Gujarat High Court
Legal Heirs Of Decd. Harilal Punamchand … vs State Of Gujarat on 28 July, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8892/2021 ORDER DATED: 28/07/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8892 of 2021
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LEGAL HEIRS OF DECD. HARILAL PUNAMCHAND SHAH & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR. NISHIT P GANDHI(6946) for the Petitioner(s) No.
1,1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5,1.6,1.7
MS NIRALI SARDA AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
DECEASED LITIGANT THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS/ REPRESTENTATIVES
for the Respondent(s) No. 3
DELETED for the Respondent(s) No. 10,3.1,9
NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 4,5,6,7,8
NOTICE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE
Date : 28/07/2026
ORAL ORDER
1. By the present Writ Petition, the petitioner is praying for a
direction to quash and set aside the show cause notice dated
15.03.2021 issued by the learned Collector, Surendranagar taking
into suo motu revision the mutation entry No.3530 dated
26.12.2010, which was duly certified on 14.03.2011. The petitioner
has been put to show cause on the ground that the father of the
petitioner was not original agriculturist and no evidence is on record
to show that he was an agriculturist. Accordingly, there is a breach
of Section 54 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and
Agricultural Land Ordinance, 1949 and why the said land should not
be vested with the State Government.
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2. The learned counsel Mr. Nishit Gandhi appearing for the
petitioner submits that the impugned notice is barred by limitation.
The learned counsel submits that this Court by catena of decisions
has held that suo motu proceedings have to be initiated within a
reasonable period of time and in the present case, suo motu
proceedings have been initiated by the learned Collector after a
period of 10 years. The learned counsel further submits that this
Court has also held that “agriculturist” means a person who
cultivates land personally and the concept of “original agriculturist”
is contrary to law. The learned counsel submits that the impugned
notice be quashed and set aside. In support of his contentions, the
learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Chaital Rashmikant
Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2017(0)JX(GUj) 490.
3. Per contra, the learned AGP Ms. Nirali Sarda appearing for the
respondent Nos.1 and 2 submits that the subject land was originally
transferred vide registered sale deed No.1711 dated 01.07.2010 in
favour of Ratilal Punamchand Shah and the same came to be
approved by the mutation entry No.3530 dated 14.03.2011. She
submits that late Harilal Punamchand Shah claimed that he was an
agriculturist on the basis of the land purchased in Village Varan,
Taluka Deesa by way of the mutation entry No.3129. She submits
that upon inspection of the mutation entry No.3129, it is revealed
that the status of agriculturist was obtained by the petitioner’s
father by way of civil court’s order dated 09.03.2010 and there is no
other document on record to show that the father of the petitioner
was holding any agricultural land as agriculturist prior to purchase
of the subject land. She submits that in view of the said discrepancy,
the learned Collector has initiated the suo motu proceedings for
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breach of Section 54 read with Section 75 of the the Saurashtra
Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Land Ordinance,
1949. She submits that the impugned notice be upheld.
4. Heard the learned counsels for the parties, considered the
submissions and perused the documents on record.
5. It is not in dispute that the father of the petitioner had
purchased the subject land by way of registered sale deed, for
which, the mutation entry No.3530 dated 26.12.2010 came to be
mutated and duly certified on 14.03.2011. The suo motu
proceedings have been initiated after a period of 10 years. The
Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in 2024(4)
GLH 410 – The State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Hussainbhai
Satarbhai Meman has held as under:-
“104. Moreover, the proceedings for eviction had been initiated
after a long lapse of time, which would raise a question with regard
to the validity of the action taken by the Collector for summary
eviction of the transferees, who are in settled possession of the
lands-in-question for a sufficient long time. The question before us
is as to whether it was reasonable on the part of the Collector to
initiate proceedings for summary eviction of the transferees, who
are the holders of the lands in the area for considerably long period
of time and who are admittedly carrying on agricultural operations.
There is a categorical submission of the petitioners in the bunch of
the writ petitions that the lands-in-question have been put to
agricultural use since after the date of transfer and are also in
agricultural use till date. The status or nature of the lands has not
been changed by the transferees, who may not fall within the
meaning of agriculturists under Section 2(c) of the Saurashtra
Gharkhed Ordinance, 1949. The vehement submission of the
learned counsels appearing for the petitioners is that the notices
issued by the office of the Collector/Deputy Collector are ex facie
barred by delay.
105. This issues has been considered by the Division Bench of this
Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat &
Ors. [(2016) 2 GLH 1021] wherein dispute was pertaining to thePage 3 of 11
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provisions of Section 54 and 75 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed
Ordinance’ 1949. In the said case, the first transfer was of the year
1970, mutation of which was entered in the year 1973. The land
had exchanged many hands and no dispute was raised by the
executant of the original sale deeds. However, a private
respondent, thereafter, had intervened by filing a separate writ
petition inter alia praying for a direction to complete the inquiry. In
the proceedings initiated under the Ordinance, show cause notice
was challenged by the occupants of the land on the ground that
after 37 years from the date of revenue entry, the proceedings
initiated under the Ordinance were ex facie barred by delays. The
Division Bench of this Court examined three aspects of the matter;
firstly the question of reasonable period for initiation of action of
issuance of the show cause notice under the Ordinance; the second
was as to whether initiation of action is without jurisdiction and the
third aspect was about the locus of the respondent therein whose
father had executed sale deed and received consideration and by
his volition parted with the possession, seeking for invalidation of
transfer after death of his father, who did not raise any grievance
during his life time.
106. On the question of reasonable period, the Division Bench has
considered the decision of the Apex Court in Patel Raghav Natha
which pertains to the revisional powers under Section 211 of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code, to note that the “revisional powers
must be exercised in a reasonable time and the length of
reasonable time must be determined on the facts of the said case
and the nature of the order which is being refused”.
107. The Division bench judgment of this Court in Chandulal
Gordhandas Ranodriya was noted, wherein the question was of
delay in initiation of the action under Section 84C of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The relevant
observations in paragraph Nos. ’12’ and ’13’ whereof are noted
hereinunder :-
“12. Indisputably, the land in question is a new tenure land,
to which the provisions of Section 43 of the Act are
applicable. It is also well settled that if a person wants to get
the land converted from new tenure to old tenure, then as
per the Government Resolutions passed from time to time
and other provisions of the Act, the Collector has to
determine the amount of premium due and payable by the
person who seeks conversion and as per the guidelines laid
down such amount determined by the Collector if is paid,
then necessary orders are being passed by the authorities
converting the land from new tenure to old tenure thereby
lifting the restrictions as imposed under Section 43 of the Act.
It is also well settled that question is if the land is transferred
in violation of the provisions of Section 43 of the Act, then
such transactions could definitely be termed as voidPage 4 of 11
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transactions. However, the question is whether such void
transactions could be annulled at any point of time and
whether the authorities could be justified in taking over the
possession of the land for the purpose of vesting in the
Government at any point of time.
13. In our opinion, it is well settled that even though void
transaction if is allowed to remain effective for considerable
long period, the authority named therein will be precluded
from initiating proceedings to annul it. It can remain effective
and in existence till it is invalidated and set aside. If its
existence is allowed for a considerable period and by a
passage creating valuable rights in favour of a considerable
section of people, like the appellants in the present case, it is
difficult to accept the proposition that despite the change the
competent authority under the Act would be entitled to
exercise powers under Section 84(C) of the Act at any point
of time.”
108. What would be the reasonable time as explained by the Apex
Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation v. C.C.
Santhakumar was taken note of in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya
in the following manner in paragraph No. ’16’ as under :-
“16. In the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation
v. C.C. Santhakumar reported in 2007(1) SCC 584, the
Supreme Court has elaborately explained this principle of
action to be taken within a reasonable period of time. It
would be appropriate for us to quote paragraph Nos.35, 36,
37, 38, 39 and 40.
“35. A “reasonable period” would depend upon the factual
circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any
empirical formula to determine that question. The
court/authority considering the question whether the period
is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding
circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question.
36. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha (1969 (2)
SCC 187) it was observed that when even no period of
limitation was prescribed, the power is to (2007) 1 SCC 584
be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the
reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case
and the nature of the order which was sought to be varied.
This aspect does not appear to have been specifically kept in
view by the Division Bench. Additionally, the points relating
to applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands
(Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977, and even if it is held that
the Act was applicable, the reasonableness of the time during
which action should have been initiated were also not
considered. It would be hard to give an exact definition of thePage 5 of 11
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word “reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according
to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built
up the old scholastic logic stands now like the jingling of a
child’s toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the
reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by
authority, the decision of the Judge usually determines what
is “reasonable” in each particular case; but frequently
reasonableness “belongs to the knowledge of the law, and
therefore to be decided by the courts”. It was illuminatingly
stated by a learned author that an attempt to give a specific
meaning to the word “reasonable” is trying to count what is
not a number and measure what is not space. It means prima
facie in law reasonable in regard to those circumstances of
which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or
ought to know. (See: Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath
Ashok Kumar (1987 (4) SCC 497) and Gujarat Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. (1989
(1) SCC 532). As observed by Lord Romilly, M.R. in
Labouchere v. Dawson (41 LJ Ch 472) it is impossible a priori
to state what is reasonable as such in all cases. You must
have the particular facts of each case established before you
can ascertain what is reasonable under the circumstances.
Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is
rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive
or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.
37. These aspects were highlighted in Collector and Others
v. P.Mangamma and Others (2003 (4) SCC 488).
38. As observed in Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal (2002
(1) SCC 134), it is “looking at all the circumstances of the
case; a “reasonable time” under ordinary circumstances; as
soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what
the contract requires should be done; some more protracted
space than ‘directly’; such length of time as may fairly, and
properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having
regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending
circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea”.
39. According to Advanced law Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyar
3rd Edition, 2005 reasonable time means as follows:
“That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the
rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party
from losses that he ought not to suffer.
“Reasonable Time” is defined to be so much time as is
necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently whatPage 6 of 11
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the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular
case.
If it is proper to attempt any definition of the words
“reasonable time”, as applied to completion of a contract, the
distinction given by Chief Baron Pollock may be suggested,
namely, that a “reasonable time” means as soon as
circumstances will permit.
In determining what is a reasonable time or an unreasonable
time, regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the
usage or trade or business, if any, with respect to such
instrument, and the fact of the particular case.
The reasonable time which a passenger is entitled to
alighting from a train is such time as is usually required by
passengers in getting off and on the train in safety at the
particular station in question.
A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the
case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as
soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what
the contract requires should be done; some more protracted
space than “directly” such length of time as may fairly, and
properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having
regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending
circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea.
Reasonable time always depends on the circumstances of the
case. (Kinney)It is unreasonable for a person who has borrowed ornaments
for use in a ceremony to detain them after the ceremony has
been completed and the owner has demanded their return.
(AIR 1930 Oudh 395).
The expression “reasonable time” means so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently what
the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular
case”. [See: Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew (2005(7) SCC
667)]
40. In all these cases at hand the factual aspects have not
been examined, because the grievance appears to have been
focused on the applicability of Section 77 (1A)(b).”
109. In paragraph No. ’19’ in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya, it
was concluded that:-
“19. It must be fairly said that if the statute does not
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prescribe time limit for exercise of revisional powers, it does
not mean that such powers can be exercised at any point of
time even if there is a breach of Section 43 of the Act, which
is a provision which relates to a new tenure land, rather it
should be exercised within a reasonable period of time. It is
so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be
unsettled after a long lapse of time. It is clear from various
judgments of the Supreme Court that where a statutory
provision for exercise of any suo motu powers of revision
does not prescribe any limitation, the powers must be
exercised within a reasonable period of time even in the case
of transaction which would be termed as void transaction.”
110. Taking note of the law discussed in Chandulal Gordhandas
Ranodriya, the Division Bench of this Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai
Vegda has further proceeded to note another Division Bench
judgment in Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar, which also pertains to Section
54 of the Ordinance, 1949 and the question wherein was of
reasonable time to initiate action under Section 75 of the
Ordinance, 1949 for summary eviction of the occupant, transfer in
whose favour was alleged to be invalid. While dealing with various
contentions about the validity of the transaction and the effect of
the same due to the delay, it was noted therein that at the time
when the transaction was executed and the entry was mutated in
the revenue record, the petitioner had merely submitted a
certificate issued by the Talati of village certifying that the
petitioner was preparing agri-tools. However, at that stage, the
authority did not demand any other details or clarification from the
petitioner and/or did not initiate any action. The State authorities
allowed the transaction to operate for years. Subsequently, when
the action to annul the transaction came to be initiated after 17
years, the petitioner raised objection on the ground that the action
was unsustainable because of the inordinate delay and that since
the time when the transaction was entered into, he had put the
land-in- question to the agricultural use only, and further the status
and the nature of the agricultural land had been retained and
maintained by the transferee. Thus, in the facts and circumstances
of that case, considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter
specifically that the transferee had not changed the nature or status
of the land and also has incurred expenditure to improve the quality
of soil, it was held therein that the aforesaid factors would be
relevant and would deserve due consideration. It was, thus,
observed in paragraph No. ’20’ as under :-
“20. Even if the concept that the void action cannot be
validated on the ground of belated action is applied in
present case, then also, in view of the special facts and
circumstances of present case it would be appropriate to take
into account the peculiar facts of present case which emerge
from the record viz:-
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(a) during the entire period of 17 years the vendor has not
taken out any action in law against the transaction and any
suit or proceeding for declaration or for any other relief does
not appear to have been filed by the vendor.
(b) the petitioner was an agricultural labourer at the time
when the transaction was executed and was tiling and
cultivating various agricultural lands.
(c) The petitioner was also artisan i.e. engaged in the
activity of preparing agri-tools.
(d) more important is the fact that even after purchasing
the land in question the petitioner has, as claimed by him,
continued to use the land for agricultural purpose and the
status or nature of the land in question as agricultural land is
not changed and it continues to be agricultural land (said
factual assertion by the petitioner has not been disputed by
the respondents and any contrary evidence is not placed on
record)
(e) the petitioner has also claimed that he has incurred
substantial expenditure in improving quality of soil.
(f) another important factor which, in the facts of present
case, has emerged is that in view of the orders of the
authorities it is only the vendor who will stand to gain/benefit
since the land, even after the orders, will not vest in the
government in absence of any provision providing for such
consequential.”
111. While holding so, though it was found by the Division Bench
in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda that the decision of the competent
authority in holding the transaction-in-question as void is in
consonance with the provisions of the Ordinance and cannot be
faulted, but it was concluded that in the interest of justice and
equity, it cannot be overlooked that the impugned action in exercise
of powers under Section 75 of the Ordinance to summarily evict the
petitioner after having allowed the transaction to remain alive for
17 years, cannot be justified. It was held that the eviction order
completely overlooked that the petitioner has continued to put the
land to use for agricultural purposes and has not changed the status
and the nature of the land, rather he has invested further amounts
for betterment of the agricultural land. The reasons for delay of 17
years has remained unexplained and unjustified and the only
defence was that the transaction is statutorily void.
112. Taking note of the above decisions in Chandulal Gordhandas
Ranodriya and Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar, it was, however, observed
by the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda in paragraph
No. ’10’ as under:-
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“In our view, the above referred well considered two
decisions of this Court makes the position abundantly clear
that if the action is to be initiated for setting aside of a
transaction under the Ordinance by invoking section 54 read
with section 75 of the Ordinance, it has to be within
reasonable period. The above referred two decisions are in
respect of the cases wherein the powers were exercised and
proceedings were initiated after 5 years and 17 years
respectively, whereas in the present case, it is after more
than 35 years. Hence, we find that the initiation of the action
itself can be said as beyond reasonable period and the bar of
delay and laches could operate against the authority in
initiation of the action. The aforesaid aspect is coupled with
two additional circumstances, one is that the land has
changed hands further during the period of delay and the
ownership is transferred by the purchaser to the another
person and the second is that the revenue entries were
mutated. Thereafter, they were also certified by the
competent authority and in spite of that, no action was taken
for cancellation of such entry or otherwise or even for
declaration of the transaction as invalid within reasonable
period. If during the period of delay, the rights of the parties
in the properties are altered, the delay would operate as a
bar with more gravity and when the ownership is changed
during the period of delay, the bar for not taking action within
reasonable period would also operate with more gravity
against the authority in initiation of the action.”
126. As noted by the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai
Vegda the settled position cannot be unsettled in a belated action
taken by the revenue authorities. The notices issued to the
petitioners to show cause for invalidating the transactions under
Section 54 of the Ordinance and the action for eviction as
contemplated under Section 75, having been initiated after a long
lapse of time and in most cases after the death of both the original
transferees and even the original transferor, cannot be said to be
justified from any angle.
127. For the above discussion, we do not find any good ground to
deviate from the legal position settled with the Division Bench
judgments of this Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda and Bhanji
Devshisinh Luhar where belated actions taken for eviction of the
transferee under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949, were found to
be inequitable and unjustified. Exercise of powers in a reasonable
time where the legislature does not fix the time limit for exercise of
such powers is a well settled position of law, which cannot be
unsettled on the submissions of the learned Additional Advocate
General that the decision in Patil Raghav Natha was rendered while
making scrutiny of the exercise of revisional powers under Section
211 of the Bombay Revenue Code, 1879 and hence is not applicablePage 10 of 11
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to the proceedings initiated under Section 75 of the Ordinance,
1949 for summary eviction.
128. At the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that a
declaration of the sale deed as invalid was required to be made
after an inquiry which must have been conducted within a
reasonable time before the Summary eviction. The sale deeds
remained valid for considerable long period of time and moreover,
they are binding on the vendors. The inquiry into the status of the
predecessor-in-title of the petitioners or the petitioners herein after
such a long lapse of time, can not be permitted, as it may not be
possible to bring on record all the relevant documents in such an
inquiry(s). A transaction hit by Section 54 is not void ab initio, but
may be invalidated and hence remains valid till it is declared
invalid. The settled position of law that the transaction which
remained valid and effective for a considerable period of time
cannot be unsettled, is not to be deviated. Further, there is no
vesting contemplated under the Ordinance, 1949 and as noted
hereinbefore, the show cause notices are prescribing for not only
eviction of the transferees, but resumption of the land in favour of
the State Government by directing for entry of the name of the
State in the revenue records after deletion of the entries, even of
the original landholders while deleting the name of the transferees,
which is wholly without jurisdiction.”
6. In view thereof, the impugned notice dated 15.03.2021 issued
and the suo motu proceedings initiated by the learned Collector,
Surendranagar are barred by limitation and without jurisdiction. The
impugned notice is accordingly quashed and set aside.
The Special Civil Application is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
No order as to cost.
Direct service is permitted.
(ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE, J.)
cmk
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