Himachal Pradesh High Court
Ravneet & Another vs State Of H.P. & Another on 29 July, 2026
2026:HHC:31472
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 758 of 2026
Reserved on: 21.07.2026
.
Date of Decision: 29.07.2026.
Ravneet & another ...Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. & another ...Respondents
of
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
For the Petitioners
rt
Whether approved for reporting?1
:
No.
Mr Rishi Tandon, Advocate.
For Respondent : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General for respondent
No.1/State.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 53 of 2022, dated 06.10.2022, registered at
Police Station Sangrah, District Sirmour, H.P. for the commission
of offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406, and 506 read
with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the consequential
proceeding arising out of it and pending before learned Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Rajgarh, District Sirmour, H.P. (The parties
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were
arrayed before the trial Court for convenience).
.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant Anjinta was married to the
petitioner Ravneet on 14.02.2021 as per Hindu rites and customs.
Her husband had promised not to demand anything during the
of
marriage; however, he demanded four gold rings, ₹50,000 and the
Shagun from the victim and her father. Her husband and her
rt
mother-in-law started harassing and beating her for bringing
insufficient dowry. They used to taunt her by saying that her
father had not provided anything to her. The informant became
pregnant, but she was forced to do household chores by saying
that her father had not sent servants with her and she was brought
for doing the work. She was not even allowed to go outside, and
whenever her husband and his mother would go outside, they
would lock the informant inside the house. She was not permitted
to talk to her parents. The marriage was also not registered. She
was not allowed to visit her parents’ home. Whenever the
informant’s parents visited her, the informant’s husband and her
mother-in-law misbehaved with them. They gave beatings to the
informant on 04.10.2022 and threatened to kill her. The informant
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was forced to leave her matrimonial home with her eleven-
month-old daughter. The petitioners accused the informant of
.
stealing the jewellery worth ₹20,00,000/-, which is false. The
informant only had ₹300/- with her. She was threatened
telephonically. She was pregnant and was unable to take care of
her child. She reported the matter to the police. The police
of
registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police seized
the jewellery and the bills of the jewellery from the jewellers. The
rt
police recorded the statements of witnesses. It was found that the
marriage was not registered with the local Panchayat. Hence, the
charge sheet was filed before the learned trial Court.
3. Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge sheet, the
petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that the
allegations contained in the FIR are vague and do not disclose the
essential ingredients of the offence. The police did not find any
material to substantiate the allegations made in the FIR. The
continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the
process of the Court. The petitioner no. 1 and the informant came
in contact through Facebook. The marriage was solemnised with
the consent of their parents. Petitioner no. 1 and the informant
independently co-habited on the first floor of the petitioner no. 1’s
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parental house as husband and wife; they never resided with the
parents of petitioner no. 1, who were living separately on the
.
ground floor. A daughter was born to petitioner no.1 and the
informant. The elder sister of petitioner no.1 resides Canada. The
informant’s brother wanted to settle in Canada, and the informant
and his family members insisted that the petitioners arrange for
of
the settlement of the informant’s brother in Canada. When the
petitioner and his family members expressed their inability, the
rt
informant and her family members started creating pressure upon
the petitioners. The father of petitioner no. 1 suffered physical and
mental stress due to the discord and disturbance in the
matrimonial life of the parties. The petitioners had gone to
Gurdwara Chamkor Sahib. The father and brother of the informant
took her away from her matrimonial home. Petitioner no. 2 filed a
complaint in the Police Station, but chose not to pursue it. The
present complaint was filed as a counterblast to the complaint
filed by petitioner no. 2. The informant had also filed a complaint
before the Protection Officer, giving an entirely different version
of the incident. The informant did not allow petitioner no. 1 to
meet his daughters. Nothing was entrusted to the petitioners. The
allegations in the complaint, even if taken to be true, do not
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constitute the commission of any cognisable offence. Therefore, it
was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and
.
the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed.
4. I have heard Mr Rishi Tandon, learned counsel for the
petitioners and Mr Jitender K Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent no. 1, State.
of
5. Mr Rishi Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioners,
submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely
rt
implicated. The allegations in the complaint made to the police,
even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of
any cognisable offence. The allegations are vague and not
sufficient to proceed against the petitioners. The complaint was
filed as a counterblast to the complaint made by petitioner No. 2.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed, and the
FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of it be
quashed.
6. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent No.1/State submitted that the
petitioners had harassed the informant for bringing insufficient
dowry. They turned her out of her matrimonial home when she
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was pregnant. The charge-sheet was filed before the Court in the
year 2023, and the present petition has been filed after the lapse of
.
three years, for which no explanation was provided. The inherent
jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly, and no case is made out
for the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be dismissed.
of
7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
rt
The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to thedecision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarisedsome of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:31472court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive.
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should
be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they aretaken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
of
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
rt Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose thecommission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
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the institution and continuance of the proceedings,
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause nos. (1), (4) and (6) would
of
be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
rt
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR
or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such
a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:31472neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of
this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.
The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded.
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines
that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal
proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting theof
Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court.
The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the
following situations: (i) the criminal complaint has been
filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the
rt
legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv)
the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint containsvague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are
willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
10. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neelu
Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286: 2009 SCC
OnLine SC 1693 that the Court has to see that particulars of the
offences committed by every accused and the role played by the
accused in committing the offence are given in the complaint
made to the police. It was observed: –
“9. To lodge a proper complaint, the mere mention of the
sections and the language of those sections is not the be-all and::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:31472end-all of the matter. What is required to be brought to the
notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by
each and every accused and the role played by each and every
accused in committing that offence.
.
10. When we see the complaint, it is sadly vague. It does not
show which of the accused has committed what offence,
and what is the exact role played by these appellants in the
commission of the offence. It could be said that somethingis against Rajesh, as the allegations are made against him
more precisely, but he is no more and has already expired.
Under such circumstances, it would be an abuse of theof
process of law to allow the prosecution to continue against
the aged parents of Rajesh, the present appellants herein,
on the basis of a vague and general complaint which is
silent about the precise acts of the appellants.” (Emphasis
rt
supplied)
12. Similarly, it was held in Abhishek v. State of M.P., 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1083: 2023 INSC 779 that the tendency of false
implication by way of general omnibus allegations, if left
unchecked, would result in the misuse of the process of law. It was
observed:
“13. Instances of a husband’s family members filing a
petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against
them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes areneither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty
abound on this score. We may now take note of some
decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan
Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar [(2022) 6 SCC 599], this
Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation where
the High Court had refused to quash an FIR registered for
various offences, including Section 498A IPC. Noting that
the foremost issue that required determination was whether
allegations made against the in-laws were general omnibus::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:31472allegations which would be liable to be quashed, this Court
referred to earlier decisions wherein concern was expressed
over the misuse of Section 498A IPC and the increased tendency
to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes.
.
This Court observed that false implications by way of general
omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial
disputes, if left unchecked, would result in misuse of the process
of law. On the facts of that case, it was found that no specificallegations were made against the in-laws by the wife, and
it was held that allowing their prosecution in the absence of
clear allegations against the in-laws would result in anof
abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal
trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe
scars upon the accused, and such an exercise ought to be
discouraged.
rt
14. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC 667],
this Court noted that the tendency to implicate the husbandand all his immediate relations is also not uncommon in
complaints filed under Section 498A IPC. It was observed
that the Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in
dealing with these complaints and must take pragmaticrealities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial
cases, such as allegations of harassment by the husband’s close
relations, who were living in different cities and never visited orrarely visited the place where the complainant resided, would
add an entirely different complexion and such allegationswould have to be scrutinised with great care and
circumspection.
15. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [(2009) 10 SCC 184], this
Court observed that the mere mention of statutory
provisions and the language thereof for lodging a complaint
is not the ‘be all and end all’ of the matter, as what is
required to be brought to the notice of the Court is the
particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused
and the role played by each and every accused in the
commission of that offence. These observations were made in
the context of a matrimonial dispute involving Section
498A IPC.” (Emphasis supplied)::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
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13. It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a person to face criminal
.
allegations without any specific instance of criminal misconduct
amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:
“18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet
papers indicates that the allegations levelled by the First
Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping,of
specifying no instances of criminal conduct. It is also
pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time of
the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even the
police thought fit to drop the proceedings against the other
rt
members of the Appellants’ family. Thus, we are of the view
that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was nothing but a
counterblast to the divorce petition & also the domesticviolence case.
25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general
and sweeping allegations without bringing on record anyspecific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but an abuse
of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to subject the
allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough scrutiny to
find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in theallegations or whether they are made only with the sole object
of involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, moreparticularly when a prosecution arises from a matrimonial
dispute.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. It was further held that in matrimonial disputes, the
parents, including the close relatives, make a mountain out of a
molehill, and every matrimonial conduct amounting to nuisance
does not constitute cruelty. It was observed: –
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“32. Many times, the parents, including the close relatives
of the wife, make a mountain out of a molehill. Instead of
salvaging the situation and making every possible
endeavour to save the marriage, their action, either due to.
ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the
husband and his family members, brings about the
destruction of the marriage over trivial issues. The first
thing that comes to mind for the wife, her parents and herrelatives is the Police, as if the Police is the panacea of all
evil. No sooner does the matter reach the Police than even if
there are fair chances of reconciliation between theof
spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a
sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one
another. Tolerance of each other’s faults, to a certain
bearable extent, has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty
rt
quibbles and trifling differences are mundane matters and
should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to
destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. The Courtmust appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that
point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in
each particular case, always keeping in view the physical
and mental conditions of the parties, their character andsocial status. A very technical and hyper-sensitive approach
would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of
marriage. In matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers arethe children. The spouses fight with such venom in their
hearts that they do not think even for a second that if themarriage were to come to an end, then what would be the
effect on their children? Divorce plays a very dubious role so
far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The onlyreason why we are saying so is that instead of handling the
whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal
proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each
other. There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment and
harassment by the husband and his family members
towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or
harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery
should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that
too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:31472Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of
holding the husband to ransom so that he could be
squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents,
relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife complains of.
harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC
cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without
Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial
conduct which may cause annoyance to the other may notamount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations and quarrels
between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life,
may also not amount to cruelty”
of
15. Similarly, it was held in Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v.
State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127: 2024 (2) SCR 252 that the
rt
phenomenon of false implication by a general omnibus allegation
in the case of a matrimonial dispute is not unknown to the Court.
When the allegations are general and omnibus, the prosecution
should not be continued. It was observed: –
“14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is
significant merit in the submissions of the Learned Counselfor the Appellants. A bare perusal of the complaint,
statement of witnesses and the charge sheet shows that theallegations against the Appellants are wholly general and
omnibus in nature; even if they are taken in their entirety,
they do not prima facie make out a case against theAppellants. The material on record neither discloses any
particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific
role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the
commission of the offences.
15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of general
omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes
is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias
Sonam v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, this Court dealt::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:31472with a similar case wherein the allegations made by the
complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s. 498A and others
were vague and general, lacking any specific role and
particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR against.
the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if left
unchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law.
xxxx
17. Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra), we find
that the High Court, in this case, has failed to exercise due
care and has mechanically permitted the criminal
proceedings to continue despite specifically finding that theof
allegations are general and omnibus in nature. The
Appellants herein approached the High Court on inter alia
grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated on
vexatious grounds and even highlighted the
rt
commencement of divorce proceedings by Respondent No.
2. In these peculiar circumstances, the High Court had a
duty to consider the allegations with great care and
circumspection so as to protect against the danger of unjust
prosecution.”
16. This position was reiterated in Geddam Jhansi v. State of
Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263, wherein it was observed:
“31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with
penal consequences involving coercive measures, whichcan be permitted only when the specific act(s) which
constitute offences punishable under the Penal Code or any
other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the accusedand a prima facie case is made out. It applies with equal
force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic disputes.
Criminalising domestic disputes without specific
allegations and credible materials to support the same may
have disastrous consequences for the institution of family,
which is built on the premise of love, affection, cordiality
and mutual trust. The institution of family constitutes the
core of human society. Domestic relationships, such as
those between family members, are guided by deeply::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:31472ingrained social values and cultural expectations. These
relationships are often viewed as sacred, demanding a
higher level of respect, commitment, and emotional
investment compared to other social or professional.
associations. For the aforesaid reason, the preservation of
family relationships has always been emphasised. Thus,
when family relationships are sought to be brought within
the ambit of criminal proceedings, rupturing the familybond, courts should be circumspect and judicious and
should allow invocation of the criminal process only when
there are specific allegations with supporting materials thatof
clearly constitute criminal offences.
32. We have to keep in mind that in the context of
matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in
the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic
rt
violence, there may be a tendency to implicate other
members of the family who do not come to the rescue of thecomplainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged
incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself
constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts
attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high, andrelationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to
exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily
mean that such domestic disputes should be given thecolour of criminality.
33. It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty and
violence in the domestic sphere, which do happen, ought to
be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic violence
typically happens within the four walls of the house and notin the public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed
by the public at large, except perhaps by the immediate
neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence by the victim
of domestic violence may not be easily forthcoming and
producing direct evidence may be hard and arduous, which
does not necessarily mean that domestic violence does not
occur. In fact, to deal with this pernicious phenomenon,
stringent statutes like the Protection from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005, have been enacted with a very expansive::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:31472meaning and scope of what amounts to domestic violence.
Since violence perpetrated within the domestic sphere by
close relatives is now criminalised, entailing serious
consequences for the perpetrators, the courts have to be.
careful while dealing with such cases by examining whether
there are specific allegations with instances against the
perpetrators and not generalised allegations. The purpose
and mandate of the law to protect the victims of domesticviolence is of paramount importance, and as such, a balance
has to be struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are
brought to book, all the family members or relatives are notof
indiscriminately brought within the criminal net in a
sweeping manner.
34. For a matrimonial relationship that is founded on the
basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent to
rt
make a partner hurl allegations of domestic violence and
harassment against the other partner, would normally nothappen at the spur of the moment, and such an
acrimonious relationship would develop only in the course
of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the
culmination of a series of acts that turn, otherwise, anamicable relationship into a fractured one. Thus, in such
cases involving allegations of domestic violence or
harassment, there would normally be a series of offendingacts, which would be required to be spelt out by the
complainant against the perpetrators in specific terms torope such perpetrators into the criminal proceedings
sought to be initiated against them. Thus, mere general
allegations of harassment without pointing out thespecifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is
the case in respect of the present appellants.
35. We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relating
to domestic violence, the complaints and charges should be
specific, as far as possible, as against each and every
member of the family who is accused of such offences and
sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to
misuse of the stringent criminal process by
indiscriminately dragging all the members of the family.
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There may be situations where some of the family members
or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or
harassment perpetrated on the victim and may not extend
any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily.
mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence
unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement
and instigation. Hence, implicating all such relatives
without making specific allegations and attributingoffending acts to them and proceeding against them
without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and
had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domesticof
violence would amount to abuse of the process of law.”
17. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
rt
18. The informant had specifically mentioned in the
complaint made to the police that ₹50,000/- given to her as
Shagun and four gold rings given to her were retained by the
petitioners forcibly. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, (2024) 16
SCC 35: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2285 that Stridhan belongs to the
informant and retaining it constituted an offence punishable
under Section 406 of the IPC. It was observed at page 38:
13. The sum and substance of the present dispute lies in the
father’s right over the gifts, i.e. “stridhan” given by him to his
daughter at the time of marriage. The generally accepted rule,
which has been judicially recognised, is that the woman
exercises an absolute right over the property. We may refer to
Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar,
(1985) 2 SCC 370: 1985 SCC (Cri) 180 : (1985) 155 ITR 190],::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
19
2026:HHC:31472wherein a Bench of three Judges observed: (SCC pp. 376-77,
paras 6-7)
“6. To the same effect is Maine’s Treatise on Hindu Law at p.
728. The characteristics of Saudayika have also been spelt
.
out by Mulla’s Hindu Law at p. 168 (Section 113) which gives
a complete list of the stridhan property of a woman both
before and during coverture, which may be extracted thus:
‘113. Manu enumerates six kinds of stridhana:
1. Gifts made before the nuptial fire, explained by
Katyayana to mean gifts made at the time of marriage
before the fire which is the witness of the nuptialof
(adhyagni).
2. Gifts made at the bridal procession, that is, says
Katyayana, while the bride is being led from the
rt residence of her parents to that of her husband
(adhyavanhanika).
3. Gifts made in token of love, that is, says Katyayana,
those made through affection by her father-in-law
and mother-in-law (pritidatta), and those made at
the time of her making obeisance at the feet of elders
(pada-vandanika).
4. Gifts made by father.
5. Gifts made by mother.
6. Gifts made by a brother.’
7. It is, therefore, manifest that the position of
stridhan of a Hindu married woman’s propertyduring coverture is absolutely clear and
unambiguous; she is the absolute owner of such
property and can deal with it in any manner she likes —
she may spend the whole of it or give it away at her
own pleasure by gift or will without any reference to
her husband. Ordinarily, the husband has no right or
interest in it with the sole exception that in times of
extreme distress, as in famine, illness or the like, the
husband can utilise it but he is morally bound to
restore it or its value when he is able to do so. It may
be further noted that this right is purely personal to
the husband and the property so received by him in
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2026:HHC:31472
marriage cannot be proceeded against even in
execution of a decree for debt.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. The position of the wife or woman being the sole authority
.
in respect of “stridhan” stands emphatically stated in Rashmi
Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
Kumar Bhada, (1997) 2 SCC 397: 1997 SCC (Cri) 415] in the
following terms: (SCC pp. 405-406, paras 9-10)
“9. A woman’s power of disposal, independent of her husband’s
control, is not confined to saudayika but extends to other
properties as well. Devala says: ‘A woman’s maintenance
of
(vritti), ornaments, perquisites (sulka), gains (labha), are
her stridhana. She herself has the exclusive right to enjoy it.
Her husband has no right to use it except in distress….’ In
N.R. Raghavachariar’s Hindu Law — Principles and
rt
Precedents (8th Edn.), edited by Prof. S. Venkataraman, one
of the renowned Professors of Hindu Law, at para 468 deals
with “Definition of Stridhana”. In para 469, dealing with
“Sources of acquisition”, it is stated that the sources of
acquisition of property in a woman’s possession are: gifts
before marriage, wedding gifts, gifts subsequent to
marriage, etc. Para 470 deals with “Gifts to a maiden”. Para
471 deals with “Wedding gifts” and it is stated therein that
properties gifted at the time of marriage to the bride,
whether by relations or strangers, either Adhiyagni or
Adhyavahanika, are the bride’s stridhana. In para 481 at p.
426, it is stated that ornaments presented to the bride by
her husband or father constitute her stridhana property. In
para 487 dealing with “powers during coverture” it is
stated that saudayika, meaning the gift of affectionate
kindred, includes both Yautaka or gifts received at the time
of marriage as well as its negative Ayautaka. In respect of
such property, whether given by gift or will, she is the absolute
owner and can deal with it in any way she likes. She may spend,
sell or give it away at her own pleasure.
10. It is thus clear that the properties gifted to her before the
marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time of giving
farewell or thereafter are her stridhana properties. It is her
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2026:HHC:31472
absolute property with all rights to dispose of at her own
pleasure. He has no control over her stridhana property.
Husband may use it during the time of his distress, but he has a
moral obligation to restore the same or its value to his wife.
.
Therefore, stridhana property does not become a joint property
of the wife and the husband and the husband has no title or
independent dominion over the property as owner thereof.”
(emphasis supplied)
Pratibha Rani [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370:
1985 SCC (Cri) 180 : (1985) 155 ITR 190] stands followed recently
in Maya Gopinathan v. Anoop S.B. [Maya Gopinathan v. Anoopof
S.B., (2024) 16 SCC 45]
15. Noticeably, the position of law has remained consistent
throughout since 1985, till date, regarding the sole authority of
the woman in respect of her “stridhan” as has also been held
rt
recently in Mala Kar v. State of Uttarakhand [Mala Kar v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1049], wherein a decree ofdivorce stood passed inter se the parties on 18-10-2014, and
FIR was filed on 6-4-2015, the appellant’s request for the
respondent to pay a sum of Rs 10 lakhs in full and final
settlement of all claims, including “stridhan” was accepted,and the former husband was directed to pay such amount.
16. As evidenced from the above, the jurisprudence as has been
developed by this Court is unequivocal with respect to thesingular right of the female (wife or former wife), as the case
may be, being the sole owner of “stridhan”. It has been heldthat a husband has no right, and it has to then be necessarily
concluded that a father too has no right when the daughter is
alive, well, and entirely capable of making decisions such aspursuing the cause of the recovery of her “stridhan”.
19. The informant made specific allegations against the
petitioners that they were taunting and harassing her for bringing
insufficient dowry. They used to force her to work by saying that
::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
22
2026:HHC:31472her father had not sent servants with her. She was not allowed to
go outside, and she was kept locked inside the house. She was not
.
permitted to visit her parents. She was beaten on 04.10.2022, and
she was forced to leave her matrimonial home on 05.05.2022. An
allegation of stealing the jewellery worth ₹20,00,000/- was made
against her. All these allegations, prima facie, show the
of
commission of an offence punishable under Section 498-A read
with Section 34 of IPC.
20.
rt
It was submitted that the allegations in the complaint
are false. This submission will not help the petitioners. The Court
exercising inherent jurisdiction does not go into the validity or
otherwise of the allegations and has to treat them as correct. This
position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit
Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it
was observed: –
“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court
must believe the averments and allegations in the
complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held
that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the
judicial process should not interfere at the stage of
investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
23
2026:HHC:31472powers of the Court should not be used routinely according
to its whims or caprice.”
21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
.
Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the
Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the genuineness of
the allegations. It was observed: –
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
of
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of
the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the
rt
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face
value, must disclose the commission of an offence and makeout a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in
the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint,
even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the
commission of an offence or make out a case against theaccused. We are of the considered view that the present case
would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated
by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court
in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that
once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any
merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position
of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat
[Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59:
(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph
Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3
SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of
whether the High Court could entertain the Section::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
24
2026:HHC:31472482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-
sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of
the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
.
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same are not made out even
prima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even
if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned
Single Judge [Joseph Saivaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have
of
still examined whether the offences alleged
to have been committed by the appellant
were prima facie made out from the
rt complainant’s FIR, charge-sheet,
documents, etc. or not.”
22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-
trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was
observed at page 397:
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is notsupposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be
made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan
Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The
relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the
Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …
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2026:HHC:31472
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the
powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether
any sufficient material is available to proceed further.
against the accused for which the accused is required to
be tried or not’.”
23. The Copy of the charge sheet shows that the petition
was filed before the learned High Court on 12.01.2023 and the
present petition has been filed after the lapse of three and a half
of
years. No reason has been assigned for the inordinate delay in
filing the present
rt petition. The inherent jurisdiction is
discretionary and cannot be exercised in case of inordinate delay.
It was laid down by the Delhi High Court in Ajit Kumar Gola v. State
(NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1398, that ordinarily a petition
under Section 482 of CrPC should be filed within 90 days and the
delay beyond 90 days should be satisfactorily explained. It was
observed:
“12. In Bata v. Anama Behera, 1989 SCC OnLine Ori 325: 1990
Cri LJ 1110, the learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Courtobserved as under:
“Though for filing an application under Section 482 there is
no limitation, the application should be filed within a
reasonable time, so that the progress of the case is not
disturbed at a belated stage. A revision petition challenging
an order can be filed within 90 days from the date of the
order. Similarly, a period of 90 days, which is at par with a
revision petition, should be treated as a reasonable time for
filing an application under Section 482, and if it is filed::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
26
2026:HHC:31472beyond the period of 90 days, the applicant would have to
explain the cause of the delay.”
13. Similarly in Gopal Chauhan v. Smt Satya, 1978 SCC OnLine
HP 33: 1979 Cri LJ 446, it was observed that a petition under
.
Section 482 CrPC and Article 227 of the Constitution of
India filed after expiry of 3 years from the date of
summoning ought not to be entertained when the case is
fixed for the stage of evidence and that too, when the
petitioner has approached the Revisionist Court.
14. Thus, although the question of inordinate delay and
laches has not been dealt with in many cases but the fact
of
remains that a party who invokes the jurisdiction of the
High Court for quashing of FIR and the consequent
proceedings by embarking on to show that the ingredients
of Section 409 or 420 IPC are not made out, is not only
rt
required to meet the test of expeditious dispatch of
approaching to the Court but he should also be able to show
that the facts are so glaring that it calls for interference of
the High Court rather than raising the disputed questions of
fact. In the present case, the FIR was admittedly registered
in the year 1999, and a charge sheet had also been filed in
the same year. Therefore, the petitioner was aware of what
the accusations against him were when he appeared before
the Court for the first time in 1999, as a complete set of the
charge sheet must have been supplied to him. If at all, the
petitioner felt that there was a case for quashing of the FIR,
he ought to have approached the Court at the earliest
possible stage. I agree with the observation made by the
Orissa High Court that if a revision against an order of
summoning could be filed within a period of 90 days then
ordinarily a period of 90 days should have been sufficient to
invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482
CrPC Admittedly, this has not been done and if the period is
calculated from 1999, the present petition has been filed
after more than 11 years and, therefore, there was
inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner for
which not even an iota of Explanation is forthcoming in the
petition.
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2026:HHC:31472
15. Even if, the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the cause of action for filing the petition
accrued to the petitioner only after 09.052009 when the
charges against him under Section 409 and 420 IPC were
.
framed, is taken to be correct even then from the date of
framing of the charge, there has been a lapse of almost two
years in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. As I have
observed hereinabove that a revision against an order ought
to be filed within a period of 90 days and the said period has
been held by Orissa High Court Court to be reasonable and
sufficient to invoke the revisionary power of a Court, then
of
ordinarily the said period can also be said to be reasonable
in normal circumstances while preferring a petition under
Section 482 CrPC while as in the instant case, there is a
lapse of almost two years without there being even an iota
rt
of averment in the petition as to what the petitioner was
doing during these two years.”
24. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to
provide any explanation for the delay, and the inherent
jurisdiction cannot be exercised at their instance.
25. It is undisputed that the matter is pending before the
Learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
949 that when the matter is pending before the learned Trial
Court, it should be left to appreciate it. It was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR
do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of
any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of
the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2026 20:33:23 :::CIS
28
2026:HHC:31472application before the trial court under Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even
according to the State, the investigation is over and the
charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court.
.
In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to
look into the materials which the investigating officer
might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If
any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shalllook into the materials and take a call whether any
discharge case is made out or not.”
26. No other point was urged.
of
27. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is
dismissed. rt
28. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
29th July, 2026
(ravinder)
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