumes greater significance
24
because no specific accused has consistently been attributed the
use of any sharp-edged weapon causing the fatal injuries. Thus,
the medical evidence does not completely support the
prosecution version regarding the manner of assault and the role
assigned to individual appellants.
37. The law relating to conviction under Section 149 IPC is no longer
res integra. In Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202, the
Supreme Court held that where a large unlawful assembly is
involved, courts must exercise great caution before convicting
individual accused solely on omnibus allegations and must be
satisfied that reliable evidence establishes their participation.
Likewise, in Kuldip Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 324,
the Supreme Court reiterated that mere presence in an assembly
is insufficient unless the prosecution proves that the accused
shared the common object. In Roy Fernandes v. State of Goa,
(2012) 3 SCC 221, it was held that constructive liability under
Section 149 IPC cannot be invoked mechanically in the absence
of convincing evidence demonstrating membership of the
unlawful assembly and participation in furtherance of the common
object. The principles laid down in these decisions are fully
attracted to the present case where hundreds of persons were
admittedly present, individual roles remain uncertain, and
material contradictions persist regarding the participation of
several accused.
25
38. Equally instructive is the decision in Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh
v. Valerabhai Deganbhai Wagh, (2017) 3 SCC 261, wherein the
Supreme Court held that where evidence against several
accused is inseparable and some co-accused are acquitted on
identical evidence, the appellate court must carefully examine
whether the remaining convictions can safely be sustained.
Similar observations were made in Krishnan v. State of Kerala,
(1996) 10 SCC 508, wherein it was emphasised that suspicion,
however strong, cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it
becomes evident that the prosecution has relied primarily upon
omnibus allegations without satisfactorily proving the specific
participation or common object attributable to each appellant. The
acquittal of eight accused persons on substantially similar
evidence considerably weakens the prosecution case against the
remaining accused.
39. Having considered the entire oral and documentary evidence, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has
undoubtedly established that an unfortunate incident occurred in
which Basant lost his life and certain prosecution witnesses
sustained injuries. However, the crucial issue is not whether the
occurrence took place, but whether the prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the present appellants constituted
the unlawful assembly sharing the alleged common object and
participated in the commission of the offences. The cumulative
26
effect of the material contradictions in the testimony of
eyewitnesses, the inconsistencies regarding the number of
assailants, the admitted presence of hundreds of villagers at the
scene, the improvements made during investigation, the absence
of consistent attribution of overt acts, the divergence between
medical and ocular evidence, and the acquittal of eight co-
accused on substantially identical evidence creates a reasonable
doubt regarding the prosecution case.
40. Criminal jurisprudence mandates that whenever two views are
reasonably possible on the evidence adduced, the one
favourable to the accused must prevail. The benefit of every
reasonable doubt must necessarily enure to the accused. In the
facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is unable
to hold that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing,
beyond reasonable doubt, that the present appellants were
members of the alleged unlawful assembly sharing the common
object attributed by the prosecution or that their guilt under
Sections 147, 452, 427/149, 435/149, 302/149, 307/149 and
323/149 IPC stands proved to the requisite standard.
Consequently, Point for Consideration No. (i) is answered in
the negative and in favour of the appellants, holding that the
prosecution has failed to establish their membership of the
unlawful assembly and their participation in the alleged offences
beyond reasonable doubt. The appellants are, therefore, entitled
to the benefit of doubt.
27
Re: Point for Consideration No. (ii)
41. The next question which falls for consideration is whether the
prosecution has been able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
that the present appellants were members of the alleged unlawful
assembly sharing the common object contemplated under
Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and that their individual
participation in the commission of the offences punishable under
Sections 302/149, 307/149, 452/149, 435/149, 427/149, 323/149
and 147 IPC has been established by clear, cogent and reliable
evidence. The answer to this question necessarily depends upon
whether the ocular evidence led by the prosecution inspires
confidence and is of such unimpeachable character as to safely
sustain the conviction of the present appellants, particularly in the
backdrop of the admitted fact that the alleged incident took place
in the midst of a large gathering of nearly 600-700 persons,
where allegations have been made against a large number of
accused in a general and omnibus manner. The Court is,
therefore, required to examine whether the prosecution witnesses
have been able to consistently attribute specific overt acts to
each of the present appellants; whether the evidence of the
injured and independent witnesses is free from material
omissions, improvements and contradictions; whether the
documentary and medical evidence lends assurance to the ocular
28
version; and whether the acquittal of eight out of twenty-four
accused persons on the same set of evidence has any bearing
on the sustainability of the conviction recorded against the
present appellants.
42. It is a settled principle of criminal law that where the prosecution
relies upon evidence relating to a mob assault involving a large
number of persons, the Courts must scrutinize such evidence
with greater circumspection, for the possibility of exaggeration,
false implication and mistaken identity cannot be ruled out.
Unless the prosecution is able to establish, beyond all reasonable
doubt, the identity, presence, participation and sharing of the
common object by each appellant, the benefit of doubt must
necessarily enure to the accused. It is in the light of these settled
principles that the present point requires consideration.
43. Upon an anxious consideration of the entire oral and
documentary evidence available on record, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the individual participation of the
present appellants in the commission of the offences alleged
against them. Though the prosecution has undoubtedly proved
that an unfortunate incident occurred in Village Charbhatha on
the intervening night of 07/08.08.2014 resulting in the death of
Basant Sahu and injuries to Parma Bai, Satyavan Sahu and
Dharmendra Kumar Sahu, the crucial question is whether the
29
prosecution has succeeded in proving, with the degree of
certainty required in criminal jurisprudence, that each of the
present appellants was a member of the unlawful assembly
sharing the common object contemplated under Section 149 IPC
and actively participated in the commission of the offences.
44. The prosecution case itself discloses that the alleged occurrence
took place in the course of a village meeting attended by an
exceptionally large gathering. PW-1 Satyavan admitted in
paragraph 50 of his cross-examination that nearly 200-250
persons were present at the Kalamanch, whereas PW-2 Parma
Bai admitted that nearly 500-700 persons had assembled there.
PW-3 Dharmendra Kumar Sahu also deposed that besides the
accused persons, there were 400-500 villagers including women,
children and elderly persons. Independent witness PW-4 Gayatri
Bai stated that about 250-300 persons had gathered, whereas
PW-9 Hemnarayan Sahu also spoke of a large assembly. Thus,
irrespective of the numerical variation, one fact emerges beyond
controversy that several hundreds of persons were present at the
place of occurrence. Such evidence itself introduces a serious
difficulty in accepting omnibus allegations made against every
accused without careful judicial scrutiny. In a situation where
hundreds of persons are present, the possibility of mistaken
identity, exaggeration, over-implication and false implication
cannot be lightly brushed aside, particularly when admittedly
there existed prior enmity between the parties.
30
45. A careful appreciation of the evidence of PW-1 Satyavan reveals
substantial infirmities affecting the reliability of his testimony
insofar as the present appellants are concerned. Though he
claimed that all the accused assaulted his father, he
simultaneously admitted that immediately after the assault
commenced, he fled away from the Kalamanch out of fear. He
further admitted that he did not witness the subsequent
occurrence in Mayaram’s field where the deceased was ultimately
found dead. Thus, PW-1 is not an eyewitness to the entire
incident culminating in the death of Basant. Significantly, PW-1
admitted that the names of some accused persons were omitted
from the FIR because the Investigating Officer declined to record
all the names furnished by him. Equally significant is his
admission that there was long-standing hostility between his
family and several accused persons owing to earlier complaints
lodged by his deceased father regarding illegal felling of
Government trees. Such admitted enmity undoubtedly furnishes a
motive not only for the occurrence but also for false implication.
The settled principle is that where evidence emanates from
interested witnesses having admitted previous hostility, the Court
must insist upon independent corroboration before sustaining
conviction.
46. The evidence of injured witness PW-2 Parma Bai also does not
inspire complete confidence so far as the individual role of the
present appellants is concerned. Although she narrated that
31
Basant was assaulted at the Kalamanch and thereafter dragged
towards Mayaram’s field, she admitted during cross-examination
that when vandalism and arson were allegedly committed at her
house, she herself was not present there. She further admitted
that she did not know all the accused persons belonging to
Village Kalangpur and had no previous acquaintance with many
of them. She also admitted that accused Kaminibai and
Nirmalabai had not assaulted her at the Kalamanch but allegedly
assaulted her later on the road. These material improvements
and variations demonstrate that the prosecution version
underwent embellishment during trial. More importantly, despite
claiming that hundreds of persons were present in three adjoining
lanes surrounding the Kalamanch, no satisfactory explanation
has been furnished as to why independent witnesses from among
those numerous villagers were not examined to support the
prosecution case against each individual appellant.
47. PW-3 Dharmendra, another injured witness, also admitted that
immediately after the assault commenced he attempted to run
away and in that process fell down and sustained injuries. He
further admitted that after escaping, he contacted the police and
thereafter returned home. Consequently, he admittedly did not
witness the subsequent assault allegedly committed in
Mayaram’s field where the fatal injuries were inflicted. His
testimony, therefore, cannot be treated as direct evidence
regarding the actual homicidal assault resulting in Basant’s death.
32
Even otherwise, his evidence suffers from improvements over the
FIR. While attributing exhortations to some accused during trial,
several such details find no place in the earliest version. His
evidence, therefore, cannot safely be accepted as furnishing an
unimpeachable basis for sustaining conviction against every
appellant.
48. The independent witnesses examined by the prosecution, namely
PW-4 Gayatri Bai and PW-9 Hemnarayan Sahu, instead of
strengthening the prosecution case, considerably weaken it. Both
these witnesses admitted that after the quarrel commenced
during the village meeting, several persons belonging to Village
Kalangpur left the place. PW-4 specifically stated in her cross-
examination that accused Shatrughan, Ghondul, Jhaggar Singh,
Chhabilal, Parmanand and Lokesh did not assault the
complainant party. PW-9 also admitted that the accused persons
belonging to Village Kalangpur had left the meeting immediately
after the dispute arose. These admissions clearly demonstrate
that the prosecution witnesses themselves distinguished between
various accused and admitted that every person named in the
FIR had not participated in the assault. This circumstance
assumes great significance because the learned Trial Court itself
acquitted eight accused persons on the same evidence.
49. The acquittal of eight out of twenty-four named accused by the
learned Trial Court is another circumstance which strikes at the
33
very root of the prosecution case. The allegations in the FIR and
in the depositions of the eyewitnesses are predominantly
omnibus in nature, alleging that “all the accused assaulted”, “all
dragged the deceased”, or “all participated”. The learned Trial
Court, while extending benefit of doubt to eight accused persons,
accepted that the evidence was insufficient to establish their
participation beyond reasonable doubt. However, while convicting
the remaining accused, including the present appellants, the Trial
Court failed to indicate any clear distinguishing feature
establishing their individual overt acts with certainty. Once the
Court itself disbelieved the prosecution case against one-third of
the accused on identical evidence, the remaining evidence
necessarily required far more cautious scrutiny before recording
conviction of the present appellants. Unfortunately, such exercise
is conspicuously absent.
50. The prosecution has also failed to establish the ingredients
necessary for fastening constructive liability under Section 149
IPC. The Supreme Court in Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR
1965 SC 202, while dealing with offences committed by a large
unlawful assembly, held that although every member need not
commit an overt act, the Court must nevertheless be satisfied that
reliable evidence establishes the presence and participation of
each accused and that the common object is proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Where witnesses make sweeping allegations
against a large crowd without specifically identifying the role of
34
individual accused, the Court must approach such evidence with
great caution. Similar principles have been reiterated in Kuldip
Yadav (supra), wherein the Supreme Court held that mere
presence in an assembly does not automatically attract Section
149 IPC unless the prosecution proves that the accused shared
the common object of the assembly.
51. Likewise, in Roy Fernandes (supra), the Supreme Court
observed that criminal courts must carefully sift evidence in cases
involving group assaults and must guard against the tendency of
witnesses to implicate every person belonging to the rival faction.
In Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh (supra), it was reiterated that
where witnesses make general allegations against a large
number of persons and independent corroboration is lacking, the
benefit of doubt must ordinarily go to the accused. Similarly, in
Krishnan (supra), the Supreme Court emphasised that where
two views are reasonably possible from the evidence on record,
the one favourable to the accused must invariably be adopted.
Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the prosecution evidence falls substantially short
of the standard required for sustaining conviction under Sections
149 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC.
52. The medical evidence undoubtedly proves that Basant sustained
fatal injuries and that Parma Bai, Satyavan Sahu and
Dharmendra Kumar Sahu also received injuries. However,
35
medical evidence merely establishes the factum of injuries and
the cause of death; it does not identify the assailants. The
prosecution was therefore required to establish through cogent
ocular evidence that the present appellants were responsible for
causing those injuries or were members of an unlawful assembly
sharing the requisite common object. Unfortunately, the ocular
evidence suffers from material contradictions, improvements,
omissions and exaggerations noticed hereinabove. The medical
evidence, therefore, cannot cure the inherent deficiencies in the
prosecution version regarding the identity and participation of the
individual appellants.
53. Another significant circumstance creating doubt is that despite the
prosecution version that 600-700 persons had assembled at the
Kalamanch, no truly disinterested independent witness from
among the large gathering has supported the prosecution version
against the present appellants. The prosecution relied principally
upon closely related witnesses whose testimony admittedly
emanates from a background of previous hostility. Though
relationship by itself is no ground for rejection, where such
evidence suffers from material inconsistencies and lacks
independent corroboration, prudence requires the Court to seek
assurance before recording conviction for serious offences
punishable with imprisonment for life. The burden always rests
upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of every accused
beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the prosecution
36
has undoubtedly proved that a violent incident occurred and that
Basant lost his life. However, it has failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that each of the present appellants formed part
of the unlawful assembly sharing the alleged common object or
actively participated in the commission of the offences attributed
to them. The evidence is rendered doubtful by the presence of an
enormous mob, sweeping allegations against all accused,
material omissions and contradictions, admitted previous enmity,
absence of reliable independent corroboration, and the acquittal
of eight similarly situated co-accused on the same evidence.
These circumstances cumulatively create a reasonable doubt
regarding the prosecution case against the present appellants.
54. Consequently, applying the well-settled principles governing
criminal trials and extending to the appellants the benefit of every
reasonable doubt, this Court is unable to sustain the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court. The prosecution has failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the present appellants were
members of an unlawful assembly sharing the common object
alleged by the prosecution or that they participated in the
commission of the offences punishable under Sections 147, 452,
427 read with Section 149, 435 read with Section 149, 302 read
with Section 149, 307 read with Section 149 and 323 read with
Section 149 IPC. Accordingly, Point for Consideration No. (ii)
is answered in favour of the appellants, and it is held that the
conviction and sentences recorded against them cannot be
37
sustained in law. The appellants are, therefore, entitled to the
benefit of doubt and deserve to be acquitted of all the charges.
Conclusion
55. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival
submissions advanced at the Bar, meticulously re-appreciated
the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record and
examined the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court in the
light of the settled principles governing criminal jurisprudence,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has
failed to establish its case against the present appellants beyond
all reasonable doubt. The evidence led by the prosecution,
though sufficient to establish that an unfortunate incident had
occurred resulting in the death of Basant Sahu and injuries to
certain prosecution witnesses, falls considerably short of proving,
with the degree of certainty required in criminal law, that each of
the present appellants was a member of the alleged unlawful
assembly sharing the common object contemplated under
Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code or that they actively
participated in the commission of the offences alleged against
them. The prosecution evidence is replete with material
omissions, improvements and contradictions. The eyewitnesses
have made sweeping and omnibus allegations against a large
number of accused persons despite admitting that nearly 600-
700 persons had assembled at the place of occurrence. The
38
possibility of mistaken identity, exaggeration and false implication
cannot, therefore, be ruled out.
56. This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that out of twenty-four
persons named as accused, the learned Trial Court itself found
the evidence unreliable insofar as eight accused persons were
concerned and extended to them the benefit of doubt. However,
while convicting the remaining accused persons, including the
present appellants, no convincing distinction has been drawn
demonstrating as to how the evidence against the appellants
stands on a different footing. The evidence against the acquitted
accused and the convicted appellants substantially emanates
from the same set of witnesses and suffers from identical
infirmities. In the absence of clear, cogent and convincing
evidence establishing the individual participation of each
appellant and the existence of a common object shared by them,
it would be wholly unsafe to sustain their conviction merely on the
basis of general allegations.
57. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion,
however grave or strong, can never take the place of legal proof.
The prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt and every reasonable doubt must necessarily enure to the
benefit of the accused. The constitutional guarantee of a fair trial
and the settled presumption of innocence continue to operate till
the guilt of the accused is established by unimpeachable
39
evidence. Where two views are reasonably possible on the
evidence available on record, the one favourable to the accused
must invariably be adopted. In the present case, the cumulative
effect of the inconsistencies in the ocular evidence, the admitted
existence of a large and unruly mob, the improvements and
omissions in the testimony of material witnesses, the absence of
reliable independent corroboration regarding the specific role of
each appellant, the admitted previous enmity between the parties
and the acquittal of similarly situated co-accused on the same
evidence creates a reasonable and substantial doubt regarding
the prosecution case against the present appellants.
58. In the considered opinion of this Court, the learned Trial Court
failed to appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective and
proceeded to record the conviction by invoking Section 149 IPC
without first satisfying itself that the prosecution had established
beyond reasonable doubt the common object of the unlawful
assembly and the conscious participation of each of the present
appellants therein. The findings recorded by the learned Trial
Court, therefore, cannot be sustained either on facts or in law and
deserve to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
59. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No.1185 of 2015, Criminal
Appeal No.1196 of 2015, Criminal Appeal No.1198 of 2015,
Criminal Appeal No.1398 of 2015 and Criminal Appeal
40
No.1428 of 2015 are allowed. The impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 09.09.2015passed by the
learned Sessions Judge, Balod, District Balod (C.G.) in Sessions
Trial No.84/2014, insofar as it relates to the present appellants, is
hereby set aside.
60. The appellants, namely, Hariram (appellant in CRA No.1185 of
2015); Smt. Kamin Bai and Smt. Nirmala Bai (appellants in
CRA No.1196 of 2015); Dhananjay, Pawan Kumar, Deolal,
Romlal, Domar, Dalsingh, Daleshwar and Devendra Kumar
(appellants in CRA No.1198 of 2015); Ghondul Ram and
Shatruhan Lal (appellants in CRA No.1398 of 2015); and
Lokesh Kumar and Gendu Ram (appellants in CRA No.1428
of 2015), are acquitted of the charges punishable under Sections
147, 452, 427 read with Section 149, 435 read with Section 149,
302 read with Section 149, 307 read with Section 149 and two
counts under Section 323 read with Section 149 of the Indian
Penal Code, by extending to them the benefit of doubt.
61. It is reported that all the appellants are on bail. They need not
surrender. Their bail bonds and surety bonds shall stand
discharged.
62. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Now Section 481 of the Bhartiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellants are directed
forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45
41
prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 of sum of Rs.25,000/- with two
reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned
which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an
undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition
against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid
appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
63. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted
to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information
and compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Anu
