Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. vs Sanjay Singh on 22 July, 2026
Bench: Abdul Moin, Pramod Kumar Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
APPLICATION U/s 378 DEFECTIVE No. - 89 of 2026
[Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:50122-DB]
State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko.
..Applicant(s)
Versus
Sanjay Singh
..Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s)
:
G.A.,
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)
:
Court No. - 11
HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.
HON’BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J
[Dictated by Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.]
[Order on C.M.A. No. 1 of 2026 (delay condonation)]
1. Heard learned AGA for the State-appellant-applicant and perused the record.
2. This is an application for condonation of delay in filing the instant appeal.
3. The appeal is filed with the delay of 140 days. The reasons explained in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay are found to be sufficient.
4. Consequently, the application is allowed.
5. Delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned.
[Order on Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal)]
6. Heard learned Additional Government Advocate for the State-appellant and perused the record.
7. The present Government Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 09.10.2025 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No. 15 (POCSO Act) Sitapur, whereby the learned trial had acquitted the respondent/accused in Sessions Trial No. 723 of 2011, arising out of Case Crime No. 271 of 2010, under Section 302 IPC and Sessions Trial No. 724 of 2011, arising out of Case Crime No. 275 of 2010, under Section 25(1-B) of the Arms Act, Police Station Pisawan, District Sitapur.
8. Briefly, the prosecution story is that the complainant Neeraj Singh lodged a First Information Report stating that on 12.06.2010, he was coming from Pisawan in the morning, a motorcycle bearing no. UP31 P2338 Hero Honda Splendor Plus was parked in north side of village Daulatiapur Gursanda and a man was found dead in a suspicious condition at some distance. On 16.06.2010, the police arrested the accused Sanjay and recovered the weapon from him. Accused Sanjay stated that he had the weapon with which the murder was committed, which was recovered by the police.
9. On the basis of the said complaint report, FIR No. 271/2010 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and FIR No. 275/2010 under Section 25(1-B) of the Arms Act were registered at Police Station Pisawan, District Sitapur. The matter was formally recorded in the case GD and its investigation was handed over to Neeraj Singh, who recorded the statements of the witnesses, visited the place of occurrence and drew a site map. After investigation, on finding sufficient evidence, chargesheet was sent to the court against the accused Sanjay Singh under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25(1-B) of the Arms Act.
10. The learned Magistrate Court took cognizance of the chargesheet and necessary copies of the prosecution records were made available to the accused under Section 207 of Cr.P.C. but since the case under Section 302 IPC and Section 25 (1-B) Arms Act was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Sitapur, handed over it over to the Sessions Court on 30.08.2011.
11. On 03.12.2011, the court framed charges against accused Sanjay Singh under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25 (1-B) of the Arms Act, which the accused denied and claimed to be tried.
12. The prosecution has relied on documentary evidences to prove its case FIR Exhibit Ka-1, recovery memo of blood stained soil Exhibit Ka-2, recovery memo of motorcycle Exhibit Ka-3, Panchayatnama Exhibit Ka-4, Postmortem report Exhibit Ka-5, Original GD certificate of destruction Exhibit Ka-6, Photocopy of GD Exhibit Ka-7, Challan of dead body Exhibit Ka-8, Photo of dead body Exhibit Ka-9, Sample seal Exhibit Ka-10, Letter of CMO Exhibit Ka-11, Letter of RI Exhibit Ka-12, Sight map Exhibit Ka-13, Fard recovery of weapon Exhibit Ka-14, Charge sheet No. 114/10 Exhibit Ka-15, Original GD certificate of destruction Exhibit Ka-16, Carbon copy of GD Exhibit Ka-17, Chik FIR No. 275/2010 Exhibit Ka-18, Naksa Najari related to FIR No. 275 of 2010 Exhibit Ka-19 and charge sheet Exhibit Ka-20 have been presented in the court.
13. In the context of the above charges leveled against the accused, the prosecution has examined PW-1 Neeraj Singh, PW-2 Chotakke Singh, PW-3 Ramkali, PW-4 Dr. Ravikant Shukla, PW-5 Girish Dutt Pandey, PW-6 Investigating Officer Madhunath Mishra, PW-7 Constable Mohrir Ashok Kumar and PW-8 Rangnath Tiwari in oral evidence, thereafter the prosecution concluded its evidence.
14. P.W. 1 Neeraj Singh in his statement has deposed that he gave a written report at the police station on 12.06.2010 reporting the bike and the dead body, he had found on the Daulatiapur Gursanda link road north of the village.
15. P.W. 2 Chotakke Singh deposed that he did not know the deceased and reached the spot later on and that he did not give any statement under section 161 of the Cr.P.C.as the police claimed and he was merely required to be a witness to the document being prepared by the police officer. Thus, he turned hostile.
16. P.W. 3 Ramkali, the grandmother of the deceased deposed that the deceased Rahul had sold his field to person named Ramveer who is resident of the village Daudapur and had bought a motorcycle amounting Rs. 40,000/-. At around 10 A.M. in the morning before his death the deceased had informed his grandmother that he was going to meet Sanjay. She further deposed that Sanjay must have killed her grandson.
17. P.W. 4 Dr. Ravi Kant Shukla in his statement deposed that on 12.06.2010 he performed the postmortem of the deceased at about 04:10 PM. Injuries found on the body of the deceased are as under:
External Injuries :-
1 cm firearm entry wound was present on the right side of the chest, above the right nipple. The edges of the wound were indented and cut. Blackness was present along the edges and surrounding the wound. A bullet was recovered from the skin on the back of the chest, which was sealed and placed in an envelope and handed over to the accompanying police officer.
Internal injuries :-
1- The right lung was ruptured and yellow.
2- About one and a half litre of clotted blood was present in the chest cavity.
3- Teeth 16/16 were present.
4- About half a litre of liquid was present in the stomach.
5- All other internal biological organs were yellow.
6- The bladder was empty.
The cause of death is likely to be due to excessive bleeding.
18. P.W. 5 Head Clerk Girish Dutt Pandey proved the new G.D. report as the previous one had been destroyed .
19. P.W. 6 Madhupnath Mishra, Investigating officer deposed that on 12.06.2010 when the case was given to him, he began the investigation then the name of Sanjay Singh came into light. On 16.06.2010 Sanjay Singh was caught by the police before whom Sanjay Singh confessed that on 11.06.2010 at night around 9 PM he killed the deceased Rahul. Upon taking the search of Sanjay Singh, a 315 bore country-made pistol with empty cartridge which was found in the right side of his pant.
20. P.W. 7 Constable Mohrir Ashok Kumar and P.W. 8 Inspector Rangnath Tiwari proved the documents prepared during the course of investigation.
21. The statement of the accused/respondent was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on July 11, 2025. The accused admitted the veracity of all police documents, denied the prosecution evidence, declared himself innocent and stated that he was being falsely implicated.
22. Having adduced the evidence on record the trial court acquitted the accused-respondent herein of the charges levelled against him under Section 302 of the IPC and Section 25(1-B) of the Arms Act.
23. The judgment of the acquittal was passed on the ground that the FIR is delayed. Initially, Fauti information was lodged wherein no suspicion on accused has been expressed. In the FIR, no facts with regard to last seen together has been mentioned, even name of the eye-witness was also not stated therein. The learned trial court found that prosecution has rests its case on the circumstantial evidence, but neither the evidence of last seen together nor the extra-judicial confession has been adduced. Learned trial court further found that arresting and recovery of the alleged country-made pistol is doubtful, as there is a difference with regard to the date of arrest and the date of preparing the site plan. Trial court further found that in the analysis of Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), the alleged recovered cartridge was not tallied with the group of the country-made pistol nor specifications where tallied. The trial court also found that it is highly improbable that any person, having country-made pistol from which it is alleged that the offence has been committed, will wonder till 5 days. The trial court further found that there was material discrepancies in the statement of the witnesses of facts which was not worth belief. Under such circumstances, the trial court found that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the accused was given benefit of doubt and the judgment of acquittal was passed.
24. Challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 09.10.2025, the learned AGA for the state-appellant submits that trial court has erred in appreciating the evidence on record. He further submits that although initially the Fauti information was given and after tracing out the deceaseds dead body, case was converted in the murder case, he further submits that on arresting of the accused, the weapon used in the crime was recovered. The accused also made a confessional statement before the Investigating Officer, wherein, he had admitted the incident caused by him. He further submits that other witness of facts had also given the testimony, who had stated that the deceased had gone to meet with the accused and this circumstance will have effect on the dying declaration, but learned trial court did not appreciate the evidence in correct manner and erroneously rests its opinion on the basis of surmises and conjectures.
25. He further submits that witnesses are intact and have supported the prosecution case and the finding recorded by trial court is not one of the possible view. Submission, therefore, is that judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court requires serious consideration and the reversal and the accused-respondent is liable to be convicted.
26. We have considered the submissions of learned Additional Government Advocate for the State-appellant and have perused the record.
27. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of law on the appeal against acquittal.
28. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790, in paragraph 10, the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that “the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, especially when the prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and infirmities”
29. In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words:
“The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the view formed by the trial court was a ”possible view’. The judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete misreading of the material evidence which has led to miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with. This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High Court of its powers to re-appreciate the evidence, including in an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding of fact.”
30. In a judgement of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, the law on the issue involved has been considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as under:
“10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:-
“12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more, the probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).
13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under:
“…the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses….”
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).
15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:
“(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that an “order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.”
18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances includes:
i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;
iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”
31. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it is wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal.
32. The aforesaid judgments were taken note of with approval by Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166, Nagabhushan vs. State of Karnataka (2021) 5 SCC 222, and Babu (supra) in Achhar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 543.”
33. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471.
34. In Ramesh and Others v. State of Haryana; (2017) 1 SCC 529, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations:
“24. We have duly appreciated the submissions advanced by counsel for the parties on both sides. No doubt, the High Court was dealing with the appeal against the judgment of the trial court which had acquitted the appellants herein. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is undoubtedly narrower than the scope of appeal against conviction. Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 confers upon the State a right to prefer an appeal to the High Court against the order of acquittal. At the same time, sub-section (3) thereof mandates that such an appeal is not to be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. Thus, before an appeal is entertained on merits, leave of the High Court is to be obtained which means that normally judgment of acquittal of the trial court is attached a definite value which is not to be ignored by the High Court. In other words, presumption of innocence in favour of an accused gets further fortified or reinforced by an order of acquittal. At the same time, while exercising its appellate power, the High Court is empowered to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence before it. However, this exercise is to be undertaken in order to come to an independent conclusion and unless there are substantial and compelling reasons or very strong reasons to differ from the findings of acquittal recorded by the trial court, the High Court, as an appellate court in an appeal against the acquittal, is not supposed to substitute its findings in case the findings recorded by the trial court are equally plausible.
35. In Jafarudheen vs State Of Kerala; (2022) 8 SCC 440, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations:
“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”
36. In Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Another; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 451 the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations regarding the parameters that must be considered while dealing with the applications seeking leave to appeal under Section 378 of CrPC:
“7. The question as to how the application for grant of leave to appeal filed under Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C. should be decided by the High Court and what are the parameters which the High Court should keep in mind remains no longer res integra. This issue was examined by this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar reported in (2008) 9 SCC 475. C.K. Thakker, J. speaking for the Bench held in paras 19, 20, 21 and 24 respectively as under:
“19. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of appeal by the State in case of acquittal. Sub-section (3) declares that no appeal “shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court”. It is, therefore, necessary for the State where it is aggrieved by an order of acquittal recorded by a Court of Session to file an application for leave to appeal as required by subsection (3) of Section 378 of the Code. It is also true that an appeal can be registered and heard on merits by the High Court only after the High Court grants leave by allowing the application filed under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code.
20. In our opinion, however, in deciding the question whether requisite leave should or should not be granted, the High Court must apply its mind, consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or arguable points have been raised and not whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set aside.
21. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of law of universal application that each and every petition seeking leave to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal recorded by a trial court must be allowed by the appellate court and every appeal must be admitted and decided on merits. But it also cannot be overlooked that at that stage, the court would not enter into minute details of the prosecution evidence and refuse leave observing that the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court could not be said to be “perverse” and, hence, no leave should be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
24. We may hasten to clarify that we may not be understood to have laid down an inviolable rule that no leave should be refused by the appellate court against an order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We only state that in such cases, the appellate court must consider the relevant material, sworn testimonies of prosecution witnesses and record reasons why leave sought by the State should not be granted and the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court should not be disturbed. Where there is application of mind by the appellate court and reasons (may be in brief) in support of such view are recorded, the order of the court may not be said to be illegal or objectionable. At the same time, however, if arguable points have been raised, if the material on record discloses deeper scrutiny and reappreciation, review or reconsideration of evidence, the appellate court must grant leave as sought and decide the appeal on merits. In the case on hand, the High Court, with respect, did neither. In the opinion of the High Court, the case did not require grant of leave. But it also failed to record reasons for refusal of such leave.
xxx xxx xxx
12. We are of the view that at the stage of considering grant of leave under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., a prima facie case should be looked into by the High Court, of course, not ignoring the materials on record.”
37. On perusal of the record, we find that the trial court has made a detailed discussion and after marshalling all the facts and evidence, has observed that the dead body of the deceased was lying on some place which was noticed by some stranger, named, Neeraj Singh PW-1, who had given Fauti information to the police station concerned, whereupon police personnel made inquest of the dead body and on the basis of document, traced from the deceased pocket, relative Sunil Singh was called who appeared alongwith other relatives and also identified the dead body as Rahul. Thereafter, in the postmortem report, death of the deceased was found due to antemortem firearm injury. Learned trial court also found that during the course of investigation, on the clue of tracing and tracking, the accused-Sanjay Singh was arrested and on his confessional statement given before the Investigating Officer, he was made an accused in this case and on his personal search, one country-made pistol was recovered which was sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. Learned trial court also found that in the FSL report, the cartridge which was also recovered with the possession of the accused, did not tally with the alleged recovered firearm and specification of the same was also not tallied. The learned trial court also found that the prosecution has not established the motive in the case. It is also to be notable that no such witnesses have been examined by the prosecution who can give the testimony with regard to last seen together. It is only argued by the prosecution before the trial court that one relative of the accused, namely Prithvi Pal had given statement during the course of investigation that accused met him and admitted that he had killed the deceased through gun shot, but here it is also made clear that evidence of the Prithvi Pal may be to the extent of extra judicial confession, although he has not been examined. But the prosecution did not establish that Prithvi Pal was a reputed person who had influenced on the police and the police could help and protect the interest of accused, therefore, his evidence has no significance.
38. PW-3 Ram Kali had stated that the deceased was her grandson, who had told her at 10:00 A.M. that he was going to meet Sanjay Singh but this statement does not have the impact of dying declaration because it does not squarely fit in the provisions contained under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act because there is only a statement with regard to proceed of the deceased-Rahul. it does not contain the circumstance of any transaction.
39. As per the postmortem report of the deceased, the firearm entry wound was found on the right side of the chest and in the internal examination, the lungs were found lacerated and the chest cavity was filled with the blood and the death of the deceased was occurred due to antemortem injury resulting in hemorrhage. Although, death of the deceased was homicidal but the evidence which was adduced by the prosecution, on close scrutiny, we find that the evidence is not sufficient and the chain of the circumstances is not linked to each other. In such view of the matter, we, therefore, find that the trial court has taken possible view of the matter on appreciation of entire evidence on record, which cannot be substituted by this court taking a different view as per law discussed above.
40. Accordingly, it is not a case worth granting leave to appeal. The application for granting leave to appeal is rejected.
[Re: Government Appeal]
41. Consequently, since the Criminal Miscellaneous Application (Leave to appeal) has been rejected by order of the date, the present Government Appeal is also dismissed.
(Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.) (Abdul Moin,J.)
July 22, 2026
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